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Abstract  
The thesis analyses the Finnish immigration apparatus through a Foucaultian governmentality 
framework and critiques the way immigration has been problematized. The immigration apparatus, 
ranging from discourses to various administrative regulations and their rationalities, is examined through 
the Finnish Aliens’ Act, Schengen visa regulations, and Finnish Immigration Services’ implementation 
documentation as well as through the related governmental bills and reports and parliamentary 
discussions and committee statements between 1999 and 2010. The thesis argues that the 
governmentality of immigration is a socio-evolutionary governmentality that relies on largely taken-for-
granted conceptualisations of how society needs to be governed. The thesis shows that immigration 
control cannot be understood solely through the discourses of nationalism, liberalism and 
multiculturalism, but that these discourses themselves need to be understood in the light of a state racist 
socio-evolutionary constellation of power/knowledge at the heart of liberal governmentality and its 
naturalism. In the first instance, this claim is supported by a discourse theoretical analysis of the 
functioning of power/knowledge in immigration-related discourses. Additionally, the claim is supported 
by contrasting the analysis of discourses and rationalities of governing with an analysis of technologies 
of governing, i.e. rules and regulations of immigration control. The thesis then questions the 
governmentality of the immigration apparatus through various epistemological tools of decentring. 
These tools highlight how a commonsensical ‘truth’ about immigration and its governing is produced 
through methods, such as utilising explanations relying on psychologism, historicism, naturalisation, 
market veridiction and universalism/particularism, which enable a silence and scarcity of meaning 
around the taken-for-granted modes of knowing immigration and its governing. Finally, this claim about 
state racist governmentality of immigration is evidenced by a comparison of the contemporary way of 
problematizing immigration with the way immigration was problematized by early American race 
hygienic immigration policies. This comparison insists that eugenics and social Darwinism should not be 
exceptionalised, but that their rationalities of governing should be evaluated in terms of the logic of 
‘making live and letting die’ that they propose. The thesis concludes that unacknowledged and taken-
for-granted modes of knowing the world in socio-evolutionary terms—and specifically in social Darwinist 
terms emphasizing social position as a measure of fitness and human worth and entailing an all-
inclusive logic of racialisation—have an impact on contemporary liberal ways of governing immigration 
both in general and in Finland in, at the point at which we think how immigration should be governed so 
that it promotes the health and wealth of the population and defends it from degeneration.  
Keywords: Foucault – governmentality – immigration – social Darwinism – eugenics – liberalism  
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1. Introduction 
This is a Foucaultian study into the governmentalities related to foreigners in Finland. It focuses on the 
legislative and high-level policy documentation of the central government, not on practices of 
implementation or civic, local, municipal or other institutional policies. This is not a policy study, but a 
study into the rationalities and problematizations functioning in the art of governing immigration. The 
research focuses on the way that immigrant related or aliens’ policies—mainly immigration, integration 
and citizenship policies—have been conceptualised and discussed both in governmental documents 
and bills and in the Finnish parliament from 1999 to 2010.  
The heuristic starting point of the research was the desire to analyse the contradictory requirements that 
are imposed on immigrants via different discourses, i.e. discursive bodies of knowledge, in politics: 
Having been an immigrant in three different Western countries myself, deciphering how an immigrant is 
expected to exist struck me as incoherent. Especially, because of the differing racialised cleavages that 
immigration discourses contain, it became very difficult to draw a line between ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘the 
requirements of integration’. This became more and more evident with the increasing critique of 
multiculturalism during the 2000s. In the various discourses about immigrants and immigration it was the 
lack of freedom—of freedom (not) to be, as Prozorov would characterise the Foucaultian concept of 
freedom (Prozorov 2007)—that silently screamed at me. That is, the limits that were imposed on the 
immigrant in different situations for different reasons required a care of the self that had very narrow 
boundaries, limiting the freedom (not) to be what one wanted. To be an acceptable immigrant was 
becoming rather difficult; a task of manoeuvring oneself through a gridlock of contradicting expectations. 
It was this dynamic discursive formation that I wanted to investigate further. Overall, the impasse of 
contradicting expectations that immigrants face seemed to me to be created through a changing, 
opportune interplay of assigning ‘things’ as universal or particular. That is, the way that nationalist, 
multiculturalist or liberal discourses were asserted as universal/particular in different situations and how 
they were employed to discipline the immigrant seemed a pertinent way of investigating how the ‘truth’ 
about acceptable immigration, acceptable immigrants and acceptable integration was created.  
In this thesis I shall analyse the governmentality of governing immigration. This will be done by 
examining the immigration apparatus, i.e. the discourses and regulations that frame the 
problematization of immigration in Finland. Governmentality studies understand ‘government’ as a 
matter of promoting the wealth and health of the population and the economy. I will argue that 
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unacknowledged and taken-for-granted modes of knowing the world in socio-evolutionary terms—and 
specifically in social Darwinist terms emphasizing social position as a measure of worth and entailing an 
all-inclusive logic of racialisation—have an impact on liberal governmentality, at the minimum, at the 
point at which we think about how immigration should be governed so that it promotes the health and 
wealth of the population. The thesis will show that even when talking about the governmentality of 
immigration, it is insufficient to talk about liberal, nationalist or multiculturalist governmentality, but that 
the underlying technologies and rationalities speak another language—and that language is state racist. 
I shall defend this assessment by comparing the early American race hygienic immigration policies and 
their problematization of immigration to the governmentality in the contemporary immigration policy in 
Finland.  
Choosing Finland as a case study should not be considered as an assumption that Finnish immigration 
policy is unique in its governmentality. This is not only because of underlying Western cultural 
discourses, but also because Finnish immigration policy is designed in explicit comparison to other 
Western immigration apparatuses: The Finnish government explicitly researches policies in other 
countries and refers to them as frameworks of the possible and (un)advisable modes of governing the 
‘push and pull’ dynamic of immigration control. Even a cursory examination of immigration policies in 
other Western countries demonstrates that similar rationalities are in play (see Appendix 2). 
Nevertheless, because of the Foucaultian dedication to specific studies, I shall not systematically 
compare Finnish policies to other EU or Western immigration policies, except to eugenic American 
immigration policy after the 1860s.  
In this introductory chapter I shall outline the basic framework of analysis, define the concepts and 
describe the analytical process of how it was possible to come to argue that state racist and eugenic 
governmentality are valid frameworks of interpreting contemporary immigration policies. I shall first 
contextualise the research project in Finland and its history of migration. After this, I shall shortly outline 
the theoretical framework of governmentality and biopolitics and contextualise the research at hand in 
this field. Then, I shall introduce the research design through the four different levels of analysis and 
while doing this I shall introduce the methods and the research questions as well as the concepts of 
discourse, power/knowledge, apparatus, and state racism.  
1.1. Why Finland and Why ‘Race’? 
The project grounds itself in an inductive process of empirically analysing the formation of 
power/knowledge in Finnish immigration politics. Why focus on Finland then? Firstly, there is a relative 
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limitedness of studies into this topic from a Foucaultian viewpoint and especially in English. Given that 
most of governmentality studies into Finnish immigration focused on integration policy, there was also a 
gap in the literature (Pyykkönen 2007b; Pyykkönen 2007a; Kerkkänen 2008; also in Sweden Dahlstedt 
and Hertzberg 2007; Dahlstedt 2008). But Finnish immigration policy is also interesting in many ways. 
Firstly, Finland is a new immigration country, which means that the political ‘truth’ about immigration has 
only been debated during the past two decades. In general, Finland experienced similar patterns of 
emigration to Southern Europe making the earlier migration patterns very different from many other 
larger European countries that experienced an influx of labour migration in the mid twentieth century  
(e.g. Nylund-Oja et al. 1995; Similä 2003; in English see Lahav 2004, 30). Although there has always 
been immigration to Finland (Leitzinger 2008a; and 2008b), it was not until the 1980s that net migration 
to Finland turned positive and, moreover, during the 1980s the increase of immigrants in Finland was 
slow (see Appendices 1 and 2). 
 
Chart A. Foreigners in Finland 1920-2010. 
The graph shows the number of foreign nationals in Finland since 1920 (Source: Statistics Finland). 
The increase of immigration to Finland began after the Cold War, as is seen in the increasing numbers 
of foreign nationals in Finland in Chart A above. Chart A demonstrates well the impact the Cold War had 
on Finnish immigration: Finland’s position between the Communist and Capitalist blocs politicized the 
arrival of refugees from the Communist bloc. Consequently, the arrival of refugees from the Eastern 
block was rare and was not talked about openly if possible (e.g. Aallas 1989; Leitzinger 2008b). This 
has contributed to the notion that immigration of refugees is a ‘new’ phenomenon in Finland. The 
common understanding is that it was only in the early 1990s that Finland started receiving immigrants in 
any noticeable numbers. This view is historically incorrect—as in between the World Wars Finland had 
over 20.000 refugees, the same level was reached only at the end of the 1990s (Leitzinger 2008a). This 
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cannot be seen in Chart A above, because it does not distinguish between refugees and other 
foreigners, but in reality, as said, Finland had received more refugees during 1917-1939 than during the 
1990s (e.g. Leitzinger 2008). Yet, because of the low levels of immigration to Finland during the Cold 
War and because of the politicisation of asylum policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (or the problem of 
‘defectors’), aliens’ policy did not figure as an important sector of legislative activity. This was the case 
until the 1990s when immigration was problematized because of the increasing numbers of immigrants. 
In this sense, the commonsensical mode of knowing immigration as a ‘new’ phenomenon certainly has 
a ring of truth in it.  
Secondly, Finland is interesting because of the high level of support for the populist party, the (True) 
Finns,1 which is known for its opposition to the government’s immigration policy. Despite the fact that 
Finland has one of the lowest proportions of immigrants in the European Union (EU), the support for the 
(True) Finns, rose up to 9.8%, from the previous 4-5%, in the last European parliamentary elections in 
2009 and to an unprecedented 19% in the last parliamentary elections in 2011, which had a major 
impact on the party political scene in Finland. The rhetoric about ‘the swarms of immigrants’ circulating 
in the parliament, the media and especially in the social media is, thus, revealed to be highly 
‘reactionary’, if we compare it to the objective reality of numbers, as shall be discussed in more detail 
soon. As Keskinen points out, in the 2000s, the immigration issue has become discursively more 
complex and charged. The electoral victories of the (True) Finns has politicised immigration and turned 
discussions more antagonistic in comparison to the more consensual earlier discussions (Keskinen 
2009, 33; also Matinheikki-Kokko and Pitkänen 2002, 49). However, taking into consideration that 
before 2011 the (True) Finns had only 4% support in the parliament and that they have been an 
opposition party all this time, one cannot hold (True) Finns responsible for the content of Finnish 
immigration policy. 
Thirdly, the ‘reactionary’ nature of immigration politics in Finland speaks of the strong impact of 
nationalist discourses in Finland (also Lepola 2000), and not only on immigration policy (e.g. Pulkkinen 
1999). Finland has often been discursively identified as a racially and culturally homogeneous society. 
As many writers have tried to point out, Finnish history is permeated by the influence of foreigners: 
Many of the Finnish brand names from food to industry are in fact companies founded by and named 
                                                     
1 The True Finns party, which is a left-wing nationalist party known in the media for its anti-immigration stance, changed the 
translation of their party name from ’True Finns’ to ’the Finns Party’ in 2011. Because the research focuses on the period 
before 2011, I have adopted the use of (True) Finns to mark this change for the contemporary reader. In Finnish, the 
party’s name Perussuomalaiset has a connotation of ’basic’ or ’typical’ Finn, of something ’essential’ and ‘no-frills’ Finnish, 
and in that it does not have such as a clear  connotation with ’untrue’ and ’false’ Finnishness  as the English translation 
does. Yet, the new translation does indicate a desire to claim the definition of ‘Finnishness’ for the (True) Finns—for which 
the party has been criticized in the media. 
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after immigrants.2 Besides having been culturally, politically, societally, economically and ‘biologically’ 
influenced by both Sweden and Russia in countless ways, and even in many ways by Germany, the 
contemporary ‘multitude of cultures’ is regarded as something new by the majority of Finns. Further, 
despite this myth of racial and mono-cultural unity, Finland actually incorporates various old cultural 
minorities. Most notably, besides the Swedish-speaking minority, there are Jews, Karelians, Ingrians, 
Tatars, Russians, the Sami and the Roma peoples (e.g. Nylund-Oja et al. 1995; Pentikäinen and 
Hiltunen 1995; Häkkinen and Tervonen 2004). There is, thus, an explicit tradition of silencing minorities 
and asserting a unified national identity. Yet, it would be false to assume that the Finnish discursive 
formation around immigration was openly racist in the strict sense of the word, which we shall discuss in 
more detail in Chapters 2 and 4. The power/knowledge constellation functions in more subtle ways, as 
shall be seen. All in all, Finland as a case study offers a view into a country that has a rather short 
history of problematizing immigration and therefore is still searching for the ways in which to adapt to 
changing migration dynamics.  
Fourthly, then, we can say that the conceptualisation of immigration as something new and uncontrolled 
rather reflects the ‘noticeable’ character of immigration in the 1990s and relates to the arrival of the 
phenotypically different Somali refugees, which is commonly referred to as ‘the Somali Shock’ in Finland 
(e.g. Aallas 1991). Whilst ‘race’ as a concept is rarely, if ever explicitly discussed—and I initially did not 
imagine that racist discourse would feature in this research—this problematization of Somali 
immigration, nevertheless, speaks of an explicit problematization of ‘race’ or ‘phenotypical visibility’ in 
Finnish immigration politics. In comparison, although in many other countries these ‘shocks’ related to 
phenotype have been experienced much earlier, the talk about ‘race relations’ have not gone anywhere 
either; phenotype continues to function as a key way of identifying ‘the other’. Overall then, Finland is a 
good example of a country in which the terminology and limits of politically correct discourse are 
contemporarily being searched for and in which the limits of defining racism are openly addressed in 
media discussions.  
Further, this aspect of racialisation is not solely limited to Somali immigration. With the break-up of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, Finnish immigration took another—or rather the old—direction with the increase of 
cross-border migration between Russia and Finland (Leitzinger 2008b). This migration was related to 
                                                     
2 This also relates to the earlier policies in which the settlement of foreigners in Finland was disciplined by not granting 
working permits. This led to a situation in which, although foreigners were allowed to live in Finland, their livelihood was 
guided towards entrepreneurship (Leitzinger 2008b). There is still a distinct emphasis on entrepreneurship as a mode of 
employment for foreigners in the contemporary integration policy.  
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the Finnish policy of Ingrian return3 which allowed Ingrian Finns to immigrate to Finland on more 
favourable conditions. Once in Finland, Ingrians are statistically identified as either Russian or Estonian. 
In 2010 Russians and Estonians make up about 35% of all foreign nationals in Finland and about 36% 
of those naturalised (source: Statistics Finland). Not all Russians or Estonians entered under Ingrian 
regulations, of course, but, nevertheless, the perception of increasing immigration can be connected 
both to Ingrian immigration and to the ‘psychological’ impact of the independent, unregulated arrival of 
Somali asylum-seekers to Finland in the early 1990s. Before the arrival of Somali asylum-seekers 
Finnish refugee policy had mainly functioned around the well-regulated quota refugee arrangements 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).4 With the end of the Cold War, these 
independent population movements of refugees appeared as something new. There is no denying that 
the impact of the arrival of Somali refugees is related to an underlying racialisation of people with 
‘darker’ skin tone, but as Puuronen has argued, also Russians are racialised in Finland meaning that 
racism as racialisation is not merely about phenotypical difference (Puuronen 2001; and 2011). These 
patterns of racialisation will be clearly seen in the parliamentary discussions later.  
In the early 1990s the public had had very little contact with ‘visible minorities’, i.e. with foreigners of any 
other than ‘white’ skin tone. To tackle this ‘reaction’ to phenotypical difference I have openly employed a 
                                                     
3 Ingrians, living in the areas around St. Petersburg and Estonia, have been historically conceptualised as ‘Finnish people’ 
and they speak/spoke a dialect of Finnish. Ingrian immigration started in the early 1990s, but was included in legislation 
only in 1996. The law stipulated a right of return for those who had served in the Finnish army or who were moved to 
Finland and later deported to the Soviet Union during the Second World War and its aftermath. Also, those who had been 
or half of whose parents or grandparents had been designated as ‘Finnish’ in Soviet passports (that differentiated between 
nationality and citizenship) could immigrate to Finland without the normal requirement of being able to support oneself 
financially. During the early years of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the associated economic difficulties, this clearly 
presented Ingrians with a unique opportunity despite the fact that at the time Finland also suffered from an economic 
depression partly caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. If we look at the historical basis of the construction of this 
‘right of return’, historically Ingrians had migrated southward from districts that are now northern and eastern Finland. 
Religio-culturally they are thought to be mainly of the Lutheran denomination. Contemporary Ingrians have not lived in 
Finland—except maybe as refugees before and during WW II, when some Ingrians fought on the Finnish side in the war. 
These people were repatriated to the Soviet Union after the war on the request of the Soviet Union. After the break-up of 
the Soviet Union, political room for the development of a discourse on the ‘return of the Ingrians’ from the ex-Soviet Union 
was created, and the historical migrations over the Finnish-Russian border restarted (Leitzinger 2008). The initiative for the 
formulation of the Ingrian return policy came from the Finnish president Mauno Koivisto in April 1990. In the Finnish 
parliament the discussion on the issue referred to a ‘debt of honour’ and a ‘right of return to the promised fatherland’. The 
Ingrians were re-conceptualised from ‘Soviets’ to ‘Finns’ and their ‘return’—although Ingrians had not lived in Finland 
beyond the population movements during the World Wars—has discursively been constructed as a historical continuation 
of the ‘repatriation’ or ‘return of ‘Finns’ from the wrong side of the border’. The discursively ordered status of Ingrians in 
Finland has been fluctuating throughout history: On one hand, before World War II, i.e. before Finland lost parts of the 
Karelian territory to the Soviet Union as war reparation, the Ingrians and Eastern Karelians from outside the Finnish 
territorial borders had been registered as ‘foreigners’ in the Finnish population register, although Ingrians or East Karelians 
did not require a residence permit to stay in Finland. (E.g. Lepola 2000, 96-108.)  
4 The UNHCR system of refugees consists of an annual quota of refugees that participating states select from refugee 
camps under the UNHCR. Each country gets to choose the individual refugees they will allow to immigrate. The state pays 
for their entry and upkeep for a period. Finland started this process in unofficial terms in 1973 with political refugees from 
Chile and later from Vietnam, and joined the official UNHCR quota refugee programme in 1988.    
 
7 
socially constructed concept of ‘race’ as a mixture of phenotype and culture. To analyse ‘race’ in 
immigration statistics, I have used a categorisation modelled according to the traditional race theoretical 
assumptions about ‘Caucasian’, ‘Mongolian’ and ‘Negroid’ races or ‘white’, ‘mixed brown’ and ‘African 
black’ ‘races’ in terms of phenotype, which I have deduced from nationality.5 Whilst it is obvious that 
phenotypical difference cannot be adequately described through nationality, this is the only level at 
which the state can approach the issue. That is, whilst discrimination at the level of implementation can 
be affected by actual phenotype and not nationality, immigration regulations cannot—in the 
contemporary liberal power/knowledge constellation—explicitly utilise actual phenotype to regulate 
immigration. But as governmentality studies have insisted, especially Hacking (e.g. 2006), regulations 
and statistics are a technology of governing that can hide and silence issues. That is, regulations based 
on nationality can hide the use of nationality as a measure of probability for controlling the phenotype of 
entering immigrants. As shall be seen, this underlying rationality is evident in immigration policies. 
To investigate the impact of racialisation on immigration policy, I have not only categorised each country 
based on the majority population’s skin tone but also based on broad religio-cultural categories of the 
majority. These categories are ‘Christian and Jewish’, ‘Asian religions’ and ‘Muslim’, that, again, are 
designed to reflect broad stereotypes, not reality. By combining these two types of categories, we can 
operate with a more ‘nuanced’ system of stereotypes such as ‘Christian & Black African or ‘Muslim & 
Black African’, or ‘Christian & Mixed Brown’ or ‘Asian religion & Mixed Brown’. Yet, this study does not 
address the content of stereotypes, but merely uses these categories to evaluate the potentially 
racialising structures of immigration policy outcomes. That is, strictly, I do not consider the content of 
racialising stereotypes valid or meaningful, but in order to address the issue of racism and racialisation, 
i.e. how such stereotypes can affect the life of those who are marked as something else than ‘white and 
Western’, these crude prejudices need to be operationalised somehow. Appendix 3 offers more details 
on these categorisations.  
When analysing Finnish immigration patterns based on these racialising categories, the first thing we 
notice is that today some 65% of the foreign-born are ‘white’, as indicated by their nationality. The 
increase of ‘white’ immigration has been steeper than that of ‘non-whites’, as Chart B shows. Later on, I 
will extend the analysis of ‘whiteness’ by dividing it into ‘Eastern Christian’ and ‘Western Christian’ in 
order to reflect the historical race theoretical divisions that certainly were also central in nineteenth and 
                                                     
5 I have substituted the old ‘yellow’, ‘red’ or ‘Latin American’ and ‘Middle Eastern’ categories with ‘mixed brown’ simply to 
refer to the tones of skin in-between ‘white’ and ‘black’. The culturalising/racialising connotations attached to phenotype 
have been separated into the religio-cultural categories that can reflect such stereotypes better. (See Appendix 3 for more 
information.)  
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twentieth century Finland that debated its ‘racial’ position between the East and the West—the echoes 
of which are heard in the contemporary discourses on Russians as ‘whores and criminals’ and Swedish-
speaking Finns as Nordic ‘bättre folk’ (better folk) (Kemiläinen et al. 1985). These earlier race theories 
certainly included theories about ‘Southern Europeans’, as shall be discussed in Chapter 4, but in the 
context of the EU, these modes of racialisation are not evident in immigration policy anymore—the 
same, however, could not necessarily be said about the society at large. 
Finally, the perception of increasing immigration can also be connected to immigration statistics and 
Finnish return migration. A good proportion of ‘immigrants’ in immigration statistics are actually Finnish 
nationals returning home from abroad.6 On average, immigration levels drop by 39%, if returning ex-
patriots are deducted from immigration figures. Thus, as Chart C shows, the number of foreign  
 
Chart B. The foreign-born population in Finland between 1990 and 2010 as organised according to ‘race’ of the 
country of origin.  (Source: Statistics Finland) 
immigrants has not reached 25.000 a year, but rather 17.000 a year. Further, if we take into account the 
annual figure between incoming and outgoing foreigners, then total net migration has only reached 
14.000, with those of other than ‘white’ skin tone reaching the net level of 6.000 a year, as Chart D 
shows.   
Yet, what undeniably changed after 1990 is that the numbers of immigrating foreigners who stay in 
Finland started steadily increasing, as Chart A showed. In 1990 the number of foreigners in Finland was 
                                                     
6 All EU and Finnish ‘immigration’ statistics include their own returning nationals in immigration figures, although it is 
commonsensical to think that an ‘immigrant’ is always a foreigner and not just a migrant. 
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roughly 26.300, i.e. about the same it had been before the Cold War, and in 2010 it was almost 
168.000, taking the proportion of foreign nationals from 0.5% to 3.1% in twenty years in a country of 
some 5 million inhabitants (Source: Statistics Finland). Yet, in comparison to most other European 
countries the numbers of foreigners and foreign-born are very low: In EU-27, the proportion of foreigners 
was 6.5% and of foreign-born 9.4% in 2010 (see Appendix 2).7 
 
Chart C. Immigration to Finland 1987-2010:Total and Foreigners. 
Immigration total figures include Finns (Source: Statistics Finland). 
As Chart D below shows, altogether in 1990 there were about 64.900 and in 2010 248.100 foreign-born 
residents, i.e. including those who had been naturalized, taking the proportion of the foreign-born 
population from 1.3% to 4.6%.8 Out of these, the proportion of presumably ‘non-white’ foreign-born 
increased from 0.3% to 1.6% between 1990 and 2010. That is, out of the 4.6% of residents who had 
been born abroad, 1.6% had been born in countries that typically had ‘non-white’ majority population. 
Altogether, the proportion of residents with foreign nationality rose from 0.1% in 1990 to 1.1% in 2010. 
Between 1990 and 2010 the proportion of Finnish citizens who are likely to be of other than ‘white’ skin 
tone rose from 0.006% to 0.5% (based on the country of origin information, source: Statistics Finland). 
Whilst these figures cannot be taken at face value (as nationality is not the same as actual individual 
phenotype), they do indicate that the majority of immigrants and foreigners are of ‘white’ skin tone. Yet, 
beyond ‘Russians’, there are no explicit racialising media or political discourses aimed against EU 
                                                     
7 Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Population and Social Conditions publication 34/2011. Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec. europa.eu/cache/ ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-034/EN/KS-SF-11-034-EN.PDF, date accessed 
18.7.2011.  
8 These figures include also “ethnic Finns” born abroad to Finnish parents. 
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migrants—not, for example, in such a manner as there are in the UK currently. Thus, despite the 
numbers of ‘non-white’ immigrants in Finland being very small, the support for the anti-immigrant (True) 
Finns has increased exponentially. This increase has brought explicitly racist comments to the national  
 
Chart D. Net Immigration of Foreigners 1987-2010.  
The number of incoming minus outgoing immigrants (Source: Statistics Finland). 
media, which have resulted in political and media discussions, party disciplinary measures against 
politicians making racist remarks, threats of violence against anti-racist activists and actual lawsuits for 
inciting ethnic agitation. Beyond this explicit political commotion around racism, racism as racialisation is 
not merely a problem of the (True) Finns, but a systemic characteristic that also permeates immigration 
policy, as shall be seen. 
I will now move on to outlining the theoretical framework of governmentality studies by outlining the 
basic theoretical starting points and specifying in more detail what it means to analyse government from 
the viewpoint of governmentality. After this I shall introduce the research design and then return to the 
issue of governmentality in the shape of introducing the concept of state racism. The changes in Finnish 
immigration policy shall be discussed in section 3.1. in a limited fashion, but as with the immigration 
patterns also the immigration policy will be outlined in the appendices in a more detailed manner. 
1.2. Why Governmentality and Biopolitics?  
As said, this is a study into the governmentality of governing immigration. In this section I shall first 
address the analytical implications of adopting the governmentality perspective and then explain the 
term and the type of analysis conducted under governmentality studies. The reasons for choosing this 
focus pertain to the analytical implications embedded in the framework’s capability to analyse both how 
‘truth’ is produced and how things are governed. Governmentality is only one of the many analytical 
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angles among Foucaultian research orientations. Governmentality studies, or the ‘analytics of 
government’, as an academic approach originate from Foucault's 1977–1978 course entitled “Security, 
Territory and Population” concentrating on the productivity of governmental rationality in various fields 
and analysing it as “an ordered space of political, epistemic and ethical instruments and effects” 
(Prozorov 2007, 29). At the time also Donzelot developed similar notions in his book The Policing of 
Families (Donzelot 1977/1979), which contributed towards increasing analytical endeavours in this 
direction. Later Foucault advanced his analysis of governmentality in The Birth of Biopolitics. Eventually, 
during the 1980s the key notions in Foucault’s and Donzelot’s theories found their way to the UK and 
Australia where governmental analytics were extended by such scholars as Burchell, Dean, Gordon, 
Miller and Rose (Rose et al. 2006, 88). Governmentality studies have various strands utilising different 
aspects of the theoretical background: some doing more descriptive and some more critical analysis 
(Rose et al. 2006, 94).  
What does it mean to adopt a governmentality framework for this study then? Governmentality studies 
are based on three displacements: a) the displacement of the institution, which asserts that institutions 
function as part of a wider project and cannot be studied separate from it; b) the displacement of the 
function, which transports the focus from discussing the shortcoming or efficiencies of policy functions to 
viewing the function itself from its inside; and c) the displacement of the object, which refuses to study 
the phenomenologically given object, such as immigration, without questioning how the object of study 
is socially constituted (Foucault 1977-78/2007, 115-120). That is, the focus is not on the soundness or 
efficiency of governance and policy (Cruikshank 1999, 4; Dean 2010, 37), but on how ‘reason’ operates 
in governing phenomena in their empirical particularity (e.g. Dean 2010, 27). Hence, instead of 
investigating solely what immigration and integration policies consist of, how immigration is 
administered, how explicit discourses describe immigrants and immigration, the critical focus is equally 
on what are the effects of immigration policy and what does this say about the way immigration and 
immigrants are understood. Essential in this is to understand the way issues are problematized and 
politicized and the solutions that are offered and designed to issues. Further, the analysis does not a 
priori assume that the ‘theory’ in immigration policy would be congruent with the ‘practice’ of immigration 
policy, but allows for an “immanent disjunction and dissonance between the ‘programmer’s view’ and 
the logic of practices, their real effects” (Dean 2007, 83). Government becomes a matter of practice, a 
“way of doing things” that relies on a specific constellation of power/knowledge, which in itself becomes 
a focus of critique (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 318). 
Essential to understanding the analytical extent of governmentality studies is to understand Foucault's 
critique of political science and its insistence on not cutting off the King’s head (Foucault 2002, 122). 
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That is, the persistent analysis of political phenomena from the perspective that political power is 
something that is invested in governmental institutions, hampers the analysis of how meaning is formed 
and operates politically in society overall.9 The difference of the Foucaultian approach can be explained 
also in another way; by thinking about how the way in which we think about the state varies historically. 
The governmentality framework conceptualises government in the context of a qualitative change in 
which government becomes a matter of promoting ‘the welfare’ or ‘the common good’ of a population 
and the economy. In this governmentality is inherently connected to biopolitics and the exercise of 
biopower, i.e. power over the way life is lived (which shall be discussed shortly). This mode of 
conceptualising governing is different from the older, sovereignty based imperial, feudal or monarchical 
state that conceives governing in terms of raison d’état; governing for the benefit of the state itself or of 
the sovereign ruler embodied in the state (Foucault 1977-78/2007). This is what Foucault refers to when 
speaking about the resistance against cutting off the King’s head: it is a mode of analysis that is suited 
for power that is exercised through sovereignty and law, and not through biopower that relies on much 
more than simply law and punishment for executing its reign. This change in focus should not be 
interpreted as signifying a complete discontinuation of sovereignty based modes of governing—these 
two modes of governing coexist—but contemporary modes of sovereign power in liberal Western 
countries are grounded in liberal governmentality. In terms of this study, this means that immigration 
policy cannot be analysed as a sequence of individual legislative changes, but as an apparatus. More 
importantly, liberal democratic discourses about how immigration should be governed become an object 
of analysis. That is, liberal democratic discourses need to be analysed as part of the power/knowledge 
constellation, not as an unquestioned point of reference. 
Thus, power, for Foucault, is not solely appropriated by state institutions and held by its officials. Rather, 
the state apparatus—its ‘essence’, extent and its limitation—is an effect of power. The ‘state’ is 
                                                     
9 The Foucaultian notion of power is based on a different conceptualisation of the relationship between the state and the 
individual than in the traditional conceptualisation of power: The state-individual relationship is not a relation of domination 
and subjugation. For Foucault, the subject is not simply the object of power, but the relationship of power and the 
individual goes much deeper: “[P]ower is not something that is divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, 
and those who do not have it and are subject to it. Power must, I think, be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather 
as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of 
some, and it is never appropriated in the way that wealth or commodity can be appropriated. Power functions. Power is 
exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit 
to and exercise power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, 
power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them” (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 29, italics in the original). “The 
individual is not, in other words, power’s opposite number; the individual is one of power’s first effects. The individual is in 
fact a power-effect, and at the same time, and to the extent that he is a power-effect, the individual is a relay: power 
passes through the individuals it has constructed” (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 30). Thus, the individual is primarily an effect of 
power and only secondarily a subject/object of power. That is, although the individual is primarily made and socialised into 
certain types of subjects through different discourses in the grid of historicity, language and power, there is nevertheless 
agency: The individual is made but also makes oneself into what one is. Yet, the effects of power relations permeate the 
individual thoroughly.  
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continuously constructed at the micro-level and the state apparatus becomes a secondary effect of 
relations between power and knowledge (Foucault 1980, 122). Therefore, governmentality cannot be 
analysed in terms of state action, but as a wider order of things. For Foucault power is not simply 
negatively repressive—not solely a matter of hegemony or getting people to do what they would not 
otherwise do—or normative; it is also positively productive and constitutive (for a clarification see 
Haugaard 2002, 4). For Foucault “[p]ower is everywhere”, not just in the hands of the sovereign, the 
judiciary or the patriarch. This is “not because it [power] embraces everything, but because it comes 
from everywhere”, “because it is produced from one moment to the next...in every relation from one 
point to another” (Foucault 1976/1998, 93). Thus, in this framework the analysis of power does not focus 
on the type of power Finnish state exercises over the immigrant and whether this is conflictual or 
consensual, based on state resources or normative influence.10 Rather, it is the constitution of reality 
and the systems of knowledge that enables the use of power, whatever form it takes in practical 
situations, that is the final focus here. 
Moving on to discussing the term governmentality, it can be said that governmentality is both a 
rationality and an art of governing, which in the West has typically been identified as liberal. 
Governmentality is, however, a multi-dimensional concept that refers, firstly, to the process of increased 
governmentalisation of society in modern Western states, i.e. to the increased governing of the 
population and the economy related to the shift away from sovereign rule.11 In this, governmentalisation 
cannot be distinguished from biopolitics, which, in the Foucaultian sense, refers to a sphere of 
governing and politics, to political power that takes as its object the administration of life. Biopolitics is 
an extension of the role of government to the governing of the population according to the administrative 
imperative of optimizing and improving the health and welfare of populations. Biopolitics is inherently 
linked to the aforementioned erosion of the rule based on sovereignty and law; to when sovereign 
                                                     
10 Foucault specifically criticises the traditional, liberation/repression hypothesis of power typical of Western liberal thinking. 
Traditional conceptualisations of power refer to the general hypothesis of ‘power as a resource’ or ‘power as ability’ to get 
others to do things. Mark Haugaard (2002) has analysed academic theories of power and differentiates between four 
different approaches: Firstly, there is the analytical approach that is based on analytical philosophy, which tries to clarify 
the concept of ‘power’ and distinguish it from concepts such as ‘power resources’ and ‘influence’. From a Foucaultian point 
of view, this approach could be characterised as an attempt to guard against the historicity of language in order to attain 
the true definition of power. Secondly, Haugaard distinguishes normative approaches that try to define how power should 
function in society. Thirdly, there are socio-theoretical conceptualisations of power. The normative and socio-theoretical 
models of power often distinguish between conflictual and consensual forms of power, some of them taking also structural 
factors into account. Haugaard’s fourth category is the post-modernist socio-theoretical view of power in line with the 
Foucaultian formulation of power, which differs from other conceptualisations in that it regards power as constitutive of 
reality (Haugaard 2002). In comparison to the other three conceptualisations of power, the focus in Foucaultian analysis is 
not on how ‘A’ exercises power over ‘B’, but rather how A and B have come to define themselves in a way that allows for 
this exercise of power to happen.  
11 Dean (1999; 2007; and 2006) has drawn attention to the governmentalisation of the domestic and international sphere as 
well as of poverty and unemployment (1991; 1995; and 1998). 
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punishment was bolstered by disciplinary technologies, which enables a shift towards biopower and 
governmentality (Foucault 1976/1998, 138-139; Foucault 1977-78/2007, 70-75; Foucault 1978-79/2008; 
see also Dean 2010). Modern liberal governmentalities, in the plural,12 involve the general 
governmentalisation of society, which speaks of the way we think that society and the economy should 
be governed more pervasively—even if at a distance, as shall be discussed shortly. Immigration sits 
tights inside this edifice of thought: the imperative of managing immigration and population movements 
arises from the heart of biopolitics.  
Given that immigration is one of the key fields that have become objects of governmental biopolitics, 
governmentality studies have focused on immigration quite a lot. Especially disciplinary and sovereign 
modes of governing immigration have been at the centre of analyses. To name a few examples, Bigo 
has concentrated on analysing the securitisation of immigration as an inherent governmentality of 
modern Western states (Bigo 2001; and 2002; also Bigo and Guild 2005). Andrijasevic and Walters 
(2010) have discussed the making of the international refugee regime and its ordering practices into a 
mundane neoliberal governmentality. Lippert (2005) has also focused on sovereign and pastoral forms 
of power used in resisting asylum practices by giving sanctuary to refused asylum applicants in Canada. 
Many studies include analysis of exclusionary rationalities in immigration regulations and visa regimes 
revealing their rationality of making asylum seeking and immigration as difficult as ‘reasonably’ possible 
(Morris 1998; Walters 2002; Salter 2006; and 2008; Kasli and Parla 2009). Gerken (2007) has focused 
on the neo-liberal conceptualisation of immigrants as either ‘factually’ benefiting or not benefiting the 
U.S. economy and society. I will extend this focus on disciplinary power by looking at the 
governmentality of immigration through the prism of historical comparison.  
Secondly, besides increased governmentalisation, governmentality as a term refers to the various 
knowledges and techniques that are thought to be essential for governing society and the economy.13 
                                                     
12 Foucault identified modern governmentality as broadly liberal, but at the same stressed that there are many types of 
liberalism: classical, economic liberalism, welfare state liberalism, social liberalism and neo-liberalism with their 
contextually specific self-critical ethos. Practical applications of liberal governmentality are not unified in their prescriptions 
of what governments should (not) do about managing the state, the population, the economy and the society. In the 
Finnish case, it is the welfare state liberalism that has a larger role to play in the discourses of immigration (e.g. Blomberg 
et al. 2008), but in general, I will not complicate the study further by distinguishing between various forms of liberalism in 
other ways than what becomes evident in the discourses themselves. Those interested in the relations of the welfare state 
to social democracy and economic liberalism can consult, for example, Foucault's The Birth of Biopolitics (1978-79/2008).  
13 With the rationalities and technologies of governing, the analytical task in governmentality studies comes very close to 
what others might recognise as policy analysis or governance studies. In this sense, governmentality could be seen as a 
rather ‘customary’ concept, very similar to the concept of governance denoting a capacity to get things done outside the 
strictly legal framework. But governmentality denotes an inherently different way of understanding the limits of government 
than ‘governance’: In line with the Foucaultian conceptualisations of power/knowledge, the governmentality approach does 
not conceptualise government as functioning based on the explicit consent of the governed, as evidenced through 
democratic elections and the legal framework. When power is not conceptualised as A’s capacity to impose his/her will on 
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This is an important point for understanding what the analytics of governmentality entails. Whilst 
sovereign modes of power are important for immigration control, we are here concentrating on the 
normalising and disciplinary modes of exercising power in the context of immigration. Disciplinary power 
can be implemented either through the state apparatus or through civil society. Indeed, according to 
Foucault the unity of liberal governmentality has been founded on the domain of civil society and its 
“governing at a distance” (Foucault 1976/1998, 93; Foucault 1978-79/2008, 295). It is through civil 
society that governmentality is constituted as the ‘conduct of conduct’ of the population (Foucault 1978-
79/2008, 186). This governing through civil society at a distance is the preferred way of governing under 
liberalism, because this is governing through freedom, which, as we shall discuss more in depth in 
Chapter 2, is considered essential to the liberal desire not to govern too much. The population is 
governed by giving individuals the freedom and the rights to mould themselves into acceptable 
citizens.14 Rose has especially concentrated on elaborating the relationship between governmentality 
and the care of the self, extending his thoughts to the role given to ‘freedom’ in liberal governmentality 
(e.g. Rose 1996; 1999b; 1999a; 2006; and 2008). In terms of governing immigration, governing at a 
distance can be seen, for example, in the preconditions imposed on entry and stay that define the 
acceptable citizen-to-be. 
Besides technologies, governmentality studies investigate how rationalities of governing are translated 
into, or give rise to, objectives regarding the life of the population. These objectives become prescribed 
in techniques and modes of governing the state, the self, families, groups and organisations, which 
together enable the liberal preference for governing at a distance, or governing through rights and 
freedoms (e.g. Rose and Miller 1992; Barry et al. 1996; Rose 1999b, 49; Dean 2010, 32). These 
objectives and the underlying ways of thinking about governing as a wider programme are then 
transmitted to the population and into the economy through various strategies, tactics and mechanisms, 
such as policies, laws and rules, schooling, training, expected activities and codes of conduct relating to 
various aspects of behaviour (ethical and moral, professional, civic, parental, pupil, inmate etc.) 
(Foucault 2002, 211; also Dean 1999, 2-3). This toolkit of rationalities and technologies is similarly 
employed to govern immigration and immigrants at a distance—but how and with what tools is a matter 
of specific analysis of various dimensions of governing. In terms of analysing immigration and its control 
technologies, Salter has focused on border controls, immigration regulations and visa regimes as states 
of exception that enclose the individual in a “documentary, biometric, and confessionary regime” (Salter 
                                                                                                                                                                      
B (e.g. Hindess 1996) nor governance as a matter of administrative rationality and effectiveness, government becomes 
understood, through a more fundamental arrangement of ‘things’, as an order of things.  
14 For example, Stoler (1995) has focused on how desires are educated and Cruikshank (1999) has analysed the way in 
which empowerment is utilised as a technology of conducting the conduct of populations. 
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2006, 169). Lippert and O’Connor, Salter and Maguire have focused on migrants in airports and the 
securitized technologies in function there (Lippert and O'Connor 2003;  Salter 2007;  Maguire 2009). Gill 
(2009a; 2009b) and Conlon (2010) have analysed what kind of governmentalities the administering, 
caring and (dis)locating of asylum seekers include and what kind of power effects they have. Chan 
(2005) has focused on the way that racialised and gendered governmentalities are evident in Canadian 
deportation orders of criminals and how they function as a disciplinary technology of moral regulation 
and social control. That is, studying governmentality requires analysis that goes beyond the discursive 
surface and investigates the technologies and rationalities and their power effects. This study continues 
this line of investigation analysing the various technologies employed in the apparatus of immigration 
control that extends from visa regulations to citizenship and integration policy.  
In analysing the rationalities of governing it is important not to conceptualise rationalities as a form of 
sovereign dictums—as sovereign dictums themselves are embedded in the power/knowledge 
constellation. Rather, governing for the ‘welfare’ of the population and its economy is achieved through 
knowledge, i.e. through scientific theories and expert opinions (or their commonsensical variants), that 
enable the understanding of the laws of the economy and population and the phenomenon of 
migration—as shall be discussed at length in Chapter 2. Manipulating these laws requires increasingly 
multiple and complex mechanisms and a network of institutions of security and administration to 
implement the laws and regulations needed for this task of manipulation (Foucault 1977-78/2007). That 
is, this process of governing cannot be separated from generic discourses and ontologies functioning in 
society, because these condition the definition and implementation of that which can be held ‘true’ and 
that which is conceptualised as a sound way of governing society. Indeed, cultural studies (e.g. Bennett 
1995; 2003; and 2004) connected governing and culture by insisting that “culture itself could be 
analysed as a set of technologies for governing habits, morals, and ethics—for governing subjects” 
(Rose et al. 2006, 97). In this sense, what is in question in this research are some of the fundamental 
ways in which Western culture is implied in the way we govern immigration.  
Because governmentality studies investigate rationalities and not just technologies of governing, it is 
inherently tied in with Foucault's conceptualisations of power/knowledge, which refers to the reciprocal 
constitution of power by knowledge and knowledge by power. That is, it does not refer to the famous 
slogan of ‘knowledge is power’ (Foucault 2000a, 455), but rather to the interdependence, in which one 
cannot exist without the other when it comes to knowledge regarding society and humans. That is, the 
status of knowledge as ‘truthful’ is dependent on a regime of power, and power, as said, functions 
through a regime of truth.  Power/knowledge is a strategic field that functions in unison with 
governmentality. These Foucaultian insights have been applied to the study of immigration, for example, 
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by Lippert (1999) who has investigated early refugee studies as a form of expert knowledge by 
contextualising it at the birth of the international refugee regime. The way ‘illegal’ immigration has been 
created and made an object of governmental technologies has been investigated by Inda (2006) and 
Hedman (2008) who shed light on the knowledge underpinning problematizations of legality/illegality. 
This study extends this focus by insisting on the aforementioned displacement of the object and does 
not limit the analysis to a sector of immigration policy, but rather surveys the wider strategic field of 
power/knowledge. In doing this, the study specifically aims to understand the way immigration is 
contemporarily problematized under liberal governmentality by also studying the problematization of 
immigration in the United States after the 1860s and comparing these two modes of problematization.  
Hence, studying governmentality is studying an order of things;15 a study of apparatuses of governing 
and the power/knowledge constellation enlightening the mode of governing. The analysis of 
governmentality is then inherently an analysis of power/knowledge. As Dean explains, “[i]If, for Kant, 
‘critique’ is the study of the conditions of true knowledge, the study of governmentality is a kind of 
critique of political reason, in as much as it seeks to investigate some of the hitherto silent conditions 
under which we think and act politically” (Dean 2010, 59; Rose 1999b). In this, it is the concept of 
discourse as knowledge that is epistemologically relevant to the whole Foucaultian endeavour. The 
central task of governmentality studies is to understand the underlying rationality of governing; to 
decentre the knowledges and technologies that are used. In this case, this means understanding the 
rationalities of governing foreigners through immigration control, refugee and citizenship policy and 
decentring the rationalities underlying these technologies. This decentring shall be done through specific 
tools, which will be outlined shortly and elaborated on more thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
We have now seen how the Finnish context offers interesting viewpoints into the rationalities of 
governing immigration. Namely, Finland offers a good example of a contemporary political culture in 
which the limits of ‘political correctness’ for explicitly racialising problematizations are searched for and 
in which the definitions of racism are a matter of heated conversation after twenty years of increasing 
and partly phenotypically different immigration. In the following chapters we shall be investigating the 
governmental discourses about immigration and the rationalities of governing different types of 
immigrants. As outlined in this section, this investigation shall take the shape of analysing the wider 
                                                     
15 For some, the use of the word ‘thing’ in academic language is questionable. In this research the ‘thing’ is the emergent, 
non-specific phenomenon that becomes defined in the context of governmentality embedded in a specific 
power/knowledge constellation. Foucault explains this vagueness of ‘order of things’ by saying that “government is not 
related to territory, but to a sort of complex of men and things”; “‘Things’ are men in their relationship with things like 
customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking. Finally, there are men in their relationships with things like accidents, 
misfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death” (Foucault 1977-78/2007, 96). In this sense, ‘things’ refers to whatever may 
become an object of concern to government before which its signification remains unproblematised. 
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‘order of things’—as advised by the displacements of the institution, function and object—that is 
constituted around immigration and that is inherently linked to liberal governmentality and its rationalities 
and technologies. I will now move on to discussing the actual research design. This will be done by 
explaining the four different levels at which the analysis was conducted that each focused on different 
research questions through different methods.  
1.3. Research Design: Research Material and Four Levels of Analysis 
In this section I will address the practical steps through which the research design was operationalised 
and how the conceptual framework extended from discourse theoretical analysis to the analysis of an 
apparatus of immigration control and its problematizations. As said, the starting hypothesis was that a 
game of truth was being played around the definitions of immigrants and immigration, in which these 
concepts came to be defined in conflicting ways. As will be explained more thoroughly shortly, the first 
level of analysis concentrated on this aspect by examining the discursive formation and the discourses 
used and definitions forwarded. The second level of analysis extended this focus and analysed the 
games of power/knowledge that were played by omitting, including, selecting and excluding discourses, 
definitions of immigration and subjectifications of immigrants. The third level of analysis relied on the 
previous two levels of analysis that investigated the rationalities expressed in immigration politics. The 
third level was dedicated to examining technologies of immigration control, by analysing the apparatus 
of immigration through contrasting the power/knowledge constellation analysed with the technologies of 
governing immigration and understanding the underlying rationalities of governing immigration. The first 
three levels formed a picture of the governmentality of immigration control in Finland. The fourth level of 
analysis was inductive. It focused on understanding this governmentality and its problematizations of 
immigration and explaining their rationalities by comparing the structure of problematization to the early 
American eugenic immigration policies. Before I explain these levels of analysis in more detail and 
explicate the research questions and outline the methods employed, a few words on the practical steps 
in the form of explaining the concepts that delimited the focus of the study as well as the process of 
selecting research materials and the objects of research are in order. 
1.3.1. The Research Focus and the Research Material 
The theoretical starting point in Foucaultian discourse theoretical analysis (to be outlined shortly) and 
governmentality studies with its three displacements had an impact on the way the object of study and 
the primary materials were selected. Due to the displacement of the object, the basic terminology of the 
field needed to be reconsidered. Migration, as a general concept, includes both emigration and 
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immigration. In this research, the focus is on immigration. But the investigation is not solely limited to 
immigrants, rather, the focus is on foreigners, i.e. on those who are either allowed or denied entry 
and/or residence. This is because those excluded function as an important parameter of how 
immigrants are defined. Further, the term immigrant requires explanation also in the sense that, firstly, 
the use of the term is generally vague: sometimes it includes refugees and asylum seekers and even 
second generation ‘immigrants’, sometimes not. In the analysis it has often been impossible to 
determine who are the ‘immigrants’ talked about or what kind of ‘immigration’ does the text or speech 
refer to. In this research, I will specify the various subcategories when I do not mean immigrants or 
foreigners in general. Yet, there is no possibility of controlling the vagueness in general, rather the 
vagueness of the use of the words themselves forms a part of the research field of ‘politics’.  
Based on the displacement of the institution and the function, this is not a study into policy or politics per 
se but into the way immigration is made sense of in politics. That is, attention is not aimed at the 
analysis of the manoeuvrings of various political actors or the efficiency of policies and their 
implementation. Politics is understood as a process leading to and arising from a specific 
power/knowledge constellation, in which the definitions are an inherent object of political 
power/knowledge games. What does this mean then in terms of the governmental actors studied? I will 
not discuss party, local and institutional politics or media discussions, although these clearly play a part 
in the politics of immigration. This focus on high-level politics means that I am leaving the 
implementation aspect outside. This choice of limits is informed by the need to keep the scope of 
analysis manageable.  
The analysis of politics is limited to high-level national politics, i.e. to the governmental and 
parliamentary power/knowledge constellation. Besides the government and the parliament, the key 
governmental actor in the field of Finnish immigration policy is the Ministry of the Interior, although other 
ministries are also involved in various aspects of aliens’ policy formulation and implementation. The 
views of ministries are included as far as they are expressed in government bills, ministerial documents 
and reports, and in statements by ministers in parliamentary discussions, but I have not analysed policy 
or recommendations specific to various ministries, such as immigrant-related education policies or the 
opinions they have expressed about various governmental bills. The Finnish Immigration Service is the 
main enforcement agency granting asylum, residence permits and citizenship, but, although their 
implementation practices have been left out, I have included implementation guidelines in the research 
material as these guidelines are essential for opening up the significance of governmental regulations. 
That is, the only authorities included are the government and the ministries, the parliament and its 
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committees and the Immigration Services, and the rest of the authorities have been left out of the 
study.16  
Whilst the displacement of the function requires that the efficiency of policy outcomes does not become 
a target, but rather that immigration control is regarded as an apparatus. The policies studied are, 
nevertheless, limited by the concept of immigrant-related policies. These include 1) immigration policy 
and law aimed at controlling who can enter and stay (visa and other entry criteria, residence, refugee 
and family reunification criteria), 2) integration policy and law that include the guidelines and aims for 
municipal action on integrating immigrants and 3) other policies and laws that indirectly impact on the 
existence of immigrants and foreigners in Finland, such as laws relating to social benefits and the 
related right to home municipality (that regulates the right to social benefits), citizenship law, domestic 
security policy (includes terrorism and racist violence) and the laws treating the detention of foreigners. 
Out of these, it is the actual immigration policy that is central. These other regulations have been taken 
into account as a part of the apparatus when they function in conjunction with the immigration control 
apparatus. But as said, not being a policy study as such, what policies, when and who promoted them 
are not objects of study. Policy is treated as a matter of a web of regulations and discourses articulated 
in governmental documents and bills and parliamentary committee statements analysed. That is, 
immigration policy is studied as an apparatus; as a “heterogeneous ensemble” of relations between 
“discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, [as relations 
between] the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault 1980, 194).   
The primary materials consist of government bills, relevant ministerial reports, committee statements 
and parliamentary discussions as well as the Immigration Services’ guidelines for implementing the law 
between 1999 and 2010. At the particular level of implementation, there is always overzealousness, 
                                                     
16 These excluded actors include, for example, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy that used to be responsible for 
immigration before the Ministry of the Interior and to whom the responsibility for integration policy administration was 
transferred back in 2011. Local or regional authorities under the Ministry of Employment are also in charge of assessing 
the labour market needs that are used as a precondition for granting employment based residence permits in many cases. 
Also the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health cover issues related to 
immigrants under their specific fields and, for example, officially comment on government bills at times. On top of the 
Immigration Services, the police have the authority to grant extensions to residence permits and to register the entry of 
certain foreigners, such as Nordic and EU citizens and, recently, the family members of Finnish nationals. Also auxiliary 
institutions, such as the Ombudsman for Minorities and the Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations (ETNO) that treat issues 
related to discrimination and multiculturalism have been left out. Naturally, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Police and 
the Border Guard also have an implementation role in managing visas, extensions of residence permits, deportation and 
entry of foreigners. In addition the administrative courts and the Supreme Administrative Court are the appeal entities in 
the migration and asylum system. Regional and local authorities, on the other hand, are responsible for integration 
measures. Further, the third sector provides many services and support functions for foreigners in Finland, but these have 
not been studied either. 
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compliance or resistance to varying degrees. Concentrating on particular implementation practices 
would have required different research methods. Actual implementation is, of course, a valid research 
focus, but fundamentally these institutions function inside a framework of governing, which is informed 
by the rationalities and prescribed technologies of the central government. The techniques of 
governmentality in terms of these levels of micro implementation, nevertheless, present a future 
opportunity for research. This focus on documentation and discussions rather than on implementation is 
also informed by  a lack of easily available material from other authors, such as solid, informative 
statistics from institutions in charge of implementation, such as the Finnish Immigration Services or the 
Border Guard. I was nevertheless able to gather some statistical data from the Immigration Services 
and the EuroStat databases to support the analysis with more ‘factual’ aspects. This in itself is a wide 
corpus and the selection of final primary materials from these sources has been thought through with 
the aim of gathering a representative sample of the discourses utilised, as will be discussed in the next 
sections. Altogether over 3300 statements and over 110 documents were analysed in detail. I shall 
explain what policy issues these documents are mainly related to in Chapter 3, when I shall discuss the 
general developments of Finnish immigration policy. Now I shall, however, move on to discussing the 
research design and its four levels of analysis in more detail, although many of the concepts touched 
upon here will be developed further in Chapter 2 that discusses the theory and methodology further. 
1.3.2. First Analytical Level: Discourses and Discourse Theory  
What was it then that the analysis of the primary materials focused on? As said, the research was 
designed to contain four levels of analysis. The intention on the first level was to chart the dynamic 
discursive formation of power/knowledge functioning around immigration politics departing from a 
discourse theoretical analysis. The analysis focused on how the discourses of liberalism, 
multiculturalism and nationalism were used in these games of power/knowledge leading to the observed 
way in which immigrants were governed and defined in inconsistent and contradictory ways. The 
research questions asked at this first level were:  
1) What kind of discourses are utilised to support claims regarding immigrants and 
immigration? 
2) In what ways are immigrants and immigration conceptualised, i.e. how are immigrants 
subjectified17 and, in more general terms, how are immigration related ‘things’ identified and 
known?  
                                                     
17 ‘Subjectifying’ and ‘subjectification’ refer to the way that people are made into subjects, i.e. to the way that people are 
made and how they make themselves into certain kinds of subjects of political power and power/knowledge through which 
they govern themselves and others (Foucault 1982-83/2010; Rosenberg and Milchman 2009).  
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The a priori assumption was that the discourses of making sense of immigration would fall under the 
broad discourses of nationalism, multiculturalism and liberalism in their various nuances ranging from 
open border cosmopolitanism to nationalist chauvinism. 
Discourse Theory 
As the reader may have noticed, I do not use the term discourse analysis but discourse theory. With this 
distinction, which shall be discussed in further detail in Chapter 2, I mean an analysis that does not 
focus on individual documents or discussions, but rather places various types of discursive material 
(such as laws and comments made in the parliament) on the same level, divorces them from the 
immediate context and its dynamics (for example of a parliamentary discussion or documentation 
around a specific bill) and investigates the statements themselves as forms of knowledge that are part 
of the larger power/knowledge constellation, through which the way knowledge is used has power 
effects and how power is used impacts on the way knowledge can be used.  
This theoretical approach is grounded in the Foucaultian definition of discourse and power/knowledge 
and has consequences for the way that discourses are defined and used in this research. Given that 
Foucault conceptualises discourse not as a logical totality of statements, that would be internally and 
temporally coherent and unified, but rather as a “a system of dispersion” (Foucault 1969/2002, 39) 
influenced by its own emergence and by its quality as an event, the discourses of nationalism, 
liberalism, and multiculturalism must be approached in their emergence. For Foucault, “[d]iscourse must 
not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs” (Foucault 
1969/2002, 25). As discourses, nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism are what is made of them or 
how the speakers utilise them. The limits of discourse, therefore, can never be defined, because, in light 
of Foucault’s later writings, it is the emergent nature of discourse, the strategic fluctuation of structures 
of knowing, that becomes analytically more important (Foucault 1970/1981, 66-69). Yet, a (truthful) 
discourse can be characterised as “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation and operation of statements” (Foucault 1980, 133), that vaguely limit that which 
can be said in reference to a discourse. Importantly, then, in this research nationalism, liberalism and 
multiculturalism, or racism, social Darwinism and eugenics, as discourses, do not refer to academic 
theories, but to how knowledge is made use of in politics, as shall be explained further in Chapter 2.  
The actual discourse theoretical method used for this analytical level shall be explained in Chapter 2, as 
it is inherently tied to Foucault's epistemological critique of the modern mode of knowing that will also be 
discussed in Chapter 2. At this stage it is sufficient to understand that the primary discourse theoretical 
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method operationalises the statement as a logical entity that formulates a discursive order of things by 
proposing and articulating ‘certain things as being like something’ and then assert the truthfulness of this 
claim by designating towards sources of positivity. Chapter 2 will outline the structure of this method 
more in detail prior to presenting the results of the analysis in Chapter 3. Appendix 4 will 
comprehensively discuss the actual way the method is employed. The analysis of the discursive orders 
forwarded in the primary materials enables the second phase of analysis that focuses on how strategies 
of power are employed to produce a power/knowledge constellation around immigration.  
1.3.3. Second Analytical Level: Games of Truth and the Strategies of Power/Knowledge 
The second-level discourse theoretical research sought for the power games of truth producing 
discursive orders, in which the inconsistencies between subjectifications and definitions could be 
detected and different expectations and assumptions revealed and charted. The third empirical research 
question asked was:  
3) What kind of power/knowledge constellations and discursive orders are created based on 
the discourses through which immigrants and immigration are defined?  
This phase of analysis charted discursive orders that were produced about immigration and immigrants 
in relation to different issues and through different discourses. (Appendix 4 expands on the practical 
tools of making this happen.) By examining the juxtapositions between various discourses, for example, 
how nationalist discourses were used to discipline liberal discourses and in what situations—and vice 
versa—an understanding of the basic strategic field of power/knowledge was constructed. At this level 
the tools of decentring started to be employed by observing what kind of strategies of power/knowledge 
were used in producing ‘truthful’ discursive orders about immigration. These tools of decentring (which, 
again, shall be expanded on in Chapter 2), are in essence the same as the strategies of 
power/knowledge, which designate the hegemonic or marginal, the truthful or false status of statements, 
but the idea is that when these strategies are spelled out the functioning of power in determining ‘truth’ 
is revealed, which allows for the decentring of ‘truthful’ discourses. At this stage observing the ways in 
which discourses were asserted as universal or particular (i.e. universalism/particularism as a strategy 
of power/knowledge) was central. Equally the way in which explanations for ‘truth’ were selected by 
choosing either psychological or historical explanations for phenomena proved enlightening (i.e. 
asserting psychologism or historicism as a strategy). Similarly listening to the silent gaps and missing 
meanings inside and between discourses—i.e. that which was not being said (silencing and scarcity of 
meaning) was important. Finally, by noting that which was being taken-for-granted either by making 
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certain things appear as natural (naturalisation) and non-political or by marginalising some things by 
making them appear exceptional (exceptionalisation) the way the power/knowledge constellation was 
strategically constructed could be analysed. After forming a picture of this strategic field, it was possible 
to move onto the next level of analysing the apparatus of immigration control ranging from discourses to 
technologies of governing immigration.  
1.3.4. Third Analytical Level: Governmentality and the Apparatus of Immigration Control 
The analysis in this third phase meant analysing governmentality as a combination of rationalities and 
technologies. As the governmentality framework dictates, central to understanding governmentality are 
not solely the discourses that express explicit rationalities, but also the technologies of governing 
immigration. The analyses had to be extended beyond the discursive power/knowledge formation and 
the relations between rules of implementation and parliamentary discussions, between committee 
statements and permit application processes had to be addressed. Immigration policy and immigration 
control technologies were studied as an apparatus ranging from discourses to regulations. The fourth 
research question asked: 
4) What is the web of regulation governing immigration, i.e. what are the technologies of 
immigration control? 
Thus, this level analysed the laws, decrees and rules of implementation of governing immigration and 
their rationalities were analysed. Then the apparatus of immigration control was contrasted with the 
separately expressed rationalities in various discursive orders that the first two levels of analysis had 
revealed. Accordingly, on the third level of analysis, the fifth research question asked: 
5) How the technologies of governing immigration work in conjunction with the expressed 
power/knowledge constellation and what kind of a taken-for-granted governmentality do 
they form? 
Forming a picture of the whole apparatus of immigration control enabled the analysis of the 
governmentality of immigration in Finland. Again, at this phase it was essential to look at the strategies 
that were employed to produce ‘truthfulness’ at the level of technologies. In this endeavour, the focus is 
on decentring the commonsensical knowledge that impacts the conceptualisations of immigration both 
for the layperson as well as for the expert. This common sense is defined in practice by the empirical 
analysis of the Finnish discursive formation around immigration. Common sense is here understood as 
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the taken-for-granted product of a power/knowledge constellation that establishes the limits of that 
which can be thought of as ‘rational’ or ‘natural’.18 
Besides the above-mentioned tools of decentring or strategies of power/knowledge (universalism/ 
particularism, naturalisation and exceptionalisation, silence and scarcity of meaning, historicism or 
psychologism), at this stage it was especially revealing to focus on the employment of market 
veridiction, i.e. on the mode of assessing the value of things through economic rationalities, and on the 
modes of governing at a distance through rights and freedoms. With these analytical tools the thesis 
attempts to create a space for thinking differently: for thinking differently about governing immigration by 
removing “the ‘naturalness’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ character of how things are done. In so doing, it 
renders practices of government problematic and shows that things might be different from what they 
are” (Dean 1999, 38). This decentring involves placing a question mark after—not only the 
commonsensical way of understanding immigration through the discourses of nationalism, liberalism 
and multiculturalism—but also through understanding Western governmentality through liberalism. This 
then enables critical evaluation of the way that we think about immigration and integration and the role 
of the state in it.  
1.3.5. Fourth Analytical Level: Problematizations and Eugenics 
The three levels of analysis allowed for building a picture of the governmentality of immigration as an 
apparatus with its taken-for-granted ways of governing immigration. As has been said, analysing 
problematizations is a focal point of interest for governmentality studies, because problematizations 
always reveal something essential about the way we think society, or in this case immigration, needs to 
be governed. Therefore, the fourth level of analysis formulated its task as answering the question: 
6) How does the governmentality of immigration, through the rationalities and technologies of 
the apparatus of immigration control, problematize immigration? 
That is the ultimate aim of the four-layer research design was to understand the governmentality of 
immigration and its problematizations. Chart E below visualises the analytical process:  
                                                     
18 ‘Common sense’ as a product and a technique of power has been analysed by post-structuralist researchers. For 
example, Roland Barthes, through his conceptualisation of doxa (for an account of the various definitions of 'doxa' Barthes 
uses see Herschberg-Pierrot 2002) and lately Norman Fairclough (Fairclough 2001, 64) share a similar association of 
common sense with ideology and power.  
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Chart E. Levels of analysis of the governmentality of immigration. 
The research design was inductive; based on this analysis of the discursive formation, the emerging 
power/knowledge constellation, the strategies of power/knowledge employed, and of the 
governmentality and its problematizations, the final framework of theoretical interpretation was 
searched. It became evident that the a priori assumption, that immigration politics could be understood 
through the discourses of nationalism, multiculturalism and liberalism, turned out to be false. To 
continue analysing immigration through the discourses of nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism, 
i.e. through utilising the regular categories—such as nation-states vs. countries of immigration, jus soli 
vs. jus sanguinis laws, civic nationalism vs. primordial nationalism, multiculturalist vs. assimilationist 
policies etc.—brought me to an analytical standstill. That is, the governmentality of immigration, as an 
apparatus of rationalities and technologies, could not be adequately explained by merely referring to the 
interplay of these discourses. The technologies themselves had rationalities that needed to be 
explained. There were integral parts to the apparatus of immigration that remained silent, 
commonsensical or taken-for-granted. What emerged was the realisation that the way immigration was 
problematized was something more fundamental, which the well-trodden path of analysing immigration 
was silencing. 
Placing a question mark after the designation of Western governmentality as liberal became pertinent, 
because it was not altogether clear what constituted the ‘liberal’ in the governmentality of immigration. 
Central to the critical evaluation became the investigation of why society needed to be defended from 
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immigration: A question mark needed to be placed after immigration policy and the knowledge it is 
founded on in toto.  
By analysing these strategies of power/knowledge, by listening to the silent gaps and explicating the 
taken-for-granted, the fourth level of analysis attempts to explain the governmentality of immigration as 
a form of state racist governmentality that relies on race hygienic problematizations of immigration. The 
seventh research question rising from the inductive process is: 
7) To what extent do the contemporary immigration apparatus and its governmentality mirror 
the problematizations of the US eugenic immigration policy after the 1860s? 
This question will be answered in Chapter 4 that is dedicated to explaining eugenic governmentality and 
race hygienic immigration policy in the United States and comparing its regulations to the contemporary 
Finnish regulations explained in Chapter 3. Now that I have explained the analytical levels and the basic 
theoretical outline of the thesis, I shall introduce the concept of state racism as a type of governmentality 
to lay the ground for the turn that the thesis will take in Chapter 4.  
1.4. State Racist Governmentality  
By state racism Foucault did not mean a state that explicitly purported racist policies of segregation or 
extermination, such as the United States before the 1960s, Nazi Germany or Apartheid South Africa. 
This type of designation of racism has failed to renounce analysing politics in terms of sovereignty and 
law, as it insists on investigating governing through a legalistic framework of the state. Therefore, it is 
important to understand that Foucault's notion of state racism refers to society: it is not a mere 
technology of state, but an overall rationality of society and how it needs to be governed. As such, state 
racism is defined as a constantly re-emerging and changing system that does not have any universal 
position, but is always subject to changing power/knowledge constellation. With state racism Foucault 
referred to: 
“a racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own products. This 
is an internal racism of permanent purification, and it will become one of the basic dimensions of 
social normalization” (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 62).  
Thus, we are rather talking about a dynamic rationality of governing in which fitness and ‘degeneracy’ 
become key terms of normalisation. Foucaultian state racism is not strictly speaking a relation between 
the state and race, but a governmentality characterised by the permanent cleansing and refinement of 
the race-nation itself, a matter of public, social and race hygiene that is inherently grounded in socio-
evolutionary thought. State racism is a dynamic of governmentality that extends outwards and inwards 
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and forms an essential logic of Western rationalities of governing (Foucault 1977-78/2007, 117; 
Foucault 1978-79/2008, 228-229).  
The fact that social evolution is a grounding knowledge of secular modernity is self-evident. We know 
socio-evolutionary discourses are constantly utilised in politics; discourses of progress and 
modernization are ubiquitous. Yet, somehow the functioning of socio-evolutionary rationalities form an 
unexamined part of the common sense. The fundamental assertion in this thesis is that in places—that 
is, not in all regimes of truthful governing—liberalism becomes rather a technology through which we 
execute state racist governmentality. I will be showing this by looking at the practice: at how socio-
evolutionary discourses in practice enlighten the contemporary governmentality of immigration. 
Therefore, the final methodical application is comparing the way that immigration is problematized 
contemporarily in Finland with the way that immigration came to be problematized in the United States 
under a social Darwinist and eugenic or race hygienic regime of truth. In this context, the relationship 
between governmentality and state racism and the historical and contemporary content of state racist 
governmentalities will be elaborated further.  
If viewed from this perspective of state racist governmentality being at the centre of why society needs 
to be defended, what is at stake is not only the re-interpretation of the way nationalist, liberal and 
multiculturalist discourses are employed as tools of governmentality, but also the question of the 
definition of racism becomes pivotal. (We shall discuss this issue in detail in Chapter 4.) This definition 
of racism is a highly contested issue in contemporary Finland evidencing itself in talk shows and legal 
battles over when the politically correct edge has been surpassed and racism has begun. Racism was 
not one of the discourses that I a priori assumed to have an impact on the discursive formation on 
immigration in Finland. Yet, the inductive method made it impossible to ignore the issue of racism as 
racialisation. The concept of racialisation, as defined by Miles, refers to the way in which racism works 
as a process of signification by attaching meaning to and categorising people on the basis of 
phenotypical difference and then ordering this difference into hierarchical structures of signification 
(Miles 1990). Therefore, racism as racialisation describes ‘the maintenance and production of a race 
hierarchy’ (Puuronen 2011, 66). Consequently, in this thesis racism is not treated as an ideology that 
can be proven false by science (cf. Miles 1990, 42), but it is analysed as a discourse of dispersion that 
has power effects. Racialisation as a technology of discipline and normalisation is essential to state 
racist governmentality. Racism cannot be separated from its biopolitical foundation (e.g. Stoler 1995, 
60). In later chapters we will return to this issue of racism and the way it functions as part of state racist 
discourses—state racism being about the way socio-evolutionary discourses, often grounded in social 
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Darwinist and eugenic thinking, are utilised for governing—and to the issue of racism being one of the 
key technologies through which state racist rationalities are executed.  
The overall argument in this thesis is that multifarious socio-evolutionary assumptions are placed on 
immigrants and that these assumptions interlink with nationalism, multiculturalism and liberalism, 
because of the way that these discourses become a part of socio-evolutionary governmentality. The 
moral discourses that nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism contain become disciplined by the 
overarching rationality of defending society from unfitness defined in social Darwinist terms. Banal social 
Darwinist conceptualisations play an important role in the complicatedness of the immigrant’s settlement 
process, which is in many (but not in all) ways conceptualised as the survival of the fittest immigrant. 
These conceptualisations are witnessed, for example, in the ‘perpetual entering’ of the second 
generation ‘non-white’ immigrant, which rely on the racialising logic of cultural fitness, and on human 
capital type of explanations of why certain immigrants succeed and others do not (Gullestad 2002; cf. 
Balibar 1990/1996, 142-144).  
Yet, the aim here is not normative or pragmatic in the traditionally liberal sense, and the thesis does not 
address issues of how things could be done better or whether doing this otherwise would be practical. 
Nor does the thesis address the issue of what discourses regarding social evolution are true and what 
false: socio-evolutionary rationalities are not exhausted by state racist governmentality, as socio-
evolutionary theory contains many alternative discourses that could conceptualise governing in different 
terms. The point is to open the field of power/knowledge to new questions and possibilities, not to 
exercise (even well-meaning) power and fix down the unsettledness of identity and ethics. This is 
because it is in continual resistance that post-structuralism really sees the promise of freedom. As 
Foucault said in an interview when asked whether he was searching for alternatives: 
“No! I’m not looking for an alternative; you can’t find the solution to a problem in the solution of 
another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not a 
history of solutions—and that’s the reason why I don’t accept the word alternative. I would like to 
do the genealogy of problems, of problématiques. My point is not that everything is bad, but that 
everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then 
we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and 
pessimistic activism” (Foucault 1983/2000a)  
As Robert Young explains:  
“Criticism becomes reflexive with post-structuralism. As a reflexive discourse, which constantly 
divides itself against itself and transgresses its own systems, post-structuralist criticism avoids 
becoming fixed, avoids becoming an established method. It is this self-critical, self-transforming 
aspect that is often found so irritating and so confusing in post-structuralist thinkers. Looking 
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(mistakenly) for a completed system, the reader finds it impossible to pin down and systematise a 
series of texts. [...] The breakthrough occurs when the reader realises that his unease and 
uncertainty are not the product of a failure to understand, but an anticipated critique of the terms 
of his own will to knowledge.” (Young 1981, 7) 
Hence, it is examining the conditions of possibility of thinking about immigration and especially the 
possibility of thinking differently about immigration that are the essential features of this research. As 
Foucault wrote, “it is fruitful in a certain way to describe that which is, while making it appear as 
something that might not be, or that might not be as it is” (Foucault 2000b). Hopefully, this critical 
evaluation will overall allow more freedom (not) to think and be governed in contemporary ways. 
This does not mean that this thesis is void of normativity. I am clearly against social Darwinist and 
eugenic conceptualisations of fitness and degeneracy that rely on moral, class-based 
conceptualisations of human worth, which I see as functioning in the current power/knowledge 
constellation as discourses of power. Yet, it would be naïve to say that the effects would solely be 
negative and that there was nothing beneficial to be achieved by race hygienic or social Darwinist 
modes of governing. We will address these issues as the argument goes on, but inherently no 
normative answers are sought here—in the Foucaultian framework this would be a matter of politics, 
something that is more appropriately addressed through openly political action. The goal is merely to 
open up a space for thinking differently about governmentality by offering Finnish immigration policy as 
an example how this governmentality functions contemporarily.  
 
I have now charted the basic research approach in this thesis. I have outlined the Finnish immigration 
context and explained the reasons how and why racialisation becomes a discourse of interest in this 
research. I have positioned this research inside the Foucaultian governmentality framework and 
preliminarily explained how state racist rationalities refer to a socio-evolutionary governmentality that 
operates on the basis of a logic of permanent purification of society. I have also described the research 
design and its four levels of analysis with their different research questions and methods. The structure 
of the thesis is arranged as defined below. 
We will now move onto discussing the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this research in 
a more meticulous manner. Chapter 2 will scrutinize the Foucaultian governmentality framework more in 
detail linking it to the way liberal naturalism functions as the key to enabling state racist rationalities of 
governing. We will also link governmentality to the modern mode of knowing by examining the way in 
which scientific government and epistemological criticism are intertwined and why, consequently, the 
 
31 
socio-evolutionary framework becomes part of liberal governmentality. This examination of the modern 
mode of knowing will also give us the methods of analysis, both in the form of discourse theory and the 
tools of decentring.  
After the theoretical and methodical grounding of the research project, the thesis proceeds to presenting 
the results of the first three layers of analysis. In Chapter 3 I shall outline the developments of 
immigrant-related policies before moving on to examining the ways in which immigrants and immigration 
are discursively ordered and what kind of rationalities of governing these definitions speak of. In section 
3.2., we shall especially focus on the power games of truth played between the discourses of 
nationalism and liberalism in defining the way immigration should be governed. After this, in section 3.3., 
I shall analyse the technologies of governing immigration, e.g. the visa, residence permit and citizenship 
regulations and spell out the rationalities these technologies comprise. Altogether the discussion about 
contemporary rationalities and technologies of immigration control and the problematizations they depict 
in Chapter 3 will outline the governmentality of immigration.  
The racialising and class-based rationalities of governing immigration uncovered in Chapter 3 will help 
us to debate the issue of why nationalism and liberalism are not sufficient modes of explaining the 
governmentality of immigration, why they are implicated in the socio-evolutionary framework of 
governing and why racism as racialisation is essential to liberal governmentality. Chapter 4 examines 
these issues and aims to decentre the strategy of exceptionalising social Darwinism and eugenics by 
discussing their centrality to the socio-evolutionary framework and, consequently, to liberal 
governmentality. This argument is then supported by outlining the history of eugenic immigration policy 
in the United States after the 1860s and examining its governmentality and its relation to liberal 
governmentality in section 4.2. Finally, in section 4.3., we will examine the eugenic problematizations of 
immigration side by side with the contemporary Finnish ones. We shall do this by analysing how ‘race’-, 
class-, morality- and health-based technologies of controlling immigration functioned in the earlier and 
how they operate in the contemporary apparatuses of immigration control. In Chapter 5 I will conclude 
that the way we think immigration must be governed is permeated by eugenic rationalities and that in 
certain ways we rather see an intensification of eugenic rationalities than their ‘liberalisation’. 
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2. Liberal Governmentality and Power/Knowledge  
This chapter will investigate liberal governmentality in relation to epistemological and ontological 
frameworks. We will dwell on Foucault's basic concepts in more depth than in the Introduction, and 
elaborate the notion of state racism further. Because, in Foucault's understanding, the success of 
power, i.e. the efficiency of a governmentality, can be calculated in its “ability to hide its own 
mechanisms” (Foucault 1976/1998, 86; also e.g. Burchell 1991), understanding liberal governmentality 
in-depth, but still as an emergent order, is important for the task of decentring it. Through its focus on 
analysing the conditions of possibility of governing—i.e. conditions that are embedded in the taken-for-
granted, common sense bodies of knowledge—governmentality studies attempt to decentre the 
practices of governing by decapitating the King. Power is in the ‘order of things’, not in the hands of ‘the 
state’, but in its capacity to hide itself in the ‘taken-for-granted’ that it emerges from (Foucault 1975-
76/1997, 92-93; and 1976/1998, 93-95). As Foucault said about power/knowledge:  
The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power … truth 
isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have 
succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of 
multiple forms of constraint. And it includes regular effects of power. (Foucault 1980, 131)  
That is, the status of knowledge as truth is dependent on a regime of power, and power functions 
through a regime of truth. The effects of power are both positive and negative, both constitutive and 
silencing, and, thus, power’s regime of truth cannot be defined a priori as malicious or as falsehood. 
What Foucaultian analysis does is pay attention to how power is exercised through unquestioned forms 
of power/knowledge. Power/knowledge, thus, is a field of strategic play between knowledge and power. 
Foucault writes: 
Indeed, it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together. And for this very reason, 
we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is 
neither uniform nor stable. To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided 
between accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between a dominant discourse and the 
dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various 
strategies (Foucault 1976/1998, 100). 
Truth becomes exercised based on changing and shifting relations of power, and vice versa (Foucault 
1975-76/1997, 53). Power/knowledge is not a question of domination, but an emergent game of truth; 
where there is power there is also resistance. Certainly, forms of knowledge are not accepted, but 
‘subjugated (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 7). But it is this game of power/knowledge, in which subjugated 
knowledges are further marginalised, silenced, ignored and ridiculed and in which the subject positions of 
those speaking in the name of subjugated knowledges are delegitimized or, alternatively, through which 
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they find their way to the centre (Foucault 1977/1980, 199), that is central. The political in Foucault's 
discourse is the operation of certain discourses as truthful.   
In this chapter, I will first take a look at the concept of governmentality as a scientifically sound mode of 
governing and explain how liberal governmentality functions inside the modern mode of knowing. This will 
involve a replication of Foucault's epistemological criticism as well as an analysis of the strategies of 
power/knowledge that the modern mode of knowing requires and allows. I will then investigate further the 
way that liberal governmentality employs science and grounds its modes of governing in naturalism. This 
will pinpoint the ways that naturalism functions as a strategy of power/knowledge, and how it allows for 
state racism. This analysis of liberal governmentality as a form of naturalism, together with the epistemic 
strategies of power/knowledge, provides the tools of decentring that shall be employed to analyse the 
discursive constellation around immigration in Chapters 3 and 4.  
2.1. Scientifically Sound Government  
As has become evident, governmentality studies focus on how ‘reason’ functions in the various 
phenomena of governing and how the way immigration and immigrants are conceptualised impacts on 
the governing of immigration. Integral to governmentality is the analysis of the rationalities and 
technology of governing, with the emphasis being on rationalities. This is why this research employs a 
discourse theoretical method that tackles the power/knowledge constellation around immigration in its 
specificity. This analysis of rationalities and the power/knowledge constellation is pivotal, because under 
liberal, biopolitical governmentality government comes to mean scientifically sound and, thus, ‘rational’ 
government: For governing to be appropriate, it must understand the laws that underpin the population 
and the economy (e.g. Foucault 1977-78/2007, 349-354; Foucault 1978-79/2008, 15-17, 61-62, 115; 
also Burchell 1991). Discourses of governing needed to be ‘scientific’, ‘objective’ or ‘systematic’, truthful 
knowledges about the state, society, economy, population, health etc. Thus were born the social 
sciences and the analysis of political economy tasked with the duty to discover these non-distortable 
laws of the population and the economy and therefore also ‘the natural limits of  governing’, which  gave 
rise to the liberal critique of government expressed in the discourses of ‘big government’ or ‘too much 
state’ (e.g. Dean 1999, 51). Government becomes “inextricably bound up with the activity of thought. It 
is thus both made possible by and constrained by what can be thought and what cannot be thought at 
any particular moment in history” (Rose 1999, 8). This is why we shall next turn to discussing 
epistemological critique through Foucault's thoughts on the modern mode of knowing: without 
epistemological critique it is difficult to step beyond our regimes of truth and therefore beyond our 
regimes of governing immigration.  
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Foucault's epistemological criticism is best approached through The Order of Things (1966/2002),19 
which analyses the Enlightenment’s philosophical problematization of knowledge and its relation to 
language. In this, Foucault's account is aligned with the post-structuralist strand of the Linguistic Turn 
(as opposite to analytical philosophy), which is a well-known formulation underlying various 
constructivist approaches. What we shall do here, however, is maintain this epistemological critique 
                                                     
19 Traditionally, Foucault's work has been divided into two distinct phases: the archaeological and the genealogical, and The 
Order of Things: The Archaeology of Human Sciences has been understood as a structuralist work par excellence (also 
Kearney and Rainwater 1996, 336-337; cf. Tavor Bannet 1989, 3-4). The archaeological phase is said to be focused on 
the historical, epistemic conditions of knowledge and it is often been interpreted as structuralist. Foucault's later work, the 
genealogical phase, extends his research project into assessing the material conditions of discourse and the relations of 
power in the discursive field. This phase has been traditionally thought of as post-structuralist (Best and Kellner 1991, 43-
47). This study functions at the conjunction of that division, because it utilises works from both phases. Structuralism, 
based on Saussurean linguistics, is generally understood as an analysis of supposed formal, unconscious social structures 
underlying societal behaviour, and Foucault's conceptualisation of discursive structures and epistemes have often been 
given rather rigid interpretations even as laws (Kurzweil 1980, 204-208; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 32 and xxii; Major-
Poetzl 1983, 164; Kearney 1986, 283-289; Merquior 1991, 14-15; Frank 1989/1992, 109). Although Foucault was 
somewhat seduced by structuralist terminology (e.g. Tavor Bannet 1989; Kearney and Rainwater 1996), and although a 
certain ‘causality’ can be seen to be attributed to discursive systems in The Order of Things (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 
xx-xxi), Foucault has generally been critical of the attribution of causality in social sciences and vehemently objected to 
being called a structuralist (Foucault 1966/2002, xiii-xv). Yet Foucault acknowledged that the analysis of power was 
missing from his earlier, archaeological writings (Foucault 1980, 114-115). In this research I have not utilised these 
‘structuralist’ or universalist aspects of epistemes, but rather read his earlier work in light of The Order of Discourse, which 
conceptualises the relationship between academic knowledge and power, and other later work and rather concentrate on 
his “fundamental criticism” of the modern epistemology (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 115).  
    Foucault's shift from archaeology to genealogy is also a shift from analysis of systems of thought to the effects of power of 
the systems of thought (Young 1981, 48-49). Both of these phases are, however, integral to the same project of analysing 
the relationship between power and knowledge. As Dreyfus and Rabinow claim, as does Foucault, that he never deserted 
archaeology but rather later it was used to serve the genealogical task by isolating objects in discourses (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1982, xxi). Foucault writes:  
    “Archaeology is the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy is the tactic which, once it has 
described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them” 
(Foucault 1975-76/1997, 10-11).  
    Thus, the archaeological method is never forgotten in Foucault, which can be seen in the relatively stable way Foucault 
builds his arguments in different books: He always maintains an historical perspective analysing the different ways that 
people before us have conceptualised things, in order to construct a ‘history of the present’ that defies teleological 
interpretation and instead points out the discontinuities in history and the stories we tell about it. It is what he does with this 
historical investigation that changes with time: With time Foucault’s analysis focuses more on the Will to Power than on the 
Will to Truth (e.g. Hook 2001/2007, 6). Foucault would later position his earlier archaeological work in relation to genealogy 
by re-conceptualising it as a genealogy of our relation to truth:   
    “Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we 
constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power 
through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through 
which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. So, three axes are possible for genealogy. All three were present albeit in 
a somewhat confused fashion, in Madness and Civilization. The truth axis was studied in The Birth of the Clinic and The 
Order of Things. The power axis was studied in Discipline and Punish, and the ethical axis in The History of Sexuality” 
(Foucault 1982/1984, 351-352).  
    In light of his later writings, both the episteme and language turned into regimes of power/knowledge, into regimes that 
incorporated a certain order of things, the stability of which was a result of constantly re-enacted power struggles. In 
Foucaultian post-structuralism there are still some type of ‘systems’, even if these are fluid, indefinable, temporal and 
certainly not universal or causal in the positivist sense. Most importantly, these systems are understood as effects of 
power that have a certain hold over individual freedom, similar to Laclau and Mouffe’s Foucaultian concept of ‘hegemony’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Broadly speaking, however, post-structuralism engages in a  “a critique of metaphysics (of the 
concepts of causality, of identity, of the subject, and of truth), [and] of the theory of the sign” (Young 1981, 8), thus 
decentring the basic tenets of structuralism. 
 
35 
close to the analytical surface, i.e. we shall actively employ the tools of epistemological critique whilst 
analysing the discursive orders formulated around immigration in Finland.  
2.2. Scientifically Sound Epistemological Vigilance 
Tools of Decentring: Rendering Government Technical 
Foucault's criticism of the modern mode of knowing is expressed in his theory of the anthropological 
sleep, which fundamentally highlights the way that modern reasoning becomes oblivious to its own 
epistemological grounds. This oblivion is the grounds through which power/knowledge becomes 
possible. This oblivion of epistemological uncertainty is also the means through which governing, 
defined as necessarily scientific, loses its political significance and renders itself technical, it becomes a 
matter of “will to improve”, make governing effective and efficient instead of political (Murray Li 2007). 
Whilst this epistemic critique does not require rehearsal, the ground for situating the tool kit of 
decentring employed here needs to be explained. The Linguistic Turn questioned the epistemic 
configuration that the modern mode of knowing is based on. The Enlightenment’s renunciation of God 
as the affirmer of true knowledge had led to the formulation of the cogito, man as a knowing subject, as 
a being who is limited by his own birth and death; i.e. by his finitude. Because of this finitude, of the 
limitedness of man’s own existence, the ontological necessity of expressing knowledge through 
language, of proposing that ‘something is’ and declaring it as (scientifically) true, became problematized. 
When man is always born into a world and into a language that already exists and when things 
(cultures, sciences, ideologies etc.) have begun before him and will continue after him, man’s 
socialisation into these social and linguistic systems rendered his capacity for transcendental knowledge 
questionable. That is, after the renunciation of God as a securer of transcendental knowledge, the 
analysis of man’s finitude put man’s capacity to produce positive, true knowledge under the magnifying 
glass (Foucault 1966/2002, 330-347). 
Despite this renunciation of the authority of God in forming true (scientific) knowledge, modernity was 
not ready to relinquish the notion and the aspiration of transcendental knowledge itself (e.g. Racevskis 
1993, 4; Laclau 1996/2007, 23). The aspiration for transcendental knowledge, for Truth with a capital ‘T’, 
resulted in defining the knowing subject, cogito, as capable of truthfully perceiving reality, i.e. as having 
a transparent relationship with reality regardless of his finitude. The identity of the knowing subject, as 
one capable of rationality, of speaking truthfully, became supremely important. Historically, this 
capability for rationality was, ‘of course’, stronger in some (white, upper class, educated men) than in 
others; some people were subjectified as being more prone to ‘feeblemindedness’ than others—women, 
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lower classes and other races being the obvious candidates. However, as Foucault points out, because 
of this conscious criticism of the religious foundations of truth—because of the conscious 
problematization of the ability to produce positive knowledge—the modern cogito thinks it is actually 
being epistemologically vigilant: The Enlightenment is ‘enlightened’, because the modern cogito is 
critical of his own earlier reliance on God as a point of validating knowledge as well as of his own 
historicity as a knowing subject. In his vigilance, the cogito posits the question: ‘How man, as a being 
tied to history, can know positively?’ But paradoxically, this vigilance in itself is assumed to guarantee 
the ability for transcendental knowledge and universal rationality. 
Having replaced transcendental knowledge, as affirmed by God, with an affirmation by man himself as a 
historical, but nevertheless epistemologically vigilant being, the question of ‘How can man propose and 
articulate positive things from a transcendental viewpoint when he is tied to the historicity of things?’ 
becomes answered—according to Foucault—by constituting man as an empirico-transcendental being. 
This means that the cogito, the knowing subject, is made capable of being both the object of knowledge 
and the knowing subject at the same time. The cogito is capable of knowing himself rationally and 
scientifically. It is this empirico-transcendental doublet that Foucault sees as the pre-critical answer to 
the question ‘What is man?’ Foucault writes: 
[Man] is that living being who, from within the life to which he entirely belongs and by which he is 
traversed in his whole being, constitutes representations by means of which he lives, and on the 
basis of which he possesses that strange capacity of being able to represent to himself precisely 
that life.” “In one sense man is governed by labour, life and language [but] he, as soon as he 
thinks, merely unveils himself to his own eyes in the form of being who is already (Foucault 
1966/2002, 384 and 341 respectively). 
The epistemological basis for the positivity of man’s knowledge is the empirical: the life that man lives 
and—because of his living it—can also know transcendentally. This is the empirico-transcendental 
riddle that henceforth sustains positive knowledge. Thus, in the modern epistemology, according to 
Foucault, knowledge becomes grounded in man’s phenomenological assessment of who he is and what 
he experiences.  
That is, a common solution to finitude is to make the ontology of man relevant to epistemology. 
Accordingly, in the social sciences, we see a proliferation of theories that base their knowledge on this 
answer, on assumptions about the nature of man, on the particular answers to the question ‘What is 
man?’ For example, the nationalist theorem is married to the ontological status of man as a ‘national 
being’, as a member of a nation. In nationalist discourse the production of positive knowledge then 
becomes validated by the discursive formulation of that living, national being who, from within the 
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national life to which he entirely belongs and by which he is traversed in his whole being, constitutes 
nationalist representations, by means of which he lives, and on the basis of which he possesses that 
strange capacity of being able to represent to himself precisely the truthfulness of that national life. 
Equally, the liberal epistemology is based on the ontology of the universal human being who, from within 
the liberal life to which he entirely belongs and by which he is traversed in his whole being, constitutes 
liberal representations by means of which he lives as a human being, and on the basis of which he 
possesses that strange capacity of being able to represent to himself and to know precisely the 
truthfulness of the universal liberal way of life.  
From this ontologically privileged subject position, it is the experience of the empirical, of the 
phenomenological, and its transcendental interpretation that becomes central for the modern mode of 
knowing. The governmentality of immigration, I argue, functions inside such a discursive field informed 
by such epistemological assumptions, which is why we see such a focus on the different definitions of 
the objects and subjects in immigration related discourses: The articulation of identities of ‘things’ 
becomes the battle field of truth and power; from how the immigrants’ identity is defined follows the 
truthfulness of immigration policy. It is because positivity becomes tied to identity that modernity 
culminates in identity politics. When truth games are played politically—and this is the field that is under 
investigation here, not the academic power/knowledge constellation—identity is essential. In the case of 
the Finnish discussion of immigration politics this power/knowledge constellation, which ties the truth 
value of that which is said to the identity of the speaker, is elemental: Media discussions are polarized 
between ‘immigration critics’ and ‘ladies with flower hats’ (i.e. the do-gooders), between ‘racists’ and 
‘liberals’.   
Foucault's critique of the modern mode of knowing focused on the constitution of the cogito and on how 
it became a key configuration in the way that modernity conceptualises its ability to produce 
transcendental knowledge. Yet, this empirico-transcendental configuration has not satisfactorily solved 
the problem of historicity and the enigma of language; it has only affirmed the desire for transcendental 
knowledge and the image of the man thought to be capable of transcendental knowledge. In the third 
step of solving the epistemological problem, Modernity makes language and discourse into important 
objects of enquiry: In the necessity to use language is hidden a possibility of error; an error which 
haunts the epistemic field of modernity, but regardless of which positivity must still somehow be 
guaranteed (Foucault 1966/2002, 332-334). This is where the Linguistic Turn most explicitly connects to 
the epistemic configuration of modernity. Modernity embarked on a quest to master language and to 
reveal the true and original meanings of its words (e.g. semiology), or to unify language through an 
 
38 
analysis of the system of its use (e.g. analytic philosophy); all this so that man could master that which 
he knows (Foucault 1966/2002, 330-335; Foucault 2000a). 
But the instability of the modern mode of knowing is still unsatisfactory. Should there not be something 
outside language that guarantees Truth? In addition to trying to master language, modernity designates 
its source of positivity outside language in order to render its knowledge true and affirmative. These 
methods external to language require that before the articulated proposition can be considered to be 
(scientifically) true its foundation of positivity must rest either on (1) the truth of the object (i.e. fact), (2) 
truth of the discourse (i.e. ism, ideology, theory etc.) or, (3) the truth of the actual experience 
(phenomenology) (Foucault 1966/2002, 347-351).  
Yet, immediately we can see the circularity of these motions of affirming positivity: the truth of 
experience is affirmed through the phenomenological truthfulness of interpreting experience through 
language, facts speak for themselves, as if without a need of interpretation and language, and discourse 
is proven true through reference to the socially constructed authority of the discourse itself. All in all, 
positing discourse as simply truthful is reminiscent of the religious mode of validating truth—which 
modernity initially wanted to discard. Hence, it comes as no surprise—to the vigilant cogito—that this 
solution is not wholly convincing either. Additional ways of transcending historicity, of stopping the 
perpetual escape of transcendental knowledge, are sought through psychologism and historicism. 
These are two supplementary solutions that guard against mistakes in interpreting the truth of the 
experience and truth of the discourse. Psychologism guards against unthought, against that which 
cannot be thought or easily known, and against psychological limitations to transcendental knowledge 
hampering the lucidity of the cogito. Historicism guards against the historicity of discourse and the 
limitedness of the cogito similarly compromising transcendental knowledge. (Foucault 1966/2002, 351-
356.) However, what psychologism and historicism are converted into in practice, in this unstable 
epistemic configuration, is a tool of power/knowledge: The ways these tools of affirming positivity are 
utilised have power effects. The ways in which historical and psychological explanations are used 
become strategies of power/knowledge. 
Tools of Decentring: Psychologism and Historicism 
Psychologism refers to the application of “psychological techniques to traditional philosophical 
problems”. Generally psychologism relates to the Western discussion on “whether logic (and 
epistemology) are parts of psychology” and whether it is relevant to study the functioning of human 
cognition as an influential factor in the pursuit of truth (Kusch 2007). Psychologism, as a form of critique 
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and as a form of explaining cognition, guards against errors originating in the cogito’s psychology, 
against unconscious factors, against the unthought of what cannot (or should not) be thought, against 
the unsecured limit between reason and unreason, between sanity and madness, between normal and 
abnormal. At this conjunction of psychologism we also find the epistemic vigilance against psycho-
biological factors (which shall become objects of discussion later on in the thesis), against the limits 
imposed by man’s biological being, against the unthought of instincts, genetic determinations and 
cognitive laws that influence the knowledge produced by man. Through critique of the cogito’s ontology, 
on which modern knowledge is made to rely, the limits of (scientifically) true knowledge can be 
ascertained. In this sense, the way that psychologism is used is intrinsic to the game of 
power/knowledge around immigration.  
This type of epistemic vigilance attempts to chart the shadows of the unthought—of its “dim 
mechanisms, [and] faceless determinations” (Foucault 1966/2002, 355-356)—and to bring this 
unconscious ever closer to man and his knowledge; thus hopefully ending man’s alienation from the 
lucidity of truth. In terms of immigration research, we can see, for example, how civic nationalism guards 
against the ‘dim’ feelings of primordial nationalism (for an academic position reflecting this, see Ignatieff 
1993), or how governmentality studies guards against the faceless determinations of the all-devouring 
desire to govern. The way that psychologism is used, as a tool proving or critiquing the truth forwarded 
about immigration and immigrants, about racism and nationalism, about social evolution etc., is what we 
shall be paying attention to throughout the analysis. 
In the epistemological context historicism, as a tool of guarding against the unthought embedded in 
historicity, refers to the hermeneutical20 view that knowledge and meanings, in their essence, can be 
understood only in reference to their historical and local conditions, to the context that they have been 
formed in. Hermeneutical analysis is a different historical analysis than semiology, because it asserts 
the infiniteness of interpretation, whereas semiology battles that, which does not mean that these two 
forms of chasing truth would not in practice converge (Foucault 2000c, 278). Hence, vigilant historical 
analysis becomes another potential route to positivity: It becomes a way of deciphering, of interpreting 
the true meaning of things ‘as they were’. Historicism becomes a way of isolating lucid and positive 
                                                     
20 Hermeneutics is a philosophical approach associated especially with Martin Heidegger who was writing at the early part of 
the twentieth century. Hermeneutics opened up the question of the primacy of the cogito and human knowledge in relation 
to their historical context, thus relativizing truth as historical (e.g. Anderson et al. 1986, 65-67; Ramberg and Gjesdal 
2005). The hermeneutical tradition has influenced Foucault's thought, but the focus of hermeneutics remained with 
contextual interpretation, of which Foucault was critical, associating it with ‘commentary’ (see Foucault 1966/2002, 373; 
also Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, xix). Nevertheless, Foucault's post-structuralism is a form of radical hermeneutics 
(Foucault 2000a) (Foucault 2000a, 278). 
 
40 
totalities of true phenomena and things, because it arrests time and overcomes finiteness and, thus, 
provides criticism and therefore validity to scientific knowledge.  
At this conjunction we also find Foucault's work: Instead of wanting to overcome historicity Foucault 
embraces it, thus revealing the changing character of systems of thinking and the knowledge produced. 
Importantly, because of Foucault's insistence on discontinuity—not continuity as traditional historical 
analysis would have it (White 1994)—Foucault's historicism is not a socio-evolutionary narrative, but 
one filled with ruptures and dislocations, with emergence and ambiguity. Equally, a lot of critical, 
decentring theory is done under psychologism. This highlights the reason why Foucault never asserted 
that his theory would be post-modern theory: His and other post-structuralist critique is situated inside 
the traditions of critique embedded in the modern mode of knowing (Foucault 1966/2002, 239). Both 
historicism and psychologism are related to the final step that the modern mode of knowing takes to 
justify its production of true knowledge; they are related to the step of tracing origins, which shall be 
discussed next.  
The final solution to the problem of historicity of language and man’s knowledge is the attempt to fix 
‘Origins’, in which the modern cogito assumes that he can find the truthful essence of his knowledge 
and guard against finiteness by knowing the origin of his empirico-transcendental knowledge. 
Consequently, modernity aims to trace man in his life, labour and language back to his origin (Foucault 
1966/2002, 363). In practice, however, the origin is inaccessible to man: it is not only because in the 
search for the pure and original essence of man, the modern man finds a monkey (Nietzsche quoted in 
Foucault 2000d, 79), but, rather, the origin escapes into the darkness of history, as the origin cannot be 
known except through language, which initially was epistemologically problematized anyhow (Foucault 
1966/2002, 360). In Foucault's analysis, modern epistemology attempts to solve this circularity through 
cogito’s most peculiar ability to elude the eluding of origins: The retreat of origins is halted by the return 
of the origin in the future, in the repetition of that which has already begun (Foucault 1966/2002, 362). 
That is, the positivity of knowledge is grounded in the constant repetition of things, words and 
discourses, which highlights their true, positive quality and offers a way to circumvent the eluding of 
origins and of attaining universality, thus lending positivity also to discourses of common sense—
because it is in their repetition that they attain their truth value.  
In academic theories this method is often seen in the construction of a history and transposing this 
history to the future, in the tracing of the origin of things and their repetition to highlight how things 
should be ordered. For example, the retreat and return of origins can be seen in the way that 
primordialist discourse of nationalism ground the truthfulness of nationalism in the constant return of 
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‘nationalist’ conflict, policies, cultures and psychologies. Similarly, the liberal, republican or civic 
discourses of nationalism presume that the state can be marked as a universal—rather than national—
phenomenon in the retreat and return of its original form: Charles Taylor, for example, uses a 
conceptualisation of history to portray the effect that the lack of appreciation of the ‘true’ origin, of the 
true essence of state, has had on the universality of the liberal order:  
But subsequently, so much did nationalism become the rule, as a basis for patriotism that the 
original prenationalist societies themselves began to understand their own patriotism in 
something like nationalist terms. Instead of seeing liberal institutions as uncomplicatedly 
universal, nationalism accredited the idea that in each society they must be tailored to the 
particular genius of the people (Taylor 1997, 41).  
Taylor interprets history so that he can show how some countries erred and started thinking that the 
universal organisation of state was actually a national invention. Here the liberal assumption of 
universalism, which should be readily available for the lucid cogito capable of guarding against the 
impurities distorting the true essence of things, is nicely outlined: institution and structures of society are 
universal, and any particularist interpretation of their origins is an expression of the ‘murky’ unthought 
and should have been resisted. The truthfulness of the knowledge of patriotism and republicanism is in 
the fact of its repetition from Ancient Greece to modernity in the minds of the most lucid and rational.  
Tools of Decentring: Empirico-Transcendental Riddle, Psychologism and Historicism 
According to Foucault, at the end of it, the modern cogito is unable to overcome the circular 
constellation of his mode of knowing. The historicist process of transcending the limits of knowledge 
succumbs to the tautology of the return of the origin or perpetual interpretation in the same fashion as 
psychologist knowledge succumbs to perpetual analysis. Hence, we can see how knowledge becomes 
a matter of discourse, a matter of applying a constellation of language, an already-interpretation, to (our 
experience of) reality. In Foucault's analysis the vigilant cogito falls into an anthropological sleep, a 
comforting epistemological slumber. Foucault explains:  
And so we find philosophy falling asleep once more in the hollow of this Fold; this time not the 
sleep of Dogmatism, but that of Anthropology. All empirical knowledge, provided it concerns man, 
can serve as a possible philosophical field in which the foundation of knowledge, the definition of 
its limit, and, in the end, the truth of all truth must be discoverable. [...] [T]he pre-critical analysis 
of what man is in his essence becomes the analytic of everything that can, in general, be 
presented to man’s experience (Foucault 1966/2002, 372).  
Yet, Foucault offers no solution to the circularity of seeking transcendental truth, and it is clear that he 
does not envision himself making a radical break from the modern mode of knowing either (Foucault 
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2000a, 447-450).21 Nevertheless, Foucault has a clear epistemological anti-humanist, “anti-
anthropological sleep”, agenda of trying to think ‘without immediately thinking it is man who is thinking’.  
Therefore, analytically this research shall not ground its starting point in a preconception of man, in the 
presumed identity of cogito. This research does not view Finnish immigration policy from the viewpoint 
of how well it responds to the ‘reality’ of man’s multicultural essence or to ‘universal’ values, or how well 
it protects the national order of things. Man is not viewed either as a cultural, universal or resisting 
being. The attempt of the research is not to understand which one of the discourses relating to 
immigration is closer to the ‘truth’, as judged by a diagnosed return of a discursive order. The aim is to 
partake in the critique of reason, in the critique of the mentality of governing immigration. This is done by 
engaging with this epistemological critique in an active manner. The tactics employed by the knowing 
subject, that is the empirico-transcendental doublet, become a method of analysis. The ‘death of the 
subject’ is operationalized through the empirico-transcendental riddle. That is, the secondary layer of 
analysis, which focuses on strategies of power/knowledge, will help in guarding against the fatiguing 
effect of common sense by operationalizing epistemological critique through the tools of decentring, 
such as the empirico-transcendental riddle, or the recognition of the use of psychologism or historicism 
to produce positivity. 
We have now seen where the strategies of historicism and psychologism are situated in the modern 
mode of knowing and its critique. These methods of affirming positivity end up functioning like strategies 
of power/knowledge in practice. In light of the inadequacy of the solution presented to the problem of 
language and historicity by the modern mode of knowing, the manoeuvres of power/knowledge become 
central to understanding how truth is produced. Foucault explains: 
Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations; there can exist 
different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, 
circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy (Foucault 
1976/1998, 101-102). 
                                                     
21 As said earlier, because of the centrality of cogito’s identity to knowing, psychologism and historicism occupy a major 
position in the social scientific field, and not least in critical theory and post-structuralism. The influence of historicism is 
clearly evident in Foucault as well as in other post-structuralist writers’ texts (Young 1981, 8, 12 and footnote 21). Although 
Foucault advocates the abandoning of all psychologism and historicism in the sense of ‘retrieving the origin’ (Foucault 
1966/2002, 372), the epistemological foundations of modern psychoanalytical methods as well as historicism can also be 
used as a form of critique and as a tool for decentring both the knowledge and the cogito. Taking this into account, it can 
be clearly see why Foucault refused to speak about a ‘Postmodern’ era in terms of epistemology (Foucault 1966/2002, 
239): For him the critique of the modern mode of knowing that he was forwarding was not radical enough as he still 
employed the epistemological configuration of modernity in his critique. Nor did he support the eventualisation that is 
typical of some postmodern research, but rather advised to keep a balance between structuralising and eventualising 
research orientations (Foucault 2002b).  
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[R]ather than looking for the single form, the central point from which all the forms of power would 
be derived by way of consequence or development, one must first let them stand forth in their 
multiplicity, their differences, their specificity, their reversibility: study them therefore as relations 
of force that intersect, interrelate, converge, or, on the contrary, oppose one another or tend to 
cancel each other out (Foucault 2000b, 59). 
Hence, power functions in a web of relations in which various power games of truth operate tactically 
without a need to be consistent or uniform. The choice of the mode of re-affirming positivity, through 
either psychologism or historicism, is inherently selective and it can have varying power effects. The 
impact of psychologism and historicism are further reinforced when employed in unison with either 
universalizing or particularizing strategies of power/knowledge that we will discuss later in this chapter. 
Keeping this in mind, we will now turn towards discussing the framework of liberal governmentality and 
state racism. This will entail the explication of how this modern mode of knowing inserts itself to the 
centre of the modern practice of governing. In doing this, we will pinpoint further tools of decentring the 
power/knowledge constellation of modern governmentality that defines itself as a scientifically sound 
mode of governing.  
2.3. Liberal Governmentality 
As has been indicated, modern biopolitical governmentality is inherently linked to the erosion (but not 
the end) of rule based on sovereignty and law, which enables a shift towards biopower; a shift from 
“take life or let live” to “to make live and to let die” (respectively Foucault 1976/1998, 136; and 1975-
76/1997, 241). This transformation in the modes of understanding the governing of state and society 
entails a shift from punishment to discipline, from sovereign reign to government, from conquest to 
security, and from the sovereign’s subjects to biopolitical citizen-population (Foucault 1977-78/2007). As 
said, biopolitics is an extension of the role of government to the governing of the population according to 
the administrative imperative of optimizing and improving the health and welfare of populations. It refers 
to when historically tax collection came to be bolstered by increasingly in-depth policy formulation; to 
when the King stopped merely collecting his dues and government started to aim at increasing the 
taxable income through governmental intervention. The concept of the population was essential to this 
development of biopolitical governmentality. It is the socio-scientific knowledge—the product of this 
circular model of affirming positivity—about the population and its economy that becomes central for 
biopolitical governmentality. 
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2.3.1. Biopolitical Governmentality, Science and Naturalism 
Biopolitics fundamentally conceptualises the population as an object as well as a means of government. 
As said, this change in the modes of governing happened in conjunction with Malthusian 
conceptualisations of making the population both a risk and a resource. Central to this understanding 
was the quality and quantity of the population, in relation to resources needed to sustain it, giving rise to 
the need to govern the population, its habits, health and productivity (e.g. Dean 1991). Therefore, 
biopolitical governmentality, in the Foucaultian sense,22 refers to government that takes as its object the 
administration of life through technologies such as normalisation and discipline.  
On the surface, there is an evident paradox in linking liberalism with the increasing governmentalisation 
inherent to biopolitics, as liberalism is typically associated with weariness towards increased 
government. This paradox is solved through vigilance: Liberal governmentality becomes an art of 
limiting government, of questioning who can govern and how much can be governed, of being critical of 
its own reign. That is, technologies of governing also become an object of the cogito’s practical 
vigilance. But this shift is not solely a result of a belief in freedom, or in ‘humanism’ or ‘morality’; the 
rationality underlying liberal governmentality is related to the epistemological transition embodied in the 
Enlightenment giving rise to a process of conceptualising government in terms of science, and 
specifically in terms of political economy and the natural sciences (Foucault 1978-79/2008; Foucault 
1977-78/2007; Foucault 1975-76/1997). Society is not governed as much through raw power and 
morality as through quasi-natural laws (e.g. Foucault 1977-78/2007, 349-354; Foucault 1978-79/2008, 
15-17, 61-62, 115; also Burchell 1991).23 The liberal vigilance against the murky unthought of the desire 
                                                     
22 One of the current misrepresentations of Foucault's thinking is Agamben’s interpretation of Foucault's concept of 
biopower. As various theorists have shown, Agamben mistakes a method of government with a field of governing. In 
asserting that Foucault is mistaken in thinking that the state did not govern life before biopolitics, Agamben ignores 
Foucault's message in Discipline and Punish, where Foucault indeed asserts that the sovereign had always had rule over 
life, but its government had been implemented through punishment, not discipline. Foucaultian biopolitics signifies the 
extension of a different mode of governing that relies on discipline and normalisation into the biological life of the 
population. Agamben instead talks about sovereign power over life, the right to take life, and not about power as a matter 
of ‘making live’. As Prozorov insists Agamben does not follow Foucault's call to abandon the conceptualisations of political 
power in terms of sovereignty and law, but rather conflates these modalities of power (Prozorov 2007, 103; also 
Ojakangas 2005) which rather leads to exceptionalising analysis of politics through extremes such as the concentration 
camp, for example. 
23 The way I am using naturalised laws here should not be confused with the old traditions of natural laws in the sense that 
we are focusing on how conceptualisations of the natural are used in politics. The concept of the natural does not appear 
in politics in the same way that it does in theories of natural law of morality or jurisprudence. Rather, the natural must be 
understood through the limits of politics, through the silences and the unthought, rather than through explicit designations 
towards either socio-biological theories or theories of natural rights. Although, according to Foucault, neo-liberalism 
ceased to conceptualise economic laws as natural laws and rather diverted to conceptualising them in terms of rule of law 
(Foucault 1978-79/2008, 162-163), we cannot deem this as a fundamental alteration of governmentality. That there is 
something ‘sacred’ or ‘untouchable’ in politics that speaks of the limits of liberal governmentality that are vaguely couched 
in terms of naturalised laws. Both neo-liberal economic and liberal population management maintain market veridiction and 
the superiority of the market over the sovereign despite changes of rhetoric and therefore it is sufficient to concentrate on 
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to govern does not mean ‘no government’: it only means ‘not too much government’ (Foucault 1978-
79/2008, 12-13). 
When to govern means to understand the laws that underpin the population and the economy, 
government becomes inherently linked to science. Governing becomes a task that requires expertise 
based on scientific knowledge about society and the human, about its qualities and quantities. This is 
where the discourses of social Darwinism and eugenics make their entrance into the field of 
governmentality. This shift towards scientifically sound governing is historically interlinked with the birth 
of evolutionism and the ensuing birth of social sciences (Foucault 2002a, 127-130). In this context, 
population and the economy become imagined in terms of quasi-organic, systemic interactions and 
naturalised laws giving rise to a socio-biological corpus of knowledge ranging from Lamarck, Cuvier and 
Darwin to Spencer and the later positivist social sciences (e.g. Hofstadter 1945; Young 1969). We will 
return to this nexus of knowledge in Chapter 4. 
The requirement that discourses of governing be ‘scientific’, ‘objective’ and ‘systematic’ created and 
tasked the social sciences and political economy with the duty to discover these non-distortable laws of 
the population and the economy. Thereof ‘the natural limits of governing’ were made essential to the 
liberal self-critique of too much state (e.g. Dean 1999, 51). It is in this naturalised realm of society and 
its social evolution that psychologism and historicism find their logical ground as tools of questioning the 
positivity of government and science. Further, this socio-economic and socio-biological nexus is where 
the binary of universalism/particularism enters the heart of liberal governmentality. In the context of 
conceptualising government through naturalised laws that are necessarily universal, particularism 
presents scientific knowledge with a need to signify and explain the particular in relation to the universal. 
The particular essentially needs to be a part of the whole—this method of power/knowledge often leads 
into strategies of governing through the abnormalization of the particular. 
Tools of Decentring: Naturalisation 
In important ways, this scientific view of society was based on an extension of biological metaphors to 
social reality. This metaphoric extension acquired a status of unquestioned common sense, it became a 
constituent element of social sciences (Stepan 1990). This gives rise to a certain naturalism in social 
sciences and, consequently, in liberal governmentality. For example, the body-politic belongs to a series 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the way governing immigration is subjected to the veridiction of the market. Consequently, I refer to these a priori limits 
and assumptions as naturalised laws, not natural laws in the classical or academic sense (e.g. Himma 2005). The history 
of the interconnections between political theory and moral philosophy or natural law jurisprudence are outside the scope of 
this study, nevertheless as with other academic discourses, we are conceptualising them through the way they become 
employed in politics.  
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of organic conceptualisations of society. The modern epistemological configuration, which can ground 
positivity in the truth of discourse, allows for social scientific knowledge to be produced through 
analogies and metaphors. Especially organic, medical or nature-based metaphors are used as evidence 
of the natural(ised) laws that govern society: money becomes the blood of the body, government the 
brain, the delinquent the cancer, cultural memes the genes etc. These metaphors impose their own 
organic logic on society and its government, which functions as a way of naturalising society, for better 
or worse. Importantly, the organic definitions a priori assume that the state, society, and economy—like 
any prospering organism—are cohesive, not functioning against each other. These metaphors assume 
that society’s various parts and functions are contributing towards the same end by performing their own 
naturalised activities as evidenced, for example, by the Durkheimian conceptualisations of organic 
solidarity, without which society is assumed to have a functional malady. With naturalised laws come 
organic models of society and the ‘body politic’: the theories of social evolutionism, the dynamics of the 
survival of the fittest, the invisible hand of the market, which is an euphemism for the quasi-organic, 
natural dynamics of the economy, social cohesion etc. Whilst contemporary explanations of society 
have lost much of the organic language, especially in academia, the commonsensical 
conceptualisations of how to think about governing, the metaphors used, the dynamics assumed etc., 
do implicitly contain the limiting effects of naturalism, as in the assumption that osmosis should be the 
logic of immigrant integration. 
Foucault asserts that it is indeed this naturalism that is fundamentally original to the emergence of 
liberal governmentality (1978-79/2008, 61), although this naturalism is posited as an opposite to the 
state. That is, government is artificial and so are its laws and technologies of governing, but ‘civil 
society’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘nation’ and ‘race’ were variably made into quasi-natural systems (1977-78/2007, 
349). This naturalism becomes inherently connected to the limits of governing under liberalism. In its 
attempt to guard against too much artificial governing, liberal governmentality executes government 
through freedom in ways that attempts to respect the naturalised limits of governing and leave enough 
room for the ‘natural’ to function. The appropriate limits of state intervention are defined by the ‘natural’: 
To govern well means to know the laws of ‘natural’ society. This naturalism is how liberal 
governmentality makes itself inevitable, unquestionable and establishes itself as a taken-for-granted, 
commonsensical truth. Importantly then, it is this naturalism also that helps to silence the limits of 
government: that which can be governed is significantly impacted by that which is thought to be 
(un)natural. 
The quasi-organic society is imagined to be linked to its milieu through the population, the economy 
and, specifically, the desires of the population, which are understood to function as the primus motor of 
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the socio-economic and socio-biological entity that was called ‘race’ (Foucault 1977-78/2007, 70-79). It 
is this biological order of things, the inherent socio-biology of man that “appeared as a given foundation 
of society that was not of a political order’” (Polanyi quoted in Dean 1991, 69). To improve the wealth 
and the health of the population then becomes dependent on a range of socio-biological and socio-
economic factors linked to the metaphorical extension of the ‘organic’ to society. Therefore, it is not only 
truth that is grounded in the ontology of man as the empirico-transcendental doublet, but also governing 
needs to find its foundation in the psycho-biological and socio-biological ontology of man, in his 
evolutionary biology (e.g. Rose 1999, 114-119). Importantly, in comparison to the earlier modes of 
governing, these naturalised laws in liberal governmentality are not natural rights in the early religio-
philosophical sense, but based on the inherently biological nature of man. In this sense liberal 
governmentality is not a discourse of rights, but rather rights appear as a means of government, as a 
means of governing desires. In order to critically assess these modes of thinking about government and 
the naturalised limits of government, we need to pay attention to the silence and scarcity of meaning 
around the discourses of too much state and naturalised discourses of governing. That is, we need to 
pay attention to the type of explanations and significations that are not circulated or that are silenced as 
well as to the discourses that are utilised. For example, we need to be mindful of what kind of socio-
biological discourses enlighten our notions of competition and freedom, democracy or work etc. Such 
definitions of government through naturalism impact on the technologies of governing, which shall be 
discussed next. 
Tools of Decentring: Governing through Freedom 
The central way in which naturalism impacts on the technologies of governing is epitomised in the 
concept of desire, i.e. the individual’s interest, through which liberal government is made to function 
(Foucault 1976/1998, 138-139; Foucault 1977-78/2007, 70-75; Foucault 1978-79/2008; see also Dean 
2010). Desire, natural laws and freedom became the essential tools of liberal governmentality—because 
it is in (relative) freedom that the man behaves as nature indicates. Thus, almost paradoxically 
government is required to leave certain naturalised dimensions of society (economy, civil society and 
the private) outside government, but at the same time government is made dependent on the proper 
functioning of these dimensions. Because of this the liberal technologies of government are not 
formulated in terms of ‘planning’ or ‘directing’, but in terms of organizing society and its legal framework 
so that it permits and enables naturalised laws to function to benefit the wealth and health of the 
population (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 232). The biopolitical impetus to govern the labour ‘force’ and 
productive ‘power’ of the population gives rise to a need to govern the capabilities of the population. But 
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this governing of the capabilities of the population must happen at a distance; by organising society so 
that naturalised laws and mechanisms of the population and the economy are respected.  
In liberal governmentality the human is defined as radically free based on which government is made to 
function largely through conceptualisations of rights and freedoms: In the case of immigration, the task 
of governing immigrants is the task of identifying how their conduct can be conducted through their 
freedom and their rights. “To govern humans is not to crush their capacity to act, but to acknowledge it 
and to utilize it for one’s own benefits” (Rose 1999, 4). This is a freedom against the state, against the 
state’s ability to distort the naturalised laws of society and the economy. Although government through 
freedom may be an oxymoron to some, the way freedom is conceptualised in liberalism could be 
characterised as “an artefact of government” (Rose 1999, 63) instead of conceptualising this freedom as 
a freedom (not) to be, which is how the Foucaultian thinking on freedom can be characterized (Prozorov 
2007). Rose explains this difference through analysing Fukuyama’s explanation of societies that can be 
governed through liberalism: Fukuyama characterises a society that is not ‘anarchist’ or ungovernable 
as a society that is “capable of self-government”, as a society that “depends ultimately not just on law 
but on the self-restraint of individuals. If they are not tolerant and respectful of each other”, “if they 
cannot cohere for common purposes, then they will need an intrusive State to provide the organization 
they cannot provide themselves” (Fukuyama quoted in Rose 1999, 62).24 The impetus to ‘cohere for 
common purposes’, of creating social cohesion, has to be made to happen: It is not sufficient to set 
people free, but people have to be made free, and free in a specific way contributing towards social 
cohesion (Rose 1999, 65). There is, thus, a clear qualitative criterion for those who can be free from 
state intervention. This freedom is not a sham, but it is a task. This task is what civilisation depends on. 
Further, as Rose points out, Hayek defined freedom as “an artefact of civilization” that “was made 
possible by the gradual evolution of the discipline of civilization” and natural selection (Hayek quoted in 
Rose 1999, 67).25 Therefore liberal governmentality cannot be analysed without analysing power as at 
the same time restrictive and enabling, direct and indirect and as extending beyond institutions and 
forming proliferated relations of power rather than domination. This is also essential for the analysis of 
immigration control: because technologies of governing need to function from a distance, the immediacy 
of a single law, individual policies and exceptional practices are not enough to bring out the rationalities 
embedded in the apparatus of governing at a distance. ‘Making live’ is a technology of governing at a 
distance that is extensively executed through rewards, such as a right of immigration. That is, the 
                                                     
24 Original reference to Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, London, Penguin, 1996, 
pp. 357-358. 
25 Original reference to Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. III, The Political Order of a Free People, London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 163.  
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technology of ‘making live’ presumes that rights can be used as rewards to be earned—as rights are not 
necessarily posited as inalienable rights and limits to moral government, but merely as means of 
government. 
When vigilance against the undue distortion of naturalised laws is imperative for liberal governmentality 
the application of power becomes less evident and more flexible, because power appears as a matter of 
respecting the ‘natural’.26 The most typical strategic processes that have power effects, are the 
techniques of discipline and normalisation (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 38-39). The effect of these 
disciplinary techniques is to make it difficult, if not impossible, to think and act outside the normal. The 
normal is essentially a norm, a subjectification and a power/knowledge constellation that designates that 
which is and/or ought to be under liberal governmentality, thus conducting the conduct of population, as 
a matter of governing society at a distance, so that it benefits its own wealth and health. As Gerken 
(2007) has pointed out, by extending social citizenship to immigrants the neo-liberal conceptualisation of 
immigrant as either ‘factually’ benefiting or not benefiting the economy and society renders immigrants a 
part of the population to be normalised and disciplined. These technologies of governing start with the 
normalised, commonsensical ways of making sense of immigration, which in turn define the limits of the 
unthought and impose intellectual scarcity around the analysis immigration. This scarcity can be seen, 
for example, in the limited use of evolutionary discourses around immigration, as shall be discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
Tools of Decentring: Market Veridiction 
The issue of intellectual scarcity and normalisation can be approached by investigating how liberal 
governmentality decides the limits of governing. So how does liberal governmentality perfect its art of 
not governing too much the quasi-natural spheres of civil society and the economy? How—or rather 
where—can true knowledge about its methods of governing be produced? The market is the answer. 
The limits of governing in (neo)liberalism are formulated as principles and methods of rationalizing the 
exercise of government according to the economic maximum (Venn 2009). This economic maximum 
translates into a practice of governing that “aims to maximize its effects whilst reducing its costs as 
much as possible” (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 318). That is, what liberalism does is apply the enterprise 
model to assessing the truthfulness of governing. Truth is addressed through political economy, which 
means that liberal (economic) theory asserts that the market is the site of veridiction, of speaking the 
                                                     
26 A good contemporary example of this is the politics around same-sex marriage and adoption rights, in which people utilise 
discourses about natural procreation and the natural family, with all the supposed implications for child upbringing by 
‘unnatural’ families. 
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truth.27 That is, the market determines the ‘true’ value of things—individuals, products, enterprises, 
policies etc.—when it is allowed to function according to its ‘natural’ laws of competition and 
spontaneous mechanisms of price and value determination. But it is in this edifice of the homo 
oeconomicus ruled by his desires, the value of which is assessed by the market, that government also 
finds its limit: If indivisible human rights are the limits that legal discourses try to impose on sovereignty 
and government, it is the naturalised market of desires of citizens that now impose limits on government 
(Foucault 1978-79/2008, 16-20; see also Donzelot 2008; McNay 2009; Venn 2009; Harcourt 2011; 
Montesinos Coleman 2013). In the social arena, the logic of competition operationalizes and 
materialises “inequality [that] is natural and inevitable” (Venn 2009, 214); the law of natural selection 
and the survival of the fittest, which applies to companies as much as it does to states, commodities and 
humans. 
Intellectual scarcity, or the limits around analysing immigration, is produced through liberalism’s 
extension of the same market oriented truth regime to the value of governmental action: “inasmuch as 
prices are determined in accordance with natural mechanisms of the market they constitute a standard 
of truth which enables us to discern which governmental practices are correct and which are erroneous” 
(Foucault 1978-79/2008, 32). Government policies, educational, health, social policies and immigration 
policies come to be evaluated in terms of investments, gains, costs and benefits (e.g. Burchell et al. 
1991). Government is put in front of a “permanent economic tribunal” (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 247). 
“One must govern for the market, rather than because of the market” (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 121), for 
being the operative word. The state must be “under the supervision of the market rather than a market 
supervised by the state” (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 116). The drama of this truth production is played out 
in daily newscasts with their ritualistic sequence of events: Truth is produced by first discussing political 
or enterprise issues and then presenting the oracle of the stock market reaction that is endowed with the 
inklings of papal infallibility (that explicitly determines, for example, the correctness of government action 
in dealing with the current economic crisis today) (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 85). Thus, the market 
functions as a key technology of producing truth, as a key technology of power/knowledge that renders 
truth technical, not political. 
It is not only the government that is subjected to the tribunal of the market, but increasingly the (neo-
)liberal enterprise model becomes an important mode of managing and analysing civil society. The 
                                                     
27 Veridiction here should be distinguished from the concept of parrhesia, of speaking the truth by a person, of judicial 
veridiction. Rather, it is the market, not the court or another authority, that functions as a site of determining whether truth 
has been spoken, of assessing the truthfulness of, for example, policies, or that the market has the ability to speak the 
truth (cf. Foucault 1983/2001).  
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entrepreneurial logic of ‘succeeding in a competitive environment through adaptation to the market and 
by increasing efficiency and production’ is paralleled by the analysis of social problems and social 
relations (granted this is done in a more nuanced way than when discourses of survival of the fittest 
were employed to analyse society). That is, the logic of the enterprise is applied to analysing individuals 
and the individual’s relation with him/herself. The citizen has to conduct his/her conduct as if (s)he was 
an enterprise: to manage time, goals, life plans, choices, emotions and thoughts in an efficient and 
productive way. Increasingly also communities, families, parenting etc. are being analysed in terms of 
“investment-cost-profit” models (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 176, 242; also Donzelot 1977/1979, 69). The 
neo-liberal enterprise model advises individuals and governments to conduct their conduct though 
models of (market) success or failure, input and output, invested resources and predicted gains. Whilst 
policy analysis becomes a matter of cost-benefit analysis, conducting the conduct of the population is 
done in terms of ‘human capital’ with the impetus of not governing too much and moderating the impact 
of the market’s truth regime (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 142-149). 
Thus, essential to liberal governmentality is that truth increasingly becomes decided in relation to the 
market and its models. When posited as a sphere of ‘natural’ law and naturalised mechanisms, the 
market becomes the famous ‘invisible hand’ that keeps up the ‘natural’ equilibrium of society and the 
economy. Governing to compensate for the market’s effects starts bordering on the unnatural: because 
in essence it is to tamper with the ‘truth’. What is silenced with this conceptualisation of the market is 
that as much as the market of goods is dictated by desires, whims, wishes, crises, prejudices and 
shifting fashions of common opinion of the people who can afford to participate in it, the stock market is 
only the common opinion of the rich who have the money to sell and buy stock. Therefore, the ‘truth’ 
produced always parallels class. Secondly, market veridiction has important consequences in terms of 
moral discourses: when truth is produced by market veridiction and the state needs to restrain itself from 
governing society through unnaturalised technology, morality easily, if not constantly, falls prey to the 
liberal naturalism produced through the market; or as Venn describes privileging “the calculable over the 
incalculable” eliminates “the ineffable and the spiritual” (Venn 2009, 229).  
Consequently, what we have are two overdetermined signifiers: ‘natural’ and ‘market’ that have an 
important role to play in validating liberal government and in limiting moral discourses, for example 
about equality, justice and human rights. They help to render governing technological, by making 
governing a matter of making the ‘market’ and the society to function naturally and optimally, and 
thereby by de-politicizing government and introducing scarcity of  meaning to the power/knowledge 
constellation (Venn 2009). By doing this, importantly, (neo-)liberalism ends up positing political economy 
above the sovereign, by insisting that the markets supervise the state and not that state supervise the 
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markets (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 116, 293). This model of market veridiction, with its analysis of society 
and humans through the enterprise form (e.g. cost-benefit, ‘human capital’ analysis), plays an important 
part in the governmentality of immigration, as shall be seen.  
Tools of Decentring: Scarcity and Silencing 
As has been indicated, it is not only that we should be vigilant of where the limits of self-critical 
governing are put and how truth is produced in liberal governmentality, but we also need to keep in mind 
the strategy of naturalising as a technology of power/knowledge. That which is most revealing in any 
discursive formation, according to Foucault, is not the plenitude of meanings, but the scarcity of 
meaning that the power/knowledge constellation imposes (Foucault 1970/1981, 65; Foucault 2000a, 
278 and 450-451). It is this shortage of possible interpretations, the scarceness of meaning that 
Foucaultian analysis aims to uncover (Foucault 1970/1981, 73; also Young 1981, 49; Hook 2001/2007, 
12). Therefore, when we talk about too much government, we need to ask ourselves what is the lack of 
government supposed to produce and who produces effects, what effects, how, through what 
technologies, why and when? When we talk about social cohesion, we need to ask ourselves what does 
this problematize; why, how, what is it supposed to enable and through what mechanisms? When we 
talk about rights, we need to ask ourselves what these rights are assumed to produce. We need to 
address the scarcity of meaning that the silencing of these questions and answers introduces to 
governmentality and the power/knowledge constellation—not only in relation to immigration but in 
general.  
When socio-biological laws, with their universal desires embodied in the rational man with self-interests, 
regularly produce an appropriate balance of wealth and health, the task of government is to leave this 
socio-biological balance to function at optimum levels of freedom. This is how liberalism extends its 
universalizing rationality on government and makes desire, in its variations, the object of scientific 
enquiry and government. These analyses of desires, natures and laws are not conducted in transparent 
and equal ways, as history teaches us. Social Darwinism and eugenics were the most obvious 
examples of the ‘distorted’ analysis of naturalised laws, that wholly succumbed to the circularity of the 
empirico-transcendental riddle. Yet, because liberalism assumes a priori that government cannot 
succeed, if it does not respect the non-distortable, naturalised laws, socio-evolutionary thought remains 
at the centre of liberal governmentality: To govern properly the government should not tamper with 
these laws that treat such factors as what the human is capable of and what not in the political sense 
(Foucault 1978-79/2008; see also Dean 2007, 40).  For example, socio-biological discourses about 
essential human selfishness are constantly used to limit and capture the application of the discourses of 
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solidarity inside the nationalist framework and the discourses of survivalism, i.e. that a human does 
whatever is needed to survive, are used to explain the need to eliminate or reduce social benefits in 
order to motivate people to work. The next chapter explores these points in further detail. 
2.3.2. State Racist Governmentality, Racism and Social Darwinism  
One of the central ways in which scarcity of meaning is introduced into the power/knowledge 
constellation underlying liberal governmentality is ‘race’. When talking about state racism, the issue of 
‘race’ and racism becomes central to the thesis at hand. Racialisation is essential for liberal 
governmentality, or rather, the rendering of its various intersectionalities quasi-biological,28 is essential 
for liberal governmentality because of the underlying naturalism that is assumed to limit the way society 
can be governed. Foucault insisted that within this modern framework ‘race’ became a central tool of 
exclusion (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 61), like many others have done (Bauman 1989; Agamben 
1995/1998, Goldberg 2002). This will become evident in the next chapter discussing the structure of the 
Finnish immigration apparatus. As has been indicated, Foucault's concept of state racism is defined by 
this socio-evolutionary framework, inside which the naturalised conceptualisations of society as ‘race’ 
function. So that the analysis of the immigration discourses and technologies of immigration control will 
make sense, in this section, we will elaborate on Foucault's thinking on race and racism in relation to his 
concept of state racism. This necessarily entails discussing both liberalism and nationalism and their 
relation to ‘race’. In doing this, we will continue paying attention to the game of truth and the strategies 
employed to constitute the contemporary power/knowledge constellation. 
Tools of Decentring: Normalisation  
First, we shall discuss the issue of nationalism, as ‘race’ is most often associated with nationalism. 
Nationalism has clearly been implicated in government through the ‘race’, we need to investigate this 
thinking somewhat further. Typically, the vigilance against the murky unthought in nationalism, i.e. the 
famous excesses such as Nazi Germany, has given rise to the distinction between ‘civic’/’patriotic’ and 
‘primordial’/’nativist’/’chauvinist’ nationalism that runs along the binary of ratio/emotion. But as Billig 
asserts, this supposed rationality of the ‘civic’ or ‘patriotic’ nationalism has been achieved by turning 
nationalism into an exceptional phenomena only related to ‘chauvinism’ or other (offensive) excesses of 
nationalist violence. In this sense civic conceptualisations do not reflect the everyday, banal nationalist 
practices from which all nationalist politics arise (especially Billig 1995, 17). Nationalism is politically 
                                                     
28 Intersectionality is a concept that is typically associated with Crenshaw’s analysis of African-American women’s battle 
against discrimination and how ‘race’ and gender impact the possibilities of resistance (Crenshaw Williams 1994). 
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functional. Many things can be asserted under the rubric of nationalism, but as many have asserted, 
nationalism as such does not purport any singular political model of dealing with political, economic or 
social affairs. Despite its functionality, nationalism “has no answers to any substantive political or moral 
problems” (Vincent 2002, 6; also Balibar in Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 46-47). Therefore, nationalism 
as a discourse needs to be identified as a question of mere loyalty and promotion of ‘national culture 
and interests’ against other cultures or interests. The strategic power of nationalism is in the form: in the 
ability to assert something as ‘nationalist’. In this sense, nationalism is an empty signifier: it has a highly 
variable, unspecifiable meaning as it means different things for different people (Chandler 2007, 78). 
The emptiness of the signifier of nationalism is in the reality that it is difficult to agree on what 
‘nationalism’ in specific situations signifies. Rather, nationalist politics acquire their actual, specific 
content from other isms, such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism, elitism, imperialism, religion, socio-
biology, racism, feminism, male chauvinism etc. The functionality of nationalism for politics comes 
through its role in interest formation, through desire, which was made central to liberal governmentality. 
As a discourse nationalism contributes to the naturalization of liberal governmentality. The main 
condition of operation for nationalist discourses would then be that political, economic or social interests 
are conceptualised in nationalist language. The overarching common-sense designation of things as 
national can, thus, be decentred,29 and we need to keep this in mind, when analysing the apparatus of 
immigration control. 
Gellner (1983/1996), in his grounding work of the modernist school of nationalism studies, asserts that 
nations and nationalism can be understood as intentionally created political projects. That is, nation-
states are political phenomena whereas communities—whose pre-modern compositions did not mirror 
those of modern nation-states—could be conceived as primordial. There is, thus, a difference between 
national/ethnic communities and the modern nation-state. Consequently, theorists of nationalism have 
increasingly started asserting that nations are rather ‘imagined communities’—in that all members of the 
                                                     
29 Vincent even argues that nationalism does not, per se, advocate self-determination, but sees that the conceptualisation of 
the ‘nation-state’ is more an early appropriation of the popular sovereignty discourse by nationalist political actors in 
general rather than an inherent aspect of ‘nationalist’ thought. That is, sovereignty does not need to be national (Vincent 
2002, 14-35). This point between popular sovereignty and nationalism can be connected to Foucault’s thoughts on the 
development of modern liberal governmentality and especially to his analysis of the creation of the counter-history of race.  
In his analysis, the counter-history of race related to the formulation of a historical discourse especially in France and 
England that attempted to question the righteousness of the rule by conquest. Importantly, this question was asked in 
racial terms, by asking whether a conquering race should rule another race (Foucault 1975-76/1997). In this sense, earlier 
forms of political nationalism can also be seen as elitist programmes of self-rule, i.e. as projects that are born on the soil of 
revolt, but that solve the problem of legitimacy of rule through the social contract theory that asserts the willingness of 
those ruled to be ruled (by the conquering race). It is on top of these already ‘racially’ divided societies that nationalism is 
built, further highlighting the role of nationalism as a tool of politics rather than a true expression of the soul of a nation. 
Similarly, Finnish nationalism was created as a project by the largely Swedish-speaking political elite to counter the 
Russification policies of the Russian Czar when Finland was a Grand Duchy of Russia. 
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community never truly interact with each other (Anderson 1991)—or that nations are ‘narrations’ 
(Bhabha 1990) or representations that constitute “a retrospective illusion”, but that also express 
“constraining institutional realities” (Balibar 1990/1996, 132) or depend on cognitive practices (Brubaker 
et al. 2004), instead of asserting the truthfulness of the primordiality of nation(-states) as they stand 
today.  
There is a clear, historically recognised period of political construction of ‘nations’, which questions the 
natural and self-evident characteristics attributed to nation-states. Nationalism as a political movement 
was created to serve the needs of the modernising economy, and as such it was a rationality of 
governing (Shapiro 1997). Modern states required a flexible, educated workforce whose culture would 
be based on a unified, bourgeois value system. In this context, social cohesion is postulated as a 
prerequisite for the functioning of the modern economy. That is, nationalism has a function integral to 
modern governmentality that is driven by the economy and by state interest, which puts a question mark 
over the idealised notion of nation as an organic entity that finally blossoms during the nineteenth 
century as a result of its evolution. Following Gellner’s logic of functionality, governmentality would need 
to consider multiculturalism as the appropriate ism unifying immigration states in a globalising world; 
with the right twist this could even be made into a socio-evolutionary discourse.30  
Nationalism sits at the core of the cogito’s tautological self-affirmation, confining politics and its analysis 
to its circular mode of knowing. We need to look at nationalism as a discourse that functions in the 
realm of the retreat and return of the origin, where the truth is affirmed through perpetual return of the 
phenomenon. Therefore, analytically nationalism needs to be treated as a story about origins typical of 
the modern mode of knowing—which of course does not take away the reality and meaning that some 
give to nationality on the individual level. The fundamental function of nationalism for government—that 
is not for people and their identities—is in how it functions together with the socio-evolutionary 
discourses and how it operates to naturalise the nation-state/race-nation inside liberal governmentality. 
Nationalism makes governing more efficient; it is a tool integral to the power/knowledge constellations of 
modern Western states. Nationalism is a discourse of normalisation most evident in its narrow 
definitions of normal citizens (e.g. Young 2000, 252). This is what makes nationalism such a central 
figure in the modern mode of knowing: its identity politics, its ability to appropriate any position and claim 
its centrality to one’s identity, both in its nation-state and multicultural variants. Consequently, we need 
                                                     
30 In fact, the Finnish National Coalition party, which is a right-wing entrepreneurial party, has made attempts at this direction 
when talking about immigration by claiming that in global markets multicultural skills are an important competitive 
advantage. This rationality is used to defend ‘the right kind of’ employment-based immigration. However, multiculturalism 
remains a ‘skill’ and does not extend to notions of governing society in any sustainable way, which it defines rather through 
discourses of nationalism and law and order. 
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to remember that normalisation is the central function of nationalism: it is integral to the functioning of 
socio-evolutionary discourses as discourses of power. 
Tools of Decentring: Exceptionalisation 
Yet, we cannot separate nationalism from the discourses of ‘race’. As Balibar insists, “[r]acism is 
constantly emerging out of nationalism, not only towards the exterior but towards the interior”, hence the 
relation between nationalism and racism is integral to the modern Western state (Balibar in Balibar and 
Wallerstein 1991). ‘Race’ has been an important and problematic aspect of the Western 
power/knowledge constellation that various strategies of power/knowledge have been employed 
against, but it is not only the excesses of nationalism that explain the centrality of ‘race’ to liberal 
governmentality. Rather, one of the key strategies of introducing a silence around the concept of ‘race’ 
and around its centrality to the state is the exceptionalisation. This exceptionalisation of racism is 
achieved by denying racism through its limited definition, i.e. as a belief in the biology based inferiority of 
some ‘races’, and through the normalisation of discourses of ethnicity, which together allow the 
discourses of racialisation to function as a central dynamic of liberal governmentality (e.g. Lentin 2004; 
2008; 2006/2008).  
Foucault is not the only writer to address the connection between state and racism. Goldberg (especially 
2002) offers a more substantial analysis of the connections between race-nation state, or race-state, 
discussing the apparent contradictions between the Western state in its modern and liberal form and its 
racialised practices. Goldberg pinpoints how the modern Western state relies on an order of things, in 
which heterogeneity and difference are excluded and in which the value of sameness functions as a 
repressive ordering principle (Goldberg 2002, 16), thereby highlighting the naturalised limits of 
normalisation and silence imposed around ‘race’. In similar vein, Omi and Winant discuss the racial 
state in the US as a wider notion. They criticize the transition from explaining phenomena based on race 
to explaining it based on ethnicity as not capable of understanding the complexity of the ‘racial 
formation’ grounded in the hegemonic way of organizing and ruling society (Omi and Winant 1994, 65-
69). Their analysis highlights how the move from ‘race’ to ‘ethnicity’ further limits and excludes variables 
that can be seen as explaining continued racialised stratification of society and how this manoeuvre 
thereby introduces a scarcity of meaning around the implications of ‘race’ on social success. This 
manoeuvre helps to naturalise the structures of society as a result of fair competition in the environment 
of ‘equal opportunity’. 
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As was indicated in the introduction, the Foucaultian governmentality framework relies on the analytical 
cutting off of the King’s head, i.e. on the analytical separation of government and sovereignty. If we want 
to analyse state racism inside the governmentality framework, we need to stop analysing racism as a 
matter of official state action or individual action. Rather, racism has to be analysed as a system of 
dispersion essential to which are its conditions of possibility, i.e. the role that racialising discourses play 
in governing society. As Goldberg (2002) points out, racism is not historically uniform but racist and 
racialising discourses differ. Therefore, we cannot assume that state racism functions similarly either 
historically or in various contexts. Insistence on essential continuity works to promote the 
power/knowledge strategy of exceptionalisation, which is also employed in reference to social 
Darwinism and eugenics, i.e. the ‘bad’ discourses of scientific racism, which have supposedly been 
proven scientifically inaccurate, help to rarefy state racism and social Darwinism. That is, by limiting the 
analysis of state racism to official state policies state racism is made rare and exceptional. This type of 
analysis insists on analysing government through the acts of the sovereign: through slavery, 
segregation, apartheid and Nazism making a “sacred myth” out of these atrocities (Balibar in Balibar 
and Wallerstein 1991, 45-51; also Bauman 1989 and Goldstein 2002). Through this analysis in the 
name of the King’s head, which associates government with the sovereign’s law, helps to establish and 
maintain a difference between ‘scientific racism’ and ‘the ethnicity paradigm’ and, thereby, in many ways 
normalises the utilisation of racialising discourses in politics.  
The ethnicity paradigm refers to early anti-racism, or the UNESCO tradition of anti-racism, in the West. 
The UNESCO tradition ascribes the process by which, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the 
UNESCO was tasked with establishing and publicising the scientific facts about race and race prejudice. 
This gave rise to four statements on ‘the race question’ (1950, 1951, 1967 and 1978)31 that attempted to 
refute scientific racism. The process was influenced by leading anthropologists, like the French 
structuralist Lévi-Strauss and the American physical anthropologist Montagu, as well as by anti-
colonialist and black resistance movements (Lentin 2004). However, much of the scientific thinking of 
the day was intertwined with racialised thinking in many ways and the declaration came to be highly 
criticised in many countries by those who asserted the existence of different races. In this sense, the 
prolongation of the UNESCO process against racism can be seen as a battle of power: who has the 
power to speak truthfully about race (Brattain 2007; Selcer 2012). The end result of the UNESCO 
attempt to do away with the concept of race became a rather watered down assertion: The statements 
problematize the politically suitable ways races had been defined—i.e. nation-races, such as the 
                                                     
31 These can be accessed, for example, at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001229/122962eo.pdf, viewed 
20.10.2013. 
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German race—but at the same time assert the existence of three ‘divisions’, that followed the common 
distinction of the Caucasian, Mongoloid and Negroid ‘races’ based on phenotypical differences. 
Importantly, despite holding the human race practically equal in its biological capabilities and denying 
the significance of biological differences between ‘races’ in intelligence, temperament or personality 
(UNESCO 1950), the UNESCO tradition proposed the “ethnicity paradigm”, which explains human 
differences through ethnicity and culture (Omi and Winant 1994, 14): Instead of ‘race’, people were to 
be distinguished based on their ‘ethnicity’, i.e. through the nationality or ancestry, cultural, language or 
religious groups that they were deemed to belong to. The word ‘ethnicity’, however, started to be used 
as ‘race’ had been used. Although race was made into a social myth, the statements do not disregard 
the evolutionary conceptualisations of cultural difference that had always been the essential way to 
diagnose ‘racial’ inferiority. Rather, progress or lack of it was explained through cultural difference, 
allowing for certain cultures to be understood as ‘less progressive’, if not even ‘regressive’. Cultural 
difference was essentialized by explaining it in the framework of multiple spheres of socio-cultural 
evolution, i.e. by making history into a matter of quasi-biological evolution. By asserting inherent 
differences (even if environmentally explained) between ethnicities and cultures, the UNESCO tradition 
in the end allowed for the re-emergence of the discourses of scientific racism as legitimate—as long as 
they talked about ‘race’ through the vocabulary of ethnicity and culture (see for example Brattain 2007; 
UNESCO 1950).32 This manoeuvre, whilst certainly well-meaning, as demonstrated by its insistence on 
the moral discourses of equal human rights, nevertheless maintained the diagnosis of inferiority and 
merely explained this inferiority through culture. 
Through the UNESCO ethnicity paradigm racism becomes exceptionalised and defined as a belief in 
the inherent superiority/inferiority of some biologically definable ‘races’. Racism is made into a 
presumption about immutable biological or physiological differences between ‘races’, about inherent 
differences in behaviour or ability of different races. This is essentially how racism is being defined in 
Finland by many, not least the (True) Finns. But if, since explicit social Darwinism or scientific racism, 
we have given up using the term ‘race’ and replaced it with ‘ethnicity’, this does not mean that the 
                                                     
32 According to Taguieff, the anti-racist tradition came to imply three suppositions: that cultural phenomena were 
autonomous and separate, that mental structures and modes of living were determined by culture and that different 
cultures were of equal value (Taguieff 2001). This highlights the internal paradoxes of the framework, or rather the 
strategic vulnerabilities of the anti-racist discourse: rather than present itself as a simple moral discourse (a strategy that 
would not be without its hazards of course) the framework strategically enables discourses about fixed psycho-cultural 
structures (which can be linked to structuralist social sciences) and therefore rather proposes discourses of separate 
spheres of development and the difficulty of cross-cultural interaction than discourses about flexible and non-static 
cognitive schemas and intra-cultural variation. What this approach does, by placing itself inside the limits of evolutionary 
theory, is that it enables the resurgence of the notions of polygenesis in the form of civilizational and/or national culture. In 
the end, the ethnicity paradigm is unable to resist the typical racist conceptualisation of the other as an essentialized 
representative of an ‘ethnicity’ or ‘race’.  
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conditions of possibility of racialising rationalities have disappeared. In this sense, it is not a matter of 
the “ahistorical durability of race and racism” but racist formulations alter according to context, they 
acquire different nuances in relation to different discourses (Goldberg 1993, 47-48 and 49, also 
Goldberg 1990a and 1990b). Racism is not in the uniformity of its discursive expressions, but in the 
effects of its functioning (Balibar in Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 18; also Gilroy 1992), essential to which 
is its sustenance through market veridiction and rendering racialisation technical (Murray Li 2007). That 
is, the key is not whether one uses the terminology of ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’, but the end to which these 
terms are used as means. That is, both ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ could be used very differently to the 
common sense way they are often employed in politics. The power is in the effects of discourse, not in 
the vocabulary of the discourse.  
This battle over the definition of racism is also typical of academic theories where a certain method of 
‘reading over’ and ‘appropriate contextualisation’ of racialised thinking in early nationalist theories is 
employed (e.g. Rahikainen 1995). Typically the dismissal of the connection between racism and 
nationalism is presented as epistemological vigilance: Through historicism a hermeneutical 
interpretation is offered that demonstrates vigilance against earlier nationalist discourses or academic 
theories and it is asserted that what the earlier theorists ‘really meant’ when they said ‘race’ is what we 
mean by nations or ethnicity today and that their language was just ‘typical of the time’ (see also 
Weinbaum 2001, 294). Instead of seeing ‘language of the time’ as a soothing assurance, we should 
really be worried about what we mean by ‘nation’, if it is the same as what they meant by ‘race’. The 
dictionary definition of a race from 1992 states that race is “a group of people united or classified 
together on the basis of a common history, nationality, or geographic distribution: the German race”.33 
This rather indicates that the common-sense connection between nation and ‘race’ has not gone 
anywhere; that we commonsensically use the term ‘nation’ as if it was a ‘race’. 
The shortcomings of the UNESCO tradition of anti-racism have been addressed under theories of ‘new 
racism’ or ‘differentialist racism’. Theorists of new racism talk about “racism without races”, which is 
conceptually grounded in the ‘scientifically proven’, “insurmountable cultural differences” that enable the 
substitution of the ‘naturalness’ of race with the ‘naturalness’ of culture (Balibar in Balibar and 
Wallerstein 1991, 21-22; 'differentialist racism' is a term from Taguieff 2001). The concept of race takes 
away change and variation and renders difference quasi-permanent. The power/knowledge strategy of 
naturalising or rendering culture quasi-biological makes culture essential and change at the individual 
and generational level is made slow and incremental rendering difference essential, especially when 
                                                     
33 American Heritage Dictionary of English Language, 3rd edition, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1992. 
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associated with racialising discourses of social evolution. We will return to this question of racism in 
Chapter 4, but before moving onto discussing the Finnish immigration apparatus and its 
problematizations, we need to understand how state racism and Foucault's understanding of racism fit 
into liberal governmentality and its naturalism. 
Regardless of this alignment of Foucault's assertions on race with those of others, Foucault's theories of 
race have perplexed many leading them to disregard his thoughts on race. But as Duffield points out, 
“[r]acism occupies a central, if relatively under-appreciated, part of Michel Foucault’s later work” 
(Duffield 2006, 69; also Stoler 1995, 19-21; MacMaster 2001; Lentin 2004; Venn 2009; and 2011). 
Foucault's self-imposed genealogical desire in Society Must Be Defended was “to trace the full 
development of a biologico-social racism” (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 61). What we are involved in in this 
research is not a genealogy, but a description of the functioning of this socio-biological racism inside the 
socio-evolutionary framework of governing. Therefore, Foucault's thoughts on racism need to be 
understood inside the analysis of its conditions of possibility, i.e. through state racism.  
As said, Foucault defines state racism as a dynamic process of purification and normalisation of the 
race-nation. This purification sits deep in this socio-evolutionary framework. Foucault explains: 
I think we are now in a position to understand a number of things. We can understand, first of all, 
the link that was quickly...established between nineteenth-century biological theory and the 
discourse of power. Basically, evolutionism, understood in the broad sense—or in other words, 
not so much Darwin’s theory itself as a set, a bundle, of notions (such as the hierarchy of species 
that grow from a common evolutionary tree, the struggle for existence among species, the 
selection that eliminates the less fit)—naturally became within a few years during the nineteenth 
century not simply a way of transcribing a political discourse into biological terms, and not simply 
a way of dressing up a political discourse in scientific clothing, but a real way of thinking about the 
relations between colonization, the necessity for wars, criminality, the phenomena of madness 
and mental illness, the history of societies with their different classes, and so on. Whenever, in 
other words, there was a confrontation, a killing or the risk of death, the nineteenth century was 
quite literally obliged to think about them in the form of evolutionism. (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 
256-257) 
That is, evolution becomes a rationale of governing and evolutionary thought functions as a 
fundamental discourse of power. Social evolution becomes the key discourse of power that defines the 
naturalised laws according to which liberal government needs to be conducted. In this framework what 
society needs to be defended against is evolutionary unfitness—whether this unfitness is that of the 
immigrant or that of the citizen. It is inside this framework of fitness that racialisation is employed. The 
notion of the evolution of the population—and its wealth and health, i.e. its fitness—cannot be divorced 
from liberal governmentality. If with liberal governmentality government becomes “inextricably bound up 
with the activity of thought”, this thought in large degree functions inside this socio-evolutionary 
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framework (Rose 1999, 8). Social Darwinism employed many of the rationalities of socio-evolutionary 
thought, eugenics is what brought social Darwinism to the centre of immigration policy, and this is what 
we shall focus on in Chapter 4. 
Before proceeding to discuss social Darwinism and eugenics and their functioning inside state racist 
socio-evolutionary governmentality, I will need to explain the apparatus of immigration control and its 
rationalities in Finland, which functions as the case study in this research. When analysing these 
rationalities we need to keep in mind that we are attempting to decentre the way nationalism and 
liberalism are made to function inside the governmentality of immigration control, and we need to pay 
attention to the way that they are employed as strategies of power/knowledge, if we are to find room to 
think differently about immigration and liberal governmentality.  
2.4. Power/Knowledge: Methods of Analysis 
Thus to recap, we have seen how governmentality studies look both at the rationalities and technologies 
of governing. We have also seen how modernity has given rise to a mode of governing that relies on 
knowledge about naturalised laws, laws that appear to us as untouchable common sense and that 
function based on circular and even tautological truth games. We have discussed how this mode of 
governing is extended from a distance to the individual conduct of people through technologies of 
governing, which are not simply means of implementation, but inherently relate to the arrangement of both 
material practices of governing and knowledge about governing. Before we move onto discussing the 
actual technologies of governing immigration and the rationalities that inform these technologies, we will 
discuss methodology and the actual analytical tools of decentring the power/knowledge constellation 
around immigration in Finland.  
Throughout this chapter we have discussed various tools of decentring. So far we have highlighted how 
Foucault's epistemological critique can be analytically employed to decentre actual, practical 
power/knowledge constellations through the empirico-transcendental riddle, which pins down the 
tautological nature of the modern mode of knowing and locates its source of knowing in the identity of 
the cogito. We have explicated how the choice of using historicism or psychologism, as tools of affirming 
and questioning positivity, function as strategies of power/knowledge. We have implied how rendering 
governing technical, making it a matter of the will to improve, allows for the silencing of ‘the political’ in 
the power/knowledge constellation. We focused on scarcity and silence as markers of the functioning of 
power/knowledge, the analysis of which is as important as the analysis of explicitly voiced propositions. 
And we have explained and shown the significance of normalisation and exceptionalisation as strategies 
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of power/knowledge. In addition, Foucault's thinking around governmentality has shown us how 
rationalities and technologies of governing and assessing truth also function as strategies of 
power/knowledge. We have seen how naturalism defines the rationalities of governing, how truth is 
produced through market veridiction and how technologies of governing operate at a distance and 
through freedom. These are central tools of decentring that are elemental for the second phase of 
analysing the power/knowledge constellation around immigration. There is, however, one more strategy 
of power/knowledge, namely that of universalism/particularism, that we will discuss, because this will 
give us another method of decentring the discourses of nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism.  
Tools of Decentring: Universalism/particularism 
As we have seen, it is the socio-economic and socio-biological nexus of naturalised laws through which 
the binary of universalism/particularism enters the heart of liberal governmentality and modernity. In the 
context of conceptualising government through naturalised laws that are necessarily universal, 
particularism presents scientific knowledge with a need to signify it in relation to the universal, as part of 
the whole—this method of power/knowledge often leads into strategies of governing through 
abnormalization of the particular. In Foucaultian terms universalism lies at the centre of the 
epistemological configuration of modernity: universalism is epistemic vigilance sound asleep (also 
Laclau 1996/2007, 23). This universalism/particularism binary can be conceptualised as a continuum of 
power/knowledge: the terms ‘universalism’ and ‘particularism’ cannot function without reference to each 
other, which is why the dividing line between them becomes impossible to pin down (Laclau 1996/2007, 
20-35). The universalism/particularism binary must be understood as a matter of Will to Power that 
underlines the way that the modern mode of knowing functions. Because of the centrality of the cogito’s 
identity to the modern mode of knowing, the possibility of transcendental knowledge cannot be treated 
as purely a philosophical problem that divorces questions of ontology from effects of power, but it must 
be treated as a desire for one’s knowledge to be universal and transcendentally true—and thus off limits 
to criticism. The point of genealogy is to turn questions of Will to Truth into questions of Will to Power 
(Laclau 1996/2007). Therefore, the analysis needs to look at what place is occupied by the ‘particular’ in 
the purported universal order of things, at how games of resistance are played, how subjects are 
constituted, at how we “recognise ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying”, and at 
how we subjectify the immigrant other (for in these texts, the immigrant is not a speaking subject but an 
object of governing) (Foucault 2000b, 314-316). The focus of attention is on “relations of power, not 
relations of meaning” (Foucault 1980, 114). 
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The universalism/particularism binary is essential to socio-evolutionary governmentality. Social 
evolutionism is at the heart of the self-universalization of European particularism. Whilst the 
power/knowledge strategy of universalism/particularism has its religious applications, in terms of 
“secular eschatology” (ibid.1996/2007, 25), the universal came to be used in various ways in the modern 
power/knowledge constellation. The Western mode of knowing gave rise to a power/knowledge 
constellation, in which European culture was presented as representing “universal human interests” that 
had a civilizing function. The West defined ‘civilisation’ and made itself the pivot of human social 
evolution. If we look at the position that is employed by the particular in this West and the Rest 
power/knowledge constellation, the Rest is marked by an “incapacity to represent the universal” (Laclau 
1996/2007, 24). In this context, modernization and development become represented as “as an epochal 
struggle between universality and particularisms” giving rise to a civilising, progressive mission of 
freeing the colonial mind/society from its primitive condition (Laclau 1996/2007, 24-25). That is, the 
particular becomes a phase in human evolution, the epitome of which is Western society and culture.  
Again, the question here is not about what is the correct interpretation of social evolution and what not, 
but the question is how various views of social evolution are used to govern ourselves. That is, the focus 
is on how socio-evolutionary discourses function as discourses of power (also in the intra-societal level) 
and what kinds of silences are executed through them. Because of its all-devouring universalism this 
socio-evolutionary power/knowledge constellation necessarily confuses history with evolution. That is, 
socio-evolutionary discourses make immediate historical variations into discourses of evolution, which 
rather should refer either to slow genetic change in living organisms through natural selection over 
thousands of years or to large scale social evolution, such as the move to agriculture or to industrial 
production. In this way, for example, a change from religious rule to democratic rule or a conceptual 
development in academic analysis can be painted in the colours of evolution. It is this mixing of history 
with evolution and its hyper-signified metaphors that is at the heart of the power games that liberal 
governmentality plays. 
Yet, this pivotal role of Western civilization does not mean that socio-evolutionary theory is employable 
only in one way. Even the contemporary ways in which socio-evolutionary theories are employed in 
conjunction with nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism vary (not to mention the copious 
possibilities not materialised). Namely, social evolution can either be characterised as a universal uni-
linear development or as a particular multi-linear development along spheres of civilizational/cultural 
entities. In this regard, nationalism, multiculturalism and liberalism suggest different types of 
universalities and particularities (Vincent 2002). In important ways these discourses are made possible 
inside a socio-evolutionary framework: nationalism and multiculturalism assert a framework of separate 
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sphere of development/evolution and rely on the quasi-organic qualities of cultures, nations or 
civilisations. Nationalism imposes a certain universalizing ‘naturalness’ on organising the world around 
nations (or nation-states), and multiculturalism around cultures (e.g. Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; 
Schnapper 1998; Vincent 2002). The ontological essence of human is defined as cultural making the 
human quasi-organically tied to the blood/culture/upbringing of his/her childhood, resistance against 
which is either ‘impossible’ or ‘non-desirable’. Beyond this universalizing aspect, nationalism is a 
particularist discourse of sovereignty, as it asserts the right of a singular ‘nation’ to order its affairs in the 
particular, cultural fashion, as does multiculturalism at the level of ‘ethnicity’.  
Although liberalism is essentially universalising, liberal theories nevertheless bear the contradiction of 
universalism/particularism inside the theoretical realm. This contradiction is embedded in the liberal 
conceptualisations of the moral community versus its conceptualisations of individualism, as Vincent 
asserts. The coherence of the liberal edifice of knowledge suffers from a problematic relationship with 
particularism and nationalism that underlie conceptualisations of sovereignty and nation-state (Vincent 
2002, 97-103). As well as its embeddedness in Western culture, also the practical connection of 
liberalism with the particularism of the nation-state paradigm complicates liberalism’s claim to 
universalism. Although cosmopolitanism is the most purely universalising discourse, fundamentally 
employing a logic of a single line of social evolution, its universalism is equally symptomatic of the 
Western belief in its own position as a representative of universal human interests, i.e. the pivot of 
human progress, and hence also inherently particularist (e.g. Laclau 1995; Parekh 1997; Murray 1997; 
Newman 2000; Chatterjee 2005). 
This type of contamination of the universal with the particular and vice versa (Newman 2000, 101) is 
essential for understanding how these discourses become employed in governing immigration (e.g. 
Doty 1999, 587; Tebble 2006; Lister and Pia 2008, 157-161). Because liberal governmentality in 
important ways is a socio-evolutionary governmentality, we need to investigate how these discourses 
need to function in conjunction with stories that we tell about social evolution. As Ryn puts it: “How we 
regard the relationship between universality and particularity directly affects how we think about 
humanism and multiculturalism” (Ryn 2003, 8). Paying attention to how the binary of 
universalism/particularism is employed in practice, in this case in Finnish immigration politics, is an 
important additional tool of decentring. The discourses of nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism 
typically employ the universalism/particularism binary in contradictory ways. Similarly, as with 
psychologism or historicism as strategies of power/knowledge, we need to focus on when and how 
universalism or particularism become modes of affirming positivity. In the context of political truth 
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games, these strategies divide, exclude, negate and omit at the same time as they unite, include, affirm 
and enable. It is in the strategic game of truth that governmentality is enabled and created.  
Primary Method 
How do Foucault's epistemological criticism, power/knowledge and governmentality as well as the 
discourses of nationalism, multiculturalism and liberalism come together in the method then? As has 
been said, overall the discourse theoretical method here entailed two phases; the primary phase, which 
concentrated on the analysis of knowledge produced about immigration in Finland, and the secondary 
phase, which analyses the power/knowledge constellation taking into account the rationalities and 
technologies of governing immigration. Together the first and the second level convey a picture of how 
immigration and immigrant are problematized. The third analytical level, that of the comparison of the 
problematization of immigration in contemporary Finland and the nineteenth-twentieth century America, 
is carried out in Chapter 4.  
As said, the first level analytical approach of discourse theory is different from the normal discourse 
analytical approach that typically focuses on the level of individual documents or particular discussions, 
for example in the handling of a particular bill in the parliament. Here we focus on discourses as 
systems of dispersion and treat statements as a part of the wider discursive field of making sense of 
immigration, be this then in documents about internal security, immigrant integration, refugee reception 
or rules of granting permits. In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault asserts that a discursive 
formation cannot be defined by the unity of the object, by the unity of a common style of production of 
statements, by the constancy of the concept, or by reference to a common theme (Foucault 1969/2002, 
ch. 2). Defining the discursive formations through these four aspects “presupposes a play of 
prescriptions that govern exclusions and selections” and, thus, prevents critical consideration of the 
silences and gaps in the discursive formation of immigration (in "The Will to Knowledge" Foucault 
2000a).  
In practice, the theoretical background means that the discursive formation is not unified by the object, 
such as ‘citizenship policy’ or ‘EU visa regime’, but also other policies and statements in other 
discussions including references to immigration or immigrants need to be considered in their totality as 
belonging to the dispersion of the discursive formation. Secondly, the style of discourse, such as 
legislative text versus parliamentary discussion, cannot be deemed as a delimitation of a valid sphere of 
discourse, but different types of statements can be analysed and included on a par with each other. This 
means that statements in the parliament need to be analysed at the same level of laws, decrees and 
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legislative implementation instructions. This is necessary in order to take account of the whole 
apparatus and to place discourse in context. Thirdly, discursive formations clearly expand the limits of 
concepts, such as for example ‘national interest’, ‘unemployment policy’ or ‘border control’, and the 
vastness of the discursive formation of immigration cannot be described by allowing such concepts to a 
priori limit the field of investigation. Fourthly, if one wants to include and analyse the dispersion of the 
discursive formation, it cannot be limited by such themes as ‘anti-immigration policies’ or ‘economic role 
of migrants’, for example. That is, when analysing governmentality the analysis itself cannot start from a 
problematization. 
Therefore, in practice the governmentality of immigration needs to be analysed as an apparatus. I have 
analysed laws, governmental documents (bills and reports), parliamentary discussions and committee 
statements as well as implementation guidelines as the bulk of primary sources until a saturation point 
in the analysis was reached. That is, the aim was not to analyse every statement ever made, but 
keeping in mind the repetitive function of discourse, the goal was to form a picture of the larger 
tendencies of conceptualising immigration and immigrant related issues. By a point of saturation I mean 
a point in analysis, in which no more new and surprising statements were being added and in which the 
ratio between the utilisations of various discourses was relatively stable. Altogether I have analysed 
some 110 documents containing some 3300 analysed statements in addition to a number of documents 
skimmed in order to affirm the saturation of the analysis. 
The primary analysis of the statements in the documents followed a methodical structure. The concept 
of statement was operationalized through Foucault's account of General Grammar and its structure and 
the way that Foucault paralleled this structure with the theory of anthropological sleep (Foucault 
1966/2002, 90-132 and 330-373).34 Therefore a statement was not understood as a sentence, for 
                                                     
34 For those interested in the combination it can be said that this analytical structure is Foucaultian but not Foucault's. What I 
mean by this is that this approach crucially falls short of the critical ambition of Foucault's archaeology (cf. Hook 
2007/2001). Besides the obvious difference that Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods are historical, in 
comparison to Foucault's discourse analytical method presented in The Archaeology of Knowledge the concept of 
statement is also operationalized differently, i.e. through General Grammar. Foucault's concept of statement has always 
been a source of confusion: Foucault defines ‘statement’ more through what it is not, rather than through what it is. As 
Dreyfus and Rabinow explained, the statement cannot be characterised as a utterance, it neither is a proposition nor a 
linguistic entity of a psychological or logical kind, it is neither an ideal form nor an event (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 
especially xxii, 17 and 32). Here, the statement is defined through the concept of a discursive order (derivation) and the 
elements (propositions, articulation and designation toward a source of positivity) that are required to uphold and affirm the 
truthfulness of the derived order of things. In this sense, the way that the concept of statement has been operationalized 
comes closest to a ‘logical entity’, by which I do not refer to structure of logical statements (i.e. A is B, and C is A and 
therefore C is also B), but to these elements that are required to form a coherent order of things. Whilst this analytical 
structure of proposition, articulation, designation and derivation is from Foucault's account of the way language functioned 
in the Classical era, the meaning of these terms was changed by the modern mode of knowing. The way that the modern 
mode of knowing changed the Classical general grammar was by destabilising the proposition and the articulation through 
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example, but more like a logical entity that required a proposition (‘something is’), an articulation 
(‘something is X’), a designation towards sources of positivity (‘something is X because Y’) and a 
derivation (‘something is X, because Y, which means Z) to affirming an order of things. The next chapter 
will not focus on this primary analytical structure further, as it operates on the linguistic level and it is 
only a means, and not the ultimate aim, of the analysis. I will merely indicate this analytical structure, as 
the below example shows: 
Internationally it is a commonly accepted principle based on national sovereignty that a 
foreigner does not have an absolute right to arrive to a foreign country or to stay and work there. 
The immigration policy followed by the state can be determined by its own needs and national 
interests. (Finnish Government 13.06.2003) 
A dotted line is used under the assertion & proposition (i.e. absolute right to arrive is not for foreigners). 
Designation towards a discursive source of positivity (i.e. the truthful discourse of national sovereignty) 
is marked by bold text and the underlying derivation of discursive order (i.e. that because of this 
immigration policies can be determined by national interest) is marked by a double line. 
Because the ultimate focus of this research is on the macro-level functioning of power/knowledge, in the 
governmentality, the linguistic and the immediate political context needs to be surpassed. The macro-
level of making sense of immigration is accessed through the micro-level grid of dispersed and 
fragmented statements. The methodical aim is to allow the speakers to define the discourses 
themselves; thus the discourses studied here are not predefined and generic, but specific and particular 
to the discursive field itself: Nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism are not treated as academic 
discourses, but approached through what is made of them in the Finnish context, i.e. as a discourse that 
can be used for various purposes, not knowledges that would inherently be something innate or limited 
in terms of academic histories or sociologies of thought. Nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism are 
treated as tools of politics. Treating these isms in their commonsensical form allows us to strip the 
taken-for-granted nature out of these discourses and to highlight how they acquire meaning and lose it 
in relation to a state racist governmentality. 
That is, the primary method allows for an analysis of how discourses are used as tools of politics. This 
allows for an analysis of the limiting and disciplining elements of discourse (Apperley 1997) and helps to 
chart the strategic operation of knowledge in this discursive formation (e.g. Haugaard 2002, 3). In 
practical terms, the primary method categorised statements based on the author, type of document in 
question, the year, the topics discussed, the objects subjectified, the discourses referred to, the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
historicity, by imposing on designation the impossible function of affirming positivity and undermining derivation through 
the incessant requirement of epistemic vigilance. 
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discourses objected to, and the type of tactical inclusion/exclusions established (universal/particular) 
and based on what premises. This gives an inventory of statements from which statements under one 
type of discourse can be pulled out and then compared to each other. They can be assessed, for 
example, according to what other discourses they have referred to, what discourses they have objected 
to, what topics they have discussed and what kind of exclusions/inclusions they have created. The 
taken-for-granted, the contradictions, omissions, inconsistencies and silences emerging from the 
analysis started yielding a picture about where and how strategies of power/knowledge functioned to 
formulate the governmentality of immigration, and pinpointed how much these silences and 
contradictions relied on a taken-for-granted socio-evolutionary governmentality. 
Consequently, in understanding how government functions, it is essential to understand its regimes of 
truth, its regimes of obliviousness, its regimes of problematization and the lack of thereof, its 
unquestioned assumptions and its agendas and non-agendas, because these in themselves already 
have power effects (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 12). In the momentary battles of politics, dispersed and 
inconsistent discourses are used as strategic tools in a game of Will to Power (Foucault 1976/1998, 
101-102), and this is the focus also in this method and research: The primary method analyses what 
and how discourses are presented as truthful and the secondary method analyses the way that power 
constitutes and utilises truthful discourse to form rationalities and technologies of governing immigration.  
In this chapter we have discussed the significance of knowledge to liberal governmentality and to its 
naturalising discourses of governing ourselves for socio-evolutionary progress. I have elaborated on the 
various tools of decentring this power/knowledge constellation and discussed how the actual discourse 
theoretical analysis was performed. Next I will describe how the power/knowledge game between the 
discourses of nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism is played in the discursive formation around 
immigration in Finland. We shall do this by discussing how the various rationalities and technologies of 
governing immigration are discursively ordered by the Finnish government and parliament and examine 
these rationalities of governing in conjunction with the technologies of immigration control. This way we 
can formulate a picture of the apparatus of immigration control and its governmentality, which we shall 
then, later in Chapter 4, compare with the eugenic rationalities of governing immigration. Before doing 
this we shall look at the context of our example of immigration control, i.e. the Finnish immigration 
policy, more in-depth. 
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3. Governmentalities of Immigration: Racialised Rationalities and Technologies of 
Segregation 
This chapter will present a practical analysis of the discursive formation around immigration in Finland. 
In doing this the chapter will chart the rationalities and technology of governing immigration by 
explicating how the discourses of nationalism, liberal and multiculturalism are used and how they 
function to define, include, exclude and silence the way that the governmentality of immigration is 
conceptualised. In doing this, we will keep in mind the tools of decentring explained in the previous 
chapter to point out how power/knowledge functions in practice. For governmentality studies, analysing 
the way power/knowledge functions necessarily includes analysing the technologies of governing, 
because technologies have their own rationalities and they should not be simplistically deduced from the 
explicit reasons given for them. Only by analysing both the rationalities and technology, can the silences 
and the scarcity of meaning be understood and the actual problematization of immigration illustrated. 
However, as was said before, at this conjunction I will not discuss eugenic immigration policy yet, but 
merely show the apparatus and its problematization of immigration. Before embarking on presenting the 
way immigration and immigrants are problematized by the state racist governmentality around 
immigration, I will contextualise this discussion through a short introduction to the Finnish immigration 
policy and its changes. Because this is not a study on policy per se, this introduction will necessarily be 
limited. The reader who is interested in the actual legislative changes as such can consult Appendix 1, 
which treats these changes more thoroughly and in a more chronological order.  
3.1. Introducing Finnish Aliens’ Policy 1990 onwards 
Finnish immigration policy has been characterised as strict. Yet, the direction of the immigration policies 
is not singular in the sense that the policy functions at the cross-roads of many diverse requirements: 
those created by the EU, those by the international human rights conventions and then the general aim 
of immigration control. In general terms the focus of aliens’ policy has changed over the years, not least 
because of its new found political salience in the 1990s (e.g. European Migration Network 2009). At this 
stage immigration policy entered the current framework of manipulating the ‘push and pull’ logic of 
immigration control. This was prompted partly by the increasing immigration and asylum seeking by 
Somalis and ex-Yugoslavians especially, but also the EC and EU memberships created a need to 
update the outdated immigration control regime overall.  
Increased international and EU cooperation regarding human rights and immigration has impacted on 
Finnish aliens’ policy. Already in the 1920s, international cooperation regarding refugees added a more 
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legalistic aspect to the treatment of foreigners (Leitzinger 2008b, 170-176), but the Cold War created 
different priorities in this regard. Finland joined the European Council (1989) and the European Union 
(1995), which is said to have resulted in a more pronounced impact of human rights thinking in Finnish 
domestic politics (e.g. Lepola 2000, ch. 6; Scheinin 1997). Before these memberships Finnish legislation 
was not in harmony with international human rights law in many aspects, most importantly in relation to 
the status of foreigners. Before the legislative changes of the mid-1990s foreigners had restricted rights, 
for example, to own property, to be employed or to function in certain occupations and capacities. 
Foreigners also had few, if any, civil and political or economic and social rights.  
Many of the policy changes in Finland relate to these EU policies, but also international law has had its 
impact. Foreigners’ political rights had already been extended in 1991 after the membership in the 
European Council and they would be extended further in 1995 with the accession to the European 
Union, especially for European citizens. With the 1995 basic rights reform the rights of foreigners were 
included in the constitution. All ‘qualifying’ residents now have the same social, political and economic 
rights as Finnish citizens—qualifying being the operative word—with limitations only on the right to enter 
the country and on voting rights (limited to local elections) (Finnish Government 17.12.1993; HE 
309/1993). This speaks of a certain egalitarian ethos, or the power of equalitarian discourses in the 
Finnish political scene. Regardless, the policy aims has been more restrictive after the inclusion of 
social security rights for foreigners in the constitution in 1995 (the right to income support). Voting rights 
are restricted to local elections, but they include both the right to vote and to stand for election 
regardless of citizenship; that is, voting rights are not restricted only to EU citizens (Finnish Government 
20.09.1991).35 In general, it must be noted that the criteria based on which foreigners qualify for many of 
these basic rights is determined under normal and not constitutional law and can be altered by low-key 
legislative or administrative changes. The analysis of the changes will be elaborated on in Chapter 4.   
As said, the Finnish immigration policy does not operate in a vacuum, but as part of the explicit political 
cooperation inside the European Union. EU cooperation on immigration policy was brought to the EU 
agenda by the Schengen Convention (1990), which abolished border controls between participating 
countries. The Amsterdam Treaty made asylum and immigration policy a part of increasing European 
                                                     
35 There are, however, differences in how different nationalities are thought to merit voting rights. In 1991, there were 
discussions regarding the ‘cultural criteria’ and the time delay deemed appropriate before giving foreigners voting rights. In 
1991 it was deemed appropriate that Nordic citizens would get voting rights after two years of residence (Scandinavian 
citizens have held this right since 1976) and others after four years. Although objections were voiced, the specific 
reference was to cultural differences (Finnish Parliament – Constitutional Law Committee 1991). In 1995, when Finland 
joined the European Union, these political rights were extended so that both Nordic and EU citizens get voting rights in 
local elections if they are resident in the municipality 51 days before elections. Other nationalities need to wait two years 
before being given the same rights (Finnish State 17.3.1995). 
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policy cooperation. During her EU Presidency in 1999, Finland placed immigration issues high on its 
policy agenda moving the common immigration policy process along at the Tampere Summit. This focus 
of common immigration control is an important goal of Finnish government also today. Since then EU 
immigration and asylum policy has first and foremost concentrated on common visa and asylum policy, 
illegal immigration and border and police cooperation with employment based immigration lagging 
behind. The EU gave rise to the Dublin Convention and the common multi-category visa system, which 
were adopted in Finland in 1997. The Schengen agreement was implemented in 2001.36 The visa 
process was put under a common EU visa regime in 2010. This includes a common list of visa-requiring 
countries and partly common processes and requirements for visa application (individual decisions are 
still national although countries can outsource visa processing to outside companies instead of handling 
them in the embassies). EU cooperation also includes such policies as carrier sanctions, border control 
and finger printing practices, and common visa information system etc. The EU membership in itself, of 
course, has had an impact on immigration policy because of the free movement of EU nationals. EU 
immigration policy also includes provisions for third-country nationals that are long-term residents.  
Since the 1990s Finnish aliens’ policies have inhabited a place, in which liberal and national discourses 
battle. The Immigration Act already saw some important changes in the 1990s, but it was not until 2004 
that the Aliens Act was comprehensively rewritten. This was largely a re-codification of earlier changes 
and decrees, but substantive changes were also made. The changes to the Aliens act are many, some 
are more liberal, others more restrictive. They relate both to the increasing immigration policy 
cooperation in the European Union and the European Convention related international law described 
above as well as to domestically motivated modifications to the Immigration Act. Especially the asylum 
system has been altered due to the influence by international law, by enlarging the rights and improving 
conditions for asylum seekers during their detention or stay in reception centres, as well as by including 
enhanced measures of legal protection. The situation of victims of human trafficking has been improved 
as well, legislatively at least. Besides the Dublin convention, the common EU immigration policy has 
also required changes to the categories of asylum recognised. Outside EU influence, the legislation has 
been changed so that asylum interviews are explicitly required to be conducted by the police and the 
family reunification rights of refugees have been disciplined in various ways, as shall be seen. The 
administrative regulations on handling asylum applications have been accelerated. Besides asylum 
policy, the status of those on student visas has been improved from the meagre rights originally granted 
                                                     
36 With the Dublin Convention a principle of single asylum application inside the EU was created giving rise to the system of 
returning asylum seekers inside the EU to the first country of entry. Schengen agreement that abolished border controls 
between Schengen countries created a need for common visa policy. With the multiple visa categories, such as airport 
transfer and stop-over visas were created for controlling unwanted entry etc. of people in-between flight connections.  
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to them. The legislation on the entry of Ingrians, once created in 1996, has seen a pattern of tightening 
criteria. How these changes of the Immigration Act play out in practice, in relation to other regulations, 
will be explored deeper in this chapter.  
Although this research does not focus on integration policies per se, rationalities of integration reflect in 
important ways the rationalities of immigration policy and documents and policy discussions have been 
included because of this. A comprehensive Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of 
Asylum Seekers (henceforth Integration Act) was drafted in 1999 to replace decrees designed for quota 
refugee reception processes. This law contains the provisions for rights and duties, housing and 
benefits arranged for asylum seekers. The Integration Act was revamped in 2010 when benefits were 
reduced and integration measures enhanced. The Citizenship Act from 1968 was rewritten in 2003 and 
contained the new language skills requirement. These have been the main changes in alien’s policies in 
Finland since 1999. Because understanding their underlying rationalities requires that these legislative 
changes are treated as a part of the wider apparatus of immigration that investigates the relations 
between discourses and laws and regulations, I shall not dwell on these changes any further (see 
Appendix 1 for further detail).  
Before proceeding I want to make a note about the way I have chosen to identify the authors of the 
excerpts: Instead of individuals I quote the institutions they can be deemed to represent. This is, firstly 
out of respect for individual authors against whom my criticism is not aimed: knowledge is not an 
individual endeavour, but already to be able to speak or write in a manner that can be deemed 
acceptable in the context of official institutions, the speaker needs to designate towards discourses that 
are not of his/her own making. The source of positivity is common, not individual, as the anti-humanist 
point of (post-)structuralism asserts (also Doty 1996, 147). Whether the political parties would want to 
include all comments made by their representatives as officially part of their policy is not relevant here, 
at least the representatives have not been expelled because of their statements. Overall, the research 
here is not intended to reproduce the official party line,37 but rather care has been taken to include 
statements from as wide a variety of actors as possible. 
                                                     
37 Background to Finnish Party system and the aliens’ policy orientation of various parties: Finland has a multiparty system 
with mainly 8 parties with seats in the unicameral Parliament (Fin. Eduskunta). The largest parties are the Social Democratic 
Party (Fin. Sosiaalidemokraattinen puolue), the National Coalition Party (Fin. Kokoomus) and the Centre Party (Fin. 
Keskustapuolue) all attracting similar levels of voters (around 20-24%). The National Coalition Party is a relatively right-wing, 
conservative, entrepreneur-focused party whereas the Centre Party is an agrarian party. The differences in policies between 
these three parties, in comparison to the political spectrum in other Western countries, are not huge. The country is run 
based on a general consensus of the need to maintain a functioning welfare state as well as to cater to economic growth. 
Hence, governments are most often formed by varying amalgamations of two of these three main parties. In addition there 
are 5 smaller parties some of which are also invited to form the government. The minority party, Swedish People’s Party (Fin. 
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3.2. Rationalities of Governing Immigration: Segregationist Will of the People 
We will now move onto discussing the way nationalism and liberalism have been employed to define 
immigration. We will first investigate the overall rationalities of immigration control and then investigate 
the rationalities embedded in the technologies of immigration control. Nationalism is the most commonly 
used discourse, in reference to which issues of immigration are discursively ordered in Finland (also 
Lepola 2000). I have framed the issue of nationalism as a rationality and technology of segregation, but 
limited its scope to situations in which the binary national/foreigner are employed. The fundamental 
rationality constituting the phenomenon of immigration is segregation or separation of nation-states, of 
territories and populations. Life creates migration, but states create ‘immigration’ and ‘emigration’. Thus, 
analytically the trope of segregation is a tool of removing the taken-for-granted from the governmentality 
of immigration, of combatting the rendering technical as well as the designation of immigration control 
as nationalistic. The object of the following sections is to demonstrate how the limits of aliens’ policy are 
discursively constituted, thereby highlighting the scarcity that is created in the power/knowledge 
constellation in order to explore the fundamental problematization of immigration in Chapter 4. 
3.2.1. Power Games between Nationalism and Liberalism 
Immigration questions the national order of things. The nationalist definition of the purpose of the state 
is linked via the Western democratic discourse to the preservation and promotion of the nation and its 
cultural, political and economic life. Immigration renders the purpose of the nation-state in doubt: Who 
does the state serve if not the nation? Immigration questions the scarcity of meaning that has been 
created around the mode of governing the population through nationalist discourses by imposing the 
question of multiculturalism and ‘multi-racialism’ on this power/knowledge constellation. The basic, 
underlying answer to this question posed by immigration is found in the power/knowledge game 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue), has been in all the four governments formed since 1999. The Left Alliance (Fin. 
Vasemmistoliitto) and The Green League (Fin. Vihreät) have also participated in some governments, whereas inside the era 
under analysis (1999-2010), the Christian Democrats (Fin. Krisitillisdemokraattinen puolue) and the True Finns (Fin. 
Perussuomalaiset) have not.  
As said, the True Finns have the strongest nationalist/anti-immigrant discourse attracted 1-4% of the vote in parliamentary 
elections until in 2008 they gained some 9% in European Parliament elections and 19% in the 2011 Parliamentary elections 
reflecting a rise in anti-immigrant and anti-elitist sentiments in Finland. Besides their anti-immigration stance, their political 
agenda concentrates on equality for the marginalised in society. As a short comparison and characterisation of the 
immigration discourses of the other parties the following can be said: None of the other parties run on a strong anti-immigrant 
discourse, although based on the occasional comment one could be led to believe so. The three major parties have 
functioned based on an understanding that Finland will need immigrant labour to compensate for the shrinking labour force 
as the baby-boom generation is retiring. The National Coalition party focuses on attracting highly educated labour and the 
Centre Party has an interest in lower-skilled labour for seasonal work in agriculture. The Social Democratic Party and Left 
Alliance have a human rights oriented immigration and asylum policy and they stress equal contractual conditions for foreign 
workers to prevent competition from cheap labour. The Christian Democrats, The Swedish People’s Party and the Green 
League also voice a human rights discourse with the Green League and the Swedish People’s Party having a more 
pronounced multiculturalism discourse in comparison to others. (Also Keskinen 2009.)  
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between the universalising but particularist discourse of national sovereignty and the opposing 
universalising liberal cosmopolitan discourse.  
Internationally it is a commonly accepted principle based on national sovereignty that a 
foreigner does not have an absolute right to arrive to a foreign country or to stay and work there. 
The immigration policy followed by the state can be determined by its own needs and national 
interests. (Finnish Government 13.06.2003)38 
The basic principle is that Finland should adopt such a law, in which we Finns decide who comes 
here, from where, how many and based on what. That is our right in our own country, we can 
put down these criteria and this is what we should do. (Finnish Parliament 16.6.2003, True Finns 
MP) 
But Mister Speaker, I fear that Minister Thors [of Migration and European Affairs] and her closest 
officials have an attitude problem regarding groundless asylum applications and in general 
regarding the speeding up of their processing. This attitude problem can be seen, for example, in 
such public statements in which they, that is the Minister and her officials, claim that the numbers 
of asylum seekers in Finland are not large when compared to Sweden or Norway or Denmark... 
Another such a public argument that in my opinion demonstrates a wrong attitude has been that 
we in Finland supposedly could not influence the numbers of asylum seekers. It is weird that 
Sweden and Norway for example have been able to influence these numbers. (Finnish 
Parliament 15.4.2009, National Coalition MP) 
In the context of immigration, sovereignty is attached to the territory, to the property of the land-owning 
people-nation (e.g. Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), that establishes a naturalised order of things, in 
which the race-nation has ‘a right to immigration control’. This naturalised character of immigration 
control functions as the basic limiting and disciplining discourse of power that disciplines the rival 
cosmopolitan discourses that assert the universal right to free movement and a universal moral duty 
towards all human beings regardless of nationalist categorisations. As a discourse of power, the 
nationalist sovereignty discourse derives a discursive order that holds it positively paramount that ‘the 
state’s right’ to determine aliens’ policy sovereignly should be exercised (also Lepola 2000, 289). 
Immigration control is designated as an almost moral duty. When this moral duty is ignored, 
psychologism is used to discipline the ‘distorted’ knowledge that the number of asylum applications 
cannot be controlled. The universalising moral discourse of cosmopolitanism, which holds the earth a 
common good of the humanity and entails a morality of universal hospitality, is silenced. There should 
be no trespassing on the nation’s private property, because the earth is not shared. Looking at this 
discursive order from the point of view of historicism, the cosmopolitan discursive orders have had much 
more impact. Cosmopolitan discourses were typical before the twentieth century, when the ossification 
                                                     
38 As explained in Chapter 2, the method of analysis is pointed out here by the use of dotted line under the assertion & 
proposition, by writing text outlining the discourse designated towards in bold text, and by double underlining the 
discursive order derived. 
NOTE: All other statements but those from the Government Immigration Policy Programme 2006 have been translated from 
Finnish to English and may reflect the inconsistent sentence structures of spoken Finnish. 
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of nation-states had not reached its peak. European, ‘white’ mass migrations were huge, although 
various attempts at migration control, both international and domestic, have a long history (e.g. Torpey 
2000; Fahrmeir et al. 2003; Leitzinger 2008b). In light of this, the process of delegitimising people’s 
movements has been long and effective, but not complete, as there is an evident need to discipline 
such cosmopolitan discourses. 
This segregationist discursive order is very powerful, as its positivity is supported through all three basic 
epistemological means: fact (of territorially bordered countries), discourse (of sovereignty) and 
experience (of nation-state structures).39 The common sense status of the moral duty of immigration 
control is paramount, but it has not reached a power status of unconditional, universal truth pinpointing 
towards the epistemological incongruity between particularist nationalism and universalist liberalism. In 
the power/knowledge constellations around immigration the universalising human rights discourse limits 
the power of the sovereignty discourse:  
Furthermore, the supporting arguments state that the human rights conventions that Finland is 
bound by are significant for the principle of proportionality in the application of the law. The 
Foreign Affairs Committee has in its report regarding the bill (UaVM 30/1990 vp) stated that this 
provision clarifies that decisions based on the Aliens Act will have to be consistent with the 
obligations under the conventions. (Finnish Government 13.06.2003) 
The purpose of this Act is to secure the sustenance and care of asylum seekers, temporarily 
protected persons and victims of human trafficking and by respecting basic rights to take into 
account European Union law and international conventions that Finland is bound by. (Finnish 
State 30.12.2010, Integration Act 1§) 
The assertion above is that the state’s hands are bound by the need to respect the provisions of human 
rights conventions when deciding on the entry of foreigners. The discursive order is derived around the 
rule of law and it asserts the truthfulness of human rights discourses over other (national) discourses. 
This discursive order does not wholly rely on a moral discourse, that would assert solidarity or that 
people need to be treated with respect, equally and humanely, but it is a legalistic discursive order that 
refers to legal obligations as something to be respected. Yet, human rights discourses enable powerful 
discursive tactics that allow the use of more ethical arguments in criticizing immigration policies and the 
decisions of the government and its agencies: 
Now and in the future in Finland we need to carry our responsibility for international humanitarian 
help and related work. We must always remember that Finland and Finns have received help, 
                                                     
39 Indeed, this discourse of segregation is considered to be a mark of ‘progress’ in the socio-evolutionary sense (e.g. Venn 
and Featherstone 2006). The modern nation-state with stationary populations and capacity for immigration control holds a 
very different socio-evolutionary status in comparison to, for example, states with ‘nomadic’ peoples or states incapable of 
asserting territorial control over their population. It is an interesting question how much globalisation and the developing 
ethos of free movement of labour shall change the power/knowledge constellation. 
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when it has been needed. This humanitarian approach must of course apply to the Aliens’ Law 
[and] in such a way that we try to secure basic rights based on individual assessment for each 
asylum applicant. An essential factor in the humanitarian action and all immigration related 
questions is the attitude culture that largely reigns in Finland. Too easily we stigmatise asylum 
applications as ungrounded, even if they have their own strong basis. (Finnish Parliament 
9.1.2003, Centre Party MP) 
What does the level of protection look like in Finland? We can note that last year 93 persons were 
granted asylum, that is, they were deemed to fulfil the Geneva Convention’s refugee criteria. This 
is the largest number that we have ever had, which to say the least is modest in comparison to, 
for example, France that granted asylum to 11 000 individuals last year. Regardless of the small 
number of those granted asylum, I am glad that the number is rising. Why? Because it is crucially 
important that Finland abides by the Geneva refugee convention. … I hope that this changed 
amendment would reinforce this trend that more many an applicant is considered as fulfilling the 
refugee criteria. (Finnish Parliament 24.2.2009, Swedish People's Party MP) 
In the opinion of the Constitutional Committee the simple interpretation that the family shall be 
reunited in the country where parents reside...is not in harmony with the Convention on 
children’s rights... The Administrative Committee has overlooked these comments made by the 
Constitutional Committee and, to the contrary, affirmed the primacy of these problematic 
instructions for interpretation [of the law]. ... I do not accept this Committee statement. Also the 
human and basic rights principles...should have been taken into consideration. (Finnish 
Parliament - Administration Committee 10.2.2004, objection by the Left Alliance) 
I think it is problematic that during this discussion, if not during the whole law drafting process, the 
fixation has been on accelerated removals, although it is very problematic that half of these 
[decisions] happen this way. One has to remember, for example, what human rights reports tell 
about the Slovakian Roma, whom have been regarded as if they self-evidently came here without 
any grounds that among them, among the women, are alarming numbers of women who have 
been sterilised. There are strong grounds for suspecting that some kind of ethnic sterilisation 
has been practised, so in my opinion it is not at all clear that there has not been any persecution. 
In this sense, it can be asked whether this kind of mechanical, accelerated process fits such large 
groups. (Finnish Parliament 16.6.2003, Swedish People's Party MP) 
The statements posit a moral duty of protecting humans that is asserted as a universal discourse. These 
statements base their truthfulness on the discourses of international law and humanitarianism deriving 
their discursive orders by referring to liberal identity, progressiveness, responsibility and due legal 
process. The existence of practices of stigmatising asylum seekers, granting only small numbers of 
actual asylums (see Appendix 2), of insisting that family reunification should primarily happen in a third 
country, and unilaterally considering Roma asylum applications as ungrounded and applying the 
accelerated removal process to these cases are discursively ordered as reflecting a tendency to 
overlook human rights. These are not unique statements, but designations toward liberal and human 
rights discourses are many: all parties in one form or another assert their relevance—despite the 
conditional ‘but’ that eventually appears to discipline these liberal discourses. 
If we compare these statements and the practice of asserting the truthfulness of liberal and human 
rights discourses to actual technologies of governing the picture is somewhat different. These 
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universalising objections have not been altogether successful, as shall be seen. Rather, the family 
reunification clauses have been tightened and the EU Roma have been further excluded from protection 
measures (see also Nordberg 2004).40 Contrary to the above, on the whole, the primacy of human rights 
discourses has been heavily contested in the Parliament. What we find is a strategic game between the 
requirements of international law and the desire for immigration control, in which various liberal 
discourses are played against each other. This strategic game is a game that is played over the identity 
of those who can be granted the liberal right of immigrating. The government has framed its biopolitical 
concern over the diminishing work force and tax payer pool, as the baby boom generation retires, partly 
in terms of immigration policy. With all its risks, immigration policy is a potential solution to the 
population decline. Next, we will look into how this biopolitical worry of population decline functions in 
conjunction with the desire for immigration control. 
3.2.2. Power Games between Liberal Discourses: The Will of the People 
As said, this power/knowledge game of immigration control is not only conducted through opposing 
nationalist and liberal discourses, but liberalism in itself is a heterogeneous and multifarious discursive 
field and its various discourses are being played against each other. In the game of truth around 
immigration control, the liberal discourses of democracy can be used to discipline liberal discourses of 
human rights giving rise to discursive orders around ‘The Will of the People’: 
Hence, here I have to say that if there was a referendum on foreigners, majority of Finns would 
have a completely different view from the government and from many of the parliamentarians. In 
Sweden and other Nordic countries over 60 per cent of the citizens are dissatisfied with their 
countries’ aliens’ policies. (Finnish Parliament 16.6.2003, (True) Finns MP) 
These discursive orders function around identity politics: around the subjectification of the people. The 
assertion is that the people have completely different views on immigration policy in comparison to the 
government; that the people are against immigration or that the people’s trust in asylum procedures is in 
jeopardy. Thus, it is not only a moral duty to practise immigration control, but it is a democratic 
requirement when the ‘people’s’ government is against immigration. In a country with 19% support for 
the anti-immigrant (True) Finns in the Parliamentary elections of 2011, this discourse has come to 
acquire a certain factual base. But it was already well before the ascendance of (True) Finns that 
government texts and statements in the parliament designated towards the need of conducting 
                                                     
40 Amendment in 2010 excluded EU and EEA citizens who apply for asylum from the asylum seeker reception system. The 
safe haven policy already dictates that EU citizens fall under the accelerated removal process meaning that their asylum 
applications are not considered in substance because EU and EEA countries are a priori considered ‘safe countries’. 
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immigration policy in such a way that the people can trust in its control function—as later examples will 
evidence. Yet, at the same time, definitions of The Will of the People can be somewhat different: 
I want to participate in this conversation by saying that at least in my opinion Finns are fair and 
just and they accept such immigration that is based on clear rules that have been agreed on 
together and that is understandable, open and realistic (Finnish Parliament 15.4.2009, Social 
Democratic MP) 
At the same time that I note that the Government has acknowledged the necessity of an active 
immigration policy in its programme, I also have to note that the attitudes of the Finnish towards 
the foreigners living in the country are positive. This is revealed by the poll conducted by the 
Population Research Institute of the Family Federation. Finns have a more positive attitude 
towards the quantity of foreigners than in Central Europe. Only one in four thinks that there are 
too many foreigners ....This is striking considering that Finns are more positive even when taking 
into account the proportion of foreigners in the population. ... Finns are worried about the aging 
population and two thirds accept that immigration is necessary because of this. Only one in ten 
oppose such immigration that is aimed at compensating for the aging population. (Finnish 
Minister of Migration and European Affairs 16.5.2007)  
This discursive battle over whether the people are ‘anti-immigrant’ or ‘tolerant’—people are never 
subjectified as enthusiastically inviting foreigners in—is typical. Reflecting the need to affirm the 
truthfulness of these discursive orders through psychologism they often employ the ratio/emotion binary 
designating towards ‘rational acceptance’ of immigrants being needed and consequent management of 
‘fears’ at a distance. But this rational management of fears rests on managed, controlled and predictable 
immigration policy: Silence is imposed over cosmopolitan discourses of open borders and over the fact 
that managing these fears requires the disciplining of human rights discourses, i.e. necessitates that a 
strict interpretation of human rights law is applied. Democracy makes immigration into a matter of 
controlled segregation, but this is not merely a segregation between the national and the foreigner, but 
the segregated are something else than those ‘capable of compensating’ for the reduction of the work 
force. 
On the whole then, tolerance is achieved through discourses of management, through managing 
migration, not through, for example, discourses of equal worth, human rights or moral leadership. This is 
seen in the designations towards the technologies of control. The technologisation of immigration and 
integration discourses can partly be seen in the concept of ‘the threshold of tolerance’, above which the 
amount of foreigners becomes intolerable, underlying the discursive orders around the management of 
fears vs. rational acceptance. Besides its psychologism, i.e. its reliance on inherent intolerance in 
human psychology, the concept of the threshold of tolerance is made to function as a quasi-naturalised 
law, which asserts that there is a law-like maximum percentage of foreigners in neighbourhoods or the 
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country in general that, if crossed, is bound to cause anti-immigrant commotion (e.g. Blommaert and 
Verschueren 1998; Levene 2000; Laachir 2002; Dussel 2004):  
The qualitative and quantitative management of immigration is extremely important for the 
success of integration, for the stability of the labour markets, so that, for example, markets of 
illegal labour, of cheap labour, are not created. It is important from the viewpoint of internal 
security, and especially it is imperative for the general acceptability of immigration that the 
asylum system is not abused. (Finnish Parliament 15.4.2009, Social Democratic MP) 
In Finland we have traditionally been understanding towards foreigners and we have tried to 
combat racism by education and information. Moderate and responsible aliens policy has kept 
peoples’ attitudes relatively tolerant and permissive, but big sudden changes can increase racism 
and hostility towards especially economic refugees. (Finnish Parliament 16.6.2003, Left Alliance 
MP) 
The Minister fears racism. Somehow it feels like this all happened so quickly, that too many 
people came in. And now they have been placed out there. Integration is not successful. It seems 
like these chaotic situations were kind of arranged for us, so that asylum seekers get agitated 
and then people get agitated. So I claim that if racist phenomena are created now, it in a way is 
the fault of an unskilled government that allowed this to happen. (Finnish Parliament 24.2.2009, 
(True) Finns MP) 
The previous discursive orders show how a threshold of tolerance is formulated as a matter of 
governing for democratic acceptability—so that it does not threaten internal security (which includes 
racist violence) and cause racism by creating chaos and agitation. The nation may be tolerant, but 
tolerance has its limits. ‘To tolerate’ means to stomach and to put up with something that is considered 
rather distasteful or unwelcome in larger quantities.41 This discourse then attempts to maintain a 
subjectification of the ‘immigrant’ as welcome to the country, but in small numbers. The organic notions 
of the natural laws of the population manifest themselves here. This technology of managing such 
‘volatile mixtures’ subjectifies the Finnish and the immigrants as essentially ‘aggressively reactive’ 
towards each other once critical mass is achieved. There is a supposed systemic law in function. Thus, 
in this discursive order immigration policy is about numbers, and more specifically about the numbers of 
the ‘reaction-creating’ immigrants that function as catalysts. Whilst liberal governmentality normally is 
keen on governing desires, here the desires of the population are naturalised and marked as out of the 
reach. Naturalism asserts government that attempts to surpass the threshold of tolerance as ‘too much 
government’. 
If liberal governmentality partly functions based on the respect of naturalised laws, in immigration policy 
it is made essential that an organic balance of tolerance is maintained and the boiling point always kept 
                                                     
41 Goldberg, for example, has noted that the origins of Western conceptualisations of tolerance are in intra-Western forms of 
religious freedom. That is, “[r]acially configured others were invisible to the application of tolerance in large part” meaning 
“that tolerable difference was religious” (Goldberg 2002, 15). 
 
80 
in mind. The discursive orders produced based on this organic conceptualisation vary, but typically they 
assert rationalities of defending society and maintaining a homeostasis defined as ‘social cohesion’ or 
‘integration capability’. There is such a thing as ‘too much tolerance’. ‘Too much tolerance’ is not solely 
a naturalising discourse that employs psychologism to defends its truthfulness, but also historicism is 
employed when conservative, nationalist discursive orders about ‘the Finnish men who fought for our 
national independence’ are brought out and the moral duty of defending the (liberal) national culture is 
asserted: 
How many Finns need to die in the name of tolerance in one’s own country? How many women 
need to be raped, because somebody understands only the culture of his fatherland? How many 
children need to fear to be sexually molested and abducted, although their grandparents gave 
their lives so that the future generations would not need to fear in their own country? That is, is 
pseudo-tolerance more important than the future of our children? (Finnish Parliament 16.6.2003, 
(True) Finns MP) 
I understand the need, when I look at other European countries, that big mistakes have been 
made in alien policy and especially in the integration of refugees and migrants, and that Finns do 
not want to repeat these mistakes. We do not want a country with a large portion of people who 
have a very thin real connection to this common culture. (Finnish Parliament 9.1.2003, Green 
League MP) 
Now we live in the year 2011 and what is interesting [about the German immigration and 
integration policy] is what went wrong. What went wrong is that the multiculturalism that was 
attempted did not work, but the effects [of this failed policy] took twenty years to come to the 
surface. (Finnish Parliament 10.2.2011, Green League MP) 
The speaker before referred to the discussions in German, and noted how multiculturalism did not 
work. This is a good point. We have to remember that if a nation has its own value base, its 
own culture, own traditions, then it is also better for the immigrant to live in this country. One 
should not imagine that artificial multiculturalism could be created, but different cultures can live 
together when everybody has their value base. We Finns require much more self-esteem, so 
that we could be more Finnish, when others would find it better to live here. (Finnish Parliament 
10.2.2011, Centre Party MP) 
All these discursive orders about ‘too much tolerance’ assert the moral duty of defending society from 
unwanted foreigners with differing cultural values as well as from misguided, artificial multiculturalism. 
That is, multiculturalist discourses in Finland are disciplined both from nationalist and liberal point of 
view. The biopolitical impetus of managing immigrants—and the phenomena considered to be caused 
by immigration—is seen in the limits that are put on tolerance and human rights. Immigration control 
must not be guided by too much tolerance, but rather by the immigrant’s envisioned capacity to 
integrate into ‘the’ Finnish culture. Although in principle, the Integration Act defines integration as a 
reciprocal process, this reciprocity never rises to an actual topic of discussion. At those rare occasions 
when reciprocity is mentioned, it is silenced into non-existence: The homeostasis has one direction. 
There is no substantial discussion about structural discrimination in the Finnish Parliament, but rather 
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tolerance and multiculturalism are affirmed as having been too much already. Historicism affirms that 
governments in Europe have failed to respect the naturalised laws governing and are in danger of doing 
this also in Finland.  
Thus, immigration is conceptualised as a volatile mixture that makes society unstable. To defend 
against liberal objections against the necessity of governing immigration as a volatile mixture, liberal 
discourses themselves are again brought in to assert the limits of the liberal. If most parties, at one time 
or another, have affirmed the importance of human rights discourses, they, nevertheless, end up 
disciplining the primacy of this universalising discourse through a normalising discourse of management 
efficiency:  
In my opinion the solution starts from having the bar at the right height. Of course it needs to be 
set so that it fulfils all the requirements of the European Union, United Nations and other 
international institutions, but we can use the room for manoeuvre that for example Sweden 
has used. Thus, set the bar at the right height, make processing times speedier and add 
resources where they are needed. In this the MP... is right, in my opinion, when the process is 
speedy enough it creates savings in the reception centres, when processing is speedy it is also a 
more humane solution for asylum seekers and especially for those who do have just grounds for 
receiving asylum. (Finnish Parliament 15.4.2009, National Coalition MP) 
In our opinion, the policy regarding asylum seekers has been streamlined lately when 
unnecessary cases waiting for decision for years have been weeded out by speedily denying 
entry immediately at the border. We think processing times should be shortened still so that 
nobody has to wait for the decision for longer than three months. Besides the asylum seeker 
him/herself, the biggest sufferer due to long processing times is the Finnish tax payer who in the 
end pays for all this. (Finnish Parliament 5.2.2003, (True) Finns MP) 
Based on this it can be estimated that legal appeals [on asylum decisions] will not be reduced 
but, quite the opposite, this amendment will increase appeals to administrative courts. This risk is 
of course regrettable, because it always delays, increases of cost, creates difficulties and 
such connections [to people in Finland] that then are broken down, and after this questions of 
humaneness and human rights are close to being very seriously violated. (Finnish Parliament 
9.1.2003, Christian Democract MP) 
Governing immigration is assessed through the enterprise model, but the currency counted is not only 
money but also ‘emotional suffering’, which asylum seekers and the tax payer need to be protected from 
and which needs to be calculated on the minus side. The discursive orders use the liberal discourse of 
legal protection, that regards that judicial decisions should be given in due course, to assert a need for 
speedier processing.42 Not deciding on asylum speedily is formulated as compromising human rights. 
                                                     
42 The Finnish legal process is rather slow and may sometimes last for years. This has been criticised by international 
human rights courts relating to other legislative decisions.  The criticism of the long legal process in case of applications to 
review the Immigration Services’ decisions has mostly been domestic. It has to be noted here, that there is also a 
rationality of prolonging decision-making, as it may lead to asylum seekers leaving and giving up the process on their own 
accord. The law was also amended so that prolonging decisions can enable denial, if the permit/asylum cases of underage 
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Through psychologism, the moral becomes calculated through the efficiency of rejection. Denial has to 
be swift for it to be humane. In the cost-benefit calculation applied to government and to refugee policy, 
the benefits are few. Granting asylum is not given much currency: 
[T]he resources for integration have to go hand in hand with the need, but we can influence the 
need by what kind of refugee policy we practise. Therefore, it is very good that ...these pull 
factors have been reduced...   [O]nly 15 per cent of immigrants have a background as refugees 
or protected persons, but often the discussion concentrates specifically on this group. If we do 
not succeed in immigration and integration policy, then the impact of this is reflected on the 85%, 
and we cannot afford this; that Finland is not seen as a good place to move to work and to study, 
because we shall need this kind of globalisation. We need experts, we need professional people, 
we need here people who, together with us, want to build this country, that is, these things go 
hand in hand. (Finnish Parliament 19.10.2010, National Coalition MP) 
When we talk about the so-called humanitarian immigration that is in practice about asylum 
seekers, then our policy in Finland should be that we take asylum seekers and their family 
members in quantities that we can succeed in integrating, i.e. by offering language training, even 
reading and writing skills training, offering job opportunities and a possibility for good life in 
Finland. ... There is no point in claiming that we cannot influence the number of asylum seekers 
and their family members arriving in Finland. We can influence those factors that constitute 
Finland as an attractive asylum application country.  (Finnish Parliament 4.2.2011, National 
Coalition MP) 
The above quotations highlight the power game between discourses of segregation and management 
and the discourses of human rights that disagree over the worthiness of asylum claims. In these 
discourses, the national interest is presented as efficiency and minimum resource wastage, which is 
made paramount (also Ibrahim 2005). The power game of truth is over whether the evaluation of asylum 
claims should be based on the truthfulness of the asylum claim itself or on a priori posited discourses of 
management and segregation. Because it is difficult to assert that asylum processing should not be 
managed as efficiently and cheaply as possible, the power game becomes a cost-benefit calculation on 
human rights: How much is the value of a refugee’s security and the due legal process versus how 
much it costs? Further, how the cost is calculated is also relevant. When the cost of refugees is 
calculated against the assumed loss of the right kind of immigration, the value of the right to protection 
decreases even more. Already in 1913, the eugenicists assumed that “when the representatives of more 
backward countries...have once begun to come, the members of the more advanced races cease 
coming” (Fairchild 1913, 133). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
applicants are decided only after they turn 18. The family reunification and asylum decision do not have to be based on the 
age at the time of application, but at the time decision.  
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As we have seen the rationality of segregating potential asylum seekers has become overpowering. 
Anti-liberal aspects of the asylum policy, such as detention and deportation methods, and the small 
numbers of asylums granted have been criticised in Parliament: 
I was left pondering about the comment [by the MP X] that we can take only such an amount of 
people [asylum seekers] here that we can afford to. ...Finland is one of the richest countries in the 
world. Tell me...what is the quantity that Finland can afford? 90% of world’s refugees are in 
poor developing countries. I assume that they can much less afford to have refugees than 
Finland. We should, if we wanted in any proportional way to offer protection, to have at least 
the Swedish levels, which would mean ten times more. Is this the quantity that you are after? I 
assume it is, as you referred to what we can afford. (Finnish Parliament 4.2.2011, National 
Coalition MP) 
The statements affirming the positivity of Finland affording more or that the burden Finland bears is not 
on a par with the burden some other states bear regularly have come up in the Parliament. Finnish law 
on granting asylum was widened in 2009 based on the EU directive on minimum standards of qualifying 
for asylum (2004/83/EC, Council of the European Union 29.4.2004), which has increased the number of 
asylum granted based on the need for protection. It is impossible to say, whether such an increase 
would have happened without the EU. The securitisation of asylum seeking in Finland has been rather 
successful and aliens’ policy is increasingly geared towards protecting society from asylum seekers 
through other means, such as technologies employing market veridiction as shall be described in the 
next section. Also in Finland securitization has legitimised the use of sovereign power against asylum 
seekers (e.g. Edkins 2000; Darling 2009), although Finland has opposed EU plans for extra-territorial 
asylum applicant camps.  
Hence, the circle comes around and returns back to asserting the truthfulness of problematizing 
immigration. Yet, the need to problematize is not self-evident, rather historicism shows that it is a 
political choice. Asylum seekers in Finland are nothing new, as Leitzinger asserts. During the early 
migrations, from early 1810s to 1920s, the distinction between a ‘migrant’ and a ‘refugee’ was not as 
clear cut as it is today: it made little impact on giving residence status whether a person had political, 
economic or other personal motivations for migrating. Before Finnish independence many immigrants 
simply stayed in the country with their original passports. Foreigners were simply logged into church 
population registries and thus nationalised without much ado. Instead of being recorded as refugees 
many foreigners were simply given aliens’ passports—even during the Cold War. (Leitzinger 2008b.) A 
refugee status was added to the aliens’ decree only in 1930 (Leitzinger 2008b, 301). Rather then, 
choosing to problematize asylum seeking through the technologies of increasing legalisation of the 
definitions of ‘refugee’ and ‘illegal immigrant’ is a rationality of immigration control typical of the post-
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Cold War world.43 Therefore, the selection of psychologism over historicism in politics, i.e. the 
designation of the discourses defending the naturalness of intolerance rather than the naturalisation of 
population movements and asylum seeking as true, clearly impacts the power/knowledge constellation. 
To assert, at this stage, that the difference is that the early refugees were from the ‘near abroad’, 
‘culturally similar’ or ‘integratable’, merely highlights the naturalising logic of the volatile mixtures and its 
underlying racialising logic.  
Besides the silence regarding the earlier numbers of refugees, comparisons to the higher European 
averages of asylum seekers and the foreign-born are also disciplined: immigration is a problem 
regardless of numbers. Since the early 1990s the number of independently arriving asylum seekers has 
increased to a few thousand a year, and the process of applying for asylum has been cemented. Yet, 
the numbers of favourable asylum decisions are still miniscule in comparison to the applications handled 
and granted in many other European countries. The number of ‘actual’ Geneva refugee statuses 
granted in 2000-2008 averages 1%, and temporary protection 11%. In addition to this, Finland accepts 
some 600-750 quota refugees under the UNHRC process. By year 2000, the Immigration Services 
reports having settled some 18.000 and by 2010 some 37.500 refugees including all types of refugees 
(i.e. quota and Geneva Convention defined refugees and those given temporary protection) and their 
family members. It was only in 2009 that the number of settled refugees surpassed the number of 
refugees in Finland in 1918. The fact that the numbers of foreigners, asylum seekers or refugees in 
Finland are well below the average in EU, does not take away the fact that immigration is conceived as 
a problem. The average number of asylum applications in the EU is 13.092 and in Finland 2.249 
(between 1999 and 2007), but this does nothing to the need to perceive these numbers as problematic. 
If we compare the size of the economy and the size of the population to the number of asylum 
applications inside the EU, Finland is below average also in this sense (see Appendix 2): Nevertheless, 
the implicit assertion is that the money always could have been used for ‘better’ purposes than the 
asylum process. If anything, indeed the lesson learned is that the numbers should stay small:  
“One must take a very serious attitude towards foreigners coming to Finland. In Central Europe it 
is a big problem because the proportion of foreigners is much larger than ours.” (Finnish 
Parliament 5.6.2002, Social Democratic MP) 
                                                     
43 Balibar talks about the role of human rights and refugee policy in contemporary politics and compares it to the 
international political scene of its ascendance: The refugee system was not only created as an act of remorse after the 
Second World War and Nazi atrocities, but also the Cold War and the atrocities of some Communist regimes played a part 
in its legitimisation. During the Cold War “the right of asylum was used as a weapon in the ideological struggle” (Balibar 
2002, 80). The political function of the right to asylum is more limited today and does not have the same political currency 
as during the Cold War, except in the case of such countries as China or Russia. This lack of political currency in 
international relations also contributes towards the problematization of asylum today. 
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“With globalisation the number of immigrants will grow somewhat in Finland, but this new, this 
Aliens Act presented to us still does not make Finland into a destination country of 
migrants, like most of the European countries have been already for decades. [...] The bill, 
anyhow, has been written from the point of view that neither in the future shall Finland be a 
destination for migrants.” (Finnish Parliament 9.1.2003, Left Alliance MP) 
On the other hand, what has been brought up here is also important: we should evaluate 
Finland’s attitude toward immigrants and immigration policies in general. It is right that Finland 
should not become such a country that lets in just about anybody based on looser criteria than 
other European countries, and also we need to be able to prevent the entry of people who 
come with different criminal or other purposes. (Finnish Parliament 15.4.2009, Centre Party MP) 
(Finnish Parliament 15.4.2009) 
[The bill is objected to] because on the whole in the bill, despite the focused alterations of the 
committee, the grounds for protection are widened unreasonably above the EU minimum 
directive, the future practices of immigration will become too ambiguous and loose in comparison 
with many other countries in which the aim has been to limit immigration. (Finnish Parliament - 
Administration Committee 12.12.2008, objection by (True) Finns) (Finnish Parliament - 
Administration Committee 12.12.2008) 
In these quotes, the designation is towards the discourse of problematic immigration that asserts that 
migrant ‘flows’ towards Finland are a bad thing and should be controlled. Society needs to be defended 
from immigration. In the cost-benefit calculations, the success of the enterprise of immigration policy is 
judged as a capacity of not making Finland into a country of immigration. The benefit is exclusion.  
Hence, we have seen how the liberal governmentality of defending society overruns moral discourses of 
liberalism. The empirico-transcendental doublet knows the discourse of immigration restriction to be 
true. Although the status of foreigners in Finland has moved in a more liberal direction especially since 
the 1990s, when the introduction of basic rights and the legal right to challenge administrative decisions 
was gradually extended to cover foreigners. This extension, however, has also been problematized. 
Since then the overall pattern has been to improve the technologies of control and exclusion. When the 
discourses of cosmopolitanism have been silenced and de-naturalised, the problematization of 
immigration has been defined as being a question of who is and who is not let in and based on what. 
Because of this, it is pertinent to start looking at not just the discourses around immigration, but the 
technologies of immigration control designed to implement this rationality of defending society. 
3.3. Rationalities of Segregation and Technologies of Immigration Control 
In the following subsections I will discuss the immigration apparatus and the various technologies 
through which the moral duty of immigration control is envisioned to be carried out. The technologies of 
the immigration apparatus extend from visa requirements to granting citizenship, and they explicate the 
kind of immigration that must be controlled, as well as that which need not. Before embarking on 
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discussing these technologies, it must be remembered that these technologies are offered as tools by 
the state: Whether and how these tools are utilised in individual cases by government officials cannot be 
assessed through this method—although the basic principle is, of course, that the law and governmental 
instructions of their application should be followed. The next subsections will explicate what kinds of 
rationalities the laws and regulations contain.  
3.3.1. Technologies of Human Pedigree: ’Whitest’-‘White’-‘Dark’-‘Darker’ 
The borders of the territory are “polysemic” and have different meaning for different people (Balibar 
2002, 81-82). The denial of the cosmopolitan right to a shared earth is not a universal denial. In order to 
understand the rationalities of immigration control it is necessary to investigate the simultaneous 
existence and non-existence of the border for different types of people. The visa regime is the first 
technology through which the polysemy is established. The visa regime started to be used as a control 
mechanism in situations, in which it was deemed that the society needed to be defended against the 
‘threat’ of refugee flows. In the Scandinavian context, this had already been seen during the Jewish 
refugee movement in the 1930s, when visas and entry for Jewish refugees were denied. Using the visa 
regime as a technology of prevention became the prominent response to refugee flows in the mid-1970s 
(e.g. Torpey 2000; Leitzinger 2008b, 475). Today the United Nations Development Programme has 
defined refugees as a threat, that is “the populations that are at risk...themselves...are seen as 
threatening” (Ibrahim 2005, 169). 
The current visa regime relates to the passport control free Schengen area and functions based on the 
Schengen-wide cooperative platform that includes a common visa requirement policy and visa 
application process. In this sense, the regulations analysed here are not particularly Finnish.44 Next I will 
take a look at the content of the visa requirement policy by cross-tabulating the visa requirements based 
on the ‘racial’, religio-cultural45 stereotypes and wealth of the various countries, to investigate the 
                                                     
44 The Schengen Convention and its visa regulations have been applied in Finland since 25 March 2001, but when the pre-
Schengen regulations (based on the Finlex international treaties information, www.finlex.fi) are compared to the Schengen 
era regulations, the picture is similar, but somewhat less pronounced. The comparison is complicated by the varying 
timelines of when visa free arrangements were established and when abolished. In terms of race, no non-Christian and 
‘black’ country was ever steadily in the visa free category, whereas the white Western countries were 100% already 
included in the visa free arrangements before the EU and Schengen. The pre-Schengen figure for Muslim countries that 
required visas was somewhat less, 78% against 95% in Schengen, but in reality only 2 Muslim countries (Turkey and 
Malaysia) constantly were not required visas—most other countries had visa-free entry rights only for a number of years. 
(See Appendix 3 for more information.) 
45 The categorisation into religions was based on the majority religion in each country. I utilised rough religio-cultural 
groupings that are there to mark a distance from Western Christianity rather than aiming at staying true to the exact 
religious power balance in any particular country. Where no majority religion could be established I used the main religious 
groups and ’divided’ such countries adding a half point or one-third to the relevant categories. That is, if a country was fifty-
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polysemic nature of the border. The power/knowledge constellation around the visa regime designates 
those that are entitled to cosmopolitan rights and those that are not. (More information regarding the 
‘racial’ and religio-cultural categories used in this analysis is in Appendix 3, the charts and the 
correlations can be found in Appendix 2.) 
The knowledges informing the technologies of immigration reflect a truth game between human equality 
and human pedigree. The visa requirement of ‘Western Christian whites’ from outside the EU is 0%. 
Hence Americans, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders and the rest of nationals from ‘Western 
European’ countries, including all the non-Schengen ones, have visa-free access to Finland and the 
Schengen area, whereas the neighbouring Russians do not. The exclusion of Eastern European 
countries from the visa-free regime cannot be separated from political history, but it cannot be held as 
the sole factor influencing the visa requirement for Eastern European nationals either.   
Historically, ‘intra-white’ prejudices have been common and especially in Finland these notions had 
important societal aspects and these aspects still play a role in contemporary discussions and 
‘prejudices’.46 Hence, I have kept the notion of ‘Western white’ and ‘Eastern white’ in these 
categorisations, mainly because in the pre-Schengen visa regulations the tendency toward preferring 
‘Western white’ was evident, even if Finland was officially a neutral country in relation to the Cold War 
divide. The assertion here is that the traditional differentiation of degrees of whiteness or Western-ness, 
still functions, and the EU can be regarded as a process of ‘whitening’ for Southern and/or Eastern 
European countries. Whiteness was never a category uniformly applied to those phenotypically ‘white’, 
but whiteness was a matter of degree (Bonnett 1998, 322). We will return to this question of whiteness 
and its attributes in the next chapters. Using this categorisation without regard to EU membership, out of 
the ‘Eastern European white’ countries 39% require visas to enter the Schengen area. Yet 75% of these 
countries are under visa facilitation agreements, which means that visas are not required for all people, 
in all circumstances or are granted for reduced fees. If we ignore this intra-white differentiation, the 
number of ‘white’ countries under visa requirement would be 18%, making the impact of ‘race’ even 
more pronounced.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
fifty Muslim and Christian, the country was added as half points (0.5 and 0.5) to both categories. As with ‘race’, also these 
religio-cultural categories reflect Western prejudices, not reality. 
46 These historical factors relate to the colonial past under Sweden and Russia until 1917. Under the Swedish rule the 
aristocracy and the upper classes were often Swedish and remained Swedish-speaking despite the golden era of Finnish 
nationalism that took hold of the Swedish-speaking upper class before Finnish independence from Russian rule. The 
Finnish prejudices against Russians are prominent (Puuronen 2011), but in terms of immigration policy, it cannot be said 
that the rhetoric towards Eastern European EU members, for example, would be uniformly prejudiced. Rather, Eastern 
Europeans are often designated as the coveted, ‘culturally close’ type of immigrants.  
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Chart F. Visas required for Countries According to ‘Race’ 
The rationality of the human pedigree becomes clearer when looking beyond ‘whiteness’ (see Chart F). 
Of countries with populations of ‘mixed brown’ skin colour 80% require visas to enter Schengen and of 
those with ‘black’ populations 90%. A similar pedigree was visible in the Finnish, pre-Schengen visa 
system, but the corresponding percentages were 0%-46%-63%-69%. That is, even if more ‘darker’ 
countries had at some point enjoyed visa-free entry, the correlation nevertheless remained linear (see 
Appendix 2). Hence, the pedigree in terms of visa regulations and phenotypical ‘race’ is clear: The 
rationality of requiring runs along a pedigree of ‘’whitest’-‘white’-‘dark’-‘darker’ with the ‘darker’ being the 
most likely to require visas. 
When adding the religio-cultural factor, the picture remains similar: 49% of all Christian countries are 
under visa requirements. In the case of other broad religio-cultural groups 84% of Buddhist (including 
other ‘Asian’ religions and Hinduism) and 95% of Muslim countries have visa requirements in place. 
Cross-tabulating race and religio-cultural categories tells us that, if you are ‘dark’ or ‘darker’ it helps to 
be Christian, but if you happen to be ‘black’ and Muslim, then the visa requirement is 100% (see 
Appendix 2). Instead of a discursive order of human equality, one rather sees a particularizing rationality 
of a human pedigree that governs the movement of people through the visa regime. 
Hence, we can see that the segregationist human pedigree discourse overpowers the discourse of 
equality when it comes to technologies of allowing easy access to Schengen. The visa regulations have 
very practical consequences for people trying to look for a job or to apply for asylum in Finland or 
Schengen. This has not gone without criticism in the European or Finnish Parliaments, but overall the 
near silence regarding the visa regime and its already existing human pedigree is deafening. Equality is 
not universal; some are more equal than others. 
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3.3.2. Sovereign Technologies of Segregation: The Sieve of Obedience 
The discourse of human pedigree also impacts the techniques of deciding who has the right to visit and 
based on what criteria. The criteria of granting visas are imposed only on nationals of countries that 
require visas—93% of which have either phenotypically ‘mixed brown’ or ‘black’ populations and 92% of 
which profess Islam or one of the ‘Asian’ religions (Buddhism, Hinduism etc.).47 This vetting process 
examines the ‘less worthy’ traveller’s motivation to come and more importantly to return designating 
towards discourses of segregation:  
It’s a wonder that in Europe, the United States, Australia and Japan, where I have also lived 
myself, when you come into these countries one needs to have a return ticket before getting into 
the country. Finnish Police...uses 40 million euros for nothing, to take those back who are under 
accelerated deportation orders and who do not have a return ticket to where they came from. 
Such a regulation should be justified, because it is in proportion with the measures by other 
countries and it has been accepted by the UN, and it should be applied also in Finland. (Finnish 
Parliament 16.6.2003, (True) Finns MP) 
Nowadays, as a starting principle, visas are not granted to potential immigrants, except to ECC 
citizens’ family members. (Finnish Government 13.06.2003HE 28/2003) 
The currently valid visa regulations have been consistently read so that a foreigner whose 
aspiration is to stay in the country after the visit, has to apply for a residence permit instead of a 
visa before coming to the country. If such an aspiration surfaces during the visa processing, the 
applicant is not normally given a visa. (Ibid.) 
According to the currently valid administrative procedure, when considering granting residence 
permit for applicants in Finland besides regular criterion, the original purpose of coming to the 
country is taken into account. If a foreigner has, for example, come to the country on a visa 
granted for a visit, he/she has been deemed to have given wrong information at the time of visa 
application, if he/she applies for a residence permit shortly after coming to the country. A visa is 
granted only for short term tourism or other comparable short-term stay. (Ibid.) 
Granting of a visa for a person who has a residence permit application in process, is considered 
case by case taking into consideration the overall situation. A visa can be granted to a person...if 
there is no reason to suspect that a person would refuse to leave the country after the visa 
expires. An existing job contract, a nuclear family living abroad and the expenses of returning in 
comparison with the income level are reasonable have been considered as signs for a positive 
approach towards return. Visas have been generally granted for those living in the near abroad, 
even if the person has a residence permit application under way. (Ibid.) 
As a general basis of assessment according to the consulate handbook, the visa judgement takes 
into account the security of the Schengen countries, the prevention of illegal immigration, as well 
as other aspects relating to international relations. According to the handbook, depending on the 
country of departure, the above mentioned viewpoints can vary. Thus in some countries of 
departure, for example, the prevention of illegal immigration will be emphasised. (Ibid.)  
                                                     
47 The pre-Schengen regulations in Finland required visas for 84% of non-Christian countries and around 89% of non-white 
countries (those countries that had at some point been allowed visa-free entry were divided half-and-half into both 
categories of visa-free/visas required). 
 
90 
In the above statements the validity and positivity of the discursive order on meriting visas for those who 
express a wish to immigrate is asserted in different ways. Permit applicants from visa-requiring 
countries reflecting a human pedigree are, thus, systematically subjected to the above mentioned 
criteria of ‘aspiration to stay’ or ‘willingness to leave the country’. There is a rationality, which allows the 
essentialisation of suspicion: some nationals are more likely to resist the technologies of segregation. 
The way the ‘prevention of illegal immigration’ discourse is used subjectifies certain nationals as more 
undesirable, even if illegal immigration is rather a ‘white’ problem in Finland. If the statistics on 
immigration offences in 2005-2009 are categorised based on the country of origin of the ‘criminal’, some 
57% of those convicted are ‘white’ (see Appendix 2). When looking at the visa granting tendencies, it 
becomes evident that visas are more often denied in those embassies whose location indication a 
darker phenotype of visa applicants,48 and the same applies to residence permit applications,49 as will 
be seen in the next chapter.  
The general grounds for granting visas and residence permits both in the EU and Finland include the 
requirement that the applicant cannot be deemed to be circumventing regulations of entry or stay. 
Before recent changes,50 the criteria of ‘aspiration to stay’ or ‘willingness to leave the country’ were not 
imposed on those who were not required visas and, hence, they were free to come for three months and 
attempt to fulfil the criteria for acquiring a residence permit through, for example, applying for jobs, 
attending job interviews or university entrance exams etc. Their residence or citizenship permit 
applications would never be considered against giving misleading information about their intention to 
stay in visa applications. But the visa-requiring person’s chances in life are disciplined, on the other 
hand, by requirements to demonstrate the tickets of return, travel agendas, accommodation 
                                                     
48 The statistics on granting visas based on phenotype are not sound in the sense that the applicant’s nationality is not 
recorded by the Finnish embassies, but only the embassy in which the visa application has been made. What is known for 
sure is that these applicants are not nationals of ‘Western white’ countries. If we exclude the visa applications logged in 
Russia (because of their huge amount in comparison to the rest of visa applications), the average refusal rate is 7%. 
However, in Muslim countries the refusal rate is 18% and in African countries 15%. See Appendix 2 for more information. 
49 The average denial rate for residence permit applications according to the Immigration Services Statistics is 14%. Looking 
at the Top-10 countries from which applicants have come, the average denial percentage for the citizens of the United 
States is 2% and for Afghan and Somali citizens the denial rate is over 40%. These figures shall be discussed further in 
section 4.3.1. 
50 The EU border control directive (2006/562/EC, European Parliament and Council of the European Union 15.3.2006) has 
tightened the practices at the outside borders of the EU and today all non-EU foreigners, unless carrying an EU family 
member’s residence permit, are more systematically checked for reasons to visit and legally available funds for the 
duration of the visit, as well as for health and safety hazards or foreign policy risks of any member state. Before this EU 
directive, the border checks were carried out through spot checks or ‘where reasons for suspicion arose’ and border 
guards had been instructed to avoid racial profiling in checking practices. Third-country nationals are also systematically 
checked at exit from the EU to ascertain that their stay had been legal and that they left inside the timelines required. 
Besides the increasing securitisation of immigration, stricter border control is also being rendered technical, made into a 
matter of common-sense and effectiveness of checking obedience, and evidence of an impetus of governing mobile 
populations, which is a concern in itself (Salter 2006). 
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documentation, tourist trip bookings, tickets to shows or conferences and letters of invitation, job 
contracts at home and account for family relations at home to prove that the trip is not an attempt to 
immigrate in disguise (Salter 2006). The visa-requiring traveller is here subjectified as a non-desirable 
and should not nurture ideas of immigrating. 
The discursive order arising from the previous quotes regarding the visa-requiring foreigner is one that 
seeks reasons for rejecting the application to enter or stay: Suspicion—not innocence before proven 
guilty—is enough to deny entry (Salter 2006, 172). When proof is not systematically required, suspicion 
may not amount to much more than prejudice, although liberal discourses of due process are 
increasingly being applied also to visa applications. Nevertheless, the imperative to prevent the 
conditions of permanent entry from arising (through finding a job, a study place and/or a partner whilst 
on tourist visa) for those who are of the ‘wrong’ phenotype or religion, is still pivotal. The tautological 
circle aimed at the less deserving and less equal—in which a visa will not be given, if one wishes to 
stay, and a residence permit will not be given, if one has not already achieved the means to stay (i.e. in 
practice have harboured a desire to stay)—rather expects the less deserving to accept and act in 
accordance with the subjectification of inequality. It is telling whose pursuit of happiness is accepted and 
whose not. The muteness around the technology of visa requirements is loud. It appears common 
sense.  
There are other technologies to complicate the entry of undesirable foreigners, such as the technology 
of limiting the application countries, in which visa and residence permit applications for third-country-
nationals (TCNs, i.e. non-EU or EEA citizens) can be submitted. The first visa and residence permits 
need to be in principle applied for outside Finland—for those who need them. Nordic and EU citizens 
can merely register their residence. Those who qualify for making residence permit applications in 
Finland are qualifying family members of Finnish citizens, those who have Finnish ancestry, qualifying 
family members of EU citizens, have EU long-term residence permits (since 2007), have EU permits for 
scientific researchers (since 2009) or have highly qualified employees’ EU Blue cards (since 2012). That 
is, what we have here are the main categories of privilege: those who are professionally, biologically, or 
culturally desirable and those who have established rights based on family relation or long-term 
residence. Since 1999 the regulations regarding Finnish ancestry have implications for naturalised 
citizens in the sense that their adult off-spring do not have the same rights of gaining residency as the 
children of native Finns have, even if their parents had given up Finnish citizenship, because what has 
since been required is not citizenship but nativity. Exceptions can be made to rules regulating where 
residence permits are applied most importantly on the basis of established family relations or gaining 
employment, but racialised visa requirements have an impact on the ability to arrive in Finland without 
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residence permits. Overall, the aim is to keep the (visa-requiring) foreigners out until the worth of their 
claim has been vetted. In comparison, however, in the case of the asylum applications the logic is the 
opposite: Asylum claims need to be filed in Finland and only in Finland. The primacy of defending 
society is asserted by making it as hard as possible for asylum seekers and those not desired to arrive 
(Morris 1998, 952-953). 
The EU technology of airport transit visas adds another hurdle to travellers from countries where many 
asylum seekers or ‘illegal immigrants’ are coming from—and as such constitutes an important part of 
securitised technologies of segregation, to which many have drawn attention (e.g. Bigo 2002; Lippert 
and O'Connor 2003; Salter 2007; Chalfin 2008; Adey 2009). The airport transit visas are required from 
the nationals of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iraq, Iran, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka and other countries wherefrom ‘illegal immigration’ 
is likely to come (2009/810/EC, European Parliament and Council of the European Economic 
Community 13.7.2009), i.e. from where there is known to be political persecution and wherefrom asylum 
seekers are likely to originate. The airport visa regime speaks of extreme securitization of asylum 
seeking and testifies to the rationality of making it as difficult as possible for ‘aspiring immigrants’ to 
reach Finland and Schengen by vetting the ‘likely-to-be-asylum-seekers’ before they are allowed to set 
foot in the international area of EU airports, where asylum applications can be made. “[T]he porosity or 
penetrability of the airport is different for different categories of travelers” (Salter 2007, 52). The airport 
transit visa-requiring traveller needs a permit to be ‘nowhere’.51  
The primacy of the discourse of segregation to the governmentality of the technologies of immigration is 
further evidenced by harnessing the logic of capitalism to guard the national sphere of privilege: Carrier 
sanctions, which Finland supported also on the EU level (Finnish Government 2.11.2000), have been 
successfully implemented to prevent transportation companies from bringing in visa-requiring travellers 
without pre-obtained permits, unless the carrier chooses to take the risk of being fined 3.000 € per 
person or possibly charged with organizing illegal immigration.52 In principle, the sanctions are later 
                                                     
51 Where the borders of the country are drawn and where the power to deny entry is placed is a complex issue best seen at 
the airport. This ‘international’ sphere is both filled with and void of meaning at the same time. Whereas others require 
permits to transit the zone, for those whose visas are cancelled or entry is denied arriving to this zone does not constitute 
entering the country. As a government bill explains: “In current practice the regulations regarding cancellation [of visa or 
residence permit] is interpreted so that a person undergoing border control procedures is not considered to have arrived in 
the country” (Finnish Government 13.06.2003f). The sovereignty discourse creates spheres of existence that suspend 
people and their opportunities in the air. 
52 As such, the logic of this EU regulation is nothing new. Carriers have been held responsible for taking those denied entry 
back and paying for their expenses in Finland since 1983. The 1991 Aliens’ Law already required carriers to pay for the 
costs of removing travellers who had slipped from the carrier without the required documents for entry. This included 
paying for administrative cost. In 1993 bringing in people without documents was criminalised and carriers could face 
charges of arranging illegal immigration and lose the vehicle in question to the state. A clause of no consequence was 
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cancelled, if the person obtains asylum, but as Boutruche has noted, the customer service agent of the 
carrier is unlikely to be able to assess the legitimacy of an asylum applicant’s claim in a matter of 
minutes, when it takes legally trained lawyers weeks, if not years, to decide on asylum applications 
(Boutruche 2003, 78-79). “Asylum, in other words, has come to be treated, to all intents and purposes, 
as a loophole to be closed, rather than as a right to be protected” (Turton and González 2003, 13). 
‘True’ asylum seekers, of course, are welcome and they should be protected, the Finnish parties assert, 
but remain silent about how these ‘true’ asylum seekers are supposed to reach Finland (because they 
are not).  
Further technologies of preventing asylum seekers from gaining asylum, such as the safe haven policy, 
the Dublin protocol53 and cooperative schemes with countries bordering the EU, of which Finland has 
been a keen supporter, are employed and especially designed to combat the arrival of ‘economic 
refugees’. The function of the entry interviews for asylum seekers, as a technology of the police, is to 
elicit confessions regarding transit routes (e.g. Salter 2006). The asylum seeker’s cooperation (or lack of 
it) is taken into account when considering the validity of the asylum application and later permits. If the 
asylum seeker has arrived through another foreign country, which is a party to the UN Refugee 
Convention and mostly considered to be safe, the policy of safe havens dictates that the applicant be 
returned to this country without examining the asylum application.54 The Dublin convention attempts to 
achieve the same in the EU by aiming to implement a rule of one asylum application in the EU. Safety is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
included, if these acts were motivated by safety considerations. Today, the person or the carrier arranging for entry is not 
penalised, if the person(s) obtain refugee status. This fundamentally hypocritical policy of visa requirements and 
criminalisation has been tested in practice in Finland, by a Finnish person, who ‘smuggled’ 22 Chechen asylum seekers 
into Finland most of whom had obtained asylum. The man was nevertheless charged with arranging illegal entry. The court 
initially found him not guilty, but the prosecutor appealed and the Appellate Court found him guilty. He was given a four-
month suspended sentence and his appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected.  
53 The Dublin Convention in general refers to the regulations preventing double asylum applications inside the EU and the 
principle of pinpointing the responsibility for handling the asylum request on one Member State. The Dublin II regulations 
are a further specification into the procedures of determining the responsible Member State. The policy is highly 
controversial, because it does not, for example, guarantee that an asylum application will be considered fairly, but just 
dictates the state that is responsible for logging the asylum request, and this according to many sources is not even a fair 
system. The Member States themselves do not always agree on who is responsible for the applications, and not all 
requests to return applicants to other EU countries are successful. The practice is said to hamper asylum seekers’ legal 
rights and to compromise the right to protection. For more information on criticism of the Dublin system see for example 
ECRE and UNHRC (e.g. ECRE 1.12.2001; UNHRC 2006). 
54 It has to be noted that according to reports people are rarely returned to non-EU countries to apply for asylum. (The 
application of the safe haven policy is dependent on established transit routes and intermittent stops when the applicant 
has used legal means of transit.) Rather, most asylum applicants are returned to safe countries of origin or to other EU 
countries under the Dublin Convention arrangements. This does not mean that these options would not be a desired way 
to proceed, but that ascertaining safety according to international regulations may be more complicated than desired. For 
example, in 2010 some Afghan asylum seekers had managed to walk across the Finnish-Russian border, and the officials 
publicly made comments about whether to return these people to Russia to apply for asylum. In 1991 when the first Somali 
refugees arrived in Finland via the Soviet Union, the official attempt was to send these people back to Moscow. 
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the only thing that the asylum seeker is legitimately allowed to seek. Dire need is how a true refugee is 
recognised:  
The central function of the Aliens Law is to weed the economic refugees out from those who 
seek asylum and residence permits risking their lives. Finland has a certain moral duty as a 
safe country to help those persecuted and in danger. But those that come to Finland from a 
safe country with a hope of a better living standard should be sent back to their countries. 
(Finnish Parliament 16.6.2003, Left Alliance MP) 
Investigating the motive of people who come here is not altogether wrong either; people come 
here for different reasons. Of course there are many who come here in order to profit from the 
higher living standards and our social security. But for this there are then those procedures 
that evaluate the motivation of coming to Finland. For a real refugee we need to secure the 
possibility of living here and avoiding persecution in his own country, but it is evidently clear that 
in these situations, in which the accelerated removal is currently applied, there is no such motive 
for protection, no need of protection, so we need a system through which to decide quickly these 
issues, because it causes great suffering for these people themselves if they have to wait months 
or years in Finland and then will need to leave when the situation has been clear from the start 
anyway. (Finnish Parliament 16.6.2003, National Coalition MP)  
It is in everybody’s interest that clearly groundless asylum applicants could be denied entry as 
soon as possible already at the airport or other border crossing. These asylum seekers have 
already in their countries been misled and they have lost large sums of money on the trip. Such a 
message should not go out from Finland that the law and practice here deviate from asylum 
procedures in other European countries in a way that asylum seekers would systematically make 
their way to Finland. Amendment of the law could prevent abuse of our asylum system. 
(Finnish Parliament - Administration Committee 10.2.2004, objection by the National Coalition ) 
Such asylum seekers who have possibly already received one or more negative asylum decisions 
from elsewhere in Europe or who think their chances there are lean, can come and try their 
chances in Finland. This is something that has been much discussed in the EU Council of 
Ministers, that there should be similar criteria, and there should be no differences in pull factors 
between countries in this sense. It is neither in our interest. Too liberal an asylum practice can 
very quickly be seen in problems, that we here will be able to discuss quite a lot. This is related to 
rather long processing times, as I mentioned earlier, and to the rather good benefits and rights 
according to European yardsticks. These on their part would increase the attractiveness in the 
eyes of those applicants, for whom a negative decision is a likely end result. (Finnish Minister 
of the Interior 16.6.2003) 
The assumption is that, if the asylum seekers are seeking safety, the first safe country should suffice. 
That is, selfish reasons such as economic reasons or considerations of chances of success for the 
application due to differing asylum policies should not a play part in selecting the country in which the 
asylum application is filed. The accelerated process of denying asylum subjectifies the legitimate 
refugee as one ‘in dire need’, as one who is running away from persecution and who is happy at the first 
place of safety, wherever one happens to dock or land, regardless of what his/her chances of pursuing 
his/her happiness in the longer term would be in this country: The legitimate refugee seeks safety, and 
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is not allowed to conduct his/her conduct based on the otherwise normal enterprising models of caring 
for the self. The true asylum seeker does not search for happiness or opportunities.  
The accelerated asylum application process means that the substance of the application is not 
investigated, because the person arrives from a safe country or because the application is ‘evidently 
groundless’.55 This accelerated process is often accompanied by accelerated removal. Together they 
constitute an effective technology of segregation. However, these accelerated technologies are in 
principle accepted by the UNHCR, although concern has been expressed about the shortage of the 
process preventing due process being carried out (Oakley 2007). In this sense, there is nothing 
particularly Finnish in this policy, although the time spans in Finland are short and deportation is carried 
out despite possibly outstanding legal complaints. This policy is used in one form or another in all EU 
countries despite criticism by the European Parliament (Oakley 2007). 
The accelerated process has attracted a lot of criticism in the Finnish Parliament, being probably the 
most discussed tool of asylum policy. But it is more common to view this accelerated process as a 
beneficial thing than not, as has been seen in previous excerpts. The same positive approach is taken 
to the return policies of the Dublin protocol (Finnish Immigration Service 2004). Opponents have 
referred to the discourses on legal protection, fair process and the principle of individual assessment of 
asylum claims regardless of nationality. Especially the deportation that is carried out before an appeal 
has been decided on has attracted criticism. Nevertheless, the accelerated process stands unchanged 
at the moment— normally resulting in a consequent prohibition of entry order or entry-ban for these 
asylum seekers.  
The positivity of the sovereignty discourses, of the principle of segregation of peoples, is evidenced in 
the technologies of removal and deportation.56 The discursive orders built around deportation rest on 
the above described discursive constellations of democratic desire for segregation and state 
sovereignty. But in this context, the power/knowledge game over truthfully knowing the nature of 
deportation has not been as clearly established as the truthfulness of the right to immigration control has 
been. Rather, human rights discourses also have an impact on knowing the true nature of the 
                                                     
55 This speedier process of deciding on the ‘evidently groundless’ asylum applications and the speedier implementation of 
deportation relates to the Schengen and Dublin Conventions and the EU-wide cooperation on determining safe countries 
of departure and origin to which asylum applicants can be returned. 
56 Legally the difference between deportation and removal in principle relates to the time spent in the country: those who 
have attained some kind of a permit to stay in the country (including the right to stay whilst an asylum application is 
substantially considered) are deported and those whose entry is denied at the border or inside the first three months on a 
visa or visa-free stay are removed. The substantial difference is the right of appeal, to which only deportation orders are 
linked. This legal definition cannot always be seen in the statements.  
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technologies of deportation. Yet mostly, the discourses of national sovereignty in Finland are used to 
assert that the control over national territory needs to be absolute: 
In some countries applying the Dublin II Regulation, a negative decision in respect of an asylum 
application only results in a request to leave the country, without any actual check to ensure the 
person has actually left. In such cases it is often unclear whether foreigners return to their 
homeland or whether they remain in the Schengen area. [...] Unlike the rest of Europe, Finland 
and the other Nordic countries have considered it obvious to use coercion as a last resort to 
remove from the country foreigners whose application for a residence permit has been rejected 
and who have consequently received a decision to remove them from the country.(Finnish 
Government 19.10.2006a)  
Efficient deportation and prevention of illegal immigration are a prerequisite for successful 
employment-based immigration. The situation now is out of control because of wrong signals and 
weakness of decision-making and we now have almost 4000 asylum seekers needing interviews. 
... In order to preserve the acceptability of immigration, the battle against illegal immigration 
needs to be reinforced and deportations made efficient. (Finnish Parliament 15.4.2009, National 
Coalition MP) 
I would still like to ask the Minister: Have you investigated whether the 8 day rule of the 
accelerated deportation process could be possibly speeded up further, because it looks like for 
some reason we still get unfounded asylum applicants every summer, or has the message not 
gone out to the world? (Finnish Parliament 16.6.2003, National Coalition MP) 
Accelerated deportation happens in Sweden, provided that the law is still in force there, so that a 
person puts a stamp on: ‘Deportation, you may appeal’. The person appeals and asks where to 
take the appeal. He is told: ‘Give it to me’. That is, the same person decides whether he did the 
right decision five minutes ago. And it goes very nicely and according to the excellent human 
rights conventions. Here [the President of the Supreme Administrative Court] Hallberg et 
company needs to meet multiple times before they can decide what happens. It’s no wonder 
that it takes longer [to process these cases]. (Finnish Parliament 9.1.2003, Centre Party MP) 
The above assertion regarding the issue that some countries ‘only’ request, but do not coerce, 
foreigners into leaving the territory, derives a discursive order, in which such a practice is presented as 
almost unthinkable in Finland. In this discursive context, deportation is made into a technological issue 
rather than a contested, political matter: As a matter of principle denied asylum and residence 
applications are bolstered by removal or deportation orders. The battle over the truth on asylum and 
deportation is won by an attempt at silencing the human rights discourse and concentrating on 
deportation as a technology.57 Deportation becomes a duty. 
Nevertheless, the success of the discursive order on the duty of deportation is not complete; there is 
criticism of deportation practices in Parliament. These are mostly, however, rather limited and mainly 
                                                     
57 In recent years the numbers of suggested deportations by the police have risen, but at the same time the actual numbers 
of deportations have remained steady. This can be given meaning in two ways: either as a demonstration of the increasing 
liberalism of decision-makers or as a demonstration of an increasing sense of moral duty to recommend deportation, which 
is counteracted by the unchanged legal basis for deporting leaving the number of actual deportation decisions similar (see 
Appendix 2). 
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attempt to secure ‘humane’ deportation (i.e. not using force and sedative drugs on people resisting 
deportation) or to contest the deportation of those who have already settled in the country and are then 
deported due to criminal or immigration law offences. There is no principled contestation of the 
technology itself: 
Voluntary and independent return shall be promoted on a national level, ensuring that foreigners 
without the right to reside in Finland are effectively removed from the country and that repatriation 
is effected humanely and fairly with full respect for human rights. (Finnish Government 
19.10.2006a)  
Our aim is to guarantee the minimum of legal protection for an asylum seeker so that she/he is 
not deported before an appeal has been decided on. In the accelerated process the question is 
about just a few weeks of additional time because of the decision process. It is a matter of having 
an asylum seeker deported to a country in which he/she is in danger of death, and in these 
situations, according to me, it is not consistent with human rights to implement a deportation 
decision before the appeal has been decided on. The intention is not here to prolong the 
processing times, but to give basic legal protection to an asylum seeker. (Finnish Parliament 
16.6.2003, Green League MP) 
Rendering deportation technical, i.e. depoliticizing deportation, means that what is politicised here is not 
the technology of controlling migration through deportation, but how it happens: that it should happen 
humanely, i.e. that scenes of drugged out objectors to deportation should be kept at a minimum, or that 
deportation should not happen until the appeal process has been completed when there is a risk of 
death—that is, importantly what is not politicized here is the general rule of implementing deportation 
orders, even if an asylum seeker has appealed against a negative decision. 
Another technology of immigration control is the entry-ban. Considering the issuing of entry-bans is a 
matter of routine, an additional stamp, in case of negative asylum and residence permit decisions as 
well as in case of deportation and removal decisions.58 Issuing entry-bans to asylum seekers is 
presented as a matter of fact. 
                                                     
58 In 2000 the law was amended to reinforce a requirement that removal/deportation and entry-bans are to be addressed in 
asylum interviews. In 2011 the deportation, removal and entry-ban laws were changed due to an EU directive 
(2008/115/EC, European Parliament and Council of the European Union 16.12.2008) by adding a possibility of voluntarily 
leaving inside a given time before entry-ban was issued, reflecting a framework of cost-benefit calculations. Before this a 
voluntary return clause had been included in the Finnish Integration Act that provided travel expenses and financial return 
support for refugees, victims of human trafficking and temporarily protected persons if they returned voluntarily. After the 
2011 amendment travel expenses could be paid for those who cancelled their asylum applications or left voluntarily after a 
negative asylum decision (forced removal in itself also includes the need to pay for travel costs but voluntary return saves 
administrative costs). Financial return support and compensation for moving costs can be given only to temporarily 
protected persons and victims of human trafficking if they leave voluntarily (under the new Act temporarily protected 
persons remain under the asylum seeker reception system and are housed in reception centres until they qualify for 
permanent protection after two years). The EU also has a European Return Fund with similar aims. The technology 
designates towards discourses of preferring spending money on enhancing people’s chances of establishing themselves 
back in their own countries rather than in Finland.  
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There are no requirements regarding the refusal of entry orders in the Aliens Act. As a rule 
according to the Immigration Services instructions a refusal of entry order is given when the 
foreigner has been an asylum seeker, entered or resided in the country illegally, applied for a 
residence permit the second time after having received a negative decision or has committed 
crimes. When the refusal of entry is based on illegal residence, the prohibition is normally given 
for two years. In criminal cases the length varies from three to five years depending on the 
quality, quantity and manner of committing the crime. Serious and career-type crime generally 
warrants a refusal of entry until further notice. (Finnish Government 13.06.2003)  
I would like to draw attention to the way that the Administration Committee changed this 
government bill on deportation procedures towards a more sensible direction. We heard many 
experts and changed it in such a way that, if a foreigner has not left the country inside the 
timeline given, then the police and the border control agent can issue an entry-ban, and 
this change is very good and efficient. (Finnish Parliament 10.2.2011, Centre Party MP) 
The Immigration Services instructions state that entry-bans are issued in case of denying asylum, 
unless there are overriding reasons (such as real and tight enough family ties to Finland).59 The 
additional grounds for issuing entry-bans, according to the instructions, are essentially the same as 
grounds for removal: when the person has entered illegally, has given wrong information in the visa 
application or permit application regarding reasons to visit, has not cooperated, has not given complete 
and/or truthful information, has committed or can be suspected of committing crimes and/or of procuring 
income in suspicious ways, has rendered him/herself incapable of (financially) taking care of oneself or 
has been issued with a removal order in another EU member state (Finnish Immigration Service 
8.3.2011). At the Schengen level, the entry-ban policy is more lenient.60 The impetus for preventing 
asylum seekers and failed visa or residence permit applicants from renewing their applications and 
permit over-stayers from visiting at another time is strong.  
The removal and entry-ban regulations have been changed into a more nuanced disciplinary system 
that governs through freedom, i.e. through voluntary exit, and punishes by an entry-ban: The Schengen 
regime aims to build an automated entry/exit checking system for TCN travellers, which holds and 
verifies fingerprints and automatically checks that the visa or residence permit dates have been 
respected.61 There are designs for lists of trusted travellers whose travel is made easier and border 
                                                     
59 Normally, the entry-ban applies to the whole Schengen area unless removal is done based on the Dublin protocol or if the 
person has a valid residence permit in another EU country (in which case entry-ban is given only for re-entering Finland). 
60 At the Schengen level the practice of issuing entry-bans is more liberal. The automated Schengen system also includes 
visa-free travellers. The entry-ban system does not penalise minor overstaying. The instructions are that overstayers who 
overstay by two to twelve months get a two-year entry ban, those who overstay by one to two years get a three-year entry 
ban and after that four to five-year entry-bans are issued (Finnish Immigration Service 2.2.2009). 
61 The securitisation of immigrants and travellers in Schengen has extended far and operates through three main databases: 
the Visa Information System, Schengen Information System II and Eurodac. As has been indicated, the same border 
examination regime has been extended to all travellers regardless of the visa-requirement status. Passports are 
increasingly required to contain biodata (fingerprints are going to be standard, but also facial recognition and iris scans 
have been requested). Entry and exit of all TCNs is logged into the border control systems. The regime for those requiring 
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guards who have been given the right to issue entry-bans on the spot. The desirable immigrant is 
subjectified as obedient and compliant. 
Removal orders at the border are based on records of committed crimes as well as suspicion of 
criminality. Should one have a tinfoil bag, entry is denied at the border (Finnish Immigration Service 
2.2.2009). Criminality is a reason for deportation and entry-bans are also used as further punishments 
for suspected crimes as well as committed crimes in spite of served sentences. That is, punishment is 
not enough, one needs to be disciplined and segregated. Petty larceny (or attempts at that) merits a 
one-year entry-ban and repeated offences three- to five-year bans. Drunk driving is worth a two-year 
entry-ban and an aggravated one is worth three to five years. As such there is nothing new in the 
deportation of those who commit crimes, and respect for law and order are basic considerations in 
granting visas, residence permits and nationality, but today already suspected culpability—not guilt 
determined by law—functions as a reason for denying permanent residence permits. There is a 
rationality of essentialisation or naturalisation at work here. Further, this places foreigners in an unequal 
position in front of the law, because Nordic and EU citizens have much stronger protection against 
deportation than TCNs have. Some, once again, are more equal than others.  
 Another typical use of sovereign power through technologies of segregation is detention, i.e. 
holding foreigners in custody to confirm identity, to ensure deportation or efficient processing of 
immigration decisions where ‘well-grounded suspicion’ exists that the person would complicate such 
processes, if allowed to go free, or to prevent crimes in case of ‘well-grounded suspicion’ that the 
foreigners are likely to commit crimes. Thus, detention is conceptualised as a preventative, 
‘administrative’ measure to be used on innocent people and not a measure to be used only after a 
person has confirmed the suspicions and proven him/herself ‘unworthy’ of trust. In such situations, when 
no facts are required, the positivity of a decision is based on discourse and phenomenology, that is, on 
whether ‘these foreigners are morally such that they would try to evade the authorities or to commit 
crimes’ and the decision-maker ‘knows this to be true’.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
visas is nevertheless stricter. Those requiring visas need to submit their fingerprints and digital facial pictures. These are 
then checked at the border on entry and exit against the Visa Information System that contains the visa application 
information and fingerprints, even failed ones, as the system is designed to prevent ‘visa shopping’ from other Schengen 
countries when one has denied the visa. This Visa Information System database can be made available to the police for 
the purposes of investigating serious crime and terrorism. At the same time all TCNs at the border are checked against 
‘hits’ in the Schengen Information System II that contains information on removal and deportation orders, entry-bans, 
police arrest warrants, surveillance requests and capture alerts, missing persons and requests about objects to be seized 
(cars, documents, evidence etc.). All asylum seekers are fingerprinted in the Eurodac system, which the EU Commission 
has suggested was made available for criminal investigators (2009/344/COM). Immigration Services officials have access 
to the Eurodac and Visa Information System for determining the Dublin status of the applicant. Although Immigration 
Services can request police/security investigations of the asylum seeker, it was wished that the cooperation between the 
police and the immigration services could be made closer this way. So far the EU Commission’s suggestion has faced 
opposition.  
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Mainly detention has been rendered technical; a common sense, non-political matter. International law 
allows the detention of aliens in circumstances62 in which immigrants in custody are subjectified as 
threats to territorial sovereignty. Hence this practice is not ‘Finnish’ per se in any way. But the Finnish 
custody practices have been criticized by international human rights organisations and by the Council of 
Europe. Especially, the practice of having kept children in custody was criticised.63 Although detained 
foreigners had not committed any crimes, they were legally treated as suspected criminals and 
foreigners were locked up in prisons and police cells as a preventative control measure until 2002.64 
Consequently, when legislation on detention, outside of custody legislation, was being prepared in 
2001, this was considered very much a task of getting the Finnish legislation up to the international 
human rights standards65—and up to the standards of the Constitution according to the Constitutional 
Law Committee (Finnish Parliament - Constitutional Law Committee 28.11.2001). Nevertheless, the 
discussion in the Parliament was very limited and no real discussion arose regarding the detention 
practices or the rather high numbers of custody decisions themselves (Finnish Parliament 
17.12.2001).66  
Summa summarum, we can see how the rationality of the aliens’ policy is explicitly defined as the 
prevention of asylum immigration. Society needs to be defended from asylum seekers. The power game 
of truth between the segregationist discourse and the liberal human rights discourses is largely won by 
nationalist discourses advocating the defence of the nation. The immigrant is subjectified as somebody 
who is out to try every chance he/she gets to enter or to loiter, as a relentless beggar who will 
systematically solicit each site in which he/she is likely to have a chance or where he/she is likely to get 
the best treatment and benefits. Self-interest is denied from the asylum seeker, victimhood is the only 
acceptable subjectification for an asylum seeker. The discursive order deduced asserts that the country 
must become unattractive to these unwanted vagrants, that it must stop them at the border and be 
                                                     
62 European Human Rights Convention article 5. 
63 (Council of Europe 11.5.1999) 
64 The political nature of this practice of detaining foreigners could be seen in the fact that the police themselves resented 
these detainment tasks, as they tied up resources in tasks that ‘did not require any policing skills’ (Finnish Parliament 
17.12.2001). 
65 Meaning, besides the Council of Europe’s European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and European Convention on Human Rights, also the Body of Principles for the Protection of all 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment of the UN from 1988 (43/173). 
66 Games of truth conducted in these discussions were between discourses of human rights, which subjectify immigrants in 
custody as innocent, non-criminals who had rights that should be tampered with the least possible, and the discourses of 
segregation and security, which subjectify immigrants in custody as security risks in terms of the possibility of violent acts, 
criminal attempts to cooperate with others outside to destroy identity papers or to continue criminal activities. Besides 
some critical statements, mainly the discursive orders formulated never questioned the extent to which detention was 
used, which reflects the technologisation and depoliticisation of the discursive order illegitimating people’s movements and 
marking the foreigner as dangerous. 
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certain to send a message of ‘not welcome!’. The same disciplining logic that is often applied to beggars 
in Finland is used here: Begging is prohibited. Giving to beggars encourages begging. Therefore, giving 
asylum encourages asylum seeking. 
3.3.3. Technologies of Human Pedigree: Some Are More Equal than Others  
The primacy of defending society from undesirable immigrants goes further. Market veridiction is 
employed in many ways to discipline immigration. If we look back at the visa regime that had strongly 
racialised bases, it also contained financial considerations that were used as technologies of 
segregation. The cross-tabulation of Gross National Income with Schengen visa requirements in Chart 
G shows that a low income level has a clear impact on the visa requirements:  
 
Chart G. Visa requirement according to GNI per capita with categories based on an equal number of countries in 
each category. 
The correlation between poverty and visa requirements is clear. 96% of the countries with GNI under 
$9.999 per annum fall under the visa requirement. The relation between wealth and visa requirements, 
on the other hand is not as clear. Of those countries with the GNI over $25.000 in 2008, some 19% (= 
37 countries) were under visa requirement—and they were all non-Christian and phenotypically ‘darker’. 
The countries that have a GNI under $9.999 and that do not require visas were all Christian countries 
with ‘mixed brown’ populations (more on this in Appendix 2). Nevertheless, the intersectionality of race 
and class is evident here: the richer and the ‘whiter’, the more equal your opportunities are. This can be 
seen in below Chart H that examines the culturalised categories of ‘race’ and how it impacts the visa-
free status of countries whose GNI is $0-19.000 per annum.  
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The Chart H shows that Christian countries are more likely to have a visa-free status than ‘Asian’, i.e. 
Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian etc., or Islamic countries. Likewise, the ‘darker’ the phenotype of the 
majority population, less likely is visa-freedom. Here we can clearly see how market veridiction is 
extended to govern migration. When liberal governmentality employs the market to produce truth about 
and judge the value of people and countries, the income level of countries is bound to have an impact 
on the visa system also. It is rather impossible to think that it would not. Society needs to be defended 
from the poor. When combined with the socio-evolutionary discourses of culture, inside which also 
religion came to be judged, the intersectionality of class and ‘race-ethnicity’ can be seen: It is not only 
the poor, but also the ‘culturally less progressive’ that society needs to defends itself against.  
 
Chart H. Visa requirement for countries with a per capita GNI (PPP) of $0-19.999 in 2009 according to categories 
of racialisation (n=148 countries). 
The technologies of excluding and thereby preventing the poor from gaining chances do not stop here. 
As has been seen, the potential travellers from those countries that are under visa requirements are 
judged according to their financial assets when applying for a visa: their funds for travel and return are 
considered, as is their motivation to return in terms of a steady income from a job. In Finland 37% of all 
refusals of entry at the border are based on the assessment of the person having insufficient funds, the 
second highest percentage among EEA countries—this may, however, in principle apply also to those 
from non-visa-requiring TCNs (see Appendix 2 for more information). The ‘without recourse to public 
funds’ clauses are used in many countries and tied to the residence permit status or obtaining long-term 
residence permits (Morris 1998). An additional technology of segregating the poor is contained in the 
regulation allowing a person who has ‘rendered himself unable to care for oneself’ to be removed and 
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deported (Aliens Act 1.5.2004 148 §). As Tim Bale notes, “immigrants are rarely the poorest of the 
poor”, because gaining (legal or illegal) access to the Schengen area already requires funds (Bale 2005, 
230). Immigration policy, for better or worse, judges the worth of individuals according to the assets that 
they have been able to gain in the market, instituting market veridiction into immigration policy.  
Personal wealth is not only relevant for the visa policy, but also residence permit decisions reflect this 
logic. The power/knowledge constellation around migration acknowledges the right of migration of the 
well-off and the skilled. Money in itself is a sufficient ground for gaining entry and residence. A “proof of 
sizeable fortune in the bank can be used to override national and racial quotas” also elsewhere (Anthias 
and Yuval-Davis 1992/1993, 32).  The discourses of capitalist elitism subjectify the migrant based on 
his/her financial worth:  
This section [of the Aliens Act] enables the granting of residence permit to a person who based 
on his/her financial assets has the ability to reside in Finland. (Finnish Government 13.06.2003) 
The discursive order deduced is one in which the financial worth of the person overrides questions of 
ties (family, ‘cultural race’) to the country and the purpose of residence (job, study, refuge) (Finnish 
State Aliens Act 301/2004, 39 §). “Class difference, therefore, can sometimes override ethnic and racial 
difference” (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992/1993, 32). The governmentality of immigration embodies the 
discourse of capitalist elitism that asserts the naturalness of the fact that the rich should have more 
opportunities than the poor. 
The power/knowledge constellation around migration acknowledges the right of migration of the well-off 
and the skilled. Investigating the financial worth of travellers is not the only technology of market 
veridiction, but also labour migrants and their families are evaluated through assets. Imposing income 
level requirements on residence permit applications is a major technology of preventing the relatively 
poor from immigrating. However, racialised and culturalised discourses exempt people from income 
requirements: Finnish and Nordic citizens have a right to enter and bring in their (foreign) spouses 
without sufficient levels of income. Also those of Finnish ancestry67 are able to enter and stay without 
income requirements. Beyond these racialising exemptions, the technological power games of 
segregating the poor are complex.  
EU citizens as well as TCNs, however, are subject to income requirements. The income requirement is 
not high enough to have a significant impact on the immigration of those who apply for residence 
                                                     
67 Finnish ancestry refers to those who have had Finnish citizenship, or whose parent or at least one grandparent has been 
a native-born Finn. 
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permits based on employment, but it does have a significant impact on their family reunification rights. 
For TCNs and EU citizens, the specific income level requirements are rather high: well-above average 
incomes are required before gaining family reunification rights for ‘a spouse plus two children’ family.68 
In practice, thus, it is difficult for a TCN with a below average skills and work experience to have family 
reunification rights. This discourages settlement by lower-skilled workers from outside the EU or EEA 
and maintains a ‘guest worker’ scheme of immigration typical of early immigration policies in Europe. 
These high income level requirements were applied to EU citizens and their families until 2007, when it 
became clear that EU law prevents the specification of exact income requirements and rather requires 
governments to respect family reunification—also for TCNs and refugees, thus, affirming the 
truthfulness of liberal human rights discourses. The situation of an EU citizen, whose family members 
are TCNs, was more complex until 2010. A racialising logic was used to segregate EU migrants’ TCN 
spouses so that when an EU citizen migrated from outside the EU, then EU citizens’ family regulations 
were not applied to TCN family members, but the stricter family definition (to be discussed later) and 
stricter income requirements were applied instead. The same applied, if the family had been formed 
between an EU citizen and a TCN who was already present in Finland. The impetus of defending the 
nation from foreign immigrants was evident in the Finnish government’s discussion about the 2007 
amendment on the EU citizen’s family definition. The discussions stressed that the extension of the 
family definition needed only to be applied to EU citizens’ families who had lived together legally and 
permanently inside the EU and were moving to Finland from inside the EU (Finnish Government 
                                                     
68 The required income level after taxes for a single person is 10.800 €. If the person wants to bring in a spouse, the family 
gatherer’s income level needs to be 18.360 € (+7.560 €, i.e. before taxes approx. 23.000 € pa). If the family has one child 
then the income requirement is 23.760 € or two children then 29.160 € (+ 5.400 € for each child, approx. 30.000 € and 
42.000 € respectively after taxes). These income level requirements for normal families are quite high: the average Finn’s 
salary before taxes is approx. 31.800 € and the average salary approx. 35.400 €. However, the income levels are 
proportionate to levels after which means-tested social benefits cannot be gained, thus they are there to prevent TCN 
immigrants from gaining access to benefits. That is, those liable to become public charges, i.e. needing help from public 
funds, are excluded based on these income requirements. These required income levels were increased by 11% in 2013. 
    According to current conversion rates, the income level in UK pounds for a single immigrant is some £9.330, for bringing in 
a spouse the person’s income needs to be £19.000, for first child £25.900 and further children £36.000. In comparison with 
contemporary UK immigration law, there is an income requirement of at least £18,600 for bringing in a spouse. If they are 
applying for family reunification for a child as well as a partner they are required to have an income of at least £22,400. For 
each additional child, an additional income of £2,400 is required bringing the salary requirement of bringing in a spouse 
and two children up to £24,800. Thus, whilst the right to family reunification with a spouse for those with lower salaries is 
not disciplined as strictly in Finland as it is in the UK, the practices of allowing the family reunification of children are less 
discriminatory in the UK. Yet, the major difference is that this income requirement in the UK applies to British citizens’ 
families as well as to any other settled person or refugee (except EU citizens whose families are not required to have 
specific amounts of income). The same applies to Denmark where strict age, salary and other requirements are also 
imposed on family reunification of Danish citizens. 
 
105 
19.10.2006b). After 2010 the family reunification rights of an EU citizen cannot be disciplined based on 
where the family or the TCN spouse come from.69 
The impetus of defending the nation is more prevalent when it comes to TCNs entering based on their 
individual applications (i.e. when not family members of Finnish or EU citizens or persons of Finnish 
ancestry). As said, the individual income level applied to the work-based residence permit applicants 
from third countries is rather low and it is not a critical obstacle for a single poor or low-skilled immigrant. 
The technologies of segregation are nevertheless affirmed through the discourses of national interest as 
the TCNs’ work-based residence permits are subject to labour market considerations of nationally 
needed skill-sets. However, most employment permits, are actually granted for low-skilled jobs, and in 
this sense, lower class-status is not utilised as a technology of exclusion.  
However, in terms of family reunification rights (whether the TCN has a EU long-term residence permit 
or not) the specific and rather high income level requirements are effective as a technology of 
segregation and are such that in practice lower-skilled people with larger families are not allowed in—a 
fact that has not gone without critique.70 To bring in a spouse and one child a TCN must earn an 
average Finn’s salary. A certain high-level ability to financially care for the self is in practice a 
precondition for the TCN’s right to family reunification. However, in comparison to some other EU 
countries, such as Denmark and the UK that have opted out of the common immigration policy, similar 
income level requirements are imposed on their own nationals, if they want to bring in their TCN 
spouses, thus disciplining also native ‘lower class’ individuals from bringing in TCN spouses. As we 
saw, in Finland, Finnish and Nordic nationals can bring their families without income requirements. 
The state imposes a separation of the family for TCNs, not only through these income level 
requirements, but we need to remember also the racialised categories used in determining permit 
application countries and entry rights: Unlike the family members of Finnish or EU citizens’ or persons of 
Finnish ancestry, the TCN and his/her family members are normally required to wait outside Finland for 
                                                     
69 This power game of segregation that divided EU citizens’ family reunification rights based on movement between 
countries was finished in 2010 by two verdicts of the European Court of Justice (these regulations were applied like this 
also in some other EU countries). The 2010 rulings affirmed that EU citizens residing in another EU country had the right 
to family reunification with TCNs no matter how, where from, with whom, and based on what condition the EU citizen or 
the TCN arrived to that member state (HE 77/2009 refers to two cases, C-127/08 Metock and C-551/07 Sahin).  
70 Some Finnish MPs and the European Commission have drawn attention to the high levels of income required for bringing 
in children. Consequently, the Immigration Services have opted for not demanding increased income levels for the third or 
further children at least in situations in which both parents are working (Finnish Immigration Service 3.4.2009). In 2013 this 
system was amended so that it will be only in case of a sixth child that additional income is not required. The additional 
income required diminishes by 100€ a month/1200€ a year after each child, the entry of the first child requiring an 
additional 500€ a month/6000€ a year (see http://www.migri.fi/moving_to_finland_to_be_with_a_family_member/ 
income_requirement, accessed 4.4.2013). 
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a family reunification decision. Family reunification application can be made only after the sponsor has 
commenced work and completed the normally four-month probationary period, as only after passing the 
probation period is the immigrant regarded as having a stable income (unless there are other riches 
than employment income available) (Finnish State 1.5.2004; Finnish Immigration Service 3.4.2009). 
As we have seen, the entry for those intending to apply for asylum through ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ means of 
travel has already been made dependent on wealth. The less wealthy potential refugee—whose claim 
for asylum may be equally legitimate, i.e. based on persecution due to race, ethnicity, religion, political 
opinion etc.—is judged according to his/her financial ability to attract or procure finances for his/her 
person. Of course, in the letter of the law, an asylum application is not tied to a person’s financial worth; 
this is done through the technology of building financial barriers against logging asylum applications, as 
many have noted. The subjectification of the legitimate refugee is in practice, if not in theory, decided 
through the truth game between discourses of human pedigree and human rights: The asylum seeker 
needs to be wealthy enough to buy an international long-distance fare and a visa, to be ‘credible 
enough’ to qualify for a tourist visa, for example, through having the ‘excuse’ of visiting a relative already 
living in Finland, and needs to be able to demonstrate finances for sustenance and for a return ticket. Or 
alternatively, the poor asylum seeker is forced to procure often even more money for hazardous illegal 
transit. This leaves the poor refugee often with little choice. Hence, 90% of the world’s refugees, some 
36 million, reside outside the West (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2010), often living 
their life in camps surviving on food provision for years if not decades. 
In the long run, the destitution and desperation required from a ‘true refugee’ can be evidenced by a 
long-term stay in UNHCR refugee camps. As was discussed, Finland is one of the dozen countries in 
the world who annually accept UNHCR ‘quota refugees’, which we shall discuss more in detail shortly. 
In this power game of truth liberal discourses of human rights overrun the discourses of preventing the 
poor from immigrating. Finland takes on average 700 quota refugees per annum on top of the 
independently arriving asylum seekers granted refugee status. We shall return to this topic of quota 
refugees and the role of the human pedigree in their selection shortly.  
But aside from this initial hurdle, which makes most refugees in the West relatively wealthy, liberal 
discourses in fact discipline the application of this human pedigree of wealth and social status on 
refugees. If wealth is used as a technology of governing the immigration of TCNs (and EU citizens) and 
their families, this technology did not extend to refugees’ and protected persons’ family reunification. 
Rather Finland uniformly exempts refugees from income requirements. In this sense, the liberal 
discourses of human rights around asylum win the truth game. Yet, in 2010 this power/knowledge 
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constellation changed and various wealth-related disciplinary technologies were introduced: The 
financial support for asylum seekers and temporarily protected persons was geared down and given 
only after their own assets are used. In the same amendment, paying for the family reunification travel 
costs for other than quota refugees ceased, thus practically complicating family reunification and making 
it dependent on assets also for those receiving international protection:  
Previous speeches on the floor have drawn attention to how many we can really integrate. It is 
self-evident that resources have to go hand in hand with the need. There is also a very good 
point in this report on integration implementation; now that we stop paying for travel expenses 
[related to refugees’ and protected persons’ family reunification], this is very positive, because it 
in practice reduces the amount of the people…most difficult to integrate. Myself I would want 
that we went further than this and learned from Denmark and placed income and residence 
requirements on those coming to the country for humanitarian reasons and applying for family 
reunification. After this we could trust that their integration possibilities would be ameliorated. 
(Finnish Parliament 19.10.2010, National Coalition MP)   
Here we can see market veridiction is used to discipline family reunification rights. At the same time, the 
refugee’s and protected person’s family reunification right without income level considerations is 
disciplined by applying this right only to families formed before coming to Finland—a practice, and a 
new distinction, that, according to the Finnish government, is already prevalent in other EU countries 
(Finnish Government 13.11.2009a). That is, before a refugee or a protected person is able to gain 
citizenship, which grants family reunification without income requirements, the refugee’s ability to reunite 
with his/her family (because of the technology of ceased compensation for family reunification) and to 
reunite with a new family (through the technology of making a distinction between old and new families 
the latter being now under income requirements) is disciplined complicating the ability of refugees 
without sturdy assets to reunite swiftly with their families. And if this reunification is not swift enough, the 
Immigration Services have the option of denying later family reunification claims, by claiming that the 
family ties are ‘not active and strong enough’ due to long-term ‘voluntary’ separation. The wealthier 
refugee has a better chance of practising his/her rights than the poor one. 
In the above statement, wealth is clearly designated as reflecting ‘integration ability’. In the case of 
UNHCR quota refugees, integration ability is defined as individual human capital and made to function 
as a technology of human pedigree. The Aliens Act requires that the ‘integration possibilities’ of quota 
refugees are assessed (i.e. language skills, education and work experience (Finnish Immigration 
Service 9.10.2009b)) and in 2011 the Ministry of Employment and the Economy was (again) given a say 
in choosing the country focus in selecting quota refugees. This speaks of a rationality in which 
employment based considerations can be considered more important than the need for protection as 
such. The accumulation of human capital is treated as an asset that has something to say about the 
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worthiness of a quota refugee’s security needs. Because of these criteria, the annual quota of 750 
UNHCR refugees cannot be filled every year, as there ‘just are not enough qualifying refugees’ 
according to the Immigration Services (Seppälä 2004). In many ways, human rights become a cost-
benefit calculation: cost of providing refuge minus the value of human security plus the added value of 
human capital.71 Some are worthier refugees than others. 
Human capital, integration requirements and wealth are primary methods of discipline. A secondary 
measure of discipline is the limitation of refugees’ rights: Those who have gained residence based on 
international protection are excluded from the EU long-term residence permit scheme, which allows 
visa-free travel and somewhat more beneficial settlement regulations inside the EU, thus evidencing the 
impact of discourses of segregation and inequality. A refugee does not become a settled person in the 
same sense as others, but the rationality of his/her segregation is maintained for as long as possible. 
The acceptance of the impetus of defending the nation based on racialised categories is evident inside 
the EU and opportunities for denying rights are utilised. Cosmopolitan discourses apply only to those 
who are well-off, as the analyses of the ways in which market veridiction functions inside the 
immigration apparatus.  
We have so far seen how the rationality of defending society is executed through various technologies 
of segregation. We have seen how technologies of immigration control operate through a racialising 
human pedigree as well as on a pedigree of worthiness based on money. Next we will turn towards 
investigating the technologies of family reunification from other perspectives than the income 
requirement discussed in this subsection. 
3.3.4. Technologies of Segregation: The Western Family 
In this section we will see how the definition of the family and relationships of convenience explicate the 
rationalities governing immigration. One of the basic definitions of the ‘Western nuclear family’ is the 
rejection of polygamous marriages. In Finland there is not much political discussion about this, but the 
Immigration Services may require evidence that the spouse has divorced previous marriage partners 
and the 1999 Immigration Act amendment links polygamy to criminality and dictates that family 
reunification of multiple wives is denied based on the security clause, as a matter of crime prevention 
                                                     
71 This rationality of assessing integration ability is not overpowering in the sense that Finland also provides refuge for 
vulnerable groups, such as women and children or the sick. To what extent in these situations the integration ability plays 
a role in selection cannot be determined here. Yet, evaluating integration ability is a primary criteria, a necessary step after 
which vulnerability and risks associated with gender can be considered as reasons for providing refuge (Finnish 
Immigration Service 9.10.2009a). But as said, this is an investigation into the rationalities of governing immigration, not an 
investigation into actual implementation. 
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(Finnish Government 08.05.1998). However, the impact of discourses of gender equality is clear in this 
context, and it has a long history, as shall be seen in the next chapter. The EU directive ruling out 
polygamous family reunification designates toward the need to protect women’s and children’s equal 
rights by denying at least the polygamous spouse entry to the EU explicating the universalizing 
discourse of monogamy and human rights. Member States may decide whether the father has a right to 
live with his children from different women, if he has not divorced the other mother/wife (2003/86/EC, 
Council of the European Union 22.7.2003). In Finland, the definition of the family in principle includes 
children from other relationships (but not ex-spouses). This use of liberal discourses of human rights is 
interesting. In this discursive order the truth game is played through culturalising discourses from which 
actual practices of multiple relations in the West are omitted—it is not illegal to have extra-marital affairs 
or babies out of wedlock, even if one already has a spouse, and actually the Western family includes 
children from other relationships. Rather, what is designated as illegal here is the responsibility for 
supporting more than one woman and the offspring—which could be compared to the Western practices 
of alimony and child maintenance. The power/knowledge constellation around the issue of polygamy is 
clear in another way also: The logic of ‘protecting’ women and children through denying them access to 
the support of their husband silences the fact that separating other wives and children from their 
husband/father leaves them in a more vulnerable position. Whilst there is a lot to be said for gender 
equality in this context, as a technology of segregation the requirement of divorce in cases of 
polygamous relations is problematic.  
Prohibition of polygamy is not the only way that immigration based on family reunification is 
problematized by Finnish politicians. The problematization of family reunification does not touch only 
TCNs. This problematization is not always explicit, but the rationality of limiting family reunification is 
evident. One technology through which increased control is implemented is the definition of the family, 
which is different depending on nationality: EU law dictates that EU citizen’s family is wider than that of 
Finns or TCNs. In 2007 the definition of EU citizens’ families was extended to include cared for parents 
and grandchildren under 21—of both spouses whether EU citizens or not.72 The Finnish government’s 
comments regarding this extension of EU citizens’ families—which was specifically lauded as improving 
the family reunification rights of EU citizens—are revealing:  
                                                     
72 Before 2007 amendment the EU citizen’s family included the spouse or cohabiting partner and both of their children under 
21 or otherwise dependent children and dependent parents. In 2007, when the specific income level requirements for EU 
citizens were also ended, the definition of the family was extended to include grandparents and grandchildren under the 
care of either spouse as well as other dependants who previously lived in the same household or needed to be cared for 
by the EU citizen—i.e. not by a TCN spouse, for example.  
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The number of residence cards granted to EU citizens’ family members is not expected to rise. 
The increasingly specified definition of family does not enlarge the concept of EU citizen’s family, 
but rather restricts it, because treating common law spouses in the same way as married spouses 
now requires a two-year cohabitation. Making other individuals comparable to family members 
under certain conditions is not expected to significantly enlarge the scope of family members. 
(Finnish Government 19.10.2006b) 
Here we can see how limiting family reunification is discursively ordered as the preferred outcome. It is 
not envisioned that the dependency clause (which is the condition of bringing in other than immediate 
family members) will be fulfilled often, but rather the focus is on possibilities of immigration control; on 
the requirement that cohabiting partners will be able to evidence two years of cohabitation, before they 
are treated as spouses.73 Determining dependency, according to the Finnish government, is based on a 
narrow interpretation: It must be shown that the dependent cannot be cared for by sending money or 
arranging care otherwise in the country of origin, but that care must in reality take place in Finland 
(Finnish Government 29.10.2010). Cosmopolitan discourses are disciplined in the interest of protecting 
society from unneeded immigrants.  
At the same time, the TCN’s family has been narrowed. The TCN’s family includes the spouse or 
cohabiting partner of two years and children under 18 of both adults. In principle this tighter family 
definition applies to Finnish citizens also, but because of the entry and family reunification rights of 
those with Finnish ancestry, these rules in practice make little difference to the family members’ right to 
enter and stay. The right to bring in other members of the family, like dependent grandparents, 
grandchildren or other dependents was abolished from TCNs and the Immigration Services guide on 
family reunification quite clearly states that TCNs do not have a possibility of making an application for 
other family members than adopted or fostered children that were part of the family prior to coming to 
Finland (Finnish Immigration Service 3.1.2011). In comparison to TCNs, a Finnish citizen’s (and a 
Nordic citizen’s) family can include others (such as parents) also without income requirements. This 
applies also to refugees and protected persons. In 2006 the definition of children was extended to 
include the married spouse’s children, but on the other hand a requirement was added in 2010 that 
children must be under 18 on the date of decision-making—and not at the time of the application, which 
enables the denial of residence permits for TCNs who apply for residence permits when they are close 
to 18. Despite the discourse of the ‘Western nuclear family model that immigrants need to respect’, the 
right to family is not equal (also Lippert and Pyykkönen 2012). The Western family is not a universal 
category, but opportunities for applying racialised rationalities of segregation are utilised to exclude the 
                                                     
73 In principle, the EU citizen’s cohabiting spouse was not officially disciplined through the time the cohabitation had lasted 
until 2007 (although the rule was apparently applied on the administrative level (Finnish Government 19.10.2006b).  
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racialised other.74 Some families are truer than others and for some the family needs to be ‘more 
Western’ than for others. 
This increasing control of TCN immigration can be seen in the way that family reunification is 
conditioned ‘culturally’. In 1999 a clause requiring due regard for the ability of the person residing in 
Finland to move to another country to enjoy family life was added. This assesses the ties of the 
immigrant and his family to Finland versus ties to third countries, thus designating belonging as a matter 
of ‘culture’ rather than a right based protection of family life. However, the government reports that this 
clause is mostly used to give residence permits in Finland, rather than to deny them, except in the cases 
when a foreigner has entered Finland based on family reunification and then divorces and applies for 
family reunification with a new/old family outside Finland (Finnish Government 13.11.2009b). Also, in 
cases when children have already attended the Finnish educational system for a longer period, can the 
child’s cultural ties to Finland impact decisions that otherwise could have resulted in the discontinuation 
of residence permits. It is a commonly agreed principle under international law that the state does not 
need to respect the family’s choice of country and that family reunification can be denied. Finland has 
denied 20% of family reunification requests (not including EU citizen’s family reunification, which has a 
0% denial rate today) between 2006 and 2010. In this sense, liberal discourses of rights merely 
discipline the rationalities of defending society from unwanted immigrants, but do not overpower them: 
Imposing the income level requirement is not as such in contradiction with the European 
Convention on Human Rights or the family reunification directive. Taking into consideration the 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights the protection of family life is not considered 
violated if the family has been formed at a time when the persons have known their status and 
the continuity of their family life in Finland would be insecure to start with. Therefore, 
whether the family is old or new can be taken into account in individual cases. There may be 
strong reasons to make exceptions to the income level requirement in situations in which 
residence permit application is for the spouse who has stayed in the home country after a long-
term marriage and for their children. In contrast, reasons for making exceptions to the income 
level requirement are not in principle valid if the marriage is recent, for example formed during the 
family gatherer’s trip to the home country, and the spouses’ life together has been very short 
lived. (Finnish Immigration Service 3.4.2009) 
In principle, the protection of family life is not violated, if the family has been formed at a time 
when the family members’ status as an immigrant has been such that the continuation of family 
life cannot be guaranteed in a certain country. Attention should be paid, among other things, to 
whether leading family life requires that the family lives specifically in that country to which 
the family reunification application has been addressed. (Finnish Ministry of the Interior 
22.10.2010) 
                                                     
74 To highlight the contextually contingent role of the definition of ‘Western nuclear family’, still in 1973 the National Board of 
Social Welfare in Finland maintained that the nuclear family concept should not be used too strictly but that welfare 
benefits should be granted based on wider family relations more suited to extended or multigenerational family 
arrangements (Yesilova 2009, 101). 
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When considering an application for family reunification and denying this application...due regard 
has to be given to the nature and solidity of the foreigner’s family ties, the length of 
residence [in Finland] and the cultural and social ties related to family in the home country. 
… [Also] if the foreigner is applying for the family reunification in Finland (first or renewal 
application) and the criteria are not fulfilled, the same applies to considering the removal 
(return/deportation). (Finnish Immigration Service 23.2.2011) 
It is not necessarily in the child’s interest to move to Finland, if it means leaving familiar 
surroundings, the language and culture of which he/she only masters, and separating from 
people who have in practice taken care of him/her. (Finnish Immigration Service 23.2.2011) 
A long, voluntary separation usually means the disruption of family life regardless whether the 
people in question have maintained contact via phone and/or letters or met each other during 
holidays. If the separation has been caused by compelling reasons, the separation time does not 
have the same meaning. Only the fact that the person residing in Finland has financially 
supported his/her relatives in the country of origin or elsewhere, does not demonstrate that 
family connection has been sustained in principle. ... If the person has come to Finland 
voluntarily, for example to work, study or to be married here, can family life in the country of origin 
considered to be voluntarily broken. (Finnish Immigration Service 23.2.2011) 
As the above quotes show, the truth game between liberal discourses of protection of family life and the 
discourses of segregation can penetrate deeply into people’s lives and their choices making the 
discursive order an unstable one—meaning that the individual immigration official’s power and ability to 
assign meaning to others’ actions is also at its greatest. Yet, there is nothing particularly Finnish about 
these discursive orders here: International courts have affirmed the sovereign right to limit family 
reunification and, thus, affirmed the nationalist disciplining of human rights discourses. It is not only in 
Finland that the battle between liberal and nationalist discourses over family reunification has intensified 
over the years. Germany, Denmark and UK have, for example, introduced language tests for those 
immigrants seeking entry through marriage and the UK tried to increase the age of foreign spouses to 
21 years,75 and Holland and Belgium maintain their limit of 21 years as does Denmark that has differing 
requirements when spouses are under 24 (e.g. Cyrus and Kovacheva 2010, 125) and Italy has imposed 
language tests for those seeking TCN’s long-term EU residence permits and requires foreign residents 
to learn Italian as a condition of the renewal of the first two-year permit. The Finnish law is not, however, 
overpowered by racialised categorisations, there are no age limits, no restrictions on residence permit 
                                                     
75 The raising of the age limit of spouses to 21 was struck down by the Supreme Court in case R (on the application of Quila 
and Others) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010 EWCA Civ 1482], which found the age limit to violate 
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, and the limit has been returned to 18.  
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type or length, uncompromising accommodation requirements for the sponsor,76 no language or 
immigration tests (except for Ingrians77) and no ‘integration ability’ points etc. as in some countries.78  
As we have seen, the impetus of defending the nation from asylum seekers is clear, but this impetus 
applies also to the refugee’s families. The family definition for refugees is the same as for Finns, but 
mainly the refugee’s family can also be subject to a range of biopolitical technologies such as DNA-
testing and age definition aimed to weed out the untrue child: In 2000 the possibility of requesting 
(voluntary) DNA-testing to prove biological parenthood was created (which can be and has been 
successfully used to contest denied family reunification). In 2010 a medico-forensic age definition 
procedure, aimed especially against unaccompanied underage asylum seekers and foster children, was 
added to the letter of the law to make sure that children applying for refugee status or family 
reunification are actually under 18 (if the child does not agree to this, then she/he is treated as an adult). 
The government bill on age definition clearly states that the technologies used (dental examinations and 
wrist bone structure examinations) are scientifically debated and that the databases used for 
comparison by these methods are not representative (240/2009). Helen and Tapaninen have asserted 
in their study on the use of DNA-testing in Finland, that immigration officials portray an a priori 
assumption of fraud when discussing Iraqi, Somali and some other African nationalities and their family 
reunification applications (Helén and Tapaninen 2013). Similar discourses can be found in the 
quotations below:  
There is no point in claiming that we cannot influence the number of asylum seekers and their 
family members arriving to Finland. We can influence those factors that constitute Finland as an 
attractive asylum application country. [...] Finland still takes 750 quota refugees a year, which I 
support. In question are...the thousands of asylum seekers of recent years that have not gotten 
a refugee status, but have nevertheless gained residence permits and the conditions based 
                                                     
76 The government reports that it investigated the possibility of adding accommodation requirements especially for refugees’ 
and protected persons’ family reunification applications, but that these were turned down as not suitable both by legal 
experts and the municipal housing authorities.  
77 Ingrians have been the only immigrant category who are required accommodation, immigration orientation courses and 
language tests. Ingrians have been the only applicants who have had a systemic accommodation requirement (before 
residence permits they have had to rent accommodation in Finland and sub-contracting, which is not typical in Finland, has 
not been deemed sufficient). The unavailability of council housing has practically delayed Ingrian immigration. Ingrians 
have also had to take part in immigration orientation before arriving in Finland and since 2003 they have had to pass 
Finnish tests as a condition for granting residence permits. Persons of Finnish ancestry are not required to take such tests. 
For other categories of immigrants, family reunification applications do consider accommodation, but there are no specific 
qualifications, such as the 20 square-meters per person requirement that Denmark has had. 
78 For example, in Denmark certain categories of immigrants need to pass both Danish and immigration tests. The sponsor 
must have had a residence permit for 3 years before application is possible and only after 15 years of permanent 
residence or after 28 years of residence in Denmark (or after having Danish citizenship) does the consideration of cultural 
attachment to another country not apply anymore etc. Should one be able to fulfil these and other obstacles put in the 
poorer TCN residents’ way, at one point the Danish state required a 100.000 DKK (approx. 13.500 €) collateral before the 
family reunification was made possible.  
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on which these people can get their families to Finland. If we talk about for example the Somali 
asylum seekers, then a tiny, tiny proportion of them have obtained a refugee status, the rest have 
gotten residence permits based on need for international protection. And then these resident 
permit holders apply for family reunification, so we have 6.000 family reunification applications in 
the queue, altogether 6.000 out of the 9.000 [family reunification applications] are Somalian. And 
the quantity of these is what we can influence. (Finnish Parliament 4.2.2011, National Coalition 
MP) 
Too little attention is being paid to the massive entry of Somalis through family reunification 
and the integration requirements created. It has not been specifically treated [in this amendment] 
although it is really quite relevant. Even last month 500 Somalis entered through family 
reunification, 70-80 per cent of who were illiterate. (Finnish Parliament 19.10.2010, PTK 
102/2010, Social Democratic MP)  
When residence permit is sought based on family reunification, there are no alternatives to 
interviews. In many such families besides the spouses there are children, for whom DNA-
testing may prove to be necessary. (Finnish Government 01.10.1999) 
Every Finnish embassy should have the possibilities for DNA testing although the practical 
possibilities are required only in certain embassies. Immigration Services have informed that at 
this stage DNA testing is needed for Somali and Iraqi citizens. In the initial phase test samples 
should be collected from applicants abroad at least in embassies in Nairobi, Addis Adeba and 
Ankara. (Finnish Government 01.10.1999) 
It is very important that citizens can trust that the asylum system is not abused. Therefore I think 
that the Administrative Committee will really need to work towards pressuring the Ministry so that 
we not only get the age determination tests but also that our family reunification system is not 
abused by organised utilisation of children to advance illegal immigration. (Finnish 
Parliament 24.2.2009, Social Democratic MP) 
These discursive orders, which are based on a negative subjectification of the refugee attempting to 
circumvent immigration rules, present family reunification as something that can be and should be 
restricted. This impetus becomes clear in the Finnish government’s statement on the EU’s Green Book 
on the Family Reunification Directive in 2012, in which the Finnish government explicitly states that 
“Refugees’ family reunification criteria should not be made more favourable or eased in the directive” 
(Finnish Ministry of the Interior 19.1.2012). In 1999 the law was also changed so that refugee’s family 
members did not gain refugee status anymore unless they were themselves considered to be in need of 
protection.  
On the whole, however, the discursive order around refugee’s or protected person’s family reunification 
rights is more liberally inclined than that of other TCNs because of lacking income requirements and 
because refugee’s family can also include ‘other relatives’, such as foster children on certain conditions. 
The refugee’s and protected person’s right to family reunification has, however, been made much 
harder in practice, after giving up the practice of allowing the refugee or protected person themselves to 
apply for family reunification in Finland. In 2011, in conjunction with the biometric residence permit card 
scheme, the Aliens’ Act was changed so that now only the family members themselves (including 
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children) must make the family reunification application in the nearest embassy—which in case of war 
zones is unlikely to be in the actual country of residence itself. This is a good example of rendering 
immigration control technical: This amendment was presented as a technical requirement—because 
permit applications now require biometric data, i.e. fingerprints and photos and sometimes DNA-testing, 
they must be made by the family members themselves (Finnish Government 07.09.2010). The 
amendment was applied to all open applications without the said data, thus resulting in the need for 
some family members to travel to their nearest embassies again. There is also a requirement of legally 
residing in the country where the application is made, hence the family members are made dependent 
on the visa policy of the country, in which the embassy is situated, as well as imposed the financial 
burden of travel and visa costs. This technology of remote control or externalisation of immigration 
control is in line with the impetus of governing at a distance typical of liberal governmentality (also 
Hyndman and Mountz 2008).  
Yet, the normalising edifice of the definition of the family is clearly racialised: For Finnish or EU citizens 
extended family is not a sign of cultural ‘backwardness’ or illegal(ised) immigration. Overall Somali or 
Iraqi children are not designated as ‘war children’ in need of protection and safety—as Finnish children 
were during the Second World War.79 Although these Finnish war children have been used as a 
justification in asserting the legitimacy of the refugee policy and international solidarity, the 
power/knowledge constellation overall disciplines this logic and rather the act of sending these children 
to Finland is at times defined almost as child abuse in the Finnish discussion in the Parliament. 
Racialisation makes the desire to protect children from war an illegitimate act. When asylum seekers are 
not granted ’actual’ Geneva refugee status, but given lesser forms of international protection, their family 
reunification claims are vetted against the consideration of whether the circumstances actually prevent 
the sponsor from returning the country of origin. True parents care for their children in war zones.  
3.3.5.  The Technologies of Segregation: The Sieve of the Worthy 
The disciplinary technology of residence permit types and renewal periods functions to reassess the 
validity of entry conditions—which is more necessary for some than for others—and in (prolonging) the 
granting of more permanent residence rights, as the nation needs to be defended against those who 
either fail to provide for themselves or fail to maintain the relationships that have granted them 
residence. The basic technology is granting either temporary or continuous permits. Nordic citizens and 
                                                     
79 About 70.000-75.000 unaccompanied children were sent to safety as refugees to Sweden and other Nordic countries 
during the Second World War. About 15.500 of them ended up staying. (Figures from the Finnish child refugee association 
‘Sotalapsi ry ’ (http://www.sotalapset.fi).) 
 
116 
their families merely register their residence and after that they are treated like Finns. EU citizens and 
their spouses immediately get residency rights for five years. Also those of Finnish ancestry get very 
lenient terms. If after the first permit, the above categories of people qualify for permanent residence 
permits, for others the permit periods granted were made more stringent. Also ‘EU blue card’ holding 
TCNs who qualify based on professional criteria get better rights than ‘regular’ TCNs. Deportation 
regulations are also more lenient for Nordic and EU citizens than for others in the sense that much 
graver reasons are required for deporting Nordic or EU citizens. Everybody who resides in Finland does 
have a right to means-tested social assistance in situations of dire need. Long-term reliance on social 
assistance is grounds for deportation for TCNs, but for Nordic and EU citizens’ deportation cannot be 
based on economic considerations when somebody in the family is working regardless of how much 
they earn. Thus, we can clearly see how rationalities that function at the intersection of nationality and 
class are used to govern the residence permit system.  
The continuous and temporary permits are not always different in terms of the renewal periods, but the 
type of permit makes a difference when calculating residency requirements for obtaining permanent 
residence permits or citizenship. The 2004 reform of the Aliens’ Act doubled the residence time required 
before obtaining permanent residence right from two to four years. Under both the 1991 and 2004 laws 
those with Finnish ancestry immediately obtain(ed) two- or four-year continuous residence permits 
respectively, which qualified/qualify them for permanent residence permits without a need to renew 
continuous permits. A Finnish citizen’s TCN family members, however, are initially granted continuous 
permits  with a one-year renewal period of—which is considerably shorter than that of the EU citizens’ 
and their family members’ five-year permits and those of Finnish ancestry. Besides those with Finnish 
ancestry, the highly qualified EU Blue Card holders (and their family members) are the only ones to get 
an extended first permit (for two years). EU long-term permit holders are not treated any more 
favourably in terms of the length of the residence permit time when moving to Finland, but they get the 
same first residence permit as the rest of the TCNs: one-year temporary or a one-year continuous 
permit. Importantly, the type of permit given has an additional impact, because temporary residence 
permits do not fulfil benefit eligibility requirements. TCN students mainly get temporary one-year 
residence permits that do not give access to benefits (EU students do not qualify for benefits either). 
Temporary residence permit holders (except students) can obtain continuous residence permits after 
two years, but the first continuous permit is again only for one year. This structure of disciplining 
belonging demonstrates the fundamental problematization of immigration policy, which is based on a 
sieve of the worthy that filters out those that can be granted access based on cultural or biological 
belonging (Nordic, EU, Finnish ancestry) and human capital.  
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The regime of disciplining refugees and protected persons is more complex. Exclusion is attempted by 
the specifications of the concept of internal protection and parties capable of offering protection.80 DNA-
testing is used as a technology to determine the age of children. Also income requirements as a 
condition for reunification with families formed after arriving in Finland etc. speak of the rationality of 
disciplining refugee’s and protected persons’ rights. The possibilities of denying rights are also sought 
for by differentiating between categories of protection and the rights attached to these. Today the 
system differentiates between actual Geneva refugee status and three types of subsidiary protection. 
‘Actual’ refugee status, as defined by the Geneva Refugee Convention, is granted to individuals who 
merit protection based on persecution against the person (due to political action, for example). Also 
quota refugees get refugee status. Since 1999 the refugee status is not applied automatically to family 
members anymore, except when they merit protection themselves. The three subsidiary categories of 
protection offered are secondary protection, humanitarian protection and temporary protection. 
Secondary protection and humanitarian protection do not give a person a refugee status although they 
count as international protection. Earlier these two forms of protection were under the same category of 
‘need of protection’, but in 2009 ‘secondary protection’ (justified by a danger of violence or death that is 
aimed against the individual) was separated from ‘humanitarian protection’ (general unsafe and 
hazardous circumstances in the country of origin that prevent return). This technology was instituted to 
give residence permits of different lengths. Earlier other subsidiary types of protection, except 
temporarily protected persons, had gotten one-year continuous residence permits. Today ‘actual’ 
Geneva refugees and secondarily protected persons (i.e. those under threat because of their person) 
now get a first permit for four years, whereas those under humanitarian protection get a one-year 
continuous permit. In this sense, secondary protection actually improved the situation for protected 
persons. Based on individual assessment, the need of protection may be terminated during the 
residence period due to changing circumstances or residency choices made by the internationally 
protected person. 
The technologies of providing asylum overall are dominated by liberal discourses, but as Similä asserts: 
“legislation is ‘liberal’, but practice is restrictive” (Similä 2003, 110). This liberal practice is based on a 
pedigree of moral worth. Those qualifying for refuge or protection through factors related to their person 
are considered worthier—since 2009 worth a four-year residence permit to be specific—than those who 
                                                     
80 Internal protection refers to the notion that the person could find security somewhere in the country of origin (in another 
city, another region) and relates to the notion that the protection can also be provided by international organisations 
controlling sections of the country (which potentially creates an impetus for international intervention in crisis producing 
mass exodus). As writers assert, the notion of internal protection is part of the apparatus of externalising asylum policy that 
combines also other measures such as offshore processing centres, protection in safe, third countries as well as the ‘right 
to remain in the country of origin’ discourses (e.g. Hyndman and Mountz 2008). 
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merit protection only based on general unsafe circumstances, who either get a one-year temporary or 
one-year continuous permit. Individual heroism is worth more than mere threat to life. In comparison to 
quota refugees, the ‘actual’ Geneva refugee status is rarely given to independently arriving asylum 
seekers, the Finnish granting rate being below 1.3% in 1990-2010 (see Appendix 2 for a comparison of 
how differently the Geneva Convention can be interpreted). There is something suspicious about not 
staying in relative safety somewhere else. The function of the renewal period is to assess if conditions 
have improved and the need of protection has ceased. If the impetus of returning the protected 
foreigner is the strongest in the case of subsidiary protection not granted on the basis of individual 
worth, the liberal, (individualistic) moral order nevertheless asserts itself over the nationalist impetus of 
defending the society from undesired foreigners, as limits are put on how long the lives of protected 
persons can be held in suspense.  
Temporary protection does not count under the regime of international protection and falls outside the 
EU directive. As a level of protection, temporary protection gives lower protection status than 
humanitarian protection with its one-year temporary residence permit. Temporary protection has been 
designed as a new response to specific situations of mass influx, such as the Somali, Iraqi or Afghan 
situations would have been. It was instituted in 2002 for situations of mass crisis (violent conflicts or 
environmental catastrophes). Temporary protection does not require individual assessment of asylum 
applications, but protection needs are identified by the government. A temporary permit is given for one 
year and can be renewed during the first three years, after which return or more stable forms of 
protection and individual assessment of asylum applications will follow. Depending on individual worth, 
the person after this enters the system of international protection—which temporary protection did not 
constitute. Whereas before temporarily protected persons had had the same rights as other protected 
persons, in 2010 an amendment was made that took away the right to social assistance. Temporarily 
protected persons are now maintained and housed under the refugee reception system for the first three 
years and provided with a separate means tested ‘spending money’ scheme. The technology of 
temporary protection is, thus, designed to prevent or to slow down the permanent settlement of people 
fleeing their homes due to crisis.  
Whereas before 2002, refugees and protected persons equally qualified for permanent residence after 
two years, now the system of entering due to war (as opposed to more stable situations of systemic 
persecution against an individual) is made much longer. Nevertheless, in prolonged conflict situations, 
even the temporarily protected person can attain permanent residence, when half of the time spent on 
temporary residence permits will be counted towards the residency requirements of attaining permanent 
residence. Temporary protection also has the benefit of providing categorical protection and immediate 
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family reunification (not paid for anymore), although the road to permanent settlement rights are longer, 
thus evidencing the balancing acts between the segregationist and liberal human rights discourses. 
Therefore, although there clearly is a need to defend society against refugees, the role of liberal 
discourses in the game of truth is prominent.  
3.3.6. Technologies of Human Pedigree: From Quasi-biological Culture to Culturalised Worth 
As we have seen through this discussion of the apparatus of immigration control, ‘culture’ plays an 
important role in its rationalities, as well as in the securitization of immigration (e.g. Waever 1993). 
‘Integration ability’ and ‘cultural ties’ can function as disciplinary rationalities in (quota) refugee policy 
and are integral to residence permit and family reunification applications, but they are also used to 
include immigrants. The human pedigree does not only function to exclude people of different colour 
and religio-cultural background; the logic of racialisation also operates in the positive discrimination 
towards, or the promotion of immigration of those considered either ‘Finnish’ or otherwise ‘suitable’: 
When considering suitability, attention should be given to such factors as population figure, age 
structure, standard of education, population mobility principles, distance of country from Finland 
and the conditions for integrating residents of the country in Finland. The labour 
administrations of Finland and Estonia have traditionally had good cooperative relations. 
Prospects for cooperation with other new EU countries, such as Poland, are also good. Poland 
has a central location in Europe, a large population and traditions of labour mobility. The Polish 
population is relatively young and well-educated. (Finnish Government 19.10.2006a) 
Guidance could begin before arrival in Finland. It could be necessary to arrange language and 
vocational orientation especially in the country of departure. Guidance before arrival in the 
country would also be appropriate especially in the light of attempts to increase labour mobility 
from partner states to Finland on a contractual basis. The development of the guidance system 
is thus related to cooperation to promote labour mobility (policy guideline 3) and the improvement 
of the system of recognising skills obtained abroad (policy guideline 9).(Finnish Government 
19.10.2006a)  
[T]hese factors [nationality, citizenship or country of birth] do connect through culture to gaining 
employment. The cultural factors of the country of origin can influence the attitude towards 
the second generation and children, and they may influence attitudes towards education and the 
meaning of educating oneself, and these can be thought to have a connection to cultural 
understandings relating to religion. (Finnish Ministry of the Interior 29.1.2009) 
Thus, we can see how the discourses of cultural racism and human pedigree function in these 
statements producing a discursive order in which integration is a function of some generalised essence 
of the ‘cultural’ and not the individual. In this context, the negative new racist discursive order changes 
again into a positive one subjectifying the Ingrian, the Estonian and the Polish as desired ‘partner 
countries’ that produce immigrants ‘capable’ of integration. Discourses of human equality do not fare 
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well in relation to the discourses of racialised cultural essence of individuals and the superiority of some 
cultures.  
Besides this coveted, ‘culturally adaptable’, ‘white’ immigration, there is a group whose immigration is 
even more coveted: the return migration of ‘Finns’, as we have seen in the provisions made for those 
with Finnish ancestry. Equally, the policy of ‘return migration’ of Ingrians is a clear demonstration of the 
racialisation or of the rendering of culture and belonging as quasi-biological: the most important 
category of returnees was the children of those whose ancestry could be defined as Finnish in sufficient 
levels (i.e. at minimum two grandparents’ Finnishness vs. one grandparent’s Finnishness for those of 
‘actual’ Finnish ancestry). Initially, the criteria based on quasi-biological notions were sufficient and until 
2002 no language skills were required for Ingrian ‘returnees’ (Finnish Government 27.09.2002). It was 
only after this positive discrimination of ‘Finnish blood’ began to be questioned that the language criteria 
started to be applied, the policy moved towards negative racialisation of Ingrians and their suddenly 
‘Russian’ language and culture. Their Finnishness had been diluted.  
The integration—or rather assimilation—of these Ingrian minorities has proved itself to be a discursively 
contested field (e.g. Pentikäinen and Hiltunen 1995, 7). Even if there are, on the one hand, calls for the 
provision of Russian language schooling by the state,81 the discursive field of immigration policy has 
been characterised by lamentations about ‘the Ingrians actually being Russians and not Finns’: 
The most significant problem in immigration to Finland has been caused by so called Ingrian 
return movement from the old Soviet Union region. The thought and the intention were good: the 
descendant of those that had left to escape from hunger [in the 16th century] could come back to 
the Finland that had prospered from their poorer living areas. Unfortunately, many mistakes were 
made in this context. The worst was the bargaining about the language requirements, which 
resulted in most of the returnees being almost completely Russian speakers during the last 
years. Integration has also failed miserably. A significant portion of young returnees have drifted 
to criminal activity and drug use. A part of them have apparently come to Finland with this 
purpose only. The teaching of Finnish and other education should be intensified with Ingrians 
knowing little Finnish, and for those who have clearly sought the criminal way deportation should 
be the only sensible measure. (Finnish Parliament 5.6.2002, (True) Finns MP) 
The purpose of the returnee system has been to enable the migration of those persons who have 
adopted a Finnish identity and who have a connection to Finland. With years passing by the 
returning generation has changed and many of those attempting to return through the system do 
not necessarily feel themselves to be Finnish in the same way as the previous generation. 
                                                     
81 In comparison, the Swedish-speaking minority in the Finnish mainland has approximately 275.000 people, the Russians 
number around 60.000. The calls for language education are linked to the Finnish language policy, which defines Finnish 
and Swedish as the two official languages and requires that all Finns learn both Swedish and Finnish at school and that all 
governmental employees are proficient in both languages. It used to be compulsory to pass A-level matriculation 
examinations in Swedish also, but this requirement has been abolished. The Constitution gives protection also to other 
minority languages and currently there have been discussions about having Russian as an option for Swedish.   
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Some may want to become returnees partly because the system is more lenient than the regular 
residence permit system and not really because they would want to forge a connection to the 
country from where their parents or grandparents originated. A special system for returning 
Ingrians is not appropriate anymore, and instead the residence permit system should be made 
more coherent and clear. (Finnish Government 12.11.2010) 
The Interior Minister Itälä has in public stressed the restriction of the return of the Ingrians and is 
apparently about to suggest language restrictions, a kind of fine sieve for the returnees. Is this 
really rational in the light of the larger whole? When the need of foreign labour in our country will 
increase, the Ingrians’ chances of integrating to Finland are maybe the best after all. Hundreds of 
individuals for example from India have come to the ICT-sector without any language tests. Are 
we worrying enough about the integration of these immigrants? (Finnish Parliament 5.6.2002, 
Centre Party MP) 
In these statements we can see how the culturalised logic functions around the Finnishness of Ingrians 
and how discursive orders around the possibilities of integration can be formulated. That Finnishness is 
defined through the negative subjectification of others is nothing new. But here we can see how the 
biological logic of ‘Finnishness’ has changed and the notion that Ingrians are ‘as Finnish as the Finns’ is 
being subjected to criteria of racialising logic: Finnishness is not biological anymore, but Finnishness 
becomes a matter of feeling and behaviour, of having Finnish language skills and ‘Finnish’ concepts of 
societal functioning (Finns apparently do not commit crimes or use drugs). Xenophobic prejudices 
against Russians are also rampant in media and every day speech entailing derogatory opinions about 
the legality of the activities that the minority is thought to be involved in. As Puuronen has argued, the 
racialisation of ‘Russians’ as criminals and prostitutes is in general rampant in Finnish discourses 
(Puuronen 2011), and this partly applies to ‘Estonians’, partly not. This renunciation of positive biological 
racism and the adoption of a new culturally racialising discourses has led to the renunciation of the 
returnee policy (Finnish Government 12.11.2010). The right of those who were returned from Finland or 
fought for Finland during the Second World War is kept intact, but in practice this relates only to about 
200 people. The queuing system for Ingrian ’returnees’ was closed in July 2011, but those in the queue 
can obtain residence permits until 2016 based on the earlier criteria. Under the regular provisions, 
Ingrians do not qualify as having Finnish ancestry.  
 
Summa summarum, we have seen how both segregationist and liberal discourses have an impact on 
the power/knowledge constellation around immigration. Although I have focused here on the disciplinary 
logic of immigration control, I have also shown how liberal discourses play an important role in aliens’ 
policy. They do so especially around family reunification, the child’s interest, asylum provisions and 
benefit rights, despite the segregationist discursive orders that also function at those conjunctions. But 
as governmentality studies do, I have focused on the problematization of immigration. This 
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problematization essentially also includes that which is taken for granted and not problematized. What I 
have tried to do in this chapter, is to look at conditions of inclusion embedded in the immigration control 
apparatus and to present it in a light that takes its commonsensical agreeableness away. What we have 
seen is a technology of a human pedigree.  
This pedigree functions especially at the intersections of class and ‘race’: the (un)desirable immigrant is 
marked by ‘race’, culture and assets, whether material or human capital. Although, the provisions for EU 
and Nordic citizens cannot be in themselves deemed as evidencing a human pedigree, when viewed as 
part of the wider apparatus and the logic of preferential treatment of ‘Western whites’ and those of 
Finnish ancestry—for example vis-à-vis TCN family members, their rationality can be connected to a 
more general governmentality. After all, the preferences and structures of inclusion/exclusion along 
these ‘EU’ lines were already there before the EU. The immigration apparatus is filled with technologies 
designed to keep the undesirable, ‘darker’ and poorer immigrant out. Yet, this apparatus is not explicitly 
racist, as common sense would define racism. In the next chapter, I will look into the relationship 
between the immigration apparatus, eugenic and state racist governmentality in order to understand the 
limits of governing immigration and the mode of problematizing immigration in a wider context.  
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4. State Racism and the Biopolitical Governmentality of Immigration 
Foreigners’ rights, according to the Aliens’ Act, should not be limited more than is necessary. We have 
seen in the previous chapter what limits are considered necessary. As governmentality studies assert, 
investigating problematizations is pivotal for understanding how power/knowledge functions and 
silences. The intention in the chapter is to show how the biopolitical logic of state racism, with its banal 
social Darwinism, explains the peculiar limits and the gaping silences around a human pedigree in the 
discursive formation of immigration exposed by the previous discourse theoretical analysis. I will 
demonstrate this claim about state racism and social Darwinism by comparing the way immigration is 
problematized contemporarily with the way immigration came to be problematized by the early American 
eugenic immigration policy. As a method of decentring, I shall employ the ‘language of the time’ in its 
colourfulness to point out the similarity between banal social Darwinism and the continuing effects of 
contemporary immigration policy.  
For the purpose of pinpointing the framework that the analysis of state racist governmentality is enabled 
by I shall first discuss the relations between nationalism and racism and the impact of a Foucaultian 
analysis to these. I shall then focus on the notions of social Darwinism and eugenics and by resisting 
their exceptionalisation I shall approach them rather as governmentalities. That is, instead of being 
captured by the extreme statements and policies, I shall rather approach them as scientific discourses 
that were inherently intertwined with the rationalities of governing society. In this context I shall develop 
the notion of state racist governmentality and explicate how social Darwinist and eugenic 
governmentalities differ from each other and how they operate inside liberal governmentality. It is only 
after this that I shall explain the history of eugenic problematization of immigration in the United States 
and, finally, then I shall embark on the comparison between these early eugenic rationalities and those 
seen today in immigration policies, in this case in Finland. 
Words of warning are in place here. Because we are treating immigration as an apparatus, we cannot a 
priori distinguish the Finnish and early American immigration apparatuses based on such surface 
phenomena as being old or new immigration countries, technologies of granting citizenship (jus soli vs. 
jus sanguinis), the (in)existence of green card schemes, the effects of EU membership or the historical 
level of preoccupation over terrorism. Rather, as we have done in the previous chapter, the immigration 
control apparatus needs to be analysed as a continuum of technologies that starts from visa restrictions 
and ends up with citizenship and integration policy. Whilst individual technologies may be different, we 
are addressing the overall governmentality of the whole apparatus itself. 
 
124 
4.1. From Nationalism and Liberal Governmentality to State Racism 
4.1.1. The Insufficiency of Explaining Governmentality of Immigration through Nationalism and 
Racism 
In this section I shall show that nationalism and racism cannot fully explain the apparatus of immigration 
control because of this assumption of human pedigree functioning at the intersections of ‘race’, culture, 
class and gender.82 Fundamentally, nationalism is a discourse that asserts a difference between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’: either one is a national or a foreigner. Nationalism per se, in its dichotomous simplicity, 
cannot explain human pedigree that disciplines some foreigners and their rights—but not others—on the 
basis of their ‘civilizational’ belonging and their wealth. But, as has been discussed, as an empty 
signifier it can appropriate the rationalities of other discourses and define them as national (Vincent 
2002). If civilizational socio-evolutionary discourses function in conjunction with nationalist discourses, it 
does not make them nationalist as such. Rather, one could argue that socio-evolutionary discourses are 
primary and it is nationalism that attaches itself to socio-evolutionary discourses in the West. That is, 
even if such a civilizational human pedigree can be defined as a national interest, its rationalities are not 
those of nationalism per se. Hence, we cannot explain the Finnish immigration policy as a ‘primordial’ 
nationalist discourse, because primordialism has nothing to say about the type of foreigner and his/her 
fitness.  
If not nationalism, what then explains the existence of human pedigree in the immigration apparatus? Is 
it just simply racism? As was discussed in Chapter 2, certainly the limited, exceptionalising definition of 
racism, that makes racism into an anomaly, into a matter of individual psychology and belief in biological 
inferiority, cannot achieve explanatory status. What the biologicalised definition of racism does is that it 
explicitly denies that cultural stereotypes are a form of racism. Instead, it turns such culturalising 
practices into ‘mere’ stereotypes and xenophobia by naturalising them as stereotypes in themselves are 
often marked as something that is required by our biological, cognitive make-up—as if having a certain 
kind of cognitive structure required a certain kind of thought content. That is, as if othering always had to 
be racialising. Therefore, the culturalising and racialising practices in immigration policy are normalised 
and it becomes impossible to claim that biological inferiority was implied by immigration regulations. Yet, 
because of the effects of the assumption of human pedigree, it cannot be denied that racialisation, if not 
biologicalised racism, certainly has something to do with the way that immigration policy functions. In 
                                                     
82 Whilst I have not addressed the issue of gender in this thesis, I have researched how the governmentality of immigrant 
women’s integration and immigrant mothering are conceptualised through feminism and socio-evolutionary discourses in 
Finland. 
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fact, the theory of ‘new racism’ certainly can explain the discourse of the human pedigree to a degree 
(e.g. Ibrahim 2005; Freeden 2005a, 144).  
As the theorists of new racism claim, the misidentification of cultural values as inherent characteristics of 
individuals speaks of an implicit continuation of biologicalising discourses that render difference quasi-
biological. Theorists of new racism have claimed that forms of culturalising racism employ the trope of 
‘culture’ in the same way as ‘nature’ or ‘genes’ once were used to assign characteristics to human 
aggregates. That is, where earlier the terms ‘race’ and ‘racial characteristics’ were employed to 
essentialize and exclude certain people, today the same can be accomplished by talking about 
‘cultures’, such as ‘Muslim culture’, ‘Black culture’ or ‘Asian culture’, and the characteristics of people 
coming from these ‘cultures’ (Balibar in Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 41-42; Lentin 2004, 58-65). But, 
as Leach has pointed out, there is nothing new in ‘new racism’ and that both racism and social 
Darwinism always contained a cultural dimension, the socio-evolutionary dimension (Leach 2005; also 
Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Goldberg 1993; Balibar 1994; also Rahikainen 1995; Lentin 2004, 90). 
That is, the diagnosis of inferiority was always essentially cultural—merely the explanation of inferiority 
tended to be more biological, yet not even then was it solely biological. Therefore, it can be said that the 
exceptionalising reading of racism merely disciplines the scientifically racist explanation of inferiority, 
which sees that the causes of inferiority are biological—but it does not question the diagnoses of socio-
cultural inferiority as such. Rather, what we have seen historically is that the claims about the equal 
value of all ‘cultures’ have become disciplined by liberal discourses that insist on universalism and 
universalizing discourses of social evolution. That is, the socio-evolutionary conditions of possibility of 
racist discourses remained in many ways, if not essentially, unaltered, because the diagnosis of 
inferiority remained the same. The theorists of new racism have insisted that racism indeed continues 
unhindered and manifests itself in the notion of cultural determinism, instead of the traditional, biological 
determinism associated with scientific racism (e.g. Barker 1981; Balibar 1991; Goldberg 1993; and 
2002; Gilroy 1996; and 2000). Rather, culture has become a form of civilized discrimination (Rahikainen 
1995, 22). 
The naturalisation of racism through psychologism (i.e. claiming that racism is a quasi-biological 
psychological reaction and therefore understandable) and historicism (racism has always existed) could 
certainly be seen as reasons contributing towards the functioning of human pedigree in the immigration 
apparatus (e.g. Barker 1981; Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Hannaford 1996). In this sense, there is 
something very fundamentally racist in Western culture that is consistently being taken-for-granted and 
the investigation of which is persistently being resisted. As Lentin writes: “The psychologisation of 
racism, as much on the level of common-sense as on the intellectual plane, has hindered explications 
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that root it, rather, in the history of European political thought (Lentin 2004, 35; Bauman 1989; Dean 
2010; McWhorter 2010). If racism requires the modern state (Bauman 1989), then, as Lentin argues, 
anti-racist discourses become entrapped in this modernist paradigm. That is, anti-racism is unable to 
address the issue of racism requiring a modern state, because anti-racism equally functions inside the 
same modernist paradigm. As Lentin argues, the current anti-racist discourse is not able to distinguish 
itself from the Western public political culture, but rather persistently addresses the issue of racism 
through liberalism. That is, as was already discussed in Chapter 2, addressing racism by using the 
limited, UNESCO tradition of anti-racist thinking we have ended up with the political culture of tolerance 
and political correctness with their limited or ineffective counter-discourses. As Lentin asserts, the 
typical Western anti-racist discourse formulates itself as a requirement to respect the Western liberal 
heritage of democracy, equality and tolerance. This method, in the end, is merely a superficial method 
of normalising ‘intolerance’ by assigning it as inherent to human beings and disciplining it through 
political correctness. In this process, anti-racism becomes a form of identity politics, a discourse about 
civilized and savage human beings, and a battle over the ‘true’ civilized identity of the Westerners 
and/or Finns (cf. Boswell 2000; Boswell 2005). But fundamentally anti-racism is unable to address the 
relation between race and state in its modernist specificity.  
However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the discursive status of liberal and democratic 
discourses is more complex than this type of identity politics would lead us to believe. Therefore, we 
cannot ignore the role of liberal discourses in perpetuating the rationality of racialising human pedigree 
either. The needs to reassess the way that liberal governmentality functions based on naturalism and to 
re-evaluate the issue of why the problematization of racism remains limited prevail. Liberalism, as it is 
used today, partly finds it difficult to resist and partly is coterminous with the impetus of protecting 
society from racialised others. The fact that much of anti-racism bases its strategy on the limited 
UNESCO tradition of anti-racism enables racialised thinking to continue as a mainstream 
conceptualisation through its interlinks with the rationalities and technologies of the state (Lentin 2008b; 
Lentin 2008a; Lentin and Lentin 2006/2008; Lentin 2004; Lentin and Titley 2011).Consequently, the 
rationality of governing through a human pedigree needs to be addressed through its conditions of 
possibility, i.e. through socio-evolutionary thought and its coterminosity with liberal naturalism. In the 
next section, before proceeding to discussing eugenic immigration policy, we will address the 
Foucaultian concept of state racism and its relation to socio-evolutionary thought in more detail. 
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4.1.2. Foucault and His Supposed Dismissal of Racism 
As said, typically Foucault's thinking on race has been dismissed as undeveloped. The disregarding of 
Foucault’s remarks on race is partly due to his thoughts standing out to some as a way of ‘undermining’ 
anti-racism. This notion is possibly caused by two factors: Firstly, the point that in more than one place 
Foucault asserts that it is not fruitful to discuss various discriminatory rationalities in terms of racism (as 
it is/was commonly defined). We have already discussed the limitedness of the definition of racism and 
the Foucaultian character of this criticism—with its anti-humanist objection to epistemic individualism, 
psychologism, and its utilisations of notions of abnormality and its ethnicity paradigms (see Chapter 2). 
Consequently, Foucault should be seen to deny the validity of the limited definition of racism rather than 
the existence or validity of racial discrimination per se. As has been said, racism as a practice has its 
conditions of possibility in a much wider constellation of power/knowledge than the limited definition of 
racism allows. If we treat racism as a discourse, then racism should not be defined through the object of 
discourse, that is, it should not be differentiated only according to an internal or external object of 
racism, i.e. according to colonial/imperial or national setting or even less according to the individual 
expressing or experiencing racism. Racist discourse is a system of dispersion central in which are its 
conditions of possibility. Analysing racism without taking into account or intentionally attempting to 
separate racism from its conditions of possibility is insufficient and contributes to the perpetuation of 
racism. 
Secondly, the dismissal of Foucault's thinking on racism is likely to relate to the problematic historical 
discontinuity between forms of racism, when he talks about the “colonizing genocide,” but situates the 
start of this genocidal development after the 1850s. This date, in the light of historical evidence, appears 
incorrect because of colonial expansion and killing that took place in the centuries before this. But, as 
for example Bernasconi (2010) and Mader (2011) have argued, Foucault's comments need to be 
understood in light of the larger corpus of his work. Mader explains the epistemic difference that 
Foucault asserts exists between the classical and the modern episteme’s way of conceptualising biology 
(Foucault 1966/2002; Foucault 1966/2002, 77-79; Mader 2011). This is what Hannaford has also 
argued, that qualitatively modern racism is very different from earlier prejudices (also Hannaford 1996, 
89, 97; Myrdal et al. 1944). The epistemic change between the Classical and Modern periods, that 
Foucault was concerned in The Order of Things, produced the reformulation of the meaning of ‘race’ 
and the role given to human biology, which coincided with a changing mode of governing (i.e. a shift 
from raison d’état to liberal governmentality and its naturalism). 
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In the emerging power/knowledge constellation, “‘race’ and ‘nation’ became terms indiscriminately 
conflated alternately denoting biological constitution or cultural legacy, and thereby engendering 
confusion between natural history and national history” (Campbell and Livingstone 1983, 271). Foucault 
points out how the term ‘nation’ was different: Earlier, before modern nationalism, ‘nation’ had referred 
to class rather than ethnicity. ‘The bourgeois nation’ and the ‘peasant nation’ had their own laws. The 
existence of such ‘class nations’ was not necessarily limited by territorial boundaries either, but the 
bourgeois nation covered the bourgeois over state borders (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 142). This 
differentiating concept of nation was also reflected in the early conceptualisations of ‘race’ by the father 
of racism, Arthur Comte de Gobineau, for whom each nation-race was formed by three separate races: 
the fit superrace of aristocrats, the mongrel race of bourgeoisie and the subrace of the hoi polloi 
(Jokisalo 2003, 14). That is, the discourses structuring society in terms of ‘class nations’ were also 
translated into the emerging language of ‘race’.  
As Hannaford has demonstrated, historically the modern concept of race is a new mode of knowing. 
The word itself did not enter Western vocabularies until the Middle Ages and even when it did, it referred 
to lineage, language, manners and land rights. Slowly, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the term gained a meaning that was capable of specifying the value and worth of its objects inside both 
a socio-biological, philosophical and later nationalist framework. Hannaford has asserted, in a rather 
Foucaultian way, that sloppy translation and the typically uncritical assumption of historians—the 
practices of doing the history of the present, i.e. interpreting history in a linear ‘evolutionary’ fashion, 
analysing it from the contemporary viewpoint—has given rise to the translation and interpretation of, for 
example, ancient Greek texts as if they contain the same rationalities about race as contemporary world 
does. But as Hannaford has shown, there was something essential missing in the earlier 
conceptualisations of strangers, ethnos, and ‘barbarians’ in comparison to the modern power/knowledge 
constellation. The ancient Greek conceptualisation of barbarianism and civility was not a matter of 
phenotype or biology, but rather a matter of conduct; of organising a polis and specifically participating 
in politics, in political dialogue. Nor did the Middle Ages have a human pedigree based on biology; the 
worthiness of humans was interpreted in terms of religious affiliation. Although prejudices against the 
’savage’ had been part of the intellectual milieu before the nineteenth century and social Darwinism, the 
notion that God had intended for the savage to exist had given a different, although not any less lethal 
rationality to their governing. That is, during the Middle Ages different ‘races’ were interpreted as part of 
God’s design and deemed not co-developmental or biologically of the same origin, as it was assumed 
that God had created the savage separately, this did not mean that the savage could not be killed, but 
that the savage was killed for different reasons than later, under the socio-evolutionary framework. This 
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means that death and discipline become technologies of government in different ways and for different 
purposes. It implies a completely different governmentality.   
This changing paradigm of race can be explained through the early debates between polygenesis and 
monogenesis, i.e. the debate on whether humans had a single or multiple genetic origins (e.g. Goldberg 
2002, 24-34). Before Darwin, polygenesis partly reflected the theological view that God had separated 
the races (despite common descent from Adam) and partly the racist notion that people culturally and 
biologically so ‘different’ could not be biologically the same as ‘the white bourgeoisie’. The historical 
atrocities of earlier colonialists and missionaries attest to the lethal quality of earlier religious ways of 
conceptualising non-believers. Although religious discourses could grant the ‘non-white’ races a right to 
exist on the Earth in a different way than evolutionary theories later would, the religious order of things 
cannot be deemed necessarily any better. The words by a Virginia trial judge in defence of inter-racial 
marriage bans in 1950s America show that religious discourses did not necessarily provide the ‘racially 
different’ with an equal status any more than social Darwinist discourses did:  
“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on 
separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause 
for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the 
races to mix” (quoted in Carr Horrigan 2008, 381). 
In this sense, religious discourse cannot be held a priori as a moral counter-discourse against state 
racist governmentality. As Rosen has argued in her book Preaching Eugenics, in the United States 
many liberal Protestant, Catholic and Jewish religious figures embraced eugenics as part of their social 
reform message (Rosen 2004). That is, as a mode of thinking about how to govern society, Christianity 
as a moral discourse did not always distinguish itself from eugenic discourses. Rather the Christian 
discourses of redemption as a form of the care of the self would in many ways start paralleling the 
eugenic discourses of caring for the self. 
Although notions of polygenesis can be detected in many civilizational discourses today and in the 
consistent need to explain cultural or class difference in terms of biological difference, Darwinian 
monogenesis insisting on the genetic common origins of all people became the accepted scientific view. 
The modern episteme, with the discovery of evolutionary theory, saw ‘races’ in terms of continuous 
biological evolution (Mader 2011). How monogenesis translated into social theory is revealing: with 
monogenesis came the danger of degeneration (Chamberlin and Gilman 1985). It was not only that with 
evolutionary theory the monkey became a source of truth (Foucault 2000, 372), as the cogito was 
compelled to affirm the truthfulness of his socio-biological knowledge through the return and the retreat 
of the origin now found in the monkey and other highly selective animal fables, but according to socio-
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evolutionary discourses the ‘white’ man also shared his origin with the ‘black’ man. This implied that the 
‘white’ man could relapse, decline, retreat and degenerate to the presumably ‘primitive’ state of the 
‘black’ man. In fact, it was not a long time ago that we heard a reflection of this discourse when the 
British historian, David Starkey, saw the cause for the UK August 2011 riots in the “profound cultural 
change” whereby “the problem is that the whites have become black”.83 Therefore, at this nexus of 
monogenesis we find the great impetus of defending society against degeneration; it is here that 
regression/progression becomes a central tenet of socio-evolutionary thinking on how to govern. 
Indeed, it becomes the essential dynamic of state racist governmentality and asserts a ‘one-drop rule’ of 
‘racial’ degeneration into this governmentality.   
The connection between biology and culture and its possibility for regression was, therefore, made 
rather late. Although earlier practices had been culturalising, they did not render difference quasi-
biological in the same way (Hannaford 1996; Isaksson and Jokisalo 1999, 96-104) and therefore did not 
give rise to the same biopolitical technologies of governing at a distance as liberal governmentality with 
its socio-evolutionary rationalities. Gradually the West saw an amalgamation of concepts of nation, 
nationalism, race, class and later ethnicity that become connected to organic and socio-evolutionary 
conceptualisations of society and to socio-biological thinking. This amalgamation gave birth to the 
racialising modes of thought blossoming in, for example, social Darwinism. What is essential to this 
knowledge is the confusion between culture and biology that treats ‘race’ as culturally and politically 
significant, if not determinant (e.g. Bannister 1979; Goldberg 1990, 1993, 2002 and 2009; Rattansi and 
Westwood 1994; Donald and Rattansi 1992; Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Freeden 1979; Jones 1980; 
Stepan 1982; Stocking 1968/1982; Clark 1984; Kaye 1986; Hannaford 1996). 
This blooming racialising, biological knowledge of the nineteenth century is important to this discussion 
and we will soon turn toward its functioning in problematizing immigration in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century America, but we must not lose focus on the contemporary functioning of similar 
discourses. Whilst the specific content of these discourses has altered, the contemporary conditions of 
possibility for forwarding these discourses are essentially the same strands of socio-evolutionary 
thinking that are central to modernity. These now exceptionalised and marginalised discourses of social 
Darwinist ‘scientific’ racism have their impact on the contemporary context. For example, in the case of 
the United States, Omi and Winant identify two epochs of the racial formation in America: racial 
dictatorship and racial democracy. In their account, racial dictatorship lasted until the 1960s and was 
evidenced in histories of colonialism, social Darwinism, eugenics and racial segregation. Racial 
                                                     
83 See for example The Guardian, “David Starkey claims 'the whites have become black'” by Ben Quinn, August 13, 2011, 
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/13/david-starkey-claims-whites-black, visited 15.8.2011. 
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dictatorship defined American racial identity as white, organised society according to a colour line and 
consolidated a racialised consciousness. As Janara explains, historically racism was and is foundational 
to the way American democracy was conceptualised (Janara 2004; also Mills 1997/1999). With the rise 
of the UNESCO tradition of anti-racism, the culture of political correctness silenced the foundational 
nature of these early racialising and biologicalising discourses that rendered difference quasi-biological 
without doing anything about the actual diagnoses of inferiority. For Omi and Winant, the post-1960s 
racial democracy in America can be understood as a process towards a racial consent fostered by an 
hegemony of ‘common sense,’ rather than by domination (Omi and Winant 1994). Based on the socio-
evolutionary human pedigree, whiteness continues to function as a category of evolutionary fitness. In 
this edifice ‘whites’ are ‘naturally’ placed on the top of the pedigree through ‘competition’ and ‘equal 
opportunity’—by other ‘whites’.  
Whilst Finland has not had the same phenotypically polarized history as the United States has, race 
theories have formed an essential part of Finnish social history in the form of intra-white racialisation. 
Racialising discourses related to the ‘Aryan’/’Nordic’/’Caucasian’ vs. ‘Mongol’ race theories that 
prevailed around the turn of the last century. The Swedish-speaking Finns were defined as Nordic, and 
Finnish-speaking Finns as Mongols. This distinction influenced eugenic policies: many of the early 
expert-advocates of eugenics were Swedish-speaking and eugenic policies were slanted towards 
increasing the reproduction of the Swedish-speaking families.84 These theories about Mongolian Finns 
did not disappear altogether.85 The interpretations of ‘bättre folk’ (i.e. Swedish speaking upper class or 
‘better folk’) still play a part in politics and common sense, as does the bi-racial interpretation of the 
Finnish population. The Nazis did not regard Finns as Aryans, but merely as ‘honorary Aryans’ and 
marriage licences between Germans and Finns were often denied, even if Finland cooperated with Nazi 
Germany in the Second World War (Kemiläinen et al. 1985; Mattila 1996; 1998; and 1999; Ollila 1994; 
Hietala 2009). In this sense, the basic conditions of possibility, i.e. the racialising socio-evolutionary 
                                                     
84 With time this bi-racial interpretation has changed somewhat, especially with the nationalist policy of ‘two languages, one 
nation’ discourse, in which a Swedish-speaking upper class was highly influential. Due to the early twentieth century 
fashion of Swedish-speakers voluntarily translating their names into Finnish and due to the increasing use of Finnish as 
the primary language in bi-lingual homes, this distinction—especially with after the Civil war in 1918—would give room to 
class-based racialising discourses. 
85 The Mongolian issue actually functions in Finnish society in many ways. Factually, there are genetic characteristics in 
Finns that are more typical in Siberian peoples (Kaaro 2002), and people’s looks, for example, are often interpreted inside 
this framework of Mongolian vs. Germanic/Nordic/Aryan.  
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discourses, are present in Finnish culture despite large-scale immigration or slavery not having been 
part of the Finnish history (cf. Keskinen et al. 2009).86  
Importantly, it is not the practices of racism and their frequency that are central to the functioning of 
state racism. The point is that human biology and ‘race’ have been incorporated into the functioning of 
the state through biopolitics, which has created a different power/knowledge constellation of naturalism 
wedded to racialisation that Foucault called state racism. This power/knowledge constellation may not 
be different in terms of results of exclusion and violence, but it is different in terms of its governmentality 
(Bernasconi 2010). Before modernity, political life was not defined through race, not only because there 
was no such signification until the sixteenth century, but because the borders of the political community 
were negotiated differently (Hannaford 1996): for example, based on political civility and religious 
belonging and not based on fitness as measured through the colour of the skin, social position and 
health.  
Therefore, in order to combat the naturalising historicism of the claim that ‘there has always been 
racism,’ it needs to be understood that modern racism is something very different from earlier othering 
practices. What I have demonstrated here is not the retreat and return of the origin of ‘race’ or ‘nation’, 
as the ‘there has always been racism’ discourse suggests, but rather a shift in the meaning of ‘nation’ 
and ‘race’. This in itself does not constitute the refutation of culturalising othering practices as untrue, 
but rather points towards a qualitative shift in these practices. What Foucault situates in the 1850s is the 
development of modern racism that functions inside the evolutionary framework, not the beginning of 
dehumanising treatment of others. Modern racism is a product of the modern mode of knowing with its 
retreat and return of the origin that is trapped in the circularity of having to explain the difference 
between the opposite ends of the Same (i.e. the monogesis constituting the essential sameness of the 
man) as a matter of time, as a matter of social evolution (Foucault 1966/2002, 370-371). 
                                                     
86 Keskinen et al. (2009) have analysed the functioning of racist and supremist discourses in Finland in terms of ‘complying 
with colonialism’. That is, they analyse colonialism through a centre-periphery dynamic, in which Finland appropriates the 
colonial discourses of the centre, and as a periphery state starts emulating them. Their argument is aimed at the 
discourses in Finland and the Nordic countries that attempt, through historicism, to deny that racism exists in Finland. That 
is, these speakers claim that because the colonial discourses of scientific racism never were part of the Finnish intellectual 
milieu, as Finland never was an imperial country, there is no true racism in Finland, but what we see is natural xenophobia. 
Whilst the argument of Keskinen et al. is completely valid in the sense that a lack of colonial history is an insufficient way 
of explaining the (in)existence of racism in Finland, and they correctly conclude that the claim of there not being racism is 
unsubstantiatable. The only aspect that I differ on, with Keskinen et al., is the continued association of racism with 
colonialism. Certainly, racism was essential to colonialism, but the socio-evolutionary framework blossoming around the 
mid-nineteenth century altered the rationalities of colonialism at the centre: from missionary or power political grounds a 
move was made towards understanding colonialism as ‘the white man’s burden’ of civilizing the subrace (which was also a 
domestic concern). This is also reflected in the discourses about the relative ‘benevolence’ of early colonialism in the UK. 
And in this sense, the socio-evolutionary framework started to function thereon as a condition of possibility of colonialism—
or even of the end of colonialism for those who saw that the subrace had finally ‘matured’ and ‘developed’ enough to take 
government in their own hands. 
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We cannot a priori separate ‘race’ from the modern nation-state, that much is evident (Balibar 1991). 
Yet, whilst these practices of new racism and racialisation, in my opinion, can certainly explain the 
racialised human pedigree, they do not explain the functioning of wealth and human capital in the 
immigration apparatus. Racist discourse as such has nothing to do with technologies of wealth and 
‘human capital’ (except as causes of poverty and lacking access to institutions creating ‘human capital’). 
That is, a discourse that sees those of ‘darker’ phenotype as inferior does not necessitate a discourse 
about the inferiority of the poor. To address the intersectionality of race, culture and class, as I have 
insisted, we need to turn towards the conditions of possibility of these intersectional, racialising 
discourses; to state racism, to socio-evolutionary thought, social Darwinism and eugenics. These 
biologicalising and racialising discourses gave rise to a system of evaluation, or rather depreciation—in 
the form of the human pedigree discourse. As explained already, because liberal governmentality 
functions through a naturalising power/knowledge constellation, one of the central ways in which 
scarcity of meaning, i.e. the limitedness of possible signification, is introduced into liberal 
governmentality is via its naturalism.  
4.1.3. The Exceptionalisation of Eugenics 
To address the silence around the human pedigree we need to understand how social Darwinism 
functions inside liberal governmentality. Social Darwinism and eugenics are essential to the 
contemporary discussions about ‘race’ and immigration in the sense that they have been implicated in 
‘scientific racism’, and therefore the exceptionalisation of racism is linked to the exceptionalisation of 
social Darwinism and eugenics. My claim is that the social Darwinist conceptualisation of fitness in its 
banality has been largely silenced. I will demonstrate this through the analysis of the immigration 
apparatus and its race hygienic rationalities. Before moving onto analysing the apparatus of immigration 
control, we shall address the issue of why I am approaching governmentality of immigration through 
eugenics, when the understanding is that eugenics is history.  
Eugenics is typically exceptionalised by treating it as a Nazi ‘ideology’ that has since been proven wrong 
and consequently has no relevance for the way we conduct politics today. But this common-sense 
definition is, historically and factually wrong (e.g. Searle 1976; McLaren 1990; Stepan 1991, 4-9; Stern 
2005). Eugenics never was just a Nazi ideology, quite the contrary  (Kline 2001). As Teitelbaum and 
Winter assert, from their socio-biological or eugenic point of view:  
“It is important to note, though, that many supporters of eugenics found both Nazism and what we 
understand today as racism to be completely repugnant, and that many politicians, scientists, and 
men of letters who were profoundly anti-fascist addressed themselves to the problem of race 
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hygiene in the period under review. We are not dealing with a lunatic fringe when we survey the 
history of eugenics in Europe and America, and it is only by stripping away the categories of our 
present, more equalitarian culture that we can appreciate the earlier meaning of eugenics” 
(Teitelbaum and Winter 1985, 47). 
In fact, the eugenic thinkers in Germany had for a long time agitated that the future of the German race 
was compromised, because it was unable to utilise sterilisation for the improvement of the nation-race 
like the United States did.87 Eugenic policies were first implemented in the United States, where the first 
eugenic sterilisation laws were passed in 1907 (Indiana) and affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1927 
(Buck vs. Bell). By the end of the 1920s, 24 states in the US had adopted involuntary sterilisation laws, 
the last performed in the 1970s and ‘80s. The various state laws resulted in an unaccounted number of 
sterilisations over time. With decentralised and unregulated practices the estimates range in single 
states from thousands to hundreds of thousands. In this sense, eugenics was not a Nazi policy, 
although under totalitarian governmentality, the eugenic biopolitics were certainly implemented with 
ruthless efficiency. 
Sterilisation laws were also adopted in other countries, for example in Switzerland (canton of Vaud) and 
Canada (Alberta) in 1928, Denmark in 1929, Germany in 1933, Sweden, Norway and Finland in 1934-
1935 and Estonia in 1937. Many countries had a variation of eugenic policies, whether through 
sterilisation and/or abortion or provision of birth control for lower classes, institutionalisation of 
‘degenerates’ in single-sex wards or marriage licence laws etc. preventing the procreation of people 
deemed degenerate—that is (depending on the country) those simply deemed to be unrestrained by 
convention or morality, those—in the histrionic language of the time—defined as ‘feebleminded’, 
mentally ill, epileptics, morons, idiots, mutes, criminals, prostitutes, those with venereal diseases, single 
mothers, vagrants, and sex criminals etc. For example, in Finland the eugenic sterilisation law was 
passed with overwhelming support (Mattila 1999).  
                                                     
87 Consequently, Germany followed the American Eugenics Record Office’s model law in implementing sterilisation laws 
(Hartmann 1987, 97). What was different between the implementation of eugenic policies in Nazi Germany and elsewhere 
was the use of extermination as a technology of eugenics as well as the extent of ‘hereditary’ conditions leading to 
involuntary sterilisation. Anti-Semitism as such was also widespread in the West at the time. Hence, we need to treat the 
difference between Nazi eugenics and eugenics in liberal countries as a difference of democracy vs. totalitarianism, but 
not as a difference of biopolitical governmentality. It is a historical fact that other negative eugenic technologies than 
extermination were successfully implemented in many other countries, Finland included. In international eugenic 
conferences the experts disagreed over the hereditary mechanism and the prudence of sterilising all those with the 
‘hereditary’ conditions that Germany covered (Stepan 1991, 32). These ‘hereditary’ conditions included: “’hereditary 
feeblemindedness’, schizophrenia, manic depressive insanity, hereditary epilepsy, Huntington’s chorea, hereditary 
blindness and deafness, serious bodily deformity, and alcoholism” as well as mixed-race genesis (hence the search for 
Jewish ancestors during the Nazi regime) (Stepan 1991, 32). The most significant difference was of course the systematic 
extermination of categories of people, the Jews, the Roma and the disabled most notoriously. 
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Secondly, and even more importantly, not all countries abolished eugenic legislation after the Nazi 
atrocities came to light. In fact, Sweden and Finland performed most of their sterilisations in the 1950s 
and 1960s and abolished eugenic sterilisation laws in 1975 and 1970 respectively. Most of the 
sterilisations performed in Finland were actually done after the 1950 renewal of the Sterilisations Act, 
through which politicians gave explicit advice to health professionals to reinvigorate the policy of 
eugenic sterilisations (Hietala 1996/2005; and 2009; Mattila 1999; and 2005).88 Finland also operated a 
eugenic abortion law that combined sterilisation with aborting the foetus (Broberg and Tydén 1996; 
Hietala 1996/2005). In the US the forced sterilisation of the mentally retarded continued until the mid-
1970s, in California until early 1980s (Stern 2005). In fact, the sterilisation of the mentally retarded or 
mentally ill is still legal in many countries, including Finland. Although eugenics never was as widely 
supported in Finland as it was in the United States or in Nazi Germany, and although in all countries 
there was opposition to eugenic policies, the easy passing of eugenic laws in 1935 in Finland, the desire 
to enhance the impact of the sterilisation laws in its reform in 1950 and the addition of the 1950 
compulsory castration law all speak of a commonly accepted rationality (Rahikainen 1995; Hietala 
1996/2005; Broberg and Roll-Hansen 1996; Mattila 1999; see also Schrag 2010, 93).89 In this sense, it 
cannot be claimed, that eugenics was “a minor offshoot of turn-of-the-century sociobiological thought 
that never achieved ideological ‘takeoff’ in terms of influence or circulation” (Freeden 2005a, 144). 
There are two keys to this kind of exceptionalising of eugenics. The first is its definition through the 
negative and through biology. Namely, eugenicists advocated both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ methods 
aimed at the unfit. The infamous ‘negative’ methods could include eugenic abortion and eugenic 
contraceptive use, sterilisation, segregation, institutionalisation, extermination and ‘eugenic euthanasia’, 
                                                     
88 After 1955 Finland performed 5001 sterilisations on explicitly eugenic grounds. Altogether after 1950 there were 56.080 
sterilisations, which included voluntary ones as well as those based on eugenics grounds or mental illness. The 
sterilisations that were not categorised as eugenic included, for example, the mentally retarded, the mentally ill and 
epileptics as well as socio-economically rationalized sterilisations. However, voluntary sterilisations would include also 
those that institutionalised persons agreed to as a condition of release or that ‘degenerate’ persons agreed to voluntarily. 
Because Finland practised involuntary sterilisations, unlike Sweden, the statistics between these two countries are not 
comparable. Altogether in Sweden, which is roughly twice the size of Finland, 62.888 sterilisations were performed, out of 
which 11.592 were explicitly for eugenic reasons, although voluntary. In Sweden 85% of voluntary sterilisations were 
performed after 1945. If the Finnish law allowed forced sterilisations, in Sweden the voluntariness of all sterilisations has 
been problematized and it has been shown how, in fact, psychological pressure and expert authority were advised to be 
used to accomplish eugenic sterilisations. Regardless, in Finland the consensus regards the Swedish practices of 
sterilisation as worse than the Finnish ones (statistics based on those presented in Broberg and Roll-Hansen 2005).  
89 Roll-Hansen, for example, asserts that eugenics started waning after the Second World War and the publication of Nazi 
atrocities (Roll-Hansen 1996, 264). This is partly true. The increased understanding of hereditary mechanisms started 
undermining the efficiency and meaning of negative eugenic measures already earlier and the efficiency of sterilisations as 
a technology started to be increasingly problematized. However, sterilisations did not stop in 1945, eugenic measures 
were not wholeheartedly condemned, the sterilisation of the mentally ill under guardianship is still legal—as is aborting 
foetuses based on genetic or socio-economic considerations (which does not imply that freedom of choice should not be 
allowed, but rather that the common sense rationalities themselves—of why a life with a disease is not worth living or why 
the poor should not have children—should be examined). 
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pre-marital medical checks and marriage licences, as well as immigration control. But centrally, 
eugenics advocated also a ‘positive’ policy agenda, which concentrated on enhancing the racial fitness 
of the genetically superior, on improving the nation-race to sufficient quality and on supporting the 
procreation of the genetically fit classes or individuals. In fact, positive methods were essential to 
eugenics; they were what Galton envisioned to be at the centre of eugenics (Schrag 2010, 78): 
Francis Galton . . . . has defined this new science as the study of agencies under social control 
that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either physically or mentally . 
. . . Our science does not propose to confine its attention to problems of inheritance only, but to 
deal also with problems of environment and of nurture. (Henderson 1909, 223) 
Consequently, it is not surprising that Foucault talks about “a eugenic ordering of society” reflected in 
population politics focusing on the “family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property” that 
were “accompanied by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health, 
and everyday life [which] received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with 
protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race” (Foucault 1976/1998, 149-150). 
As, for example, Turner insists, eugenics has become “an essential feature of modern government, 
despite the fact that the very word ‘eugenics’ is normally hidden from view, given its bad historical 
connections with genocide” (Turner 2007, 297). As Foucault writes:  
“let it not be imagined that this was nothing more than a medical theory which was scientifically 
lacking and improperly moralistic. Its application was widespread and its implantation went deep. 
Psychiatry, to be sure, but also jurisprudence, legal medicine, agencies of social control, the 
surveillance of dangerous or endangered children, all functioned for a long time on the basis of 
‘degenerescence’ and the heredity-perversion system” (Foucault 1976/1998, 119) 
Compulsory sterilisation was merely a negative technology of a much wider rationality of governing. The 
aim of positive eugenics was to create a society ”in which desire for ’genetically superior’ offspring 
would be the norm and in which tolerance for any sort of biological or behavioral deviation was very low, 
a society in which ordinary individuals could be counted on to make eugenic choices without any official 
compulsion” (McWhorter 2009, 418). Eugenics was to become an unquestioned religion of society 
implying a striving to create eugenic rationalities of governing the population at a distance.  
Eugenics focused on many issues: population policy, psychiatry, social work, health and hygienic 
policies, it advocated eugenic marriages, i.e. early marriages between the genetically fit, and advice for 
example on reproduction, marital morality, genetic counselling, pre-natal care and pre-natal screening, 
eugenically sound mothering and child upbringing, child benefits and maternity allowances. Eugenics 
played a key role in defining the projects of public hygiene, social hygiene and mental hygiene of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, also in Finland.  In many more countries eugenics affected policy, 
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even if religious or liberal opposition prevented the use of the infamous negative methods of eugenics. 
(E.g. Pickens 1968; Searle 1976; Freeden 1983; Hartmann 1987; Stepan 1991; Nye 1993; Broberg and 
Roll-Hansen 1996; Dikötter 1998; Kevles 1998; Kalling 1999; MacMaster 2001; Stone 2001; 
Spektorowski and Mizrachi 2004; Rosen 2004; Leonard 2005; Mottier 2005; and 2008; Gerodetti 2006b; 
Mottier and Gerodetti 2007; Turda and Weindling 2007; Turda 2010). Positive eugenics was essential to 
eugenics. The positive policy agenda gave rise to and paralleled policies of national improvement and 
modernization aimed at realizing the potential of citizens and the nation-race. Some eugenicists also 
aimed to educate the population, to make eugenics into a religion that people would follow 
unquestioned. In doing this, eugenics was intertwined with other rationalities of governing, but at the 
same time integral to conceptualising society (Stepan 1991; MacMaster 2001; Helén and Jauho 2003; 
Turda and Weindling 2007; and 2010; Dean 2010; Lucassen 2010; Kevles 1998; Ladd-Taylor 2001; 
Hietala 2009). 
Secondly, to the exceptionalisation of eugenics is its designation as a ‘minor offshoot’ of pseudo-
academic theory. Yet, social Darwinism and eugenics basically are strands of thought that applied 
evolutionary logic to society. They interpret socio-economic progress, both at the individual, social and 
international level, as a result of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. And as we have 
discussed, socio-evolutionary thought is admittedly integral to liberal ontologies and they inherently 
relate to the ideational shift from raison d’état to governmentality. Hence, whereas prior to the 1880s 
social Darwinism and eugenic laws had been resisted in many countries, the emerging socio-
evolutionary and eugenic sciences were able to—by tapping into the liberal governmentality’s 
requirement that governing be grounded in science—change politics and the power/knowledge 
constellations that made such views acceptable and mainstream. Especially medical sciences have had 
a central role in biopolitical governing (Rose 2006, 28). Eugenics functioned at the centre of debates 
about evolution, fitness, degeneracy, progress and civilization. It inherently belongs to the modern order 
of things (Bauman 1989; MacMaster 2001; e.g. Turda 2010). “Eugenics was significant because it 
occupied the cultural space in which social interpretation took place,” it provided the vocabulary, the 
discursive structure of “medical-moral” rationalities (Stepan 1991, 9). Eugenics presented itself as an 
expert knowledge and was propagated by governmental advisors, such as medical, psychiatric or social 
work experts, who inserted eugenics into liberal governmentality through its preference for scientific 
knowledge about the naturalised laws of society according to which social and national problems should 
be governed. Eugenics was part of the expert knowledge that normalised earlier stereotypes and turned 
them into modern racism and racialisation (e.g. Searle 1976; Schrag 2010, 73; Bauman 1989). In doing 
this, it inherently impacted liberal biopolitical governmentality based on naturalism and government for 
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the improved wealth and health of society, and had the impact of marginalising moral discourses. That 
is, by valuing the impetus of efficiently improving the nation-race over, for example, various discourses 
about ‘the good life’ social Darwinist conceptualisations of ‘the worthy life’ helped to marginalise notions 
of governing for ‘the good life’ attached to various moral discourses, such as religious, humanist or 
equalitarian discourses. More importantly, eugenics was appropriated by laymen and progressive 
thinkers in general and, consequently, lost its actual ‘scientific’ reference and control (Rosen 2004). 
Therefore, exceptionalising eugenics is analytically insufficient. Rather because of its centrality, we 
should not re-write history and make eugenics into something exceptional, but rather we need to focus 
on why eugenics was not exceptional, and why it was able to occupy a centre stage (even if a contested 
one90) in social sciences and politics. In doing this, we should bear in mind that eugenics never was 
simply about sterilisation. After we have given up political analysis conducted in terms of sovereignty 
and law, the analytical task becomes a task of understanding the power/knowledge constellation that 
the rationalities of governing are grounded in. Then, the relevant question in terms of governmentality is: 
Although the methods of social Darwinism, eugenics and Nazism were condemned and the excesses of 
racist rhetoric disciplined, what happened to the aims? That is, what we need to investigate is the 
continued rationalities of governing, in this case governing immigration, and whether these rationalities 
are informed by social Darwinist and eugenic conceptualisations today.  
4.1.4. Social Darwinist vs. Eugenic Governmentalities 
What are the social Darwinist conceptualisations then? My claim is that social Darwinism and eugenics 
cannot be adequately distinguished as discourses, i.e. as systems of dispersion. They both essentially 
utilise a social Darwinist definition of fitness. As the classical critique of social Darwinism showed 
already in the twentieth century, the social Darwinist theory of evolutionary fitness is not the same as the 
biological and genetic theory of fitness: In biological theory the success of a gene is seen in its more 
frequent manifestation in the current generation, i.e. in more numerous surviving progeny. That is, those 
that have more surviving children are by definition the fittest. This indeed, was the initial assumption of 
                                                     
90 The objection to eugenics come from different discourses, but American religious discourses present an interesting case. 
Schrag argues that one of the reasons behind the US prohibition of teaching of evolutionary theory in America relates 
exactly to the way these social Darwinist conceptualisations of evolution had been written into school books, how they 
were taught at schools, formed an integral part of early academic scene and how they circulated in the journals and 
newspapers of the nation (Schrag 2010, 88-90). Indeed there are similar rationalities in the contemporary religious 
objections to abortion and the use of birth control in America (see for example Rich Deem’s web article “Modern Eugenics: 
How Abortion is Getting Rid of "Undesirables"”, available at: http://www.godandscience.org/doctrine/moderneugenics.html, 
last modified July 12, 2009, accessed 23.2.2012). These racialised policies of sterilisations and the Norplant policy (long-
term contraceptive) in the US are sometimes objected to by feminist and anti-racist discourses in reference to eugenic 
practices (Burrell 1995; Gill 1994). 
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social Darwinist theory: that the upper classes would have more children due to access to better 
nourishment and resources. Unfortunately for social Darwinism, reality had this unnaturalised, ‘dysgenic’ 
pattern of birth where the richer in fact had fewer children. This is of course unsurprising because the 
wealth of a family (or nation) is related to the number of children based on very basic maths: Per capita 
income, the nation’s relative wealth, is directly influenced by the number of dependents, the size of 
inheritance is proportionate to the number of children and the parents’ possibility to provide ‘fitness 
improving’ (and status enhancing) opportunities and education to their children (especially in countries 
where education is not free) is directly impacted by the number of children. Hence, because the number 
of offspring would not render the upper classes ‘the fittest’ in the evolutionary sense, social Darwinism 
changed the criteria of determining ‘genetic’ fitness: Henceforth, the success of the gene was to be 
determined by the social position of its owner (e.g. Løvtrup 1987, 394-400). This is where naturalism, 
market veridiction and evolutionary forms of historicism start to work in conjunction with social 
Darwinism. In the scientific sense, social Darwinists and eugenicists were never so simple as to assume 
that all lower class individuals were unfit or degenerate or that the upper classes were always going to 
be fit. The governmentality, because of its belief in evolution, was inherently dynamic: the lower classes 
could prove themselves to be fit and the upper classes could degenerate. This allowed for the 
individualisation of socio-evolutionary rationalities and the naturalisation of the individual’s (obtained) 
social position.  
Underlying this social Darwinist governmentality is of course the concept of naturalised laws: Structures 
of society were not to be attributed to discrimination or injustice, but to evolution. Whereas Christianity 
had interpreted wealth as God’s election and divine protection (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 85), with social 
Darwinist discourses of evolution the rich white man simply became ‘the fittest’—because tautologically 
his ascendance in the social hierarchy proved his genetic fitness. As a discourse on worth and morality 
rendered quasi-biological, social Darwinism inseparably intertwines the meaning of evolution with race, 
nationality, class and gender by linking culture with biology and making the social order an evolutionary 
inevitable. Genes and natural (group) selection simply determined the cognitive models that 
genders/nation-races/civilisations adopted. These beliefs came to form the commonsensical way of 
interpreting the world. Henceforth historical structures of discrimination created by sexism, imperialism, 
capitalism and elitism were factualized and ‘scientifically’ attributed to genetic quality; they were made 
into products of socio-biological evolution when history was conceptualised as evolution.  
In terms of the empirico-transcendental riddle it was from the midst of his historical existence, from 
within the privileged life to which he entirely belongs and by which he is traversed in his whole being, 
that the white man constitutes representations of history as evolution that in turn enable him to 
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transcend his finiteness and through which he comes to possess the strange capacity of being able to 
assert the truthfulness of social Darwinism as an infinite discourse. As a game of power/knowledge, 
‘history’ and ‘change’ was turned into ‘evolution’ and posited as a proof of the justness or irrevocability 
of the world order: to want to change the world order meant tampering with naturalised laws of social 
evolution. Yet, the threat of degeneration makes the socio-evolutionary rationality of governing a 
dynamic one, and through this infinite dynamic, the risks and dangers of degeneration become marked 
as perpetual rationalities of conducting conduct, of ‘making live’ and ‘letting die’. To change the world 
order, social evolution had to take its natural course, meaning that the subrace needed to evolve to the 
level of the superrace, if it was not ‘let die’ before this (i.e. if the superrace did not override the subrace 
before this). This notion of evolution was conceptualised as a naturalised process; one needed to be 
aware of not governing it too much. Whilst incremental change was ‘natural’, to attempt to alter this 
order was considered the work of the ‘congenital savage’, whose essential nature entailed “an 
instinctive and natural revolt against civilization” (Stoddard 1925, 22). Civilization stood for the natural, 
evolutionary order of things; to revolt against this came naturally only to the congenitally lower type 
functioning on the basis of instincts, emotions, irrationality and neediness. The securitised role of the 
‘congenital savage’ lacking in ‘civilization’ was not only assigned to the biologically unfit, but also to the 
morally degenerate (if not even to one’s political opponents, to anarchists and communist especially, 
who are barred from entering the United States).  
If the concept of fitness is the same between social Darwinism and eugenics, social Darwinism and 
eugenics can be distinguished through the different position they employ in relation to the technologies 
of governing: Social Darwinism promotes a laissez-faire policy of survival of the fittest, which is not 
necessarily a laissez-faire policy of governmental regulation, but a laissez-faire of ‘letting die’, that is 
most effectively seen in the silence that it maintains around the ‘necessity’ of laissez-mourir. Social 
Darwinism silences moral discourses capable of resisting this impetus of ‘letting die’ by, for example, 
inserting a discourse about ‘too much government’ around such problems as, for example, the morality 
of providing quality health care also to the poor and unemployed. In comparison, eugenic technologies 
of governing suggest a more proactive or interventionist rationality of ‘making live’.91 Because “[w]e 
have the environment acting, as it were, like a sieve, separating the fit from the unfit, and selecting 
those who are best adapted to their surroundings. Every change of environment necessarily alters the 
                                                     
91 This association of eugenics, known for its policies of death, is on the surface contradictory. However, if we accept that 
both social Darwinist and eugenic technologies of governing embody the governmentality of death, and compare their 
rationalities of governing, then eugenics is the one that judges ‘death-worthiness’ based on how people conduct 
themselves or care for themselves and make proactive interventions of ‘making live’ especially through its positive 
technologies. In comparison, the social Darwinist allowance for natural selection to function embodies the ‘letting’ in the 
‘letting die’. In this sense, eugenics is an active policy of socio-genesis. 
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incidence of selection, the type of survivors in each instance being determined by the survival-value” 
(Herbert 1910, 122), eugenics also had to include proactive policy as a measure of improving the race-
nation and guarding against its degeneration. As shall be seen, American immigration policy came to 
favour restrictionist and interventionist and not laissez-faire technologies of governing immigration. This 
is the main reason for discussing the immigration apparatus in terms of eugenic governmentality, 
although the rationalities of governing immigration cannot be understood without social Darwinism.  
We have now discussed how eugenics cannot be exceptionalised through its negative methods and 
distinguished it from social Darwinism in terms of its technologies of government. Consequently, we are 
ready to present a more specific definition of eugenics, before moving onto discussing eugenic 
immigration policies as such. The term eugenics was coined by a British thinker Francis Galton in 1883 
and refers to race hygiene. Eugenics is  
“the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race, also with 
those that develop them to the utmost advantage; and it embodies the study of agencies under 
social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations. The primary 
and immediate aim of the science is thoroughly to investigate: 
(I) The laws of variation, and particularly of inheritance, of physical and psychical characters and 
of the various specific diseases and general morbid conditions to which man is subject, in order 
that it may be known to what extent these various characters are inborn. 
(2) The relative fecundity and fertility of the various racial and social classes, and the correlation 
or association of fecundity and fertility with different characteristics, in order that we may know to 
what relative extent the good, bad, and indifferent elements of society reproduce themselves. 
(3) The effect of external influences on the characteristics enumerated under (I) and (2), in order 
that definite knowledge as to how such social activities as organized charities, for example, may 
most effectively be directed toward a eugenic end. 
A parallel aim is to endeavor to influence public opinion toward eugenic ideals, particularly with 
reference to marriage, the bearing and rearing of children, and to the care and treatment of 
defective classes of society; using as the basis for the propaganda the solid contributions to 
knowledge which may be gained in the campaign of research outlined.” (Pearl 1908) 
Or as defined by more contemporary authors, eugenics is: 
“the science of the improvement of the genetic stock of the human population or of subgroups 
within. As such it constitutes a body of ideas and proposals of a positive kind, encouraging or 
stimulating the propagation of individuals and groups deemed to contribute to the well-being of 
the community, as well as a set of notions of negative kind, restricting or eliminating the 
propagation of characteristics, individuals, or groups deemed detrimental” (Teitelbaum and Winter 
1985, 47; underlining is mine). 
Fitness is the operative word of eugenics, signifying better breeding, i.e. the development of a robust 
stock of humans capable of competing and succeeding in a changing environment. As racism, also 
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eugenics appears at its height when trying to build a perfect society (Bauman 1989). Eugenics aimed to 
use proactive technologies to guide the development of the nation-race, to improve it fitness and to 
prevent its degeneration. In this sense, eugenics functioned as a biopolitical rationality inside liberal 
governmentality that operated based on a social Darwinist conceptualisation of fitness calculated in 
social position, because social position measured inherent fitness and adaptation to the environment 
most effectively. 
4.1.5. State Racist Governmentality  
The human pedigree, its functioning through racialising discourses of culture, class and morality, is 
enabled by state racist governmentality. The policies of controlling unwanted population sections have a 
long history that predates Darwin’s evolutionary theory (e.g. Foucault 1961/2006; 1974-75/1999; 
1975/1991). Biology was already a grounding notion in Western biopolitical governmentality prior to 
social Darwinism; social Darwinism is merely the explicit enunciation of its emerging logic. Herbert 
Spencer’s social Darwinist thesis was published prior to Darwin’s theory and Darwin certainly was not 
the first one to discuss evolutionism (e.g. Løvtrup 1987). Lamarck and others had already presented 
their concepts of inheritance giving rise to socio-evolutionary thinking before Darwin. Spencer’s 
Progress: Its Law and Cause was published in 1857 whereas Darwin’s The Origin of Species was 
published in 1859 and his Descent of Man, in which Darwin discussed his socio-evolutionary ideas, only 
in 1871. Darwin’s social Darwinism was never as pronounced as Spencer’s. Some do not even 
implicate Darwin himself in social Darwinism at all, but claim rather that: 
 “By using metaphorical concepts from Malthus and Spencer, Darwin made it more difficult to 
disassociate his new discovery in biology from older patterns of social thought. It was not what 
Darwin said that had little impact, but it was the manner in which he said it that led those, who 
were looking for scientific support for opinions already held, to infer that he meant what they 
already believed” (Rogers 1972, 268). 
Further, Darwin himself certainly had little to do with eugenics as such. Galton coined the term 
‘eugenics’ only in 1883. In this sense, social Darwinism must be understood as a discourse developing 
also prior to and outside of Darwin’s evolutionary thinking. “Although Darwin accepted the struggle for 
existence as only one basis for biological progress among animals and plants, the Social Darwinists 
made it the principal basis of social progress among human beings” (ibid. 271). Therefore, in terms of 
social theory, we cannot limit the socio-evolutionary rationalities to those propagated by Darwin and we 
cannot define social Darwinism solely through the writings of Darwin himself. Rather, social Darwinism 
needs to be treated as a system of dispersion essential to which are its conditions of possibility. The 
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biopolitical logic that came to be formulated in terms of state racism developed slowly together with the 
increasing scientificity of social policy.  
We must keep in mind, at this stage, that the scientificity that we are discussing is not that of ‘scientific 
racism’. As far as racism relates to the logic of governing the state, to state racism, Foucault does not 
separate the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ racism as many thinkers tend to do—a phenomenon related to the 
methodological nationalism rampant in social theory (e.g. Chernilo 2006; and 2007) and it does not limit 
itself to issues what we would today understand with the term ‘race’. State racism is a dynamic of 
purification that is conceptualised in terms of a race war. This is a race war between ‘races’ that 
fundamentally are two:  
Having established this...the idea [of biological transcription]—which is absolutely new and which 
will make the discourse function very differently—that the other race is basically not the race that 
came from elsewhere or that was, for a time, triumphant and dominant, but that it is a race that is 
permanently, ceaselessly infiltrating the social body, or which is, rather, constantly being re-
created in and by the social fabric. In other words, what we see as a polarity, as a binary drift 
within society, is not a clash between two distinct races. It is the splitting of a single race into a 
super-race and a sub-race. To put it in a different way, it is the reappearance, within a single 
race, of the past of that race. (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 60-61) 
That is, what is particular about Foucault's treatment of ‘biologico-social racism’ is that he conceives of it 
in terms of a ‘logic of race war’,92 which is both integral to Western governmentality both internally as 
well as manifesting in its external relations with the colonies— or today with the ‘developmentally Third 
World’ (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 50; on developmentalism, racism and securitization see Duffield 2002; 
                                                     
92 Historically, Foucault links the birth of state racism to a race war that was given shape in the battle against monarchism 
based on conquest. Race war is the logic that replaces the (conquering) King’s right to rule. In his account of French and 
British history in particular, he sees the creation of a ‘counter-history’ as a tool of resistance with which ‘conquered nations’ 
battle against the conquering King. Although Foucault’s analysis concentrated on the French and British examples, parallels 
can be drawn to the Finnish experience: The demand for Finnish independence was born under the monarchism of the 
Russian Tsar and was formulated in the name of the nation’s right to self-rule. In addition, the Finnish political constellation 
was impacted by the division of the Swedish-speaking upper class and Finnish-speaking ‘folk’. In both contexts, the right to 
rule is contested in reference to a race-struggle: The conquered nation-race declares its rights against the sovereignty of the 
racialised conquering monarch, after which sovereignty becomes legitimized through a universal philosophy of right, of the 
right of sovereign race-nation, through government based on the sovereign nations. The interest of the state is not identified 
with the interest of the monarch anymore, but with the interest of the ruling ‘nation’ and with the defence of the race. In 
situations when the revolt against the conquering king did not lead to actual obliteration of the sovereign, the legitimising 
philosophy of the ‘social contract’ is constructed to explain the existence of two races in the same state and the continuation 
of the rule of one over the other. The function of the social contract model, according to Foucault, then is to hide a permanent 
societal war of power. Its function was to hide the root of power in conquest that the modern constitution is based on by 
making the ruled population accept the fact of being ruled. It does this by pointing out that the lack of revolt by the conquered 
population in itself constitutes an acceptance of and a willing submission to being ruled. This process, according to Foucault, 
leads to the logic of race-war being transformed and generalised and thereby becoming a prevalent discourse diffused into 
the governmentality of the state. With time this binary logic of two races finds its way into various discourses and historical 
contexts and changes its form and object (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 65-85; also e.g. Doty 1999; Elden 2002; Mader 2011). 
Regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of Foucault's historical account, what is central in this account is the emergence of 
early discourses of ‘race’ and ‘nation’ into the political arena, which enables their later amalgamation with socio-evolutionary 
discourses. 
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2006; and 2007).  That is, it is the race war between the superrace and the subrace that is fundamental 
to this logic of state racism and its racializing dynamic of degeneration and progress. 
As Lentin asserts, already Voegelin’s interest, before Foucault, was “in showing the extent to which the 
notion of strong and weak, or passive and active, ‘races’ takes hold as a fundament of the theorisation 
of the emergence of modern nation-state” (Lentin 2004, 42; Voegelin 1933/1997). The logic of this race 
war between the strong and the weak races runs through the body-politic itself (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 
59-60). Race struggle becomes  
the discourse of a centered, centralized, and centralizing power. It will become the discourse of a 
battle that has to be waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true 
race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviated 
from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage. At this point, we have 
all those biological-racist discourses of degeneracy, but also those institutions within the social 
body which make the discourse of race struggle function as a principle of exclusion and 
segregation and, ultimately, as a way of normalizing society. (Foucault 1975-76/1997, 60-61) 
Thus, the epitome of state racism is in the division of the Same, of the human homogenetic population 
into two biological ‘races’: the sub-race and super-race with the sub-race embodying an agglomerate of 
undesirable qualities and abnormalities as well as the danger of regression, decline and degeneration of 
the whole evolutionary progress of the population.  
‘Not to govern too much’ meant accepting naturalised selection and death in the name of progress. 
Fundamentally, social Darwinist discourses of degeneracy served to naturalise and render bourgeois 
morality quasi-biological and to turn socio-historical problems into hereditary problems—and therefore 
not to matters of political organisation or God’s will, but to matters of biology, evolution and selection 
(e.g. Pick 1989, 59). As Dean asserts,  
“It follows that given we continue to live in a system of modern states, we must face up to forms 
of bio-political racism, i.e. racism that follows on not simply from discrimination, scapegoating or 
institutions, but also from the elements by which we are compelled to think about and imagine the 
states and their populations and seek to govern them. This is as true for the liberal art of 
government as for non-liberal rule. The former’s emphasis on governing through freedom means 
that it always contains a division between those who are capable of bearing the responsibility and 
freedoms of mature citizenship and those who are not” (Dean 2010, 171). 
Because of the way we conceptualise the state and its functioning through naturalised laws, citizenship 
becomes governed at a distance through technologies of freedom and rights, empowerment and 
responsibilization, and they are intimately connected to eugenic rationalities that were carried out 
through technologies of, for example, disenfranchising or sterilizing the unfit. As Freeden asserts, social 
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responsibility was one of the key ways through which eugenics entered the political scene (Freeden 
2005b, 154). 
As the father of racism and one contributor to the birth of social Darwinism, Arthur Comte de Gobineau 
insisted, social conflicts (including class conflict) were essentially race conflicts and, as we saw earlier, 
he envisioned that each nation-race was formed by three separate races: the fit superrace of aristocrats, 
the mongrel race of bourgeoisie and the subrace of the hoi polloi (Jokisalo 2003, 14). This nuanced 
theorem of subrace/superrace divide reflects the rendering of class prejudice quasi-biological. With the 
ascendance of the bourgeoisie and the industrialising world, the bourgeoisie had to elevate its moral 
standing from being a mongrel race to a class essential to the well-being of the nation-race. As Foucault 
suggests, this affirmation was more of a process of self-affirmation of bourgeois vitality, vigour and 
pedigree than a pure domination of the lower classes or a mere appropriation of “themes of the nobility”: 
The bourgeoisie imposed a biopolitical governmentality also on itself because “[i]ts dominance was in 
part dependent on that cultivation” of “health, hygiene, descent and race” giving rise to state racism, to 
“a dynamic racism, a racism of expansion” (Foucault 1976/1998, 124-125). 
Social Darwinist discourses of degeneracy are essentially discourses of morality rendered quasi-
biological. The sub-racial qualities are a matter of definition and they have come in the form of 
intersectionalities of quasi-biological forms of discrimination of ‘gender' and ‘race’, and racialising 
conceptualisations of class and ability as well as health and mental ability. Degeneracy is an important 
discourse of normalisation, if not the key discourse of abnormality. Degeneracy is defined as an 
impairment of virtue and moral principles. A degenerate is a person unrestrained by convention or 
morality. Degeneracy is thus a socially and culturally defined impairment. ‘Degeneracy’ is marked as a 
generic tool of defining the abnormal or inferior through the typical quasi-biological intersections of race, 
nationality, ethnicity, class, gender and ability vis-à-vis the ‘fit’ and the ‘normal’. The unfit were defined 
as degenerate, feebleminded, mentally ill (including conditions such as depression, bi-polar disorders 
etc.), epileptics, alcoholics, single mothers, prostitutes, vagrants and criminals. These poorer and the 
less developed, the ‘weaker gender’ and ‘weaker races’ were blamed for their own misery: they were 
not genetically as evolved as the white heterosexual wealthy man (e.g. Ryan 1998/2001). Essentially, 
genetic and social worth are made to explicitly or implicitly coincide in a perfect fit with each other and 
alternative explanations are disregarded (Hahn Rafter 1988, 7). Worth is measured through the ability to 
contribute towards the fitness of the race-nation. The figure of the degenerate, as an epitome of the 
abnormal, became a central technology of state racist (immigration) policies of purification.  
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What is in question in eugenic governmentality is therefore a proactive application of social Darwinism 
to the governing of the wealth and health of the population. As said, like any other discourse, eugenic 
and social Darwinist discourses cannot be clearly defined (Turda 2010). The members of the 
international eugenics movement held different views on heredity and the means of promoting their 
ends, as did ‘pure social Darwinists’. That is, the distinction between social Darwinism and eugenics is 
elusive in practical and theoretical terms, but eugenics arises from the same conditions of possibility of 
evolutionary discourses that are essentially to social Darwinism. And as has been insisted, eugenics 
and social Darwinism cannot be reduced to the level of individuals, i.e. treated either as a conspiracy of 
certain individuals or organisations that forward their race hygienic agenda in a clandestine fashion. 
That is, psychologising eugenics and social Darwinism in the same vein as racism has been 
exceptionalised through psychologism, i.e. reduced to a symptom of a marginalised mind, is not a 
sufficient mode of analysing the impact that eugenics and social Darwinism had historically. Rather than 
playing games of truth over who were the real eugenicists and who were not and whether they had 
access to figures of power and whether it can be demonstrated that the thoughts of eugenicists explicitly 
impacted the ideas of those in power, we shall focus on the relation of eugenic discourses, in their 
plurality and as systems of dispersion, to liberal governmentality and its limits of governing. Social 
Darwinism and eugenics need to be assessed as dispersed discourses that were employed and 
reformulated by laypersons in multiple ways finally making social Darwinism and eugenics 
commonsensical to a degree. 
Eugenic methods have been severely criticised and opposed, even by eugenicists themselves, but 
eugenics as a form of thought cannot be defined by the methods. Eugenic aims are what count. And 
these general aims and problematizations often live on unexamined in biopolitical policies, such as 
prenatal screening, embryo selection, artificial insemination and population policy (e.g. Daniels and 
Golden 2004; Connelly 2006; Richards 2008). Common sense discussions about the need for ‘licences 
to have children’ for some people or about birth control advice for welfare mothers are some of the 
contemporary discourses that embody modes of conducting the conduct for eugenic ends. There are 
also contemporary practices of sterilisation of the poor and/or minority women in many countries, such 
as coerced sterilisations of the Roma in some Eastern European countries (e.g. Zampas and 
Lamacková 2011), not to mention the sterilisation policies in the ‘developing world’, for example in India, 
China and some Latin American countries. It has also been argued that the logic of race hygiene is very 
much alive today, for example, in some socio-biological and genetic research agendas and policies 
(Hartmann 1987, 98; Nye 1993; Fijalkow 1999; Hubbard 2003; Duster 2003; McWhorter 2009; Inda 
2005; Hoeyer et al. 2009; Kevles 1998; Meskus 2009). As Teitelbaum and Winter wanted to emphasize 
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(in their book that makes only scant reference to any other sterilisation policies than those of Nazi 
Germany), eugenics is rather a science improving the genetic stock of the human population and its 
subgroups that constitutes ideas and proposals of a positive kind that encourages the propagation of 
those who can contribute to the wealth and health of society (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985, 47).93 
Central to this aim of producing fit babies is the production of fit adults and the maximization of their 
potential. My claim here is that many of these eugenic rationalities are common-sense discourses today 
and some of them permeate our rationalities of governing ourselves. But what we have today is an 
emphasis on the positive aspects of eugenics thinking. 
Next we will address the silence and scarcity of meaning, introduced by naturalism and evidenced in the 
taken-for-granted, in the immigration apparatus by finally comparing the problematizations of 
immigration in the early American immigration policy and the contemporary immigration apparatus of 
Finland as a member of the European Union. Fundamentally, through this comparison to early eugenic 
immigration policies we can tackle the issue of effects of a way of thinking—instead of analysing the 
discursive surface deafened by its silences and void of that which is taken for granted. What we need to 
focus on is the unity of effects, not the shifting vocabulary. What we need to focus on are the conditions 
of possibility of discourses regarding immigration and immigrants. I will start this investigation into the 
eugenic apparatus of immigration control by introducing the early American immigration policy 
formulations and their rationalities.  
4.2. Eugenics and ‘Restrictive and Highly Selective’ Immigration Policies 
4.2.1. A Developing Order of Things: Early American Immigration Policy 
Eugenic thinkers were not the only ones advocating restrictions on immigration in the United States. 
Migration came to be problematized by the birth of the modern nation-state and immigration control 
became an integral part of liberal biopolitical governmentality. Especially after the First World War, in the 
1920s, immigration was increasingly problematized and regulated also elsewhere, giving rise to “the 
naturalization of nativism” (Zolberg quoted in Torpey 2000, 93; see also Torpey 1998; Fahrmeir et al. 
2003). Before the 1860s, the American immigration restriction debate was influenced more by other 
discourses, such as liberal and religious discourses, and immigration debates focused around the 
adverse effects of increased labour competition and the fear of political radicalism (anarchism and 
communism especially). As a eugenicist sociologist, Henry Pratt Fairchild describes, whilst criticism of 
                                                     
93 Teitelbaum acted as the president of the American Eugenic Society, today called the Society for the Study of Socio-
Biology, in 1990-1995. He has worked in the US Congress and advised Congress on population policy.  
 
148 
immigration started to focus on the degeneracy of the immigrant more and more during the eighteenth 
century and early nineteenth century, these discourses were not successful in legislative terms until the 
1880s (Fairchild 1913). There was indeed strong opposition to explicitly racialising discourses as well as 
to the design of immigration control, but these discourses would slowly lose ground (e.g. Ngai 1999; 
Schrag 2010).  
If immigration had increasingly been discussed in terms of evolutionary rationalities, the evolutionary 
framework offered differing ways of conceptualising migration (Goldberg 2002). Prior to the ascendance 
of eugenic discourses in the United States, the naturalising evolutionary discourses—when they were 
used—could also be interpreted outside eugenic or nationalist discursive frameworks. Migration could 
be conceptualised as a matter of freedom, as an acceptable part of the struggle for survival, happiness 
and a better future. Earlier also Chinese immigration, which became the first object of clearly racist 
immigration policies, could be viewed as a positive gain based on liberal discourses of rights. The 
immigration agreement between China and the US two decades before the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882 had recognised the ‘"inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and 
also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects, 
respectively, from the one country to the other, for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent 
residents” (The Burlingame Treaty of 1868, article VI quoted in Abrams 2005, 650). This discursive 
order is different from the later discursive orders codified into international law that specifically negate 
such an ‘inalienable right’—except under the limited conditions of bilateral or multilateral conventions 
between sovereign territories. Yet, such alternative evolutionary conceptualisations—in which on the 
ontological level migration is considered inherent to the human condition—can be a part of cosmopolitan 
discourses as well as of the discursive formation around historical ‘white’ migrations. Whilst the 
immigration of the Chinese had been problematized by many at this time, the problematization had not 
reached its height. The Chinese were treated more as guest workers and excluded from citizenship, but 
their presence as such was not problematized at the official level (Torpey 2000, 96).  
As said, evolutionary conceptualisations are multifarious and the reasons why we are talking about an 
eugenic order of things, and not a just social Darwinist order of things, rests on how socio-evolutionary 
discourses were employed to govern immigration. Historically, immigration could also be deemed as a 
matter of survival of the fittest in the social Darwinist way. One of the political scientists of the 1880s, 
when justifying earlier Anglo-Saxon immigration to America, said: “It is the right of the higher civilization 
to make the lower give way before it. It was this right that the nations of Europe felt was their justification 
in taking possession of this new country. [...] The higher civilization has a moral right to triumph over the 
lower, for it is in this way that the world progresses” (Richmond Mayo-Smith in 1888, quoted in Leonard 
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2003, 693). These narratives about migration functioned, of course, to justify imperialism, but they also 
impacted the conceptualisations of the migration of the ‘higher civilization’. Akin to the ‘from rags to 
riches’ discourses, it was possible to conceptualise migration as a matter of ‘natural biological 
behaviour’, of progress through the survival of the fittest. Later, these ‘from rags to riches’ stories were 
signified differently: It would be possible to distinguish between good “natural and spontaneous” 
immigration and ‘artificial’ immigration, which “follows no natural laws” and rather was created by wishful 
thinking and unrealistic stories about the American dream (Fairchild 1913, 151). At this stage, wishful 
thinking was not ‘natural biological behaviour’ anymore, but the right to search for opportunity would be 
limited to those who deserved it.94 History of course tells us something different, for example, that many 
of the early immigrants were actually deported convicts and paupers, but this never stopped the making 
of eugenic discourses into discourses of power around immigration.   
Contemporarily such discourses about the survival of the fittest migrant are often employed in neo-
liberal or liberal discursive orders and are mostly used to discursively order the migration of the highly-
skilled or the coveted type of racialised immigration—i.e. the culturally suited, highly skilled and 
educated Westerners. In general, these discourses about the fittest immigrant function around highly-
skilled immigrants who are deemed to have the talent, the endurance, the ‘human capital’ and the 
competitive drive to succeed and search for the best opportunities—and a priori the best provisions for 
migration. Fairchild describes this rationality:  
“On the part of the people who take part in the [migratory] movement a high degree of civilization 
is demanded. They must be trained to act on individual initiative, and must have sufficient 
personal enterprise to undertake a weighty venture without an official or state backing. They must 
have sufficient intelligence to know about the objective point and sufficient accumulated capital to 
enable them to get there” (Fairchild 1913, 22). 
At this stage, this discursive order would not be used to conceptualise the immigration of the lower-
skilled or the poor immigrant. Some liberal statements in the Finnish Parliament do offer a certain 
amount of legitimacy to the ‘survivalist neediness’ of the poor or lower-skilled ‘wanna-be immigrants’, 
but these discursive orders are forwarded mostly around criticising ‘Fortress Europe’ and its 
technologies of immigration control, which have prevented the immigration of the poor, and thereby 
                                                     
94 A similar tendency can be seen in the Finnish Parliament  in the discursive ordering of Finnish emigration in terms of 
worthiness. Nationalist discursive orders often paint the picture of ‘when Finns went abroad’ as a discourse of survivalist 
endurance. In these discursive orders the Finnish emigrant appears as a struggling hero, who is forced to leave because 
of a threat to his survival from famine, poverty or unemployment—attributes that today render the immigrant ‘an economic 
refugee’. In these discursive orders the Finn shows his fitness through perseverance and hard work without asking for 
alms. This historical figure of the Finnish immigrant is a myth, if we compare it to the American immigration policy, in which 
Finns belonged to the problematized group of new immigrants and were racially differentiated from ‘Scandinavians’ 
(Croxton 1911, 11 (footnote d) and 45). 
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turned the asylum process into the only legal way in which the poor migrant can stay in the country, as 
we have discussed. Yet, this nexus of criticising immigration policy is never forwarded in terms of the 
right to migrate in the Finnish Parliament, where discourses of open borders are non-existent. As we 
have seen, the governmentality of immigration relies on a sovereign right to restrict immigration, which 
does not allow for the effective use of the evolutionary discourses of a right to migration as an 
inalienable right as it did in 1868. The same was seen in the way that the British or the colonies 
themselves did not prevent the settlement of foreigners there during earlier centuries (Zolberg 2003).  
Before the 1860s immigration restriction debates were not overwhelmingly coloured by a racialising 
power/knowledge constellation. With the development of socio-evolutionary thinking and social 
Darwinism during the early decades of the nineteenth century, increasingly also immigration debates 
started to be conducted in reference to state racist and social Darwinist and eugenic discourses (Kevles 
1998, 96; Lee 2002; Stern 2005; Schrag 2010). Governing to defend society from racial degeneration 
meant inherently, firstly, to curb the procreation of the unfit at home and, secondly, to prevent the 
immigration of the unfit from abroad (McLaren 1990, 46). Whilst the US Johnson-Reed Immigration Act 
of 1924, which permanently introduced a racist quota structure, is often presented as the classic 
example of a eugenic immigration policy, in fact the race hygienic order of things had been developing 
slowly during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and was in full bloom by the 1920s. The 
Immigration Acts of the 1920s, with their racialised quota structures, solely represented an 
intensification of state racist governmentality. As we have discussed, the exceptionalising reading of 
eugenics and social Darwinism as meaning merely ‘scientific racism’ is insufficient. We need to focus on 
the eugenic order of things that functioned around the subrace/superrace and fit/unfit divide rather than 
just ‘race’ or ‘race-nation’.  
Prior to the 1880s there had been no consistent federal immigration policy, as the right to legislate on 
immigration was a battling point between state and federal legislatures in the United States. Before the 
US Supreme Court had placed immigration policy firmly under federal legislation in 1875 (Schrag 2010, 
69), individual states had been in charge of regulating aliens, if not immigration policy itself. Especially 
East Coast states had started independently to govern the arrival of immigrants at their shores (Zolberg 
2006). The problematizations had started with the arrival of destitute and sick or dying immigrants 
already in the eighteenth century with German and Irish immigrants. At this stage, the wretched 
conditions of the arriving immigrants could be explained through the hard conditions of both origin and 
travel in steerage shipping conditions or through the systemic starving or robbing of the immigrants of 
their monies during the passage: For “[i]f the poverty of the immigrant is due to no fault of his own, and 
is off-set by a sound body and a determined spirit of industry, there is every hope that the influence of 
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the new environment may set him permanently on his feet” (Fairchild 1913). Yet, even immigrants in the 
eighteenth century—that would later become the sturdy natives—were increasingly seen in terms of 
pauperism and criminality, giving rise to the persistent naturalising analysis of immigration in terms of 
‘race’ and inherent characteristics of the immigrant and not the immigrant condition and experience as 
such, if the truth about immigration was assessed through historicism. The East Coast states were more 
or less successfully placing immigration taxes on arriving aliens and/or requiring high bonds from ship 
masters for any ‘defective classes’, such as paupers, criminals, lunatics, the deaf and dumb, the blind or 
disabled or sick persons they brought on shore (Fairchild 1913; Zolberg 2003), thus instituting the 
rationality of carrier sanctions. Around the 1850s New York authorities had increased the bond required 
and added to their list of defective classes “persons maimed, or above the age of sixty years or under 
thirteen, widows having families, or women without husbands having families” (ibid. 77-78). We 
consequently see the social Darwinist problematization of unfitness as a matter of ill health and 
pauperism starting to discipline the right of migration. 
Yet, the approach to immigration at the federal level at this point was still different. In response to these 
problematizations, from 1819 till 1855 the US regulated immigrants travelling second class, i.e. the so-
called steerage passengers; these laws had mostly focused on ensuring their health and safety. To 
combat the wretched conditions on the steamships travelling to the United States, penalties were 
imposed on steamship companies who brought too many passengers on too small ships, who did not 
provide showers and not enough water. Steamship companies also had to pay a fee for each passenger 
that died during the trip. These provisions were later extended to ships operating the African slave trade. 
As such, this logic of protection is fundamentally different to the later rationality of barring as many 
steerage passengers as possible from entering—as a matter of ‘quality’ and for race hygienic purposes. 
Consequently, during the nineteenth century, with a shift in the meaning of ‘race’, a shifting 
problematization of immigrants started appearing, which can be connected to socio-evolutionary 
governmentality and state racism.  
State laws became increasingly racialising with the arrival of ‘non-white’ and ‘less-white’ new 
immigrants. Technologies of inhibiting undesired foreigners from settling in a given state ranged from 
racist exclusion policy (Schrag 2010, 38-39) and from limiting foreigners’ rights of owning property or 
land to limiting licences to practise certain professions (Schrag 2010, 68-69). These policies varied 
depending on the individual state’s immigration patterns and conditions. California, like many other 
states, attempted to regulate the foreigners inside Californian territory. California had tried to ban 
Chinese immigration already in 1858, but the attempt was later struck down as unconstitutional by the 
1875 US Supreme Court decision (Chy Lung vs. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875)), which made 
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immigration policy the sole responsibility of the Congress (Schrag 2010, 7 and 69). In 1862 California 
had drawn up the Anti-Coolie Act, aimed especially at Chinese miners, which started taxing Chinese 
workers in an attempt to protect ‘white’ labour. Many states attempted to limit undesirable immigration 
by regulating how, for example, mining, hunting and banking licences or attorney’s, accountant’s and 
barber’s licences were given to foreigners. Ivy League universities also operated exclusionary racialising 
quotas etc. These rationalities did not simply apply to foreigners, but some states also operated intra-
state deportation rules of “criminals, lunatics, and other social misfits” and Missouri “prohibited the 
‘importation of afflicted, indigent or vicious children’” (Schrag 2010, 7). As we may remember from the 
introduction, also Finland used to limit the rights of foreigners in similar ways until the basic rights 
amendment in 1995. In line with the increasingly racialised political aims of California, the federal 
government did step in the 1860s—before the above mentioned Burlingame Treaty between the US and 
China, which still asserted the principle of free migration—when the US Congress started regulating 
Chinese immigration by making a distinction between ‘voluntary’ immigration and ‘coolie trade’ (cheap 
labour) migration, thus attempting to discourage lower-class Chinese immigration, especially to 
California. 
4.2.2. Race Suicide and the Problematization of Immigrant Quality 
One can of course offer multiple reasons for the increasing restriction of immigration, such as the 
increasing volumes of immigrants, the resulting social problems, the unemployment and the destitution 
of urban populations etc. But these reasons do not explain the way in which immigration became 
problematized. Instead of explaining the immigrant condition in relation to structural problems relating to 
diminishing open farmland and increased industrialisation and resulting urbanisation, immigration was 
problematized through the racialising discourses about the natural characteristics of ‘new immigrants’ 
and their race-nations. Let a eugenic thinker explain this choice of the naturalising rationality: 
Competition with the inferior and the unfit is one of the influences which cause thoughtful and 
provident persons to limit the number of their offspring. This was the conclusion of one of our 
greatest economists, President Francis A. Walker: ‘Whatever were the causes which checked the 
growth of the native population, they were neither physiological nor climatic. They were mainly 
social and economic; and chief among them was the access to hordes of foreign immigrants, 
bringing with them a standard of living at which our own people revolted. [...] Now the excessive 
increase of any desirable class will ‘give a shock to the principle of population’ among persons of 
higher standards of life. Thousands of members of the Society of Friends and others of kindred 
ideals who would not or could not own slaves emigrated from the South before the Civil War to 
escape competition with slave labor and from the sense of social inferiority which went with 
manual labor. But now there is no asylum or way of escape; therefore the families of superior 
ability and higher standards grow smaller. To encourage persons of normal life and civilized 
standards to have more children some better guarantees must be given them by the government 
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that their children will not be driven to the wall by immigrants of a lower order. This is not an 
argument against immigration, but only against admitting a flood of persons who can never be 
induced to demand a scale of wages and income which will support a reasonable mode of life. A 
great deal is said in favor of the "simple life," especially by fine people who dwell in luxury, as a 
counsel of perfection for others; but a simple life does not or should not mean a return to savage 
manners, raw meat, uncooked roots and a string about the waist.”(Henderson 1909, 227) 
In social Darwinist fashion, competition brought on by immigration of the subrace was deemed dysgenic 
to the fit population. That is, immigration was problematized through who entered, not simply over how 
many entered; over quality, not quantity. There could be no equal opportunity for all, but opportunity 
belonged to those inherently worthier than others.  
The race suicide thesis—expressed by many ‘scientifically racist’ writers such as Madison Grant in his 
Passing of the Great Race (1916)—was much more widely accepted than the contemporary 
exceptionalising reading of history grants. The race suicide thesis inherently relied on the theory of 
dysgenics born out of the social Darwinist choice of defining fitness through social position and the 
consequent problematization of the fecundity of the poor. Yet, it was inconceivable to think that ‘nature’ 
was right in making the ‘unfit’ reproduce in abundance. Instead, this was initially seen as a problem of 
culture and capitalism. The ‘reduction’ in quality of the race because of the over-breeding of the unfit 
and under-breeding of the fit was formulated as a theory of dysgenics (or cacogenics) that saw society 
as race suicidal. When fitness is determined by social position and wealth, but (maintenance of) wealth 
is linked to fewer births, the state racist task of governing so that the population increases in fitness 
becomes difficult, if not logically impossible (Myrdal 1945, 99). The race suicide theory, which applied 
both to immigration and domestic policy, embodied the discourse of degeneration, which, as a matter of 
socio-genesis, needed to be cured by state racist policy—whether through social Darwinist policies of 
‘letting die’ or eugenic policies of ‘making live’.  
More and more, the debates about immigration in Congress started to be conducted through biological 
and racial rhetoric based on evolutionary conceptualisations. For the defence of the nation-race it was 
essential “not only [to] preserve in this country the conditions necessary to successful democracy, but to 
develop here the finest race of men and the highest civilization” (Prescott F. Hall, a co-founder of the 
Immigration Restriction League, in 1906, quoted in Schrag 2010, 67). Racial characteristics were 
inseparably linked with the essentialized socio-evolutionary success of the nation-race and ‘its 
civilization’. “[T]here is something more important than rapidity of settlement or the quick development of 
wealth. These advantages will be dearly bought if we pay for them a price which involves lowering of the 
standard of American citizenship. More important to a country than wealth and population is the quality 
of its people”, wrote Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a political scientist, ardent believer in the Anglo-
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Saxon/Nordic racial superiority and the leading figure of the Immigration Restriction League 
(Immigration Restriction League 1894b, 6). 
The state racist political agenda that promoted the proliferation of ‘the fit’ in name of social evolution, 
relied on the notion that “a character of a nation is determined primarily by its racial qualities; that is, by 
the hereditary physical, mental, and moral or temperamental traits of its people” and that a nation-race’s 
superiority cannot be secured without “an uncompromising attitude towards the lower races” 
(respectively Director of the Eugenics Record Office Harry Laughlin during one of his appearances 
before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization in 1920 and sociologist Edward Ross in 
1901 quoted in Schrag 2010, 95 and 65). By 1924 the Vice President Calvin Coolidge could declare: 
“America must be kept American. Biological laws show...that Nordics deteriorate when mixed with other 
races” (quoted in Kevles 1998, 97). A Congressman during the debate on the 1924 immigration quota 
law remarked: “The primary reason for the restriction of the alien stream...is the necessity for purifying 
and keeping pure the blood of America” (Robert Allen (Dem.) quoted in Kevles 1998, 97). As late as 
1965, the repeal of the racial quota system in America, was objected to during the House hearing 
because “’a conglomeration of racial and ethnic elements’ would lead to ‘a serious culture decline’” 
(Schrag 2010, 9).  
One of the key problematizations that further propelled explicit eugenicists to the corridors of political 
power was the perceived population crisis. This was a typical problematization in the early decades of 
the twentieth century and reflected a concern over a reduced birth rate that was formulated in terms of 
the survival of the nation-race in many countries (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). The population crisis 
reinforced the conceptualisation of immigration in terms of a threat and the scientific theory of race 
suicide (e.g. Leonard 2003, 693). Equally, the contemporary problematization of immigration has in 
many ways become a discourse of population crisis with its alarmist figures of the procreative rate of 
immigrant families, the predictions about when the majority of the population will be, in essence, ‘non-
white’, and with its preoccupation with the decline in ‘native’ birth rates. 
When liberal biopolitical governmentality associates the legitimacy of government with scientifically 
sound technologies of governing the quasi-organic laws of society, policy needs to be founded on 
scientific analysis. Eugenicists as experts were capable of responding to this need. Many academics in 
the human sciences embarked on this task of providing the government and progressive thinkers with 
scientific data and many of these academics and thinkers were inclined towards eugenic or social 
Darwinist thinking (Schrag 2010, 88-89). Immigration policy in America became just one object of both 
scientific and eugenic management. 
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The physically and mentally defective are with us; one high in authority has told us that the better 
native stocks in this country are not contributing their proper quota to future generations; and in 
our immigration problem and race question, for example, we have demands for eugenic research 
and practice whose urgency needs no emphasis. These last two problems are peculiarly our own, 
and on that account some discussion of them from the standpoint of eugenics is needed. 
The most fundamental problem connected with the enormous influence of foreigners into this 
country is as to whether they can be ‘assimilated’ into our national life. The discussions of this 
problem have, for the most part, failed to touch upon the really underlying questions involved. 
These underlying questions are biological. The immigrant comes into a new physical and 
biological environment when he comes to this country. How does he react to the environmental 
change? Is his net fertility increased or diminished? Is his mortality rate, both in general and in 
respect to particular diseases, increased or diminished? Are his children changed in physical type 
toward a new ‘American’ type? If so, how many generations are involved in the change? To what 
extent does he mate within his own stock in successive generations on American soil? What is 
the relative fertility of matings between foreign and native stocks? These and similar matters 
seem to be the really fundamental problems of immigration, and they are obviously problems in 
the field of this new science. The necessity for their answer becomes daily more urgent. At 
present we have practically no data on them. Yet the collection of extensive and definite statistical 
data from which these questions could be answered would be a relatively easy matter for a 
properly organized Government bureau. (Pearl 1908) 
Eugenic knowledge was not the monstrous eugenics defined by its negative technologies, but eugenic 
thinking fitted in with wide-spread progressive conceptualisations of society and the need to govern it 
towards improved wealth and health.  
In influencing a wide-range of policies eugenic enthusiasts typically suggested technologies of 
governing that were not explicitly racialised in order to influence the composition of the population, such 
as public health, anti-prostitution, crime prevention, pauper laws and, of course, immigration restrictions. 
Harry H. Laughlin, one of the key figures of eugenic movement on immigration, for example, when 
giving evidence to Congress, was asked whether he had noticed “any parallel between the foreign 
population and those great [social] expenditures”, Laughlin answered:  
“Yes. Pertinent to that, let me give you these figures: Let us take the census of 1900. In the 
census of 1900, the foreign-born population of the country was 19.5 per cent; that is, of the 
persons over 10 years of age; and they contributed 34.3 per cent of the total insane population. 
Now, if the foreign stock was just as good as the stock already here, it ought to have contributed 
only 19.5 per cent” (Laughlin 1920).  
That is, the rationalities of protecting society from unfit immigrants was not presented as a matter of 
outrageous scientific racism, but racialisation was made necessary through cost-benefit analysis. Many 
of the eugenic studies, which were used as evidence for the sub-racialisation of Southern and Eastern 
European ‘race-nations’, were already at the time and especially later criticised for their methodological 
flaws even by eugenicists themselves. Schrag, for example, discusses some of the problems related to 
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Laughlin’s statistics highlighting, such as their samples not being representative (Schrag 2010, ch. 3). 
Despite the methodological flaws, admitted by eugenicists themselves, and the lack of effectively 
accounting for other factors than ‘racial’ ones, eugenic discourses and problematizations became 
commonsensical. Overall, race hygienic technologies, especially the positive kind, became integral to 
implementing progressive policies—not just the race suicide theories of the conservative kind. As many 
have insisted, the technologies of social control and fostering of social cohesion were permeated by 
eugenic rationalities (e.g. Jones 1982; Helén 1997; and 2003; e.g. Abrams 2005, 647; Gerodetti 2006a; 
Kennedy 2008). Thus, eugenics had to correspond to something essential in overall liberal progressive 
thinking (Ramsden 2003), that essential being the socio-evolutionary framework of governing society. 
Yet, such anecdotal evidence is not, of course, sufficient to prove the impact of eugenic rationalities on 
governing immigration, but eugenic thinkers systemically influenced policy making through the 
government bodies preparing immigration legislation. Immigration policy is one of the clearest 
formulations of eugenic thinking in American political history. Many governmental commissions were 
founded to investigate immigration in America and increasingly, with the popularisation of racialised 
evolutionary thinking, they started to include explicitly eugenic thinkers. The so-called Dillingham 
Commission or the US Immigration Commission (1907-1910), headed by Senator Dillingham of 
Vermont, a progressive immigration restrictionist, was one of many. The Commissions were partly 
headed by and they consulted eugenicists who were members of the Eugenics Record Office, the 
Immigration Restriction League, the Human Betterment Foundation and the Race Betterment 
Foundation etc. The leading figure of the Immigration Restriction League, Senator and academic Henry 
Cabot Lodge, also played an important part in the Commission. The Immigration Restriction League had 
been founded in 1894 and for a long time it advocated restricting immigration. The League explicitly 
referred to eugenic reasons why immigration should be restricted (see statement included in United 
States Government 1911, 103). The League initially advocated a head-tax, educational qualifications 
(literacy) and consular certificates as tools of immigration control to accomplish its aims (Immigration 
Restriction League 1894a).  
The aim of the Dillingham Commission was to analyse the impact of immigration and to provide a guide 
to future decisions on immigration policy. The fundamental rationality behind the Dillingham Commission 
was to substantiate the distinction between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ immigrants, the latter of which was 
problematized over its lower quality and lacking socio-evolutionary fitness. The ‘new immigration’ was 
deemed as consisting of largely transient and unskilled immigrants who congregated in urban centres 
and refused to assimilate. The Commission’s findings influenced immigration policies widely. To do this, 
it produced a 41-volume report, one of the largest studies ever conducted on immigration in America. 
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(Croxton 1911). This vast report included, among other things, volumes discussing the problems of 
immigrant children, the fecundity of immigrant women, immigrant crime, immigrants seeking charity, the 
physical changes in immigrant descendants, Japanese immigrants, conditions of emigration in Europe 
(races and literacy in countries) as well as a ‘dictionary of races and peoples’ providing information on 
how to classify new arrivals. The quasi-biological logic of equating social status with genetic make-up 
gave rise to a statistical tradition of confusing correlation with causality, which omitted multi-factor 
analysis of other contributing factors and simply correlated class and ethnicity with social phenomena at 
the surface level. Statistics were drawn to prove that recent immigrants bred at a much higher rate than 
the ‘native-born’ and that they constituted much larger proportions of the insane and delinquent than 
was their share of the population, thus ‘proving’ the race suicide theory (Laughlin 1920). These 
racialising traditions have not disappeared, but rather statistics positing ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ as 
overarching explanatory categories are regularly produced for political purposes. The Commission sided 
with the Immigration Restriction League and recommended, for example, the adoption of the literacy 
test to distinguish suitable immigrants from the unsuitable, reducing the immigration of unskilled workers 
and prostitutes and imposing immigration quotas. The Commission also recommended excluding the 
‘inassimilable’ or those who would make the least advantageous citizens.  
Eugenic thinkers, politicians and academics had also organised themselves into various local and 
(inter)national associations. In America, the Eugenics Record Office (ERO) was established in 1910 
(Schrag 2010, 68 and 78). During the 1920s, the Eugenics Record Office became the semi-official 
immigration research institution of the Congress (Schrag 2010, 92). It greatly influenced the House 
Commission on Immigration and Naturalisation that was working on reforming immigration legislation at 
this time. ERO promoted the view that “a progressive societal order must in sheer self-preservation 
accept” segregation and sterilisation as a means of improving the nation-race (ERO report quoted in 
Schrag 2010, 92). Whilst ERO focused on supporting the accumulation of scientific research on race 
hygiene, politically in the 1920s its main focus was on immigration restriction. ERO suggested that the 
federal laws should demand “the determination of individual and hereditary qualities by requiring 
modern pedigree examination in the home territories of the would-be immigrant. Our standard should be 
ultimately eliminate not only the positively feeble-minded, but also all those who are below the American 
average in natural intelligence” (ERO expert, Harry H. Laughlin, in his testimony to the House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization quoted in Schrag 2010, 99). For eugenicists, defending 
the nation-race required that “[i]mmigration should not only be restrictive but highly selective” and “no 
one of us as a citizen can afford to ignore the menace of race deterioration or the evident relation of 
immigration to national progress and welfare” (psychologist Carl C. Brighman in 1923, quoted in Schrag 
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2010, 82-83).95 The goal of eugenic immigration policy, as Laughlin expressed it was, firstly, to keep the 
unfit outside, secondly, to deport them and, lastly, if all else failed, to prevent their procreation (Schrag 
2010, 95-96). 
Overall, the influence of eugenics can be seen in how controlling the ‘quality’ of immigrants, their fitness 
or degeneracy, became an essential technology in securing the improvement of the nation-race. The 
qualitative framework of assigning rationality to the technologies of immigration control changed 
gradually from mere expulsion of those who had proven themselves unfit towards a more encompassing 
disciplinary system of prevention that was founded on a human pedigree. That is, increasingly America 
went on the defensive and it formulated this defence in race hygienic terms. Immigration policy became 
an essential tool in combatting race suicide. Certainly, not all rationalities influencing immigration policy 
were eugenic, but members of eugenic associations had a major role to play and eugenic rationalities 
were in large part adopted in a form or another, for one reason or another. And as Rosen asserts, the 
influence of eugenics cannot be calculated based on the activities of the scientists belonging to various 
eugenics associations. Rather, scientific eugenicists in many ways lost control over their own discourse 
by the multitude of eugenic enthusiasts, who applied eugenic discourses to their own field (Rosen 
2004). The primus motor in spreading eugenic thinking in American society were the various lay 
enthusiasts that amalgamated eugenic rationalities with progressive and religious thinking (Rosen 
2004). This is why we need to talk about a eugenic order of things rather than a fringe of socio-
biologists. 
Before I move on explicating what the eugenic immigration policy meant in practice in the United States 
and comparing these rationalities with the contemporary Finnish policies, I will discuss the impact of the 
eugenic order of things on immigration policies elsewhere. Although it will be seen in the ensuing 
discussion how, especially in countries of immigration, immigration policy was seen as a key method of 
defending and improving the nation-race, I will not be elaborate on them in detail. This is because from 
the historical Finnish perspective, the intellectual gaze among Finnish eugenic thinkers was more 
focused on Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States (Mattila 1999), and out of these 
countries only the United States had an elaborately eugenic immigration policy. Because of this centre-
periphery logic, the US immigration policy offers the clearest, if not the only, example of a eugenic 
impact on immigration policy. 
                                                     
95 Reference is to Brighman’s book Study of American Intelligence (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1923; 210). 
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4.2.3. Early Immigration Policies Elsewhere 
Despite this focus on American immigration policy, the impact of eugenics on immigration policy in its 
various dimensions was rather widespread and normal also elsewhere. Outside the US especially in 
Australia immigration policies were influenced by eugenic thinking. Australia outlawed Chinese 
immigration in 1893 and excluded all non-whites from becoming permanent residents by the 1901 
Immigration Restriction Act. Australia also operated a Citizenship Policy that allowed only whites as 
citizens. The White Australia policy was in force until the 1970s and in 1964 its relaxation was still 
opposed by the Australian government (Wyndham 1996). Similarly, in Canada the immigration policy 
was impacted by social Darwinist and eugenic thinking. The increased immigration in the early decades 
of the twentieth century was problematized through their ‘assimilation ability’: “English Canadians 
assumed that white Anglo-Saxons were racially superior and immigrants were welcomed according to 
the degree they approached this ideal” (McLaren 1990, 47). But in Canada the technologies of 
defending the race-nation were mostly carried out through individualising eugenic medical examinations. 
By 1906 Canada had prohibited the so-called deaf, dumb, feebleminded, idiots, epileptics, those with 
‘loathsome contagious diseases’ or those handicapped from immigrating (e.g. McLaren 1990; Wiebe 
2009). Instead of clearly racialised categories of prohibition, Canadian immigration policy adopted lower-
key administrative measures of ‘preferred’ categories, defined Commonwealth citizens as citizens of 
‘white’ countries, stopped Chinese and other ‘non-white’ immigration for a few years. However, in 
Canada immigration policy was more strongly influenced by financial interests. Like in the United States, 
where Mexican immigration was not banned, because Mexicans were needed as cheap labour in the 
agricultural business, also in Canada the 1930s restrictive immigration policies did allow railway 
companies to bring in Chinese and Southern and Eastern European labourers (McLaren 1990, 64-67). 
Thus, although there was less success in terms of racialised restrictions in Canada than in the United 
States or Australia, the basic structure of problematizing immigration through fitness and degeneracy 
remained. Immigration policies were influenced by a eugenic immigration agenda also in Latin America, 
where many countries advocated the immigration of ‘white’ Westerners as a method of improving the 
chances of progress—as elites “who wished they were white, feared that they were not” shared the 
social Darwinist concern that ‘half-breeds’ were not capable of achieving progress and high civilization 
(Stepan 1991, 44-45).96  
In comparison, in Europe and even less in Finland, immigration was not yet such an important political 
issue in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as in the Unites States. Rather Europe mostly 
                                                     
96 Here we can see how the sub-race/superrace divide is clear in the self-subjectification of the ‘non-white’, as post-colonial 
theory has insisted when discussing the impact of imperialism on colonial cultures (e.g. Fanon 1963/2004). 
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lived in an era of emigration (and imperialism). Nevertheless, the ideas regarding the application of 
eugenic policies to immigration were not unheard of in Europe. It has been argued that the British 
Aliens’ Law of 1905 was influenced by eugenic considerations although not certainly to the extent that 
the American Aliens’ Law was. Many in the UK Parliament had argued against the eugenic 
considerations in British immigration policy both on principled and feasibility grounds, but, regardless, 
the 1905 Aliens’ Law did include many of the same features as American eugenic immigration policy 
did: medical checks and weeding out of the undesirables who included ‘lunatics’, ‘idiots’ and criminals. 
Also upper-class cabin passengers were excluded from immigration checks and those who had to resort 
to aid inside a year of entry could be deported (Pellew 1989). Overall, however, because of the small 
numbers of immigrants at this stage the British eugenicists were more concerned over losing their most 
promising youth to emigration (McLaren 1990, 57). 
The earliest immigration regulations in Finland were formulated during the Swedish and Russian reigns. 
Already in the 1734 in Finland (which was a part of the Swedish Kingdom at the time), it had become a 
basic principle that “useful foreigners were accepted and others were to be removed or punished. Thus 
in one royal declaration citizenship rights were promised to wealthy Jews, but the poor and peddlers 
were refused” (Seppälä 2004, 7). In Finland the segregationist logic of deporting ‘futile, vagrant and 
criminal’ persons started in 1828 (Leitzinger 2008b, 222). Aliens’ policy of 1835 operated a technology 
of invitation without which lower-class foreigners could not enter the country, unless they had enough 
money with them (Seppälä 2004, 8).   
The influence of eugenic thinking in Scandinavia was strong, but the immigrant was not yet explicitly 
problematized in racialised ways until the population movements of the early twentieth century—before 
this Nordic countries were primarily countries of emigration. Yet, in later discourses around immigration 
“[t]he notion of a ‘pure’ Nordic race was a myth exploited with great persistency in propaganda”, 
although historically Scandinavia had seen considerable immigration (Broberg in Broberg and Roll-
Hansen 1996, 1; Leitzinger 2008a; Kyllingstad 2012). In Sweden some “saw eugenics as a reasonable 
answer to the problematic influx of foreigners” who in this period were often Jews. Gunnar Myrdal, the 
famous eugenicist and Nobel prize winner, demanded positive and negative eugenic policies to combat 
the population crisis of the shrinking Swedish population at a time that Sweden had started to attract 
increasing numbers of immigrants (Spektorowski 2004, 91, also 93; Broberg and Tydén 1996). Thus, 
also in Scandinavia the early immigration policies could be partly formulated in eugenic terms of fitness 
and degeneracy. 
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In the Finnish case, in 1933, two years before adapting eugenic sterilisations laws, the Finnish Aliens’ 
Decree was amended to include the prohibition of entry of categories of people suspected of earning 
their income by begging, by wandering and playing music, by selling ‘worthless’ goods (peddlers) or by 
otherwise dishonourable means. Also known criminals and those suspected of arriving for criminal and 
for otherwise security threatening purposes were henceforth denied entry at the border (Finnish State 
27.5.1933). Instead of deporting those who had proven themselves ‘degenerate’ and criminal, the 
impetus of defending the nation-race became more urgent, as the move towards suspicion rather than 
evidence, as a cause in deciding who should become the object of state racist segregation, 
demonstrates. Nevertheless, the history of aliens’ law cannot be deemed solely in terms of state racist 
logic. Liberal discourses that were influential in post-independence Finland guided amendments that 
abolished migration and naturalisation restrictions on Jews (1917), the Roma (1919) and Muslims and 
other non-Christians (1920) (Leitzinger 2008b, 173). Yet, sub-racialising discourses influenced other 
areas of aliens’ policy. 
Before the 1930s refugee policy had not been problematized in the same way as today. Historically the 
definition of refugees was liberal. For example, all people who had left Russia for one reason or another 
were considered refugees and their relatively large presence in Finland between the wars, did not cause 
overdue societal problems (Leitzinger 2008b, 64). It had been the practice that the immigrant 
him/herself defined their status as a refugee and government officials determined refugee status based 
on whether the decision to leave had been hasty and whether the border had been crossed 
clandestinely without the required documents (Leitzinger 2008b, 153). As Leitzinger has pointed out, 
Finland had more refugees between the World Wars than very recently and the general opinion did not 
turn against refugees until after 1931 (Leitzinger 2008b, 398). These racialising discourses started to 
have an impact on the refugee policy before World War II, when Jewish refugees started emigrating 
from Germany. At this stage, immigration policies and/or the public opinion in many countries, including 
Sweden and Finland, objected to Jewish immigration based on the same racialised logic as Nazi-
Germany used against Jews (e.g. Gordon 1977, 396; Roll-Hansen 1996, 266; Leitzinger 2008b, 187-
189; Schrag 2010, 103). In 1938 the Interior Minister Kekkonen (later to be a long-term President) had 
advised that Jewish refugees should be denied entry at the border (Leitzinger 2008b, 190-191) and in 
1939 a leading immigration official recommended: 
The so-called Eastern Jewish groups normally should not be let in to our country, because both 
their standard of civilization and their business manners make them the least recommendable 
group among the Jews. As far as it is possible for a reason or another to receive Jews into our 
country, preference should be given to Jews from such family lines who have already lived for a 
long time in civilized countries such as Austria, Germany and Czechoslovakia (really from 
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Bohemian-Morovia only) and who have obtained a certain civilized level. (quoted in Leitzinger 
2008b, 402) 
Thus, we can see how refugees are judged not on the basis of their need for protection but on the basis 
of an assumption about human pedigree—something that today is accomplished through the 
technologies of carrier sanctions and visa requirements. As has been discussed earlier, discrimination 
against Jews in Europe has been treated as one of the basic examples of the logic of ‘new racism’ or 
culturalised racism as often contemporarily Jews are not thought of as forming a ‘race’ of their own. As 
with the Jewish ‘non-refugees’ before the Second World War, ‘the threshold of tolerance’ was quickly 
reached once the first Somali refugees arrived to Finland in the early 1990s. As with the Jewish asylum 
seekers before the Second World War, initially the authorities tried to prevent the entry of Somalis, to 
ignore their asylum applications and deport them back to the Soviet Union (Aallas 1991; Lepola 2000; 
Leitzinger 2008b). 
Therefore, the connection between early American eugenic immigration policy and the Finnish 
immigration policy does not lay solely in the general conditions of possibility or in the Finnish sterilisation 
laws and eugenic social policies, because section 13 of the 1933 Immigration Act had also incorporated 
some eugenic considerations into the Finnish immigration policy. Akin to the segregationist logic 
practiced by American states prior to eugenic immigrant policy being accomplished, also Finland 
restricted aliens’ rights in many ways. Before the 1990s and the 1995 Basic Rights reform foreigners 
were excluded from many positions (and still are from some), they did not have the right to own land or 
property, did not have the same civic rights and the state had a practice of issuing residence permits 
without issuing work permits making it difficult, if not impossible, for other than rich investors or 
entrepreneurially-oriented foreigners to settle (Leitzinger 2008b).  
Leaving the history of immigration policies in Finland and elsewhere aside, it is important to understand 
that the process of formulating immigration control regimes was not uniform or solely and explicitly state 
racist in all its twists and turns: Ways of problematizing immigration are always contextual, democratic 
politics is always a matter of compromise and liberal moral discourses have had their impact, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter. This does not, however, take away the fact that socio-evolutionary 
governmentality continually functions as a condition of opportunity for state racist discourses to insert 
themselves into the policy agenda. Next, we will investigate the exact ways in which fitness and 
degeneracy problematized immigrants in the United States from 1860s onwards. In this context, I will 
also pick up the discussion relating to the current Finnish immigration policy and compare its 
rationalities to these early American formulations of eugenic immigration policy.  
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4.3. Early American and Contemporary Finnish Immigration Policies and their 
Undesirable Citizens-to-be 
Social Darwinist and eugenic discourses operated according to a logic of unfitness and degeneracy, that 
designated the feeble-minded, mentally ill, epileptics, mutes, those with venereal or other ‘loathsome 
diseases’ or disabilities as well as criminals, prostitutes, single mothers, vagrants and other morally 
loose individuals as ‘defective classes’ from whom society needed to be defended, and who either had 
to be ‘made to live or let die’. Technologies through which social Darwinist problematizations were 
included in the early American immigration policy are many. I will start this discussion from racialization 
and technologies of citizenship, because American immigration policy utilised citizenship as a 
fundamental technology of exclusion. After this I will discuss other, more subtle technologies, such as 
immigration regulations and medical examinations that were employed to defend the race-nation from 
unfitness and moral degeneracy. Throughout this section I will maintain a structure of discussing first the 
early American eugenic problematizations of immigrants around the categories of ‘race’, class 
degeneracy and unfitness and then compare these rationalities to the contemporary Finnish ones.  
4.3.1. Racialising Technologies: Eugenics, Citizenship and Civil Rights 
Early American Immigration and Citizenship Policies 
Racialisation and citizenship policy 
Naturalisation policy contains the ultimate rationalities of integrating immigrants, and it was a central 
technology through which immigration came to be governed in the United States. If we look at the early 
development of citizenship legislation in America, we can see a regime of racialisation: Before 1870 the 
American Naturalization Acts allowed only the naturalisation of ‘free white persons’ of ‘good moral 
character’. After the Civil War African Americans gained citizenship and with the adoption of the 15 th 
Amendment to the Constitution African American men were granted voting rights, at least in principle. 
However, other ‘non-whites’ could not be naturalised. When the 14th Amendment in 1868 gave 
citizenship to all children born in America, the logic of racialisation became pivotal and expounded the 
importance of immigration policy as a technology of defending the race: The change towards the jus soli 
principle regardless of ‘race’, Abrams claims, led to the exclusion of Chinese or Asian women (as 
prostitutes or concubines) as well as to the later, outright ban of Asians (Abrams 2005, 662). To shield 
against the threat to the ‘white’ race posed by Chinese immigration led to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
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1882,97 which explicitly excluded the Chinese from citizenship and criminalized immigration of Chinese 
labourers or unskilled workers. The Chinese exclusion policy was in force until 1943, when a token 
quota for the Chinese was created. The Chinese exclusion policy also required that Chinese immigrants 
carry with themselves certificates testifying to their status as skilled or professional labour. (At the time 
the US operated a four-tier skill-set system: professionals, skilled labour, unskilled labour and labourer 
(Croxton 1911).) Combined with the 1888 Scott Act, which prevented the re-entry of even long-term 
Chinese residents, unless they owned property worth a considerable sum, the Chinese immigrant 
population was slowly decreased. The whiteness of the American ‘race-nation’ was achieved by design.  
The racial criteria for gaining citizenship gave rise to complex rationalities of defining ‘whiteness’, which 
can be seen in a series of court cases debating whether ‘Mexicans’, ‘Indians’, ‘Armenians’ etc. were 
‘white’. The category of ‘whiteness’ became a complex issue, and socio-evolutionary conceptualisations 
of ‘civilizational’ markers or lack of them started to be central, not race theory with its cranial 
measurements as such (e.g. McClain 1995;  Jacobson 1999; Schrag 2010, 111-113). American courts 
handled dozens of cases around definition of races sometimes giving contradictory rulings. Whereas it 
was easier to distinguish ‘Mongols’ based on phenotypical markers, the category of the ‘mongrel’ 
presented problems. This problem was solved by the one-drop-of-blood principle. Also the ‘mixed 
brown’ category presented problems. Whereas in 1922 it had not been proven that Sicilians were 
‘white’, Indians were ‘white’ in 1919 but not after 1923, Mexicans became ‘white’ by the 1930s, 
‘Arabians’ became ‘white’ by 1941 and Afghans by 1945 (e.g. Jacobson 1999; Schrag 2010, 111-113). 
Whilst the Chinese never became white they were allowed citizenship in 1943, Filipinos and Indians in 
1946. Other ‘Asians’ could not be naturalized until the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. These 
court decisions in their turn impacted immigration policy, because those who could not gain citizenship 
were in principle prevented from immigrating. Thus, the exclusion from citizenship—and therefore from 
immigration—was not clear and the power/knowledge constellations around racialisation was/is 
changing: Today, with the contemporary racialising discourses, the Afghan would hardly be considered 
a ‘white’ man and the ‘whiteness’ of the Mexican is equally in question. Phenotype clearly had and has 
meaning beyond the skin. In ruling on the case of whether Indians were ‘white’, the Supreme Court 
Justice said in 1923:  
                                                     
97 The law was initially enforced for 10 years, but subsequently renewed by the Geary Act in 1892, when the detention 
provisions for illegal(ised) Chinese immigrants (which came to include a possible sentence of maximum one year of hard 
labour before deportation and no possibility for bail) were tightened and a requirement that legal Chinese immigrants carry 
their residence permits with them was imposed. In 1902 the Scott Act extended the Chinese Exclusion Act without an end 
date. 
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"It may be true...that the blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in 
the dim reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that there are 
unmistakable and profound differences between them today.... [T]he average...white 
American...would learn with some degree of astonishment...that he and the Hindu belonged to 
the same racial group.” 
“The children of English, French, German, Italian, Scandinavian, and other European parentage... 
quickly merge into the mass of our population and lose the distinctive hallmarks of their European 
origin. On the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the children born in this country of Hindu 
parents would retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their ancestry” (quoted in McClain 1995, 
49).  
That is, whiteness functioned as a discourse of normalisation: the ‘brown Hindu’ could not become 
normal, i.e. ‘white’. This comment highlights well the problem of replacing the concept of race with one 
of ethnicity, as many have asserted: Whereas the ‘white’ immigrant can shed their ethnicity, ‘non-white’ 
‘Asian’ or ‘black’ ethnicity finds it rather more difficult as ethnicity sticks to the skin—giving rise to the 
perpetual entering of the ‘non-white’ citizen (e.g. Omi and Winant 1994; Gullestad 2002, 51). 
Racialisation and immigration policy  
As we saw, immigration and naturalisation policies were informed by the state racist consternation over 
the procreation of the ‘Mongol race’ on American soil. The rationality of racialised exclusion translated 
into sterner conceptualisations of racialisation reflecting the increasing reign of socio-evolutionary 
ontologies. In 1899 the US started recording the ‘race or people’ of immigrants, as well as their country 
of origin (Croxton 1911, 4), and to utilise ‘race’ for administrative purposes. Before the 1920s turn 
towards statistical quota technologies of immigration control the use of racialising exclusionary 
technologies had been increasing. The 1862 Anti-Coolie Act and the 1875 Page Law had already 
excluded Chinese, Japanese and other ‘Oriental’ contract labour before the 1882 Chinese Exclusion 
Act. The 1917 Immigration Act created the Asiatic Barred zone, which cemented the criminalisation of 
‘Asiatic’ immigration and added to the exclusion of the Chinese roughly the ‘natives’ of areas east the 
Caspian Sea (excluding large parts of Iran) and south of the northern border of Mongolia.98 The Asiatic 
Barred Zone did not exclude Iran, because the socio-evolutionary theories placed the source of ‘white’ 
civilisation in Persia, which underlines the point of cultural stereotypes having a large impact on the 
racialisation processes of people—also in terms of inclusion. The contemporary racialised theories on 
Iran and Muslim countries are, of course, markedly different from these earlier ones.  
                                                     
98 The Asiatic Barred Zone included Indochina, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, parts of Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, large parts of Kazakhstan and Mongolia. It did not include the Philippines, which was a US colony 
until 1946, and from where immigration was prohibited through other means, or Japan until 1924 when the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement was still in force. 
 
166 
These early immigration acts contained many then-new-now-commonsensical technologies of 
immigration control, such as the criminalisation and penalisation of acts attempting to circumvent the 
law and the deportation of Chinese immigrants not in possession of residence certificates (e.g. Schrag 
2010; Torpey 2000).99 Control of illegal(ised) immigration became a key technology of immigration 
control. These acts only ended the immigration of skilled and unskilled labour—leaving professional 
labour the possibility of immigrating. The same applied to the Japanese whose immigration was 
controlled through the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement, in which Japan agreed to restrict granting 
emigration permits to Japanese labourers, so that the US would not ‘have to’ bar Japanese immigration 
in general. That is, demonstration of individual fitness could overrule racist exclusion. As social 
Darwinism stipulated, fitness functioned as an individualizing technology of power. This principle of 
fitness as a form of human capital was one of the basic technologies of racialisation and of rendering it 
quasi-biological, both in the intra- and extra-societal sense, as class prejudices were amalgamated with 
socio-evolutionary theory.  
As Schrag points out, although the argumentation regarding the exclusion of Chinese and 
’Mongols’/’Asiatics’ often relied on the logic that, because the Chinese or ’non-whites’ could not be 
naturalised, there was no point of allowing them to immigrate, the rationality behind this citizenship law 
and the exclusion of Asians relied fundamentally on the idea that, if imported, the ‘Oriental’ cultures 
would degenerate American cultural progress (Schrag 2010, 70). This speaks of the inherent socio-
evolutionary evaluation of race-nations and their cultures in terms of degeneracy and fitness. It is 
evident that racialisation cannot be separated from the international history of immigration policy, but 
racialisation was never a ‘white’ vs. ‘black’/’Asian’/’Hispanic’ issue (e.g. Jacobson 1999). It was not 
enough to bar the immigration of ‘Asiatics’, but the need to defend the race became more and more 
pertinent. The Immigration Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924 became the epitome of eugenic immigration 
control. Imposing a strict system of annual quotas for immigration of various ‘race-nations’, the Quota 
Acts attempted to limit immigration especially from Southern and Eastern Europe. Intra-white 
racialisation was essential (but not necessary) to social Darwinist thinking, demonstrating its inherent 
culturalising logic. This racialisation can be seen in how cultures are conceptualised by early 
immigration policy advocated in the US. In the words of the Immigration Restriction League: 
“A considerable proportion of immigrants now coming are from races and countries, or parts of 
countries, which have not progressed, but have been backward, downtrodden, and relatively 
useless for centuries. If these immigrants ‘have not had opportunities’, it is because their races 
                                                     
99 Proving residence status in California was compromised by the destruction of San Francisco residency information in the 
earthquake and ensuing fires in 1906, resulting in a deportation and exclusion of entry of even citizens and permanent 
residents (Schrag 2010, 69). 
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have not made the opportunities; for they had had all the time that any other races have had; in 
fact, often come from older civilizations. There is no reason to suppose that a change of location 
will result in a change of inborn tendencies” (see statement in United States Government 1911, 
107). 
Socio-evolutionary conceptualisations were formulated in social Darwinist terms, i.e. not based on who 
breeds and survives, but who achieves more prestige or wealth, and the worthiness of immigrants was 
judged based on the essentialising logic of racialising culture and economic success. The naturalism of 
liberal governmentality almost required a level-headed assessment of the desirability of immigrants in 
these culturalising terms. 
The social Darwinist and eugenic thinking around immigration was not exceptional, otherwise it would 
have been impossible to pass these laws. What worried the legislators and the eugenic movement was 
the changing racial composition of America due to Southern and Eastern European immigration. For 
example, a proponent of eugenic immigration practices, Charlotte Perkins Gilman “viewed most 
immigrants as undesirable and criticized Americans who imagined that ‘the poor and oppressed’ were 
good stock to build up the country” (Ganobcsik-Williams 1999, 25). Perkins Gilman’s thinking mirrored 
the common view that combined the old religious notion of the City upon the Hill with the newer, social 
Darwinist or socio-biological thinking. As Prescott F. Hall—a co-founder of the Immigration Restriction 
League—asked in 1897: Do Americans want the United States to be “peopled by British, German and 
Scandinavian stock, historically free, energetic, progressive, or by Slav, Latin and Asiatic races, 
historically downtrodden, atavistic, and stagnant” (quoted in Kazal 2004, 122)? Thus, here we see 
clearly the culturalising logic of state racism that needs to defend society from culturally degenerate 
influences in order to secure a better future for the race-nation. With culturally degenerate people came 
the decline of the whole race-nation and its future success. Society needed to be defended against this 
race suicidal threat. As we have seen, this logic is very much alive today, especially in the figure of the 
illegal immigrant, the ‘illegitimate’ asylum seeker, the Roma migrant or the illiterate immigrant.  
The logic of racialising nationality and culture saw its full bloom in the 1921 Emergency Quota Act and 
the 1924 Immigration Acts that solidified racialised quota structures. These Acts fundamentally 
functioned based on the state racist logic of race suicide and marked the end of mass immigration to the 
United States. The Quota Acts maintained the exclusion of ’Asiatics’/’Mongols’, as they could not obtain 
citizenship with later inclination towards leniency.100 The 1924 Act tightened quota structures so that 
                                                     
100 The acts contained aesthetic quotas of 100 immigrants per annum for many countries outside ‘the white world’. But as 
Ngai points out, these quotas were in practice “quotas for non-Chinese persons from China, non-Japanese persons from 
Japan, non-Indian persons from India, and so on” (Ngai 1999, 73), because the quotas explicitly did not apply to 
immigrants who could not become citizens. With time the quotas could become more lenient. Measures allowing some 
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they were even more heavily biased in favour of ‘racially superior Nordics’ and they put restrictions on 
the ‘lower races’ from Southern and Eastern Europe (e.g. Barkan 1991, 97; Kevles 1998, 96; Stern 
2005; Galusca 2009, 143; Ngai 1999).101 This change in quota calculation method based on earlier 
figures was designed to radically reduce immigration and to tighten the system of ‘racial’ quotas so that 
it granted some 85% of the quota to ‘Nordics’102 and limited immigration from the culturally degenerate 
regions of Southern and Eastern Europe (including Finland). The quota system included also non-
resident relatives of American citizens and residents, but importantly ”all aliens ineligible to citizenship or 
their descendants”, “the descendants of slave immigrants” and “the descendants of American 
aborigines” were excluded from qualifying for quotas. From the start there was very little opposition to 
immigration restrictionism. As the Finnish eugenic sterilization laws, also the racialising immigration laws 
in the United States were passed with an overwhelming majority. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act continued this system of racialised quotas until 1965 despite increasing opposition. 
Further, citizenship and voting rights were disciplined according to eugenic principles. Thus, granting of 
citizenship did/does not necessarily go hand in hand with civil rights in the United States (e.g. Hench 
1998; Behrens et al. 2003; Carey 2003). African Americans were granted citizenship in 1868 and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
immigration from the Philippines and India were passed in 1946. The whole Asiatic Barred zone was repealed in 1952 with 
the addition of small but real quotas. 
101 The 1921 Immigration Act had been put in place as an emergency measure to counter a threat of ‘a flood of immigrants 
on the way’ and to counter the effects of the earlier ‘race-suicidal’ immigration policies. The 1921 Act placed the limit of 
immigration to 350.000 immigrants per year and set the permit quotas so that a number equivalent to 3% of an immigrant 
population from a specific race-nation as recorded in the 1910 census was allowed to immigrate annually. This preliminary 
plan of restriction was not deemed satisfactory and the 1924 Aliens’ Law changed the basis of calculation: This calculation 
method, as Ngai points out, was based on the notion of ‘native stock’. Instead of calculating proportions based on foreign-
born population, it calculated the quotas based on the ‘racial’ proportions of ‘the American’ population or the ‘native stock’ 
in the 1890 census and set the quota to 2% of that. That is, between 1921 and 1924 it was the origin of the immigrants that 
was disciplined more. These strictest quota measures would not stay in force for a long time, as they were changed in 
1929 so that the quotas were calculated according to the 1920 census, thus increasing also the quotas for Southern and 
Eastern Europe. However, because also the cap on immigration was downgraded to 150.000, the number of actual 
immigrants allowed did not change dramatically and because the quotas for the British and Germans were actually 
increased outside the strictly percentage-wise calculations. The quota of the British and Germans was in 1924 34.000 and 
51.000 and in 1929 some 65.000 and 55.000 respectively. In comparison, the Polish and the Italians had quotas of 5.800 
and 3.800 in 1924 and in 1929 6.800 and 5.800 respectively. 
102 Finnish immigrants were an anomaly in the statistics used to defend the eugenic immigration policies. This problem of 
assigning a socio-evolutionary status to the Finnish race relates to the designation of Finns as ‘Mongols’ in the nineteenth 
century race theories (excluding the Swedish-speaking Aryans/Nordics/Germanics). An article on the ‘new immigration’ 
discussed at length the racial qualities of Finns in a more favourable terms (The New York Times 21.5.1911), but this did 
not change the immigration quota. Finnish immigrants paralleled the super-racialised Nordics in literacy but then contained 
the third highest proportions of sub-racialised unskilled ‘labourers’ in parallel with East Indians, Mexicans and Greeks 
(Croxton 1911). Reflecting this problematic, a newspaper article discussing the ‘races’ of immigrants addressed the 
‘Finnish’ issue at length coming to a positive conclusion on the ‘racial’ qualities of Finnish immigrants as ‘Nordic’ vis-à-vis 
the race theory of Finns being ‘Mongol’ (The New York Times 21.5.1911). In the immigration quotas of 1924 Finnish 
immigrants had a much smaller quota (170) than Swedish (whose quota was over 9561), Norwegians (6453) or the Danish 
had (2789). The quotas in the following years were proportionally more lenient towards Finns (Proclamations by the 
President of the United States, no. 1703, June 30, 1924, 43 Stat. 1958). In 1929 the Finnish quota was some 560 and the 
quotas for the other Scandinavian countries ranged between 1100 and 3400 (Proclamation by the President of the United 
States, no. 1872, March 22, 1929, 46 Stat. 2984). 
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African American men gained voting rights in 1870. ‘White’ and ‘black’ women gained voting rights in 
1920 and Native Americans in 1924. The so called ‘white primaries’ were outlawed in 1944. Regardless 
of these amendments many exclusionary practices remained especially in the Southern states. Poll-
taxes, i.e. the practices of requiring voters to pay for voting and, thus, excluding the poor from voting, 
had been held constitutional in 1937 by the Breedlove v. Suttles decision of the US Supreme Court. In 
1962 the 24th Amendment to the US Constitution ended poll-taxes in federal elections and the 1966 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections decision criminalised poll-taxes in state elections. As Schriner, 
Ochs and Shields describe, literacy tests as a condition for gaining voting rights were outlawed in 1965 
and 1970. Before this some states, especially Southern states, had combined literacy tests with so 
called ‘grandfather clauses’ that exempted those whose grandfathers had voted prior to the Civil War 
from taking literacy tests, thus aiming voting restrictions against African Americans and descendants of 
‘new immigrants’. Naturalisation in the United States is still conditional on the passing of a literacy test. 
In 1997 44 states in the US had restrictions on voting rights for people with mental or emotional 
impairments. They include restrictions for those under guardianship but many statutes also exclude 
‘idiots’, ‘insane’, ‘lunatics’, ‘mentally incompetents’, those of ‘unsound mind’ and those not ‘quiet and 
peaceful’ from voting. Only six states at this stage did not consider the receipt of mental health services 
as grounds of disenfranchisement (Schriner et al. 1997). In most states in the US voting rights are 
denied to incarcerated criminals or those on parole, some even permanently. In comparison, in the UK 
prisoners are now gaining voting rights due to the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights. 
There is, thus, a fundamental logic of abnormalization and exclusion functioning in the civil rights policy 
that is based on the logic of fitness/degeneracy and the same logic applied in Finland, as we shall see 
next. 
Contemporary Finnish Immigration and Citizenship Policies 
Racialisation and citizenship policy 
If we compare the way that immigration was problematized through eugenic conceptualisations of ‘race’ 
in the United States to the way immigration is problematized through ‘race-nationality’ today, the picture 
is somewhat different in terms of technologies, if not necessarily in terms of the rationality of 
problematization itself. Historically, the early Finnish citizenship policies and its problematizations 
parallel these American racialising discourses with its exclusion of the Roma, Muslims103 and Jews from 
                                                     
103 Finland has had a minority of Muslim Tatar citizens for over a century. This group arrived during the time Finland was 
part of the Russian empire. Tatars were given full citizenship rights and Muslim congregations acquired an official status 
during the early twentieth century.  
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citizenship, but these exclusions were abolished 1917 and 1921. Finnish nationalization policy has not 
been explicitly racist since, which reflects the power of liberal discourses during the early years of 
Finnish independence (Leitzinger 2008b). Despite the increasing influence of state racist discourses in 
the 1930s, these restrictions were not resuscitated.  
Today there exists, however, an explicitly racialising regulation in the citizenship law: only non-
naturalized citizens of Nordic countries are eligible for claiming104 citizenship after five years (vs. 
applying for it after two years) speaking of a clearly racialising form of discipline that was in force 
already in the 1968 Citizenship Act. There is no similar quasi-biological restriction on the application for 
citizenship after two years, and also naturalized Nordic citizens qualify for this, but this requires passing 
a Finnish or Swedish language test. The other fundamental rationality rendered quasi-biological in the 
Citizenship Act is the jus sanguinis principle, i.e. that citizenship at birth is only granted to those 
children, whose parent(s) are Finnish citizens. This fundamentally racialising principle is reinforced by 
the strict limiting of jus soli, i.e. the right to obtain citizenship on the basis of residence, to situations in 
which there is no possibility of obtaining another citizenship, i.e. when both parents are stateless and/or 
under international protection against specifically the state authorities in their country of origin. 
In Finland the eugenic principle of limiting the voting rights of criminals, mentally ill, illiterate, the poor 
etc. had an impact on the exercise of voting rights, for example, if not directly by obtaining citizenship 
(Rahikainen 1995; Mattila 2003). At the time of Finnish universal suffrage in 1906 categories of people 
such as vagrants (including the Roma), the mentally ill, criminals and those under the poor 
administration were denied citizen’s rights. It was only in 1956 that poverty as a reason for denying 
suffrage rights was ended in Finland. In 1969 those convicted of crimes were given the right to vote for 
the first time. Those under state guardianship due to mental illness as well as vagrants committed to the 
workhouse were given voting rights in 1972 (Rahikainen 1995; Mattila 2003). Hence, here we see how 
this type of a human pedigree, which employs the figures of the degenerate, as a person unrestricted by 
convention and morality, of the person unresponsive to discipline and normalisation as well as of the 
figure of the unfit who is inherently unable to carry the responsibility of civic duties, was applied as a 
technology of governing until rather late. In comparison, this eugenic order does not apply to foreigners 
                                                     
104 In practice, this means a cheaper fee and no need to pass a language test. That is, there are two ways in which 
citizenship can be granted: either through a claim or through an application. These modes of gaining citizenship also carry 
different prices, the claim to citizenship being much cheaper (currently 240 € as opposite to the 440 € per person in case 
of having to apply for citizenship). Those categories of people eligible for a claim to citizenship do not need to pass a 
language test (officially recognised children of Finnish men, youth who have lived in Finland for ten years or having been 
born in Finland and lived there for six years, those who have had Finnish citizenship and Nordic citizens who have lived in 
Finland for five years). Nordic citizens have the special right to apply for citizenship after two years, but in this situation 
they have to pass a language test and, as said, be native and not naturalised citizens.  
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today, although culturalising conceptualisations of fitness/degeneracy have been applied to governing 
voting rights (see footnote 35). Rather in local elections Finland grants voting rights to all foreigners, EU 
citizens and others, after they have lived in Finland for two years on (again) continuous residence 
permits, thus attempting to foster inclusion and civic skills of those already resident (in a qualifying way). 
In this sense, moral discourses of democratic equality and democratic inclusion have more impact on 
the order of things than eugenic discourses have. 
Otherwise, the contemporary Finnish Citizenship Act is discursively ordered through liberal and 
nationalist discourses. Overall, the main aim of the Citizenship Act is to fully integrate (qualifying) 
immigrants: citizenship is rather used to encourage integration rather than as a result of integration. In 
this sense, the use of jus sanguinis principle is in many ways countered by liberal rationalities that aim 
to include rather than to segregate (qualifying) foreigners. The power of liberal discourses is strongest in 
the case of residency requirements: This can be seen in that opportunities for segregation, such as 
requiring permanent residence permits before naturalisation, are not used. In most countries, a 
permanent residence permit requirement is standard. 
The requirement of permanent residence permits is a low-level administrative technology that can be 
used to postpone the gaining of rights, and is as such a good example of how segregation is rendered 
technical. In Finland, a permanent permit could be obtained after four years of residence based on 
continuous residence permits—this in practice means a further distinction between those whose first 
permits were continuous and those who first obtained temporary permits, such as students, temporary 
TCN workers or temporarily protected persons who would then need to gain continuous permits before 
being able to gain permanent permits. In this way, citizenship can in practice be postponed for some by 
quite a few years. In Finland, the standard applicants’ residency requirement has been (since 1920) five 
years on continuous or permanent permits (which in practice could mean any number of years). This 
was so except in 2003-2011 when the residency requirement was increased to six years—speaking of a 
rationality to discipline the possibilities of obtaining citizenship based on other than jus sanguinis or 
quasi-biological ‘Nordic-race’ principles. This order of things was changed between 2007 and 2011 by 
the Administrative Supreme Court’s decision, which insisted on calculating temporary residence as 
qualifying for the residency requirement. This led to a problematized situation in which citizenship could 
be obtained before permanent residence permit could. After 2011, the time resided on temporary 
permits has counted for 50%. Although the Citizenship Act is extraordinarily liberal in comparison to 
some other countries, we should not forget that the Citizenship Act functions based on the residence 
permit system, which imposes its own racialised technologies of obtaining and renewing permits that 
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was discussed in the previous chapter: The right to residence of some is deemed in need of discipline 
more often than others’ right to abode. 
As was discussed in section 3.4.5., the racialising apparatus of granting longer residence permits for 
some than for others is evident. Finnish ‘blood’ and whiteness has consequences in terms of disciplining 
the right to gain citizenship. EU citizens can obtain citizenship without the need to re-register their 
residence (if they pass the language test). The right of Nordic citizens’ and those of Finnish ancestry105 
to reside even without income requirements speaks of a lesser need to discipline some people’s 
chances of obtaining citizenship than others’. Although the return policy for Ingrians106 and those of 
Finnish ancestry is a positive type of racism, the rationality behind these regulations nevertheless 
functions based on quasi-biological racism: Finnishness is in the blood, it can last for centuries. At the 
core, Finnishness is a matter of belonging to a race-nation, not solely a matter of self-identification, 
active connections, language skills or ability to function in Finnish society. This type of positive racism is 
directly connected to negative discrimination in the sense that persons who have never lived or who 
have lived most of their lives outside Finland can be ‘Finnish’ based on blood, but those who were born 
or have lived most/all of their lives in Finland but are not of ‘Finnish blood’, on the other hand, can battle 
with the perpetuation of their immigrant status, possibly for generations.  
This quasi-biological order of things is not complete, however. Even if Finnishness is not conceptualised 
only as territorial or cultural, but fundamentally as biological, there has been an increased tendency to 
reject residence permit applications based on Finnish ancestry. In this sense, taking into account the 
end of the Ingrian immigration policy, assumptions about biology and essential Finnishness are in 
themselves reducing their influence on immigration policy. Further, this racialising logic of ‘Finnish blood’ 
has not extended to the Citizenship Act and citizenship has not been granted preferentially to those of 
Ingrian or Finnish origin, but only those who have actually personally had Finnish citizenship get more 
favourable treatment irrespective of whether they have been born in Finland or how they have obtained 
citizenship.  
                                                     
105 Those of Finnish ancestry acquire four-year continuous permits, but are required to have a five-year residency period, 
hence they need to renew their permit once prior to being able to obtain citizenship. In 2011 the Citizenship Act was 
changed so that citizenship can be obtained after four years, if a foreigner passes the language test. 
106 The Ingrian return policy is interesting in comparison to some other return policies. For example, in Italy and Portugal the 
return of Argentinean and African (respectively) ‘nationals’ is limited to those with demonstrable ancestry to people who 
have lived in Italy or Portugal. Thus, the return policy only encompasses the return of those with Italian/Portuguese/Finnish 
ancestry. In case of the Ingrians, besides those who were returned to the Soviet Union during the Second Word War or 
who fought on the Finnish side, no link to the territory of Finland has been requested. Like in the case of German 
repatriation policies that also interpret ‘Germanness’ as something extending the borders of the state, it is interesting to 
see how the concept of ‘return’ and ‘nationality’ have been discursively ordered primarily in terms of ‘race’—with language 
and culture playing a secondary role—(e.g. Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007, 8-9).  
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These individuals who have had Finnish citizenship can re-obtain citizenship through declaration, i.e. 
they can re-claim their citizenship without having to substantially apply again. Until 2003 this was 
possible after having lived in Finland for two years, but the 2003 reform of Citizenship Act tightened 
these regulations (by this time many refugees had been naturalised). Between 2003 and 2011 ex-
citizens could reclaim their citizenship only if they had lived in Finland altogether ten years, out of which 
two years were immediately prior to the application. There was, thus, a clear rationality of disciplining 
the right to lost citizenship that had potentially racialising consequences—especially if we compare it to 
the favourable tradition of granting Nordic citizens citizenship after two years of residence.107 However, 
this racialising logic was successfully countered by a more liberal and multiculturalist discourses that 
aims at integrating permanent residents and allowing equal access to rights. These requirements were 
abolished in 2011 and ex-citizens can now reclaim citizenship without residency requirements, even if 
they live abroad. 
Therefore, racialisation is not an overpowering discourse, but rights, once gained, can function as rights 
and not as something to be re-earned. In this sense, it is not possible to interpret the privileges of the 
EU and Nordic citizens solely in terms of racialisation. The historical development of the EU cannot be 
deemed solely in terms of racialised belonging or evolutionary discourses. Equally, the common history 
under the Swedish Kingdom significantly and the long, reciprocal rights of settlement and gaining 
citizenship that have been in force since the 1950s are not solely a matter or racialisation. Yet, we are 
not discussing the ‘true’ nature of these politico-historical developments, but the way they are used to 
govern. The Finnish pre-Schengen visa regulations contained the same racialised human pedigree as 
the Schengen regulations do. And in the case of the ‘Nordic’, it is not only the right to declare citizenship 
reserved for ‘natural/native’ Nordic citizens, but also the way that residency in other Nordic countries (as 
opposite to residence in other EEA countries), is calculated as qualifying as residency in Finland for 
youths who want to maintain their Finnish citizenship at 22 (to be discussed later). Although there is a 
special significance attached to the ‘Nordic’, which is both a rights-based discourse (the Nordic Passport 
Union) as well as a historico-cultural reality, this history did become, in many ways, amalgamated with 
socio-evolutionary conceptualisations. Historically, the discourses about the ‘Nordic race’ have 
functioned as a super-racialising discourse and they have become fundamental to the technologies 
around the ‘Nordic citizens’. If these discourses played a part in the early American eugenic 
                                                     
107 In practice, Finland being a bilingual country, Swedish citizens qualify automatically by the virtue of speaking Swedish. 
Other Nordic countries require at least some demonstration of language learning or skills before naturalization. But it is 
relatively much easier for Danish, Icelandic and Norwegian citizens to learn Swedish to the required satisfactory level, as 
these Scandinavian languages are very similar to each other, than for foreigners to learn Finnish, which is of a different 
language group altogether. 
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assumptions, it would have been surprising if they had not in Finland and Scandinavia. As Kemiläinen, 
for example, has shown, racial discourses were integral to the general intellectual environment after the 
1850s also in Finland (Kemiläinen et al. 1985; 1993; 1998). As others have insisted, the human 
pedigree emphasizing the biological ‘whiteness’ of the Nordic is clear (e.g. Keskinen et al. 2009; 
Loftsdottir and Jensen 2012). 
But as said, governmentality is not overwhelmed by racialising discourses. If we return to the Citizenship 
Act in itself, this racialising logic is not as imposing as in the Immigration Act and liberal discourses 
clearly have more impact: This is seen especially in the treatment of the internationally protected 
persons: ‘Actual’ refugees, (secondarily) protected persons (granted based on individual persecution 
and who acquire four-year continuous residence permits immediately) and those granted protection 
based on humanitarian reasons, have a reduced four-year residency requirement for citizenship. 
Refugees and (secondarily) protected persons can, thus, obtain citizenship without having to renew their 
first residence permit, provided that they pass the language test.108 But as has been hinted, the 
numbers given the four-year protective residence are small—although in the 2000s, especially after the 
EU directive on the minimum asylum principles (2004/83/EC, Council of the European Union 29.4.2004, 
implemented in 2009), there has been a clear increase in these numbers (see Appendix 2).  
Persons receiving temporary protection (granted based on group membership or other humanitarian 
reasons) are excluded from this preferential treatment of refugees and (secondarily) protected persons. 
After 2011 temporary protection postpones naturalisation by one and a half years in comparison to the 
Citizenship Act’s four-year residency requirement on continuous protection permits for refugees.109 All 
asylum statuses can be revoked, but in case of humanitarian or temporary protection the most important 
technology of prevention is again the need to renew permits and therefore reassess the need of 
                                                     
108 In the case of ‘actual’ refugees and (secondarily) protected persons, we can see a certain trade-off in the Finnish system: 
Whereas persons under international protection are excluded from the TCN’s long-term permit by EU law, there is this 
possibility for ‘actual’ refugees and (secondarily) protected persons to obtain citizenship a year sooner than the standard 
applicant or sooner than the long-term TCN’s permits would be available. However, citizenship imposes technologies of 
culturalised and super-racialised integration on refugees and protected persons—something that the EU long-term permit 
does not do per se (national residence rules of course may do this in varying degrees in the EU). Both the EU long-term 
residence permit and citizenship require some form of income, but citizenship can be obtained even if the income is based 
on social benefits, i.e. the question is fundamentally about the legality of earned income, not the ability to maintain oneself. 
Thus, the only way for refugees and protected persons to gain rights vis-à-vis other EU states is through the integration 
test that obtaining citizenship imposes. 
109 When the law was even amended so that temporary permits, including those for temporarily protected persons and 
students, can now be calculated at 50% value on certain conditions, it was required that before making a naturalisation 
application, the person must have received a one-year continuous residence permit directly prior to making the application. 
In case of temporarily protected persons this means today that (s)he has to have needed protection for some five and a 
half years before citizenship can be acquired. This is because temporary protection can be extended to three years, of 
which one and a half years is calculated towards the residency requirement, and after the temporary protection, the person 
must need protection for another three and a half years, before they can qualify for citizenship. 
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protection every year. Thus, although there is clearly a strong influence of liberal discourses in these 
regulations, overall, as we saw in the previous chapter, the most important technology of defending 
society from asylum seekers is the visa requirement policy, through which the countries from which 
most asylum seekers come are explicitly under airport transit visa requirements: Vetting the individuals 
who are legally allowed to enter Schengen airports from these countries is the most important 
technology of segregation. Visas are not granted for the purpose of claiming asylum or those likely to 
want to stay, leaving illegal(ised) means of transit the most viable option for seeking asylum. 
Thus, we see a discursive balancing act in the citizenship legislation: The main disciplinary technology 
that we have hinted at is the language skills test that functions as a proof of ‘cultural belonging’. We 
shall discuss this language testing soon, when discussing individualizing technologies of segregation. At 
this categorical or ‘racialised’ level, that I wanted to focus on first, the Finnish Citizenship Act is rather 
liberal: The possibility of disqualifying people based on merely granting temporary permits or requiring 
permanent permits are not used to the degree they could be. Also, once residence permits or citizenship 
have been granted, civil rights are not disciplined based on the earlier eugenic categories of fitness or 
based on ‘race’, as they could be. Whilst the requirement of a continuous residence permit again puts a 
racialised structure into the granting of residence rights, overall the treatment of the ‘qualifying’ residents 
is more liberal or equalitarian than racialising: The 2011 temporary residence calculation change, for 
example, was explicitly based on a discursive order that insisted that the type of residence permit had 
no impact on the integration process itself and that the aim should be to foster the ability of, for example, 
foreign students to settle in Finland (HE 80/2010, Finnish Government 11.6.2010). But before 
celebrating this equalitarian liberalism, we need to refocus on the way the last chapter showed how the 
visa regime and the residence permit system contain clearly racialising structures. And the rationality of 
governing has its consequences in implementation, as we shall see next.  
Racialisation and immigration policy  
Leaving behind the Citizenship Act as an ultimate rationality of including new citizens and focusing now 
on the disciplinary structure of the Immigration Act again, we are re-focusing on the pre-selection of 
citizens-to-be. Here, the major difference, in comparison to US immigration policy, is that Finland does 
not operate and never did operate a quota system in granting residence permits. Finland never was an 
immigration country and still does not want to become one, as we saw in Chapter 3. In the US the 
national quota structure was abolished in 1965, but many countries do operate preferential entry 
regimes paralleling colonial legacies, although there is a tendency away from such preferences (Joppke 
2005). The pre-Schengen and contemporary intra-EU free movement provisions and the preferential 
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treatment of those with Finnish ancestry and Nordic citizens clearly reflect racialised preferences, 
especially if we consider them against the insistence of processing about half a million visas per annum 
in embassies in Russia. But as we have seen this explicitly racialising order of things is becoming less 
evident today in the immigration policy itself.  
As was discussed earlier, the primary disciplinary technology is, however, the clear structure of needing 
to assess TCNs’ eligibility for residence, and therefore also for citizenship, more often than for others. 
TCNs come mostly from ‘non-white’ or ‘less-white’ countries, but not exclusively because the United 
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as ‘Western white’ countries, are also included in this 
category. But if we look at the denial rates for residence permits—although the available data is 
partial—we can see a racialising result of policy design and implementation, as the chart below shows.  
 
Chart I. Denied Residence Permit Applications (TCN) based on some Top-10 Nationalities 2006-2012. 
As the chart shows, there has been a remarkable increase in the denial rate as such, but for some the 
denial rate has increased much more. We can see how the denial rate for US citizens is steadily much 
less than the increasing denial rates for Iraqis, Somalis and Afghans when they apply or renew their 
permits.110 These figures should not, however, be taken at a face value, because they are certainly 
impacted by other factors, such as the type of permit applied for (see Chart J). Family reunification 
                                                     
110 The Immigration Services statistics do not reflect actual numbers of immigrants, but just the times that resident permits 
need to be applied for and renewed, which is impacted by the racialising structure of permit granting periods and the 
practices of granting residence permits. But when measured as percentages, the numbers do reflect the share of permits 
denied for each nationality regardless of how short or long the renewal period is. 
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applications for other family members, for example, have a higher denial rate than employment based 
permits (although in terms of numbers the denied employment based permits have been more 
numerous in 2006-2012). And as discussed before, applications based on Finnish ancestry have also 
seen an increased denial rate.  
 
Chart J. Denied Residence Permit Application (TCN) numbers based on permit type 2006-2012. 
Yet, whilst the type of permit applied for has an impact on the denial rate, as Chart J above shows, 
these factors do not explain away the persistent difference between the denial percentage of US 
citizens’ applications and the total denial rate, as Chart K below shows: 
Denial Percentage for 
Residence Applications 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
United States 3,0 % 0,6 % 1,5 % 3,0 % 3,0 % 2,8 % 4,6 % 
Total 11 % 11 % 12 % 17 % 20 % 22 % 24 % 
Chart K. The US and Total Percentage of Denied Residence Permit Applications Compared 2006-2012. 
The denial rate for US citizens is consistently smaller than the denial rate for any individual type of 
residence permit. Despite this, a claim about a clearly racist practice runs into problems: It has to be 
remembered that Finland used strict income requirements to limit EU citizen’s family reunification rights 
until 2007 and that Finland in general does not operate preferential residence permit practices for the 
‘New World whites’ who are also under strict family reunification income regimes. That is, ‘whiteness’ in 
itself has not guaranteed unconditional inclusion, although citizens of Australia and New Zealand 
respectively have a working holiday arrangement for young adults since 2002 and 2004, which gives 
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single young adults “in good health and of sound background” the ability to reside for 12 months by 
demonstrating funds for a return ticket and monies for the first three months only, which are required to 
be worth only some 70% of the funds that would be required from TCNs requiring a visa.111 The ‘likely to 
become a public charge’ preoccupation is not as grave a concern in the case of some.  
In comparison, there are degrees to suitable ‘whiteness’: racialising discourses used in conjunction with 
‘Western white’ do not apply to all ‘whites’ and it is not uncommon to hear negative racialising 
discourses used against Southern and Eastern Europeans, especially Russians. Yet, a claim about 
‘actually’ racist practices, in the old racist sense of doctrinally-correct biological belief in the biologically 
determined inferiority of ‘non-whites’, would need to be substantiated by a different investigation. 
Analysing the actual implementation practices themselves would have required different data than 
studied here, i.e. substantive data on applications and their decisions in the Immigration Services. 
Regardless of this reservation, the previous chapters have shown, that the preference for immigration 
from ‘culturally suitable’ countries has been explicit in the parliament and government documents and 
we can see in the residence permit denial rates that (culturalised) ‘whiteness’ at minimum creates 
structural advantages resulting in the lower denial rates for US citizens. 
Putting aside the denial rates for residence permits, we should remind ourselves of the visa regime, 
which exercises judgement on individuals primarily as representatives of their race-nation, when its 
restrictive measures are aimed at only certain nationalities with darker phenotype and ‘less-Western’ 
‘civilization’, especially if these countries are poor. Thus, even if there is no quota regime in the 
immigration policy as such, there are broad, fundamental restrictions based on what eugenic thinkers 
would have called ‘race’. A religio-cultural and socio-economic human pedigree was an integral part of 
American eugenic immigration policy. Whilst such a rationality of a human pedigree might be more 
nuanced today, it cannot be denied that there is such a rationality running through the visa regime. The 
correlation between the culturalised and racialising categories and the visa requirement was clear the 
visa requirement for ‘Western whites’ being 0% and that for ‘Black Muslims’ being close to 100%.  
We have now discussed the racialising rationalities of the aliens’ policies in Finland. In addition to these 
rationalities that function based on essentialising categorizations, social Darwinism allowed the 
individualisation of the socio-evolutionary logic when it judged the fitness of the person on the basis of 
social position and not on the number of living offspring. These individualising technologies became a 
hall mark of eugenic immigration policy that assessed the fitness of citizens-to-be on the basis of not 
only race, but of wealth, health and morality. We shall now move towards examining the history of how 
                                                     
111 See http://www.finland.org.au/public/default.aspx?nodeid=35623&contentlan=2&culture=en-US, accessed 7.10.2013. 
 
179 
these eugenic problematizations were implemented through early immigration policy measures in the 
US and compare these problematizations to the contemporary immigration policy in Finland.  
4.3.2. Individualising Technologies:  The Cheap and the Poor Degenerate 
Beyond the visa regime state racist rationality is mostly implemented through individualising 
technologies of sub-racialisation today. Social Darwinist and eugenic thinking was never simply 
restricted to scientific racism, but the intra-societal measures of problematizing unfitness and 
degeneracy through individualising technologies of defending the race-nation were integral to all 
eugenic policies. These rationalities were at their worst seen in the sterilization and institutionalisation of 
the mentally ill, criminals, prostitutes and morally degenerate women, epileptics and handicapped 
people etc., but they also played a role in the immigration policy. Whilst ‘prejudices’ were fundamental to 
social Darwinist thinking, social Darwinism and eugenics were essentially scientific discourses, which 
needed to reflect ‘reality’. Social Darwinism had to explain class mobility, the ‘rags to riches’ stories and 
the existence of intelligent, rich and learned ‘less-whites’ and ‘non-whites’. These epiphenomena came 
to be interpreted in terms of the progress/degeneration binary: because genetic inheritance was 
complex, individuals had differing characteristics regardless of their general, racial characteristics. A 
representative of an evolved race-nation could be degenerate and vice versa. This allowed the 
application of the progress/degeneracy model to individual immigrants as ‘germ-plasm-to-be’ in the 
genetic pool of the race-nation. 
Early American Immigration Policy  
The utilisation of market veridiction inside liberal governmentality functions as a key technology through 
which social Darwinist discourses assessed the worth of the individual. The influence of this could be 
seen in the immigration policy and its increasing list of those to be prevented from entering the United 
States, as Chart L below shows.  
Cheap labour was one of the first dimensions, at which immigration restrictions were aimed. This 
applied to Chinese immigration initially, which was addressed as the so-called ‘anti-coolie’ issue. The 
term referred to the entry of Chinese contract workers, who worked for menial wages and often entered 
in conditions of servitude. Coolie trade probably resembled the contemporary work-related human-
trafficking of immigrants, and like today, it could also be approached through discourses criticising the 
conditions that exploited labour was subject to both during travel and during servitude. The sub- 
racialising discourses were, thus, not the only ones voiced, but in comparison Chinese emigration could 
be seen as a matter of “this adventurous spirit, this going to the ends of the earth for work, is in this 
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Chart L. The US Immigration Acts (1891-1952) and categories of people prevented from entering based on 
wealth at various points.  
most practical and industrious of eastern peoples but another manifestation, with that intensity which 
hunger and want superadd to it, of the spirit seen in the most enterprising western races...” (Nye 1869, 
15). That is, evolutionary rationalities could be used to discursively order the migration of the Chinese in 
a different way, as a sign of the ‘socio-evolutionary development’ of the Chinese. However, as we have 
insisted, after the 1860s the power/knowledge constellations increasingly started to discursively order 
Chinese immigration in terms of degeneracy. As said, this process was started with the 1862 Anti-Coolie 
Act and the 1875 Page Law culminating in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which were the first 
racialised forms of rendering certain type of immigration illegal on the federal level.112 
Chinese or ‘Asiatic’ immigration was not the only immigration to be racialised, because of labour 
competition. Eugenic discourses helped to delegitimise the ‘new immigration’ of undesirable Eastern 
and Southern Europeans, who were next seen to be the root of both labour competition and increasing 
political radicalism. As with the contemporary Finnish discourses, this racialisation was not 
accomplished through explicit racism; rather liberal discourses themselves partake in this racialisation. 
Namely, the greatest problem also with ‘new immigrants’ was that they sold their labour cheaply and 
worked in conditions of slave-like servitude. This labour market competition was re-conceptualised in 
terms of a sub-racialising logic that designated the socio-cultural status of the labourers as ‘slave-like’. 
Yet, servitude has in fact been a practice that Northern Europeans, even from upper social classes, had 
used as a means of immigrating to the United States especially during the 18 th century (Fairchild 1913, 
                                                     
112 The Anti-Coolie Act imposed penalties on any American ship or agent bringing (or preparing to bring) into the US 
Chinese labourers without a certificate from the American consul at whose discretion it was to decide what constituted 
‘voluntary’ immigration. In line with the Anti-Coolie Act, the 1864 Immigration Act started controlling also other contract 
labour and limiting the time of servitude allowed. The 1875 Page Law criminalised the importation of Chinese, Japanese 
and other ‘Oriental’ contract labour—federally accomplishing what the Californians had been trying to do for decades. 
Later the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement between the US and Japan controlled Japanese immigration, which, as the 
Chinese Exclusion Act, allowed only highly skilled and professional immigrants. 
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49). The 1864 Immigration Act had indeed asserted the legality of the practice of pledging wages for up 
to twelve months in compensation of emigration costs. In case of the sub-racialised other, selling one’s 
labour cheaply and entering into bonds of servitude became a sign of degeneracy. It was not deemed 
worthy of a citizen to subject oneself to slave-like relations of domination; it spoke of unfitness, an 
inability to care for the self that reflected inherent qualities. Cheap labour was considered to be unable 
to practise civic skills independently or to be as worthy as a citizen should. The cheap, unskilled worker 
was not going to make a good citizen. Ownership of property was, after all, a rationality of disciplining 
civil rights in the US and elsewhere for quite some time. 
Thus, essential for the social Darwinist order of things was the sub-racialisation of the poor. Class spoke 
of the individual’s fitness, about his/her inherent abilities. The Malthusian conceptualisation had already 
started analysing poverty (and not analysing the Poor and how to get them to work) as both a cause and 
effect of its own condition (e.g. Dean 1991). Earlier thinking had conceptualised the poor as a self-
evident part of the sovereign’s regime, not as a population to be obliterated. In this earlier order of 
things, the rich person’s worry was how to pass time and the poor population was designed to labour six 
days a week under God’s design (Dean 1991, 47). The poor had a duty and service to provide to the 
sovereign. As a means of ensuring their willingness to work, poverty and hunger in themselves were 
necessary. The problem of the poor was formulated in terms of how to get them to work, which gave 
birth to the workhouse, in which those unwilling to work were put to work, and to laws of controlling 
vagrancy and merry making. Under this order of things it was possible to conceptualise the fecundity of 
the poor as enrichment, as a means of growing the wealth of the sovereign, a basis of compensation on 
its own. Work was a matter of obedience and respect for Providence, not a means of improving one’s lot 
in life in itself—as the lot was given by God (Dean 1991). With liberal governmentality and evolutionary 
conceptualisations, this stagnant order of things would change, although, with the institutionalisation of 
market veridiction, not necessarily always for the better. The amalgamation of ‘naturalised laws’ with 
God’s will eventually formulated philanthropy, charity and benevolence, in terms of Malthusianism: The 
just and disciplinary role of poverty in creating (Christian) subjects turned into a just and disciplinary 
manufacturing of modern citizens (Dean 1991, 88-96). Poverty was not about a structurally unjust 
distribution of resources, not about a logic of wealth accumulation functioning based on exploitation, as 
this was the ‘naturalised law’. If it was not God’s design, it was Nature’s design. Scarcity was God given, 
part of ‘His naturalised laws’. Under liberalism, in society that in many ways was conceptualised as 
working based on the social Darwinist logic of the survival of the fittest, poverty could be made into a 
sign of inherent unfitness reflected in the inability of the poor to conduct their own conduct in ways 
beneficial to society (Foucault 2002, 326-348; Donzelot 2008; McNay 2009, 64). 
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With social Darwinism this attitude towards the poor and other so-called degenerate categories of 
people gained the status of quasi-scientific knowledge. Whilst many scientists were more reserved in 
their application of racialising interpretations, the same could not always be said for the lay enthusiasts 
of social Darwinism and eugenics. Especially through the appropriation of social Darwinism into 
commonsensical discourses, social Darwinism had a huge impact on liberal governmentality. A science 
discovering the ‘naturalised laws’ governing society started from the premises that contesting Nature’s 
design was not only foolish but dangerous. The limits of governing often came to be defined through the 
stories that could be told about the natural. Class biology—not opportunities, circumstances, conditions 
and resources—was the final explanatory factor, a cause, a reason for people’s behaviour, the science 
showed. The statistics, or rather the statistical confusion of cause and correlation and the questionable 
ways of producing ‘knowledge’ through description and metaphor, showed that class biology was 
inherently at the root of degenerative or progressive phenomena. Class behaviour could not be a 
reflection of living in certain circumstances—because some still prospered. As with degenerate cultures, 
lower class status was a reflection of something inherent; it spoke about the essential, self-perpetuating 
essence of the lower-class and the poor (as in the contemporary ‘culture of poverty’ discourses). With 
social Darwinism charity and social welfare became dysfunctional; death and hunger were still required 
as disciplinary tools, as a policy of ‘let die’—what other motivation was there for the poor to work in 
menial conditions if not survival. This rationality of ‘letting die’ is, for example, essential to the 
disciplining of the asylum seeking regime. 
Instead of imposing minimum wage legislation on employers (Skocpol 1992), the employment market 
was allowed to function as a sphere of veridiction that assessed the true value of labourers: the lower 
the pay, the more degenerate the labourer must be. Conceptualising the labour market as a competition 
for the survival of the fittest, market veridiction legitimated marginalisation and naturalized 
unemployment as a marker of unfitness. This method of naturalization was essential to the eugenic 
order of things. As Charles Henderson, a eugenic sociologist of the time, said: when the degenerates 
“are removed, the real workers will more easily rise in earning power” (quoted in Leonard 2003, 698). 
That is, instead of assessing the situation through a discourse of rights, eugenic measures were 
suggested to cure the competition distorting effects of degenerate labour. In accomplishing this, a sub-
racialising immigration policy was seen as a technology of artificial selection, a way of defending the ‘fit’ 
working class, i.e. ‘the real workers’. Blaming low wages on those who earned them and not on those 
who paid them mirrored the typical, naturalising social Darwinist discourses of blaming the victim (Ryan 
1998/2001). Therefore, we cannot simply regard ‘nativist’ labour market protection discourses as 
discourses of rights—which they certainly were in many instances—but we need to focus on how they 
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were used in the context of state racist governmentality and what kind of technologies of governing they 
gave rise to, especially in relation to immigration. 
From the 1860s on, federal immigration policy had attempted to prevent the immigration of cheap labour 
also through more general measures that instituted the criteria that the immigrant had to be wealthy 
enough to merit entry. By 1885 all unskilled contract labour was prohibited—also from Europe—by the 
Contract Labour Act, which left most skilled labour as well as professional labour, servants113 and other 
categories, such as lecturers, artists and religious officials unregulated. Initially family members, 
relatives and friends of residents were not included under the contract labour ban, but by 1891 their 
assistance was also banned as this type of immigration formed the overwhelming majority of 
immigration to the United States (Fairchild 1913, 158). Thus, what happened was the criminalisation of 
cheap, unskilled labour, not simply the regulation of the numbers of immigrants or the prevention of 
exploitative working conditions.  
Yet, importantly, eugenicists failed to ban the entry of Mexican cheap labour. As has been said, the 
eugenic order of things around immigration was never complete. The Western Hemisphere had also 
been excluded from paying immigration tax until 1910s and later it escaped quota restrictions, because 
southern farmers and industrialists deemed Mexican cheap labour essential to their seasonal labour 
needs and hence to their increasing wealth. This was regarded as a failure by eugenic immigration 
policy advocates, which gave rise to an increased impetus of limiting the entry of Mexicans through 
other technologies, such as prevention of the entry of contract labour, of the poor, the illiterate, the unfit 
and degenerate (Ngai 1999). Mexican immigrants face(d) decades of deportation and repatriation 
policies, even if US citizens, as well as racism (e.g. Balderrama and Rodrìguez 2006), thus, evidencing 
the inherent exclusion of Mexican cheap labour from the race-nation still evident today. 
Besides the outright ban on the entry of paupers and contract labour, the poor and the low-skilled 
workers were prevented from migrating through various bureaucratic rules, such as barring anybody 
who had not bought their ticket by him/herself from entering, through demanding assets, imposing 
immigration taxes and requiring entry permits or visas and charging for them. The 1882 Immigration Act 
had imposed a small 50 cent immigration tax. The 1891 Immigration Act amendment added “any person 
whose ticket or passage is paid for with the money of another or who is assisted by others to come” 
aimed to further prevent both contract labour and state-sponsored emigration of ‘the undesirables’. 
                                                     
113 As Gedalof points out, the immigration of au pairs and domestic servants is considered unremarkable; it is justified by 
requirements of maintaining standards of living for certain families and not problematized today. But, as Gedalof points 
out, the number of immigrants in these categories in the UK is half that of asylum-seekers granted abode (Gedalof 2007).   
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Whilst the immigration tax remained at a low level, being $4 in 1907, it was buttressed by a $100 fine for 
anybody attempting to bring in a person of the ‘defective classes’. The Immigration Restriction League 
considered this a meagre obligation not likely to weed out the undesirables and unfit to become citizens 
and initially advocated a 25$ or 50$ tax. This was deemed a sign of the right kind of care of the self, of 
the “industrious and frugal habits” of the person, who could become a worthy citizen (Immigration 
Restriction League 1894, 11-12). Later, the League would change this suggestion to 10$ combined with 
a requirement for the immigrant to be in possession of 50$ and additional 25$ for each member of the 
family (see statement in United States Government 1911, 103). Thus, we see here the start of the 
‘sufficient funds’ and income requirement technologies, which are a clear demonstration of the reliance 
on market veridiction and its social Darwinist correlation with the quality of the human being and his/her 
rather literal earning of rights. Whilst it is clear that funds help in preventing exploitation and having to 
rely on charity, there is also a structural logic of a human pedigree here that functions on the basis of 
suspicion and prevention. This is remarkable in the sense that the eugenic opinion was not united in this 
notion that the worth of entry should be measured by the ability to pay. Many eugenicists, like Fairchild, 
insisted on the ‘constitutional robustness’ of immigrants (i.e. health and endurance) more than wealth 
and social status as such (Fairchild 1913, 204).  
Contemporary Finnish Immigration Policy  
The increasing influence of eugenics and the increasing sub-racialisation of the poor and their cheap, 
exploited labour laid the ground for sub-racialisation to be employed as a rationality of immigration 
restrictionism. Also today the poor migrants often are the illegal(ised) migrants. As with the Mexican 
seasonal labour in the United States, the poor immigrant is needed in Europe, but his/her presence is 
racialised and rendered illegal (Shapiro 1997, 6). In many countries, as in Finland, low-skilled seasonal 
workers may be allowed to enter and work legally under various permit-free labour arrangements for the 
duration of a tourist’s three-month stay. The entry of low-skilled and low-pay labour without access to 
rights is also arranged through the outsourcing schemes of foreign companies/workers. Besides this 
seasonal migrant labour there are also certain sectors that especially employ foreigners. In Finland, the 
resistance towards illegally employed labour, i.e. labour that is employed outside the labour union 
condoned contractual stipulations, is high on the political agenda due to the political influence of labour 
unions. The discursive orders around these illegal practices of employment are addressed more in 
terms of discourses of rights than as discourses of sub-racialisation. Rather, the discursive orders utilise 
discourses of rights and protection from exploitation, both of Finnish workers by illegal(ised) labour 
competition as well as of any worker in general. Neither is there any clear exclusion of low-paid/low-
skilled labour in the contemporary immigration apparatus in Finland. As has been discussed, the salary-
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level requirements for a single worker are rather low and the centralised labour market considerations 
used in granting employment-based residence permits includes quite a few lower-paying and low-skilled 
jobs. Yet, the unemployment and educational standards of immigrants are problematized in terms of 
their ‘lower’ average levels (which of course has to do with the policies of recognising degrees as such), 
but this discursive order is also valid for uneducated Finns. Overall, the sub-racialisation of specifically 
cheap immigrant labour is not a discourse that is exploited to its gruesome maximum in Finland. 
How much this lack of explicit sub-racialisation depends on the existence of an immigration apparatus, 
which has, firstly, built-in obstacles that prevent low-skilled seasonal workers gaining long-term entry 
and, secondly, technologies that prevent lower income immigrants from bringing in their families, is 
debatable. For most, family reunification rights are restricted based on market veridiction and granted in 
practice based on the worthiness assigned to the applicant by labour markets, unless one is Nordic, 
Ingrian or a family member of a Finn. This worthiness needs to be tested for TCNs more often than for 
others through the disciplining of the length of residence permit renewal periods. This in practice 
discourages or makes impossible the settlement of below-medium income TCN families. Considering 
the use of specific income requirements for EU citizens’ family reunification until 2007, these restrictions 
are not ‘racist’ in the strict sense of the word, but echo the sub-racialising discourses of ‘white trash’, 
thus, speaking exactly of a dynamic governmentality of state racism rather than of ‘racism’ as such. If 
the early eugenic theories correlated unfitness and degeneracy with poverty, there is still an 
unmistakable rationality of defending the race-nation against the immigration of the poor as well as of 
large families (read culturally degenerate families): The lamentation of larger families of immigrants is a 
commonly used discourse by all parties in the Finnish government. Low-income earning individuals can 
come to work but their families should be kept outside, thus encouraging the immigrant to return. The 
restriction of rights based on market veridiction is a clear rationality of preventing lower-skilled, 
‘unemployable’ or poorer families from settling, thus painting the picture of how similar the undesirable 
immigrant is to the undesirable immigrant under eugenics: Family reunification as a technology of 
encouraging integration is applied only to those worthy enough. If anything this race hygienic rationality 
has only been bolstered by the regulations that require that family reunification applications are made by 
family members abroad, including children, who are fingerprinted after the age of six. 
Thus, the overall sub-racialising system of criminalisation remains. Cheap labour is silently excluded 
through technologies that deny the status of an immigrant from seasonal and outsourced labour and 
family reunification from cheap labour. When there is a job to be done, cheap labour is utilised and 
tolerated, but without granting rights (e.g. Calavita 2003; Doty 2003). Like in the case of Mexicans, the 
tolerance of this reaction-causing group is disciplined through programmes of voluntary repatriation, 
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policing of illegal immigrants, denial of permits in case of downsizing etc.114 The border patrol disciplines 
seasonal workers through the standard of a care for the self, which is based on the 3-month rule of 
tolerated exploitation, by stamping their passport on entry and exit, making note of over-stay enabling 
the possible denial of further visas or entry at the border. As then, also today in many European 
countries, the will to effectively tackle the structures, which feed off this ‘quasi-slave-labour tourism’ on 
the clock, is not there. Once the ‘tourist’ over-stays and his/her presence is rendered illegal, it is the 
degenerate essence of the migrant that explains the phenomenon of illegal(ised) migration, not the 
political hypocrisy between what is said and what is done, between needing cheap labour and not 
wanting it (Roberts 1998): The illegal(ised) immigrant is the root cause of his/her own condition, not the 
labour market that depends on and profits from his/her exclusion. The society has to be defended from 
the degenerating membership of illegal(ised) immigration of cheap labour, but the cheapness of this 
labour is guaranteed by its sub-racialisation and criminalisation (see also Calavita 2003). Rather than 
the protection of human rights and equal treatment, we have a system protecting profit. 
If the immigration apparatus is indirectly preventing the entry of cheap labour, we also need to 
remember how poverty influences the opportunities of gaining employment to start with: Visa restrictions 
correlate with GNI, the sufficient funds requirements and considering ‘proof of willingness to return’ are 
major tools for categorically restricting and limiting opportunities for the poor. With the EU visa and 
Schengen border control regimes, asset requirements and entry checks have become a more important 
technology of immigration control. As in the American eugenic immigration policy, which started 
requiring visas and charging for them, the pricing of visas, residence permits and citizenship 
applications function as disincentives for applications today. As in the American policy, which started 
returning the poor, who had entered without sufficient funds or had their tickets paid by somebody else, 
and which started deporting those who had become a public charge inside an increasing time frame, 
also today the lack of funds or the loss of financial ability to care for oneself are used as grounds for 
removal and deportation in Finland, as described in the previous chapter. Further, obtaining citizenship 
requires that one can account for the way one earns or receives his/her income,115 that one has kept up 
                                                     
114 Before the acquisition of permanent residence rights, permits can be denied, if the immigrant loses his/her job. Although 
this logic is not automatic and other factors can be taken into account to counter this exclusionary rationality, there is no 
such clause in Finnish immigration law, as in Sweden, that does not punish people with a loss of residency for losing their 
job due to downsizing.  
115 Until 2003 the citizenship act required that the income was secure, but since then it has been only required that the way 
income is earned can be accounted for. But as said, this income can be in the form of social benefits. However, citizenship 
may not be granted, if it is suspected that the person tries to obtain citizenship in order to take advantage of benefits 
connected to citizenship. Statistics on the implementation of this denial based on ‘suspicion’ are not easily available. 
Neither are statistics that would actually tell how quickly different types of foreigners obtain the right to municipality that 
grants access to social benefits. The general rule is that municipality rights are obtained when the person has a two-year 
residence permit, which thus includes those of Finnish ancestry, EU citizens, refugees and (secondarily) protected 
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with possible child maintenance payments as well as other financial obligations under public law. There 
is a certain bourgeois criterion of how to care for the self in operation, although relying on benefits as 
such does not prevent the gaining of citizenship—but this in practice relates to people who have been 
exempted from income requirements during their prior residency. Together with the carrier sanctions 
these measures effectively prohibit the legal arrival of the poor into the Schengen area and discipline 
their stay, thus defending society from their degenerative influence.  
Although liberal discourses are strong, when it comes to the rights of refugees, the immigration 
apparatus has been developed toward a system that disciplines asylum seekers through market 
veridiction, as we have discussed in the previous chapter. Because the movement of the poor has been 
blocked, except as seasonal or outsourced labour, today those likely to become public charges—
outside the racially privileged Nordics, Ingrians and family members of Finns—are mostly asylum 
seekers. Although, it has on occasion been acknowledged in the Parliament, that asylum seekers 
already need to be relatively wealthy and/or convincing enough to reach Finland despite the systems of 
airport and regular visas aimed against people more likely to come for asylum, this does not translate 
into a redesign of the asylum seeking system. Rather it leads to the utilisation of wealth as a disciplinary 
technology. The latest Finnish technology of preventing the arrival of those designated as ‘living 
standard refugees’ or ‘economic refugees’ was the legislative amendment downgrading the financial 
support for asylum seekers, so that it is the asylum seekers’ own funds that will first be used, after which 
reduced support can be granted. Also the cost-benefit calculations of denying or allowing work during 
the asylum decision-making process has been one major technology of approaching asylum seeking 
and its ‘push and pull dynamic’. The result is a combined disciplinary system that reduced the right to 
work as well as reduced benefits, thus more and more placing the cost of displacement and asylum 
seeking on the asylum seeker him- or herself.  
Although it is difficult to think differently about the need to have secure funds when travelling or residing 
abroad, the fact remains that this social Darwinist logic of controlling immigration was a eugenic 
formulation specifically based on the idea that the poor, as the biologically, culturally or morally 
degenerate, had nothing to contribute towards the better future of the race-nation, when mere 
controlling of numbers would have sufficed to control labour competition. Whilst, besides the prevention 
                                                                                                                                                                      
persons. However, for those who attain temporary residence permits or one-year continuous residence permits based on 
employment, humanitarian and temporary protection or family reunification, the access to rights is determined by the low-
level decision of the Immigration Services. The statistics do not actually distinguish between new permits granted and 
renewed permits, but merely report the number of permits granted, hence there is not enough easily available information 
to assess the rationalities used in granting residence permit periods. That is, it is impossible to say how the rationalities of 
defending society from the degeneracy of the poor are actually implemented. 
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of entry of paupers, these rationalities were initially measured as part of the socio-evolutionary status of 
‘races’, the obliteration of actual ‘racial’ bans on immigration has moved the technology more and more 
to the individual level. These technologies preventing the migration of the poor and the degenerate 
parallel the technologies designed to allow the immigration of those considered fit and worthy as 
measured in skills, income and assets; those subjectified as desirable citizens-to-be. In the eugenic 
fashion, this test of fitness is carried out prior to residence or citizenship applications through the visa 
system, entry checks as well as through resident permit renewal cycles. In fact, the visa system was 
one of the key reforms of the early eugenic immigration policy. As the Eugenics Record Office testified, 
immigrants should be selected through the visa/consular certificate selection process based on 
“desirable...national traits, such as truthfulness, inventiveness, initiative, dependability, altruism, 
honesty, religious feeling, artistic sense, and many other talents and moral qualities, the bases of which 
are inborn in the individual and which vary greatly in family strains” (Laughlin in his 1924 House 
Committee testimony, quoted in Schrag 2010). In line with this in the EU various technologies of positive 
discrimination have been put in place for the worthy. 
The latest of the EU technologies of positive discrimination for the worthy is the EU Blue Card scheme 
for highly skilled professionals whose salary is one and a half times that of the average salary. 
Beneficial entry possibilities for scientific researchers have existed since the EU directive 2005/71/EC 
(Council of the European Union 12.10.2005) and its incorporation into Finnish law in 2008. The more 
beneficial provisions for professionals, scientific researchers, ‘professional’ artists, sportsmen and sport 
coaches, middle and top business managers (as well as considering mere wealth as a ground for 
granting residence permits) had already started with the early eugenic immigration policies, which 
specifically did not restrict the entry of even Asian professional and highly skilled workers (Lee 2002, 
36). In Finland these structures of promoting skilled labour, which is not subject to labour market 
consideration, are also in place. 
In comparison, since 1933 the Immigration Decree has prevented the entry of (and not just deported) 
beggars, vagrants, wandering musicians, peddlers, those not deemed to be able to earn their income in 
respectable ways, and career criminals or those with criminal intentions (Finnish State 27.5.1933). 
Today peddling is controlled at the border by checking baggage for the possession of ‘worthless goods’. 
Whilst musicians and artists still enjoy a permit-free right to work, this does not include ‘low culture’ of 
restaurant or street musicians. Some (forms of culture) are worthier than others. The human pedigree 
functioning in the contemporary immigration regime is akin to early eugenic immigration policy also in 
this regard. 
 
189 
Further, if poverty is already bad enough, beggars and vagrants have been an object of state racist 
governing for a long time and they have often been segregated or institutionalised for various social 
hygienic reasons (e.g. Dean 1991; Häkkinen et al. 2005). Akin to this earlier rationality of defending 
society from beggars is the contemporary problematization of (Roma) beggars and (foreign) peddlers. 
The Roma are EU citizens and enjoy the same right of freedom of movement inside the EU, but their 
rights of travel are problematized. If in France the treatment of the Roma has been notorious, in Finland 
the constant discussions in the media about the Roma beggars led to the recommendation that begging 
be outlawed (Finnish Ministry of the Interior 21.5.2010).116 The government has also excluded EU-
asylum seekers (i.e. often Eastern European Roma) from the asylum seeker reception system.117 The 
Immigration Services instructions also offer the possibility of removing those suspected of peddling 
goods, and deporting ‘normal’ beggars based on an inability to care for oneself and ‘aggressive 
beggars’ under an internal security clause (although begging is not illegal yet) (Finnish Immigration 
Service 2.2.2009).  
4.3.3. Individualising Technologies: An Increasing List of Degenerates 
Immigration restriction in America did not stop with cheap labour or the ‘racially’ different, but other 
categories of the unfit and the degenerate were also excluded. In this section we will be looking more in 
detail at the way early eugenic immigration policy in America employed the individualising 
considerations of worthiness in segregating the degenerate and then comparing it to the contemporary 
immigration apparatus. Whilst the exclusion of criminals, prostitutes and the ill certainly is nothing new in 
terms of history or even immigration history (Zolberg 2003), it is the evolutionary framework, the 
framework of degeneracy, through which the phenomena were reconceptualised, that is relevant here. 
Race hygienic knowledge was used to restrict the immigration of “the sewage of vice and crime and 
                                                     
116 The working group set to investigate the possibilities of criminalising begging recommended that professional begging 
and unauthorised camping be outlawed under the Public Order Act and that organisation of begging rings be criminalised. 
The report does recommend that victims of human trafficking should be supported (added to the law in 2006) and that 
there is a need to develop a country-of-origin information system to combat human trafficking. The working group also 
recommended that supporting oneself through begging has to be prohibited by law, that organising begging rings has to be 
criminalised and that setting camp without permission has to be outlawed (despite the inclusion of ‘every man’s rights’ in 
the Finnish law that allows everybody to camp on private or state land (as long as it is outside the private ‘yard’)).  
117 Normally EU citizens, who log asylum applications, are treated under the safe haven principle, accelerated processing 
and speedy removal. The law stipulates that the asylum applicant cannot be considered to be at risk of persecution, if the 
country of origin has a stable democratic system, an independent and impartial judicial system and fair trials and if the 
state has signed and adheres to human right conventions. These technologies of procedural human rights and abstract 
equality deny the positivity of ‘EU asylum seekers’. This rationality parts from a liberal logic of theoretical human equality, 
which is able to ignore the fact that in each single EU country the Roma are discriminated against and do not necessarily 
have the equal resources and possibilities of activating the functionaries of the state and the judicial system to protect their 
rights. In 2010 EU citizens were further excluded from the asylum process by categorically denying them the right to 
services under the asylum seeker reception system (under which EU asylum seekers had been housed until the speedy 
process could be completed, which in practice could mean weeks, if not months) except in highly exceptional cases. 
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physical weakness” from Europe and Asia (Report of the Proceedings of the Association of Medical 
Officers of American Institutions for Idiotic and Feeble-Minded Persons, June 1888 quoted in Kraut 
1995, 50). The impetus of defending the race-nation first focused on prostitutes and criminals as well as 
those supposedly mentally ill or ‘idiotic’. The first federal Immigration Act, passed in 1882, prevented a 
“convict, lunatic, idiot, or any other person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a 
public charge” from entering the country. These exclusionary rationalities had already played a part of 
individual states’ rationalities of controlling migration. The Act also required that steamship companies 
return and house such passengers on their own expense (United States Federal Government 3.8.1882, 
Section 2), thus building towards developing “remote control” technologies of governing at a distance 
(Zolberg 2003). 
The list of the unfit and degenerate grew with time, as the below and previous tables show. As the list 
below chart shows, the tendency was toward widening the scope of degeneracy of criminals from 
evidence-based conceptualisations to those of ‘confession’ about moral degeneracy. 
 
Chart M. The US Immigration Acts (1891-1952) and categories of people prevented from entering based on 
criminality at various points.  
Criminality and the Early American Immigration Policy 
Also today one of the central elements of border control is criminality. The social Darwinist theory 
equated criminality with genes rendering it quasi-biological. Criminality was something inherent to the 
human being, neither a matter of his/her living condition or destitution nor a matter of evolutionary 
discourses (which certainly could have provided differing discourses about survivalist motives for crime 
had the protection of property rights not been so central to the social Darwinist order of things). 
 
191 
Consequently, segregation or incarceration came to represent the correct technology of governing 
criminality, and if possible, reforming petty criminals. Eugenic immigration policy utilised crime 
prevention laws as a means of controlling the entry of those morally unfit, such as convicted or 
confessed criminals, into the United States. The control of criminality had started with the deportation of 
those who had committed crimes in the US, and in 1882 moved onto preventing the entry of those who 
had been convicted of crimes and later of those who confessed to having committed crimes without 
being convicted. Proving that immigrants committed crimes disproportionately to the native population 
was essential. This statistical tradition was initiated by eugenicists (Barkan 1991, 103). Laughlin, the 
head of the Eugenic Record Office, which had become the unofficial immigration research centre of the 
Congress, did not focus merely on disproportionate insanity, but ”was preoccupied with ‘alien crime’ and 
gathered voluminous data to demonstrate that immigrants from Eastern Europe were genetically 
defective and predisposed to committing criminal acts” (Nelkin and Michaels 1998, 38). The 
politicisation of criminality had started with many of the early immigrants—who and whose children 
would later become the robust stock of natives—being criminals and paupers expunged from Europe. 
Whereas these ‘criminals’ would later become the fit ‘natives’, the social Darwinist order of things, did 
make the new immigrants into essentially inherent criminals.  
Criminality and the Contemporary Finnish Immigration and Citizenship Policies  
Criminality is one of the key ways in which male immigrants are problematized. As we have seen, today 
the desirability of those who attempt to enter either for temporary or more permanent basis is thoroughly 
disciplined by assumptions of inherent criminality up until to the acquisition of citizenship. Eugenic 
punishment extends beyond fines paid or time served. Entry can be denied based on suspicion of 
possible criminal or terrorist activity, because if one was once a criminal, one is always a criminal. 
These technologies of suspicion extend even to those who have obtained residence permits, as the 
security clauses take into account the suspicion of crimes—not only crimes that the person has been 
convicted of in a court of law, but those that the police have suspected the person of. In comparison, the 
contemporary citizenship act is in many ways governed by liberal discourses, when it comes to gaining 
citizenship and committing crimes, in the sense that it does allow those having committed crimes to gain 
citizenship (there is a certain threshold in place).118 In such cases, the granting of citizenship can be 
                                                     
118 The law and the instructions for the Immigration Services include the specific numbers of certain types of convictions that 
can be ’tolerated’ before citizenship is denied (3 suspended sentences, 2 custodial sentences or 15 daily penalties). Since 
2011, criminal acts punished by a fine are not accounted as crimes anymore, but other forms of monetary penalties, such 
as daily penalties are taken into account and so are restraining orders. Before the threshold is breached Immigration 
Services can impose a waiting period after which citizenship can be granted (if no new crimes are committed). The waiting 
period is not accumulated, but rather calculated from the date of the last committed offence and from the end date of the 
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postponed: If criminality is not held as a completely inherent characteristic of an individual, the non-
inherent quality of one’s criminality needs to be evidenced by the ability to restrain from criminal or 
illegitimate behaviour for certain periods of time on top of serving the sentence for the crime.119 Yet, 
because criminality already functions as a reason for deportation, in question in practice are individuals 
who have been deemed not deportable due to other reasons, such as family relations or need of 
protection. Thus, we can see how liberal discourses of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ are overpowered in 
immigration policy by the rationality of defending the race-nation from inferior, degenerative elements. 
Moral Degeneracy and the Early American Immigration Policy  
The socio-evolutionary preoccupation with moral degeneracy did not extend merely to criminality, but 
also other modes of conducting one’s conduct that were not ‘civilized’ enough and did not show enough 
moral restraint were delegitimised and governed in the name of improvement of the race-nation through 
exclusion and institutionalisation. Social Darwinist discourses were highly gendered, as are socio-
biological discourses today (e.g. Lowe 1978; Lowe and Hubbard 1983; Birke 1986). Immigration 
restrictions were influenced by gendered conceptualisations of degeneracy and sexual/procreative 
activity. These are not policies that only related to the female gender, but conceptualisations of the 
nuclear family, male-breadwinner family models, heterosexuality120 etc. played a part. These restrictions 
were aimed at guarding the hereditary moral qualities of the race-nation. The social Darwinist 
discourses linked morality and the ‘biological’ ability to control sexual and other urges to cultural 
evolution: more advanced societies and individuals regulated sexual relations and behaviour, racially 
more advanced classes did not drink or copulate ‘uncontrollably’ or supposedly have children out of 
wedlock.  
One of the key focuses of immigration law was ‘prostitution’, which the eugenic theory saw as a sign of 
biological and moral degeneracy, which in intra-societal policies could be seen in the institutionalisation 
and sterilization of ‘loose women’, for example (Carey 1998). In America, the Page Law of 1875 had 
heralded the beginning of the preoccupation of the moral and sexual conduct of immigrants, as part of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
sentencing period. The instructions also take into account juvenile crimes (committed under the age of 15), crimes that the 
prosecutor has decided not to charge the suspect with as well as crimes for which the court has decided not to punish for.  
119 The Finnish citizenship policy, for example, requires that before a person, who has been convicted or suspected of a 
crime, is able to acquire citizenship, (s)he needs to refrain from being convicted or suspected  of a crime for a certain time 
period defined by the type and number of crimes convicted or suspected of. The contemporary US immigration law also 
has a multitude of suspension times functioning: for those convicted of crimes in their youth, five years needs to pass 
without no offences, those involved in prostitution need to pass fifteen years without involvement in prostitution before they 
are allowed to immigrate etc. In Finland, there is no predefined time of suspension of exclusion due to suspicion of being 
involved in prostitution, i.e. there is no ‘legally’ allowed way of even proving yourself fit, like in the US or Italy, for example. 
120 In case of homosexuality, the Finnish Aliens Act was changed so that since 2004 the concept of ‘registered relationships’ 
is treated equally to marriage and the concept of ’established relationships’ applies to same sex couples. 
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the future genetic pool of the country. As has been said, the Page Law prevented the immigration of 
Chinese women for ‘immoral purposes’ as well as women for prostitution in general. The 1790 
Naturalization Act prohibited the naturalization of ‘non-whites’ in general, but since 1868, if the Asians 
were born on American soil, they could in theory become citizens—provided their fathers (had) resided 
in the United States, i.e. that single women’s children did not qualify for citizenship (Abrams 2005, 662). 
As Abrams asserts, the exclusion of Chinese or Asian women was based on the eugenic consideration 
of preventing procreation of the ‘Mongol race’ on American soil, although married women and children 
of the Chinese were still allowed in (Torpey 2000, 98). The problematization of Chinese polygamy or the 
concubine system led to a ban on the immigration of single Asian women—through immigration 
legislation they became legally defined as ‘prostitutes’. Others, such as Hindus, were also prevented 
from immigrating based on polygamy (Fairchild 1913, 168). This conceptualisation of moral degeneracy 
had, by 1952, come to mean the exclusion of those who had been prostitutes or were going to be, even 
incidentally. Hence, again we see in a widening list of moral degeneration in the immigration policy, as 
the chart below shows.  
 
Chart N. The US Immigration Acts (1891-1952) and categories of people prevented from entering based on 
morality at various points.  
The prohibition of entry of concubines and polygamists was formulated as a discourse of moral 
degeneracy, but again also liberal discourses were brought to frame the question of polygamy. This was 
not simply a retranslation of religious codes of conduct, but actually women's equality was considered 
essential to eugenic rationalities:  
“For eugenic mating one of the primary conditions is perfect freedom of choice of the contracting 
parties; and this can be attained only under such social conditions as will assure to woman 
complete economic independence” (Herbert 1910, 122). 
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Polygamous relations had already been prohibited before this as ‘alien’—although mistresses, i.e. 
women whose relations to their sexual partners have not been institutionalised, have never been alien 
to Western culture (but men have not been held responsible for providing for the woman, only for 
possible children). But race hygiene required that such allegedly degenerative cultural practices as 
polygamy would be prevented from taking root. Further, like in the case of coolies, the ban on 
‘prostitutes’ or polygamy was also framed in terms of democracy: the racialisation and the rendering 
quasi-biological of what was interpreted as the ‘slave-mentality’ of ‘prostitutes’ and concubines did not 
make them worthy of citizenship. Women’s citizenship in the late nineteenth century was specifically 
conceptualised through her moral control over sexual instincts (e.g. Donzelot 1977/1979; Sulkunen 
1987; and 1989; Ollila 1994; Helén 1997). Hence, those not capable of caring for themselves in this 
manner were deemed to pollute the American racial and cultural stock (Abrams 2005). These 
exclusionist rationalities were mirrored in the intra-societal policies of institutionalisation and sterilization 
of ‘loose women’.  
The influence of evolutionary discourses of morality did not stop with the restriction of the immigration of 
Chinese women by restricting polygamy, which was designed to prevent the procreation of the racially 
undesired residents. Besides concubines and ‘white’ prostitutes also pregnant single women, single 
women with children or widows with children were prevented from immigrating in general, as they were 
deemed likely to become public charges (Fairchild 1913). The Malthusian logic had already formulated 
bastard children as a moral offence against state and society (Dean 1991, 79), and eugenic rationality 
linked morality with genetic fitness: Single women with children were deemed to be morally—and thus 
genetically—unable to conduct themselves in a civilized manner. Fit mothers were deemed to have 
particular moral skills. Pregnancy out of wedlock designated towards a woman’s failure in acquiring a 
status dependency from a man and, thus, fundamentally towards uncontrolled, ‘uncivilized’ sexual urges 
and thus moral degeneracy. The pregnancy of a single woman was a reason for deportation in the 
eugenic aliens’ law and children of foreign single women were not given citizenship.  
This socio-evolutionary order of things also regulated male sexuality (Carey 1998), but these 
assumptions played a larger role in intra-societal policies than in immigration restrictions in the United 
States, such as fidelity and abstinence before marriage, freedom from venereal diseases and 
responsibility for the upkeep of illegitimate children (Dean 1991, 77-81; also in Finland, see Helén and 
Yesilova 2003). Male sexuality was problematized in immigrant integration discussions, for example, 
through lamentation of largely masculine immigrant flows leading to an overabundance of single males 
incapable of caring for themselves in civilized enough manner without wives and thus intensifying the 
social and housing problems related to immigration (e.g.Fairchild 1913, especially ch. XII). This problem 
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was approached in the 1924 Immigration Quota Act by reinforcing the provisions for family reunification 
of US citizens’ wives, children and parents and wives and children of legal residents, thus governing at a 
distance male behaviour through the nuclear family structure (Gerken 2007, 48). Married women were 
thought to be morally superior to men, and consequently could have a civilizing effect on their husbands 
prone towards vice.  
Moral Degeneracy and Contemporary Finnish Immigration and Citizenship Policies  
The problematization of foreign masculinity continues in many ways. In the US, if African-American 
women especially have been and are an object of over-sexualisation, so have African American men. 
Today similar problematizations of male sexuality continue in the discourses about sub-racialised 
immigrant men as hyper-sexed or rapists, incapable of self-restraint and civilized conduct. As we have 
seen, this discourse has featured in the Finnish parliament, but more than that the worry over foreign 
rapists has also appeared in the media rather regularly having led to the discussions about the 
‘politically correct’ limits to publishing the nationality of suspected criminals. Contemporary immigration 
policy does focus on immigrant masculinity also through the moral dimension of parenting, as it does on 
immigrant femininity. Firstly, the sexual or emotional conduct of foreign men can be assessed through 
the test of marriages of convenience. Secondly, their parenting is tested by investigating the strength of 
the parent-child relation (or the payment of child support in the case of citizenship) against highly 
cultural notions of parenting in case of family reunification or applications on continuing residence 
permits after divorce. However, the actual way that such disciplinary possibilities are utilised would have 
required analysing implementation practices in the Immigration Services. However, one clear way in 
which masculinity is disciplined is through the anti-polygamy regulations.  
Returning to the wider discussion about moral degeneracy, the contemporary discursive order around 
polygamy is very similar to the essentialising, social Darwinist one. The definition of the ‘nuclear family’ 
and the prevention of polygamous immigration are actively enforced today. Finnish family reunification 
regulations may require proof that other marriages have ended in divorce or death, thus potentially 
excluding polygamist men from practically bringing in any wives (Finnish Immigration Service 
23.2.2011). This legislation mirrors EU regulations that justifies the exclusion of extended families 
through discourses on gender equality, or rather “the rights of women and children” (2003/86/EC, 
Council of the European Union 22.7.2003).121 The use of liberal discourses of rights is interesting here. 
In this culturally hygienist discursive order, it is better to promote divorce and deny multiple wives and 
                                                     
121 The directive leaves the actual family reunification regulations on polygamous marriage and family to individual Member 
States and does not require mutual recognition of other Member State’s residence permit decisions.  
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their children the financial and emotional support of their husbands, than to allow them to immigrate, 
else society will degenerate. The issue of polygamy could be discursively ordered differently (not 
meaning that it necessarily should be): by defining the protection of family as a ‘universal’ value or 
actually defining the right of the other women and children as being protected and supported by the 
husband/father. There is still something suspicious about a woman who becomes a wife among other 
wives. Such culturally hygienic discourses fail to consider, firstly, the practical effects of the policy on 
women and children, and secondly, it fails to consider the hypocrisy between the Western praxis of 
extra-marital relations, serial monogamy, alimonies, child support and proliferating responsibilities for 
children from multiple partnerships. Since 2006 the immigration law has recognised the children of the 
spouse, of whom the immigrant requesting family reunification is not a guardian, as belonging into the 
‘Western family’. Whereas, the Western/EU family is extended, the contemporary ‘racially’/culturally 
hygienic impetus is to insist on divorce and separating families in case of the ‘polygamy’.  
If those believing in polygamy (just those practising it) are not prevented from entering anymore, the 
discursive order around sexual and reproductive behaviour has some similar rationalities running 
through it. In many ways, female sexual behaviour outside marriage is still problematized and made an 
object of technologies for migration control. This can be seen, for instance, in the problematization of 
‘Thai’, ‘Eastern European’ or other such female migrations that are often discursively attached to sex 
work (e.g. Berman 2003; and 2010; Andrijasevic 2009). The Finnish Aliens Act states that if “there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that he or she may sell sexual services” entry to the country may be 
denied (section 148 of the Aliens Act, Finnish State 1.5.2004). Although prostitution is not illegal in 
Finland (only procuring of prostitution is), the Finnish Aliens Act requires that women suspected of 
selling sexual services, even randomly and not in the form of prostitution, are prevented from entering 
the country (HE 28/2003, Finnish Government 13.06.2003).122 In this sense, we can see a similar 
discourse of morality—of the inappropriateness of such female conduct, of the prevention of moral 
degeneracy of the nation—functioning in the current Aliens Act. This attempt to protect the ‘purity’ of 
society puts the responsibility for male sexual conduct on the shoulders of foreign women; moral 
degeneracy is found outside the borders and not inside, i.e. not in those (Finnish) men who think they 
                                                     
122 To guard against mere suspicion based on stereotypes (read ‘of Russian whores’), the government bill (HE 28/2003) 
advises that suspicion cannot be based, for example, on dress or make-up, but must be based on knowledge about prior 
conduct. Yet, no hard proof (such as a police listings) is required. This advice in itself shows well the racialisation of 
Eastern European women as ’whores’, which is very common and often explicit in Finland (Puuronen 2011). The 
government bill also attempts to draw lines around foreign women’s sexual conduct and its reasons. The bill protects the 
sex industry by specifically allowing performers to enter (cf. the exclusion of commercialised vice in 1952 US immigration 
act), but at the same time reminds the border control that women selling sexual services may be victims of human 
trafficking or pimping. But again the focus of the government’s disciplinary gaze is at those selling sex, not at those 
consuming it.  
 
197 
have the right to put women’s right to rule over their own bodies in jeopardy and to exploit and 
commodify women’s bodies for their own pleasure. Men’s engagement in prostitution as clients has 
never had any consequence in terms of immigration. 
The same applied to pregnancy out of wedlock, which for women was held as one of the key gendered 
signs of degeneracy. Eugenic practices of sterilisation tended to be heavily gendered and the majority of 
sterilisations were performed on women with children born out of wedlock and those wanting an 
abortion in such situations, because such women were deemed to have ‘loose morals’ also in Finland 
(Hietala 2009, 15). In comparison, foreign women’s pregnancies have not been politicised by 
contemporary immigration politics, because Finland does not operate the jus soli principle, but 
categorically denies citizenship from children born in Finland to foreign parents.123 Quite the opposite is 
actually true in Finland: Pregnancy and children in mutual custody are reasons for granting family 
reunification; an evidence of truthfulness of the relationship that overpowers cohabitation requirements. 
Alternative discursive orders could be built around this validity of relationships, as pregnancy can be 
quite accidental, whereas maintaining relationships, when living in different places, could be deemed 
more demanding in terms of the dedication to the relationship.  
Whilst pregnancy in the contemporary Finnish immigration policy is given a special status, quite 
opposite to the previous eugenic order of things, the issue of pregnant women’s travel and migration 
has become problematized in countries that utilise the jus soli principle and grant citizenship to children 
who are born in the country. Scholars have drawn attention to the gendered and racialised logic that 
functions, for example, in the Irish immigration policy in relation to pregnant asylum seekers. The re-
politicization of sexually active women’s migration has the result, again, that often pregnant women can 
legitimately migrate only as dependents of their husbands: As independent agents they become 
exploiters of the system (Lentin 2003; Luibhèid 2010). Already the eugenic immigration policy in 
America asserted that single pregnant women would be creating costs for the welfare state and, thus, 
should be deported. Similar logics live on in the United States, Inda asserts, and pinpoints the continued 
eugenic rationality of limiting the reproduction of the unfit and undesired illegal immigrants in the 
attempts at limiting access to prenatal care in California (Inda 2002). In Finland, the sub-racialisation of 
single pregnant (foreign) women is not there—or it is not needed.  
                                                     
123 Under the 2003 Citizenship Act children born in Finland to foreign parents or to refugees or protected persons who have 
specifically been protected against the authorities of the country of their citizenship (and not against the conditions there) 
can obtain citizenship only in situations when they cannot obtain any another citizenship. However, there are more lenient 
provisions for young persons (18-23) born in Finland to claim (not apply for) citizenship (six years of residence; those not 
born in Finland need to have lived in Finland for 10 years).  
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The illegitimate or ‘bastard’ children of Finnish men are disciplined differently today. Whilst ‘bastard’ 
children of Finnish women have always obtained citizenship automatically, the same is not the case for 
Finnish men. Finnish men living abroad are disciplined for having children, as they have to pay for giving 
Finnish citizenship to their children.124 But the contemporary legislation leaves the door open for 
disregarding bastard children from Finnish men’s sexual encounters with ‘loose’ foreign women.125 The 
granting of Finnish citizenship to the child is conditioned by the unwed foreign woman’s ability to secure 
protection by the Finnish man, because paternity has to be officially affirmed. Today the state has 
asserted its right to ‘protect’ the father and the society from fraudulent recognitions. The Citizenship Act 
includes provisions for withdrawing citizenship from a child by a foreign mother, if it comes to light 
before the child has reached the age of five, that the Finnish man actually is not the biological father. 
There are no similar disciplinary technologies here for protecting child’s interest by, for example, 
punishing Finnish fathers for obstructing the granting of citizenship to their biological children. Stoler 
analysed a similar phenomenon of moral panic during colonial times over what “French and Dutch 
colonial authorities identified as ’fraudulent recognitions’”, which threatened to disturb racial categories 
by flooding the society with “naturalized natives” (Stoler 1995, 48-49). For the state it is essential that a 
‘mongrel’ child’s claim for belonging is biologically true and that the father has not been feebleminded 
enough to believe in unfaithful women and untrue children. This biopolitical rationality did not extend 
solely to sex but also to marriage, to which we shall turn next.  
                                                     
124 The way gender played out in citizenship used to be different. Before 1984 only Finnish men’s children as well as 
children born out of wedlock to Finnish women could outright obtain citizenship at birth. A Finnish woman married to a 
foreigner could pass her citizenship on to the child only, if the child did not obtain the husband’s or other citizenship 
(Citizenship Act 401/1968, Finnish State 28.6.1968). Although this regulation is clearly related to the prohibition of dual 
citizenship, there is no automatic necessity that citizenship of children was regulated in this way, but, for example, 
residency either abroad or in Finland could have functioned as a deciding factor for granting children citizenship. Thus, 
clearly we see a changing gendered logic in the way that citizenship is assigned today, which is due to the dual nationality 
rule that the 2003 amendment created for those married to foreigners. 
125 Finnish citizenship regulations do not follow the jus soli principle (except in the case that the child cannot obtain another 
citizenship). For a Finnish man to pass on his citizenship to his child at birth the man needs to be either married to the 
foreign mother or the child will need to have been born in Finland (jus soli) and paternity must be officially recognised. A 
Finnish man’s child born out of wedlock abroad can obtain citizenship through declaration (cost 240 €), if paternity has 
been officially recognised abroad. In cases in which the Finnish man refuses to declare paternity, the foreign mother’s or 
child’s ability to insist on recognition is subject to foreign legislation regarding recognition of paternity or in their ability to 
challenge paternity in the Finnish legal system, if the Finnish man refuses to cooperate (Paternity Act 700/1975). 
Nevertheless, if biological paternity has been proven, then the child can obtain citizenship by declaration, i.e. there are no 
residency or language requirements. Hence, there is clearly an inclination toward securing the child’s right to citizenship 
based on biology. 
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4.3.4. Individualising Technologies: An Increasing List of Unfits 
Fitness and the Early American Immigration Policy  
As we have seen, eugenics included a dimension of medicalization of immigration, because of the 
genetic explanations of unfitness. In order to prevent the unfit from entering, the 1891 Immigration Act 
instituted a eugenic ‘medical’ examination regime designed to weed out the degenerate that was 
implemented through numerous check-ups, first by the steamboat companies or carriers, and upon 
arrival by doctors in the immigrant reception centres. The Ellis Island facility in New York is the most 
famous of such reception centres and it opened in 1892. The defence technologies of the race-nation 
included documentation checks as well as medical health checks by the doctors, who were largely 
active practitioners of eugenics (Nelkin and Michaels 1998). The Chart O below, again, speaks of an 
increasing list of the unfit. 
 
Chart O. The US Immigration Acts (1891-1952) and categories of people prevented from entering based on 
fitness at various points.  
The increasing medicalization of restrictionism did not merely have bad consequences. If the various 
hygienic discourses had actual scientific and medical grounds in many instances and if the general 
policy of hygienic ‘civilizing’ certainly had very positive consequences in terms of reducing practices that 
compromised survival and had resulted in high child mortality, nevertheless, there is a difference 
between hygiene and connecting medical conditions to a person’s innate essence. Tuberculosis, for 
example, was long thought to be a genetic condition of the poor, something inherent and essential to 
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them. Venereal diseases, such as syphilis, were thought to degenerate the whole family in the genetic 
sense (Helén 1997; Kuusi 2003). In a similar vein, diseases were used to legitimise the prevention of 
entry of certain race-nation: Medical checks did not only relate to infectious diseases, but the threat of 
disease was often utilised for immigration control purposes without medical or scientific grounds (Kraut 
1995; Stern 2005). Medicalization offered scientific ways of defending not only the health but the ‘moral 
integrity’ of the race-nation.  
The Immigration Restriction League was not satisfied with the examination regime and claimed that too 
many unfit immigrants were still getting through (Immigration Restriction League 1894). Eugenic science 
responded to this criticism by developing scientific tests that enabled the weeding out of the unfit and 
degenerate immigrants resulting in increasing medicalization of immigration (Kraut 1995; Stern 2005). 
The doctors and immigrant officials conducted the eugenic medical examinations based on the notion 
that a person’s race and class had medical implications. First class travellers, for example, were 
exempted from medical checks and quarantine procedures (Galusca 2009), unless someone was 
deemed to be clearly unfit and trying to circumvent immigration regulations (Fairchild and Tynan 1994). 
Prejudiced and blatantly unscientific ‘signs’ and criteria were used to weed out the “ignorant 
representatives of the emotional races” and to look for “flawless bodies and minds”. Lacking ‘cognitive 
ability’ as evidenced by wandering eyes or drooping faces, for example, was used to evaluate the 
degrees of degeneracy of the lower class arrivals. It was not only actual sickness but physical strength 
and able-bodiedness were also used as entry criteria (e.g. Selden 2000; Harjula 2003; Galusca 2009). 
Besides physical and mental ability the excludable categories included moral degeneracy (which was 
considered hereditary) and the so-called idiots, seniles, alcoholics, hysterics, epileptics, the deformed, 
weaklings, those with poor eyesight, venereal, cardiac, cancerous, rheumatoid or other diseases like 
varicose veins requiring medical treatment were marked out for removal (United States Public Health 
and Marine Hospital Service 1903, 9). Finns, it was specifically warned, often carried an infectious eye 
disease, trachoma, without overt symptoms, and thus were subject to removal (United States Public 
Health and Marine Hospital Service 1903, 7-8). All these categories were ‘likely to become public 
charges’.  
Feeblemindedness was a category that covered many of the eugenically unfit people, such as ‘lunatics’, 
‘idiots’, and ‘morons’ and it included everyone from those with disabilities to those with educational 
needs. Already in 1882, eugenic policies aimed at prohibiting the birth or the procreation of the 
‘feebleminded’ were reflected in the prohibition of their immigration through psychological assessment 
and testing. Mental ability in general played a great role in immigrant selection. Besides detecting the 
drooping faces of the feebleminded, illiteracy and intelligence were also seen as a sign of degeneracy. 
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Finally, the 1917 Immigration Act included a literacy test as a criterion of entry, which the Immigration 
Restriction League had been advocating since 1894. After this, in the American immigrant reception 
centres, such as the one at Ellis Island, immigrants’ intellectual skills were assessed through literacy 
tests, and the illiterate were deported as a matter of eugenic segregation policy (Barkan 1991, 97).  
To have scientific evidence to endorse this rationality of governing eugenic intelligence testing was 
designed to weed out the ‘idiots’ and to ‘prove’ the lower intelligence of the so-called new immigrants 
(e.g. Ryan 1997; Nelkin and Michaels 1998). Psychologist Henry Goddard claimed that two out of five 
immigrants could be classified as feebleminded, and that the Mediterranean races were intellectually 
inferior to the Nordic race” (Nelkin and Michaels 1998, 38; also Kevles 1998, 82).126 As Nelkin and 
Michaels point out: “The IQ testing of immigrants—which generally ignored the effect of cultural and 
language differences—reinforced the belief that different races had strikingly different mental traits. 
Whilst illiteracy was not always understood to signify genetic unfitness, as eugenicists recognised that 
illiteracy was also a result of educational policies in various countries, this did not mean that intelligence 
or literary testing were as such invalid modes of assessing the fitness of the immigrant. This is where 
alternative socio-evolutionary discourses were employed to make sense of the nurture-nature 
problematic: Poor educational standards per se meant a lower status of socio-evolutionary development 
of the race-nation. This translated into an a priori assumption of feeblemindedness of certain ‘race-
nations’ and resulted in the questioning of their ability to become American citizens: Potential citizens 
had to be intelligent enough (cf. Snyderman and Herrnstein 1983).127 If literacy remains a criterion in the 
                                                     
126 The issue about race and intelligence testing has been contentious for the last century. In Finland, a controversial 
academic, Tatu Vanhanen, a father of an ex-Prime Minister, has been an important figure in this research that insists on 
the lower intelligence of ‘blacks’ and higher intelligence of ‘Asians’ (note that it is the phenotypic ‘races’ that are used in 
this type of research). The common consensus is that intelligence testing is quite accurate in predicting success at school 
(because it includes testing of knowledge acquired at school), but whether it actually measures innate intelligence is 
unsettled because of the many variants that impact success at these tests. Richard Lynn, a psychologists who has worked 
with intelligence testing for the past 30 years, has noted that intelligence as measured by tests has risen so fast in Africa 
that it is genetically impossible, which indicates rather that what the tests measure is actually adaptation to modern, 
abstract thinking styles taught at school than actual innate, genetic potential for intelligence. That is, intelligence tests 
measure achievement more than genetic propensity.  
127 Snyderman and Herrnstein’s article is a good example of why mere examination of discourse or rhetoric is not enough in 
determining the rationalities of the immigration apparatus. In their article they claim that intelligence testing did not have an 
impact on immigration policy in 1924, because the results of racist intelligence tests were criticized or not mentioned in the 
debates about immigration policy at the time. Instead of looking at how the immigration policy was actually implemented 
and how intelligence tests, whether individualising or racialising, were made an important technology in selecting 
immigrants in practice, they chose to focus on mere Congressional discussions. Nevertheless, Snyderman and Herrnstein 
make a valid point that intelligence testing and its scientific validity per se should be divorced from its political application 
(Snyderman and Herrnstein 1983). This is a relevant point in relation to contemporary discussions about genetic research 
and its ethics: The problem is not necessarily the research or the technologies themselves (although they can be); these in 
themselves do not need to be social Darwinist. Rather, the problem is how the tests and their results will be utilised and 
who has access to them. For example, as in the case of gene therapy, who will have access to the technology, for what 
reasons (Dupré Spring/2007) and based on what criteria. The important question in terms of state racism is, are ‘designer 
 
202 
American aliens policy today, in the form of literacy tests as conditions of naturalisation, by 1920s it had 
become evident that literacy was not sufficient in distinguishing the unfit immigrant from the fit as 
educational levels had increased everywhere. In 1921 the Congress and the President were ready to 
contemplate a moratorium on immigration altogether (Schrag 2010), which, as we have discussed, lead 
to the introduction of the racialised quota system.  
Fitness and the Contemporary Finnish Immigration Policy 
Moving on to contemporary regulations around the eugenically unfit, if a similar clause of ‘rendering 
oneself unable to take care of oneself’ is included in contemporary legislation as was part of the eugenic 
immigration policies, it is not always used to the same extent in Finland. This relates especially to the 
use of health as a criterion of fitness in Finnish immigration policy. If the earlier American immigration 
policy excluded the unfit also as a matter of them risking becoming a public charge, besides those that 
do not have the required assets, contemporary Finnish immigration policy does not exclude disabled, 
mentally ill or physically weak individuals. In Finland, there are only voluntary health checks and the 
results do not impact permit decisions. Mental or physical ability is certainly a practical limitation in 
gaining residence permits based on employment, but also legally psychotic disorders and drug 
addictions can be used as reasons for denying residence permits and visas based on internal security 
(Finnish Immigration Service 23.2.2011, based on 64/221/EC; Council of the European Economic 
Community 25.2.1964)—thus paralleling the unfitness definitions of early eugenic immigration policy. In 
principle the public health clause allows the denial of entry and removal from the country, but these 
situations mostly apply in global epidemics or in case a foreign person has to resort to hospital care for 
a dangerous, infectious disease requiring quarantine inside the first three months after entry. The list is 
based on the World Health Organisation’s quarantine list. Aside from the list also active and developing 
tuberculosis, syphilis and other infectious or parasitic diseases specified by the WHO are also 
mentioned, but this list does not, for example include HIV/AIDS, which was used as a reason for 
exclusion in the United States until recently. Yet, social, healthcare and refugee reception centre 
officials involved with the applicant are required to disclose information regarding the applicant’s fitness 
to the Immigration Services without confidentiality limitations, which come into play in case of family 
reunification applications and asylum applications, for example.  
In fact, quite the opposite can be argued about the Finnish immigration policy and its relation to eugenic 
health criteria. For example, when Finland accepted its first quota refugees from Vietnam and also 
                                                                                                                                                                      
babies’ genetically selected, because people want ‘sporty and beautiful, blond and blue eyed’ babies, or are we talking 
about having equal access to gene therapy in order to prevent debilitating, incurable diseases. 
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refugees from Bosnia specifically people with diseases or disabilities were selected. This rationality of 
protecting the especially vulnerable continues still (Finnish Government 13.06.2003; see also Seppälä 
2004). Further, immigration policy allows health problems to be considered as reasons for protection or 
for granting residence permits (to what extent this is used cannot be assessed here).128 In this sense, 
the eugenic discourse of people likely to create a burden on the health care system is not brought to the 
centre of the discursive domain in the Finnish context, except through the insurance requirement for 
those mostly TCNs who do not have municipality rights that give access to public health care. The 
official securitisation of health has not reached the levels possible.129 In comparison, the same cannot 
be said about the American immigration policy or the UK that carry out medical checks as part of routine 
entry examination. The US medicalization of immigration restriction is in use and physical ability, health 
and mental health are reasons for denying entry based on the likelihood of becoming a public charge, 
although these regulations are employed in much narrower form since 1990.130 The American visa 
                                                     
128 As an example of a case in which medical reasons for granting residence permits became an issue, is the case of an 
Egyptian elderly grandmother, whose sons lived permanently in Finland. Eveline Fadayelin was not allowed to join all her 
three sons and their families in Finland after her husband had died. She was denied residency and ordered to be deported 
and the decision was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court in 2009, even though she was sick with cancer. The 
case raised unprecedented attention soliciting remarks from two Presidents, two archbishops, the prime minister, the 
foreign minister, head of police and the president of the supreme administrative courts. It was only after the European 
Court of Human Rights prohibited her deportation, that the Immigration Services gave her a residence permit for a year; a 
month before her eventual death in January 2011. In this sense, whilst the law does allow for humanitarian rationalities for 
granting residence permits, the practice is strict if non-existent. 
129 Whilst official discourses and technologies do not utilise disease as a rationality of exclusion, this does not mean that the 
discourses about diseases and immigrants would not be present also in Finland both in the media and especially in the 
social media. As Ingram (2008) has shown in the case of the UK, that whilst official policy may not always use racialising 
discourses about, for example, HIV/AIDS, the media does often utilise this intersection in its reporting about ‘NHS 
expenses of treating HIV positive illegal immigrants’ or about ‘lice and tuberculosis in Manchester’ etc. Media discourses 
aside, in Finland also the courts have been involved in this nexus. It is illegal in Finland, as in other Scandinavian 
countries, to have unprotected sex when there is a danger of passing on HIV. A woman of African origin, who worked in 
adult entertainment industry in Finland, received a 4.5 year unconditional, immediate sentence for having unprotected sex 
whilst being HIV positive with a number of Finnish men. None of the men were infected with HI virus. The custodial 
sentence was later reduced to half in the Appeal Court. The Appeal Court saw that there was no intention of passing on 
the disease, as the woman was under medical treatment and her chances of communicating HIV were slim, and that the 
unprotected sex had been consensual and unsolicited by the woman, thus insisting on the plaintiffs’ own responsibility for 
having unprotected sex—even if the woman in question should have informed the plaintiffs of her HIV positive status the 
Appeal Court affirmed. In this sense, there is a potential for securitizing and racialising discourses around health also in 
Finland, but contemporarily they are not a part of the immigration control apparatus. 
130 The contemporary regulations in the US requires that immigrants with mental or physical disorders are excluded, if they 
are deemed "(I) to have a physical or mental disorder and behavior associated with the disorder that may pose, or has 
posed, a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others, or (II) to have had a physical or mental disorder 
and a history of behavior associated with the disorder, which behavior has posed a threat to the property, safety, or 
welfare of the alien or others and which behavior is likely to recur or lead to other harmful behavior”. The instructions for 
doctors assessing these criteria is that there needs to be a combination of an internationally recognised disorder and a risk 
of harmful behaviour, that is, just having a physical or mental disorder in itself does not prevent entry anymore. If there 
have been such conditions in the past, medical certificates of remission need to be obtained before admission. However, a 
mental or physical disorder as such may still result in refusal of entry, if there is a risk that the person may “not be “able to 
attend school or work or that might require extensive medical care or institutionalization. Thus, certain conditions (e.g., 
mental retardation) that are no longer explicitly listed as excludable conditions may result in exclusion under this section, if 
the consular officer determines that family or other resources to care for the person do not exist” (Centre for Disease 
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policy also requires that person’s substance abuse problems provide medical certificates about their 
condition. It was only in 2010 that the United States abolished HIV as a reason for denying entry, but 
HIV-positive status can still affect the decision to deny residence permits because of the likelihood of 
becoming a public charge (see also Ingram 2008).  
Although, overall, eugenic health discourses have not permeated the apparatus of immigration control in 
Finland, DNA testing and age determination technologies speak of a continuing medicalization of 
immigration control. The contemporary focus on using DNA-testing to limit family reunification of 
children in a ‘racially’ specific way, as was seen in the previous chapter, is akin to this focus (Roberts 
1998). Also the technologies aimed at ‘anchor children’, i.e. unaccompanied children whose family 
reunification rights are problematized, are designed so that they can be excluded through age testing 
(which many have claimed is a medically unsound practice): declining ‘voluntary’ age testing results in 
being treated as an adult or insisting that child applicants be under 18 on the date of asylum decision 
gives leeway for authorities to purposefully postpone decisions. Whilst at the same time EU citizen’s 
family includes children under 21. Eugenic immigration policy, which excluded unaccompanied children 
in 1917, as they were likely to become public charges or could be otherwise unfit, was always also 
about undesirable immigrant children, as unaccompanied children were likely to come from the poorer 
classes. 
Mental ability, illiteracy, intelligence and education were standard ways, in which eugenics immigration 
policy problematized immigration. Mental ability as intelligence does not play a direct role in Finnish 
immigration policy, although the general provisions that exempt certain presumably ‘intelligent’ 
categories, such as managers and scientists, are provided with better immigration rules speak of the 
same rationality. Interestingly, recently in Germany one politician requested that immigrants be 
subjected to IQ tests before being allowed in (Spiegel Online 28.6.2010).131 Some countries, like the 
UK, operate a point system in their residence permit applications, through which levels of education and 
salary are used as grounds for denying or granting entry. In this sense, the underlying rationality of 
equating supposed intelligence with worth (social status and wealth being the social Darwinist criterion 
of fitness) has not gone anywhere, although there are no clear intelligence tests in place. Also, illiteracy 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Control and Prevention, available at:   http://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealth/ exams/ti/panel/ technical-instructions/ 
panel-physicians/introduction-background.html, accessed 20.4.2012).  
131 Peter Trapp, a domestic policy expert with the CDU in Berlin, demanded in an interview with the mass-circulation tabloid 
Bild that would-be immigrants to Germany be given intelligence tests before they are allowed in: "We have to establish 
criteria for immigration that really benefit our country," Trapp said. "In addition to adequate education and job 
qualifications, one benchmark should be intelligence. I am in favor of intelligence tests for immigrants. We cannot continue 
to make this issue taboo." (See for example: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-s-immigration-debate-
politician-demands-iq-tests-for-would-be-immigrants-a-703328.html, visited 2.3.2011.) 
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still plays a role in the immigration policy. Illiteracy of immigrants is systematically problematized in the 
Finnish parliamentary discussions. Whilst solutions are sought for this with specially designed education 
of illiterate immigrants, the granting of citizenship is disciplined through literacy: only illiterate persons 
who are over 65 are exempted from language testing, if they can provide a proof of ability to speak 
Finnish. 
There is also a direct link between mental ability and worthiness of the immigrant that can be seen in the 
language requirement attached to granting citizenship. If liberal discourses have had more influence 
over the Citizenship Act, it has been disciplined by nationalist discourses in significant ways. The main 
technology of disciplining access to citizenship is the language test that was introduced in 2003. Today 
all over 15-year olds, who need to apply for citizenship (and not claim it), need to fulfil the Finnish or 
Swedish language requirements. Thus, in practice, obtaining citizenship has been made harder as 
gaining citizenship is subject to a practical integration test: finding opportunities of learning to speak 
Finnish/Swedish with native speakers or finding the money for training and testing. Passing language 
skills tests requires a certain educational background and can require a familiarity with certain style of 
highly formal language learning. The complexity of the Finnish language is unlikely to make this task 
easy.132 Mainly only over 65-year-old refugees or internationally protected persons can be exempted 
from language testing.  
Yet, the power/knowledge constellation around language testing cannot be deemed simply 
segregationist; the aim is integrationist—for those qualifying. Language has a practical function that 
should not be discredited—although how it is made to count can be used to segregate. Further, the 
government has, especially with the renewed Integration Act, attempted to foster the creation of 
alternative language learning methods. The government does provide Finnish language teaching for 
                                                     
132 With the complexity of Finnish conjugation—with all the four words in sentence ’this beautiful flower’ having 30 different 
forms (15 singular, 15 plural)—passing exams may not be that easy. This complexity is due to the use of suffixes instead 
of prepositions. Even Swedish-speaking or emigrant Finns at times struggle with Finnish grammar and the correct use of 
suffixes. Typically, the Finnish style of language teaching is conducted through book learning, understanding grammar and 
not through teaching pupils to speak, as is the case, for example, in the UK. Although I have understood that language 
teaching in practice, in the outsourcing setting, may start from these more practical premises of learning to speak and, as 
was said, lately the government has invested in the creation of language teaching methods that suit other learning styles 
better. The same has applied to learning a trade, as it has been recognised that integration of students who come from a 
different backgrounds of learning, or little learning at all, the Finnish teaching style is not always optimum. The actual 
language learning level, against which critique has been expressed for both leniency and strictness, does not necessarily 
speak of the kind of language skills that would be required for a job in which one needs to read or write in Finnish and not 
always even for talking with the general public or clients in a professional setting. It does, as is the government’s aim, 
reflect language skills that enable the new citizen to function in everyday situations. The Finnish public is still very 
unaccustomed to Finnish being spoken incorrectly and the complexity of the language also makes the chances of 
misunderstanding ample, which makes finding jobs for non-native speakers much harder than, for example, in the UK. 
This is of course only the tip of an iceberg of the problems that a foreigner faces in the labour market, but it is the easiest 
to fall back on in recruitment situations.  
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those who are deemed to have integration needs, such as refugees and the unemployed or others in 
vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, stay-at-home mothers, children and youth etc. Nevertheless, 
citizenship is tied to the intellectual achievement of mastering the complexity of the Finnish language—
and not to a test of residence as was the case prior to 2003. In that, language testing implies a 
completely different order of things in which rights are not claimed but earned. These technologies in 
Finland are not, however, unique. In comparison, the US started requiring English language skills 
already in the 1906 Naturalisation Act. Today, in the UK and Denmark, for example, language tests are 
being used already at the family reunification residence permit level, thus speaking of the way that 
technologies of segregation are being transited to lower and lower levels of administrative rules and 
earlier and earlier phase of selecting the fit immigrant. Many countries also impose civic knowledge 
tests as a condition of naturalization. In Finland, the Integration Act has reinforced the need to teach 
immigrants civic skills as part of the integration training, but civic skills or cultural knowledge are not 
used as conditions of granting citizenship today.  
As a condition of naturalization, the language testing of all over 15-year-olds is specifically aimed at 
teenagers, who need to earn their rights already as children. Historically, this requirement of having to 
apply independently for citizenship is a change. Earlier, when citizenship or residence was granted to a 
man, his wife and children automatically obtained the same in conjunction (Leitzinger 2008b). Today 
citizenship is personal and so are integration requirements for all over 15-year old family members, 
which indicate an intensification of individualising technologies of fitness. The role of immigrant children 
and their poorer school success was one of the ways in which eugenic restrictionism was advocated. 
This problematization continues in Finland with lamentations about the number of immigrant youth who 
do not finish any type of education. In principle support for educational achievement and integration are 
provided and the focus on improving this support has been intensified, but demonstrating language 
ability requires that the person has finished an educational degree in Finland—mere attendance is not 
enough, or else the teenager needs to obtain a separate, language skills training and assessment.  
The individualizing technologies aimed at youth do not stop here. An additional technology of 
disciplining access to citizenship is evident in the regulations on losing citizenship that applies to young 
adults with dual citizenship. The 2003 reform allowed dual citizenship, whereas holding of dual 
citizenship prior to this had been possible only in few cases (certain countries) and only for children. At 
the same time, the Act amended regulations on automatically losing citizenship. Today a young adult 
with dual citizenship can lose Finnish citizenship automatically at the age of 22, if his/her ties to Finland 
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are not ‘strong or active enough’.133 Whilst this criterion per se is a nationalist one, which asks ‘do you 
want to be a Finn or a foreigner?’, the answer to this is not calculated through a culturalising measure. 
In practice, retaining citizenship at the age of 22 is merely down to a demonstration of civic fitness: of 
being able to care for oneself to the degree of being able to contextualise one’s position in relationship 
to nationality regulations and the future implications of losing Finnish citizenship, of then being able to 
make a decision and finally of being able to write a letter to the Immigration Services before one turns 
22. Thus, although the technology of governing the losing of citizenship is informed by discourses of 
civic fitness in many ways, the liberalism is disciplined by nationalist discourses. Dual citizenship is not 
actually positioned as a right that one either has or does not. The right to dual citizenship is secondary 
to the segregationist rationality of needing to take citizenship away.  
Overall, we can see that the problematization of fitness in terms of health, mental health and mental 
ability, in the contemporary Finnish aliens’ law, is not overpowering, but liberal discourses of equal 
opportunity are allowed to frame the governing of health related fitness. Whilst intellectual ability plays 
an implicit role in both immigration and citizenship policies, there are also limits to how the Finnish 
immigration policy contemporarily employs this rationality in comparison to earlier intelligence testing.  
4.3.5. Continuing Technologies: The Rendering Segregation Technical 
Rendering government technical is one of the key ways through which the social Darwinist 
conceptualisations of fitness underlying the governing of immigration are silenced and made “anti-
political” (Murray Li 2007).134 Throughout Chapters 3 and 4 we have seen how the same technologies 
pertain that were initially designed as eugenic measures of defending the race-nation in the United 
States. The visa system still functions as a primary defensive system against the unfit. In 1907 it was 
envisioned that “every agent of the steamship companies in the remotest hamlets of Europe would be 
an immigration inspector” (quoted in Schrag 2010, 65). If initially carrier sanctions were aimed at 
preventing steamship companies from killing their customers, later carrier sanctions were employed to 
                                                     
133 The Immigration Services are required to inform the person of the risk of losing their citizenship. Strong ties in practice 
mean that if the person was not born in Finland and did not to live in Finland at the age of 22 then they must have lived in 
Finland or the Nordic countries for at least 7 years prior to 22. Today, if a young adult has not lived in Finland for at least 7 
years, they must officially, in writing, declare that they want to maintain Finnish citizenship between the ages of 18 and 21, 
or they must have performed military or civil service or women’s voluntary military service, have applied for Finnish 
passport or actually obtained their citizenship during this period. However, should the person not have been able in the 
least to write this letter, between 2003 and 2011, to regain citizenship the person would need to have lived ten years in 
Finland out of which the person had to reside in Finland for the last two years unless they could prove that they had not 
obtained information regarding their risk of losing the citizenship. But as said, these regulations of regaining citizenship 
have been changed in 2011 so that there are no residency requirements to regaining citizenship anymore.  
134 Murray Li borrows the anti-politics term from James Ferguson’s The Anti-Politics Machine¸ Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1994. 
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prevent the unfit from arriving to the US. A system of consular permissions, i.e. the visa system, was 
created first to prevent the entry of Chinese labourers and later, in 1924, it was extended to include all 
immigrants (except those from the Western Hemisphere), thus extending basic eugenic immigration 
control outside the borders of America. Later, as a technology of governing at a distance, the steamship 
companies were required to assess at their own expense the likelihood of entry for travellers or had to 
pay a bond for ‘wrong’ decisions’ (for the development of this system see e.g. Zolberg 2003; also 
Torpey 2000). This gave rise to a system of medical inspections by the steamship companies. The 
double system of entry check was thus created early on. Today, we have the visa regime that checks 
the fitness for entry for the racialised groups under visa restrictions and then a double check at the 
border, at which entry can still be denied despite of having a valid visa.  
Arranging the entry of illegal(ised) immigrants was already criminalised by California, which imposed 
severe penalties in connection with its 1858 attempt to criminalise Chinese immigration. The 1875 Page 
Law criminalised and severely penalised the arranging of entry for undesirable, ‘obnoxious’ persons and 
these provisions were later extended to bringing other members of other ‘defective classes’. Today, the 
law similarly criminalises the arrangement of entry for those without required permits both as a matter of 
carrier sanctions and punishing private individuals. The direct consequence of this system, in which 
visas are not granted for asylum applicants (whether founded or unfounded) from countries wherefrom 
many of the asylum seekers are coming, is that legitimate travel, or even airport transit, is made 
impossible without a vetting process, and therefore travel is moved to the black market—and then 
controlled and securitised as a crime of ‘human trafficking’ and illegal(ised) immigration.  
Eugenic immigration restrictions created or widened illegal(ised) immigration by merely insisting that 
also legal migrants, especially from Mexico, subject themselves to eugenic quality control in the various 
entry points similar to the famous Ellis Island in New York. (Entry outside designated border crossing 
points continues to be criminalised.) Barring Mexican immigration was regarded as a failure by eugenic 
immigration policy advocates, which gave rise to an increased impetus of limiting the entry of Mexicans 
through other technologies, such as prevention of the entry of contract labour, of the poor or the illiterate 
(Ngai 1999). This resulted in the establishment of the U.S. Border Patrol in 1924. The founding of the 
Border Patrol was based on the same eugenic principles as the 1924 immigration policy itself giving rise 
to increasingly racialised and securitised policies and technologies towards Mexicans or Latin 
Americans today (Stern 2005; Ngai 1999). Its purpose was to patrol the wide stretches of the Mexican 
border and to ascertain that immigrants entered through the designated entry points, in which the 
medicalized inspection regime, which the eugenic policy instituted, weeded out the degenerate and the 
unfit (Stern 2005, ch. 2). In this sense the situation has not changed much. The Border Patrol is still 
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there to control illegal(ised) immigration that is nevertheless required for industrial gain. If anything, the 
urgency of patrolling the border has intensified (Doty 2007). Whilst in the Finnish case, illegal 
immigration has not become a hysterical object of patrol, as we saw in Chapter 3, this is rather seen as 
a matter of effective control. The estimated numbers of illegal immigrants in Finland range in few 
thousands (see Appendix 2). 
Otherwise, as Fairchild describes (1913), the early eugenic immigration policy operated based on the 
assumption that once immigrants had been carefully selected, there was no need to monitor their 
worthiness. With time, however, the period of deportation for various ‘immigration offences’ was 
lengthened. The deportation provisions had started in 1798 with the deportation of those deemed to 
threaten security. On the federal level, the 1891 Act allowed those immigrants who became ‘a public 
charge’ to be deported inside the first year of entry. The categories of deportable people were increased 
with time to include not only those who became public charges but also those who would otherwise 
have been prevented from entering as a member of the ‘defective classes’ inside a certain time frame 
(e.g. Doty 2003). The 1891 Immigration Act established a technology of deporting illegal(ised) 
immigrants at the expense of carriers. Carrier sanctions that embody the intention of barring ‘unfit’ 
immigrants are still in place and reinforced through securitising biopolitical technologies (e.g. Huysmans 
2000; Bigo 2002;  Adey 2009; Ibrahim 2005; Muller 2004). For example in 1907 this time frame was set 
to three years, thus operating a sieve of fitness similar to the residence permit renewal system. The 
deportation regime combined with the residence permit renewal regime today is more intense (Fekete 
2005). Contemporarily in Finland, the regulations on who can be deported and based on what are 
impacted by the same racialising edifice that we have seen before; Nordic and EU citizens have better 
protection against deportation whereas the deportation of those, whose residence permits are under 
more scrutiny to start with face a situation in which their deportation is considered rather self-evident. 
Only citizenship in the end provides a 100% security against deportation.  
 
Summa summarum, we have now discussed Finnish citizenship and immigration policies in relation to 
the early eugenic rationalities of problematizing immigration. As we have seen, there are changes in 
how nationalist and liberal discourses are employed in relation to state racist governmentality. The 
rhetoric is not the same, but even if the language of today is more nuanced at times, the effects remain 
similar in terms of their rationality. Even if all of the eugenic rationalities are not employed in the 
contemporary Finnish system as in the early eugenic immigration control system in the United States, 
the key rationalities and technologies remain. Because the power effects of contemporary immigration 
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control apparatus parallel those of eugenic immigration policy in many ways, we need to consider social 
Darwinist and eugenic rationalities, if not necessarily all their negative technologies of implementation, 
as part of the commonsensical ways in which we govern ourselves. We will now move to recapitulating 
this discussion on these rationalities of governing immigration and discussing their significance in terms 
of state racism in the conclusive chapter.  
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5. Conclusion:  The Beginning and the End of Liberal Governmentality 
Foreigners’ rights should not be limited more than is necessary. By cutting off the King’s head and 
analysing the immigration apparatus through the three displacements typical of governmentality studies, 
we saw in Chapter 3 what limits to rights are considered necessary. Whilst the discourses of 
nationalism, liberalism and multiculturalism were connected to these limits placed on the foreigners’ 
rights, they did not exhaust the discursive formation: There was an underlying rationality functioning 
especially in the way that immigration control was employed through its technologies that was left 
unexplained. This apparatus spoke about a need to defend society, of the need to securitise 
immigration, and it problematized immigration in a specific way. As was indicated, the key task of 
governmentality studies is to investigate problematizations. As many have pointed out, the inherent 
biopolitical governing of immigration speaks of mundane neoliberal rationalities of securitisation and 
governing through fear and the sovereign power of exception (e.g. Bigo 2001; and 2002; also Bigo and 
Guild 2005; Duffield 2006; and 2007; Salter 2006; 2007; and 2008; Lippert and O'Connor 2003; Maguire 
2009; Andrijasevic and Walters 2010). But as Doty (2007) argues, in relation to anti-immigration 
activism, political analysis that focuses on sovereign states of exception operates with insufficient 
conceptualisations of politics and fails to appreciate the impact of democracy and ‘the will of the people’ 
on how sovereignty is conceptualised in political theory (also Huysmans 2004). As Inda and Hedman 
have pointed out, the securitisation of illegal immigration and asylum seeking is achieved through a 
power/knowledge constellation, which by manipulating the legality/illegality binary criminalises forms of 
immigration (Inda 2006; Hedman 2008). Whilst analysing the technologies of securitisation is significant 
for the decentring of liberal governmentality, here the object of analysis was this power/knowledge 
constellation itself: The critical focus was more on the rationalities of securitising, on the rationalities 
embedded in governmentality, than on the technologies of securitisation per se.  
As was discussed in Chapter 2, liberal governmentality is defined as a progressive governmentality of 
governing for the increased wealth and health of society and the economy. In this, liberal 
governmentality is characterised by an insistent will to improve, as Murray Li stresses (Murray Li 2007). 
In the wake of an ascending evolutionary theory, liberal governmentality started conceptualising 
governing in terms of naturalised laws. Therefore, as I insisted in Chapter 1, we need to go a step 
further and question the role of sovereignty vis-à-vis liberal governmentality and ask what is—beyond 
the state of exception—the explanatory power of sovereignty, if the task of government is 
conceptualised as limited by naturalised laws? What sovereignty can do is suspend its own law, but can 
it suspend naturalised laws? My claim in this thesis is that the rationality of securitisation is underpinned 
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by the naturalising edifice of liberal governmentality, which must be understood as something more 
rudimentary than mere governmentalisation of the biopolitical. Rather, it must be understood as an 
essential technology of silencing the taken-for-granted limits of governing. 
I have approached the task of understanding this rudimentary liberal naturalism through various tools of 
decentring explained in Chapter 2. Naturalisation, as a form of normalisation, is one of the fundamental 
ways in which the power/knowledge constellation underlying liberal governmentality was and is 
maintained. That is, society and the economy, especially in relation to immigration, are imagined in 
terms of quasi-organic, systemic interactions and naturalised laws that function to limit that which is 
political and can, thus, become objects of government resulting in an effective disciplining of the 
discourses of rights, liberal or otherwise. In Chapter 3, I showed, as Doty indicated, how the rationality 
of governing immigration in the Finnish parliament was approached through naturalising 
conceptualisations of democratic desire, how psychologism was used to define the naturalised limits of 
tolerating (racist) reaction-causing (non-white or ‘less fit’) immigrants. In the governmental texts and 
parliamentary discussions immigration policy was approached through a survivalist mode of preserving 
the race-nation insisting on the purity and progress of the race-nation through the disciplinary use of 
liberal discourses of law and order and artificial multiculturalism. Against the heuristic assumption that 
racism would not be a discourse actively utilised in making sense of immigration, understanding this 
securitisation was impossible merely by reference to nationalism or liberalism. But as for example 
Bonilla-Silva has insisted, ‘racism without racists’ is enabled by a naturalising interpretation of society 
and its functioning that blames the victim of racism for racism—which, as we saw, was also done in the 
Finnish parliament. Inside this naturalising framework of understanding immigration, as Barker insisted, 
truth becomes grounded in the ontology of man as a psycho-biological and socio-biological being; the 
truth of immigration restrictionism is grounded in the discourses on man’s evolutionary biology and 
socio-evolutionary development that limit his desires and their feasibility, that essentialize his 
‘fundamental fears’ and ‘natural needs of security’ and designate them as the natural limits of governing, 
of governmental policy (Barker 1981; and 1990; also Rose 1999, 114-119).  
Whilst the aim was to analyse the rationalities and technologies of biopolitical governing of immigration 
as emergent discourses, the tool of understanding their conditions of possibility became historical; 
historical not in terms of genealogy, but as a matter of historicism, of studying governmentality in its 
historical context, including its silences and scarcity of meaning. This historicism, as a critique of the 
modern mode of knowing immigration, insisted that eugenics was the essential intellectual context in 
which immigration restrictionism was defined. In this thesis, I approached eugenics and social 
Darwinism as modes of governing, i.e. not as academic corpuses of knowledge, but as discourses of 
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scientific governing necessitated by liberal governmentality. I insisted that eugenics and social 
Darwinism need to be treated as systems of dispersion in which crucial is their condition of possibility, 
not their supposed condemnation and marginalisation. This condition of possibility is the naturalism of 
liberal governmentality and underlying socio-evolutionary framework of Western modernity. Inside this 
framework eugenics and social Darwinism can be distinguished based on the technologies of governing 
that they advocated, I claimed. Whilst eugenics depended on the social Darwinist definition of fitness, its 
technology of governing was rather that of proactive ‘making live’ than that of ‘letting die’ by natural 
selection. In immigration policy we saw this eugenic technology in the ‘artificial selection’ that the 
‘restrictive and highly selective’ immigration policy was designed to implement and through which the 
focus of immigration restrictionism became the quality and not the quantity of immigrants. 
In Chapter 3 and 4 I showed how the inherent naturalism of liberal governmentality allows for social 
Darwinist discourses of fitness to be employed as part of liberal governmentality. Social Darwinism has 
here been defined through its conceptualisation of fitness as a matter of social status rather than 
increased survival. Throughout the immigration apparatus we could see this rationality that evaluates 
human worth on the grounds of ‘race’, class and degeneracy in play: We saw a number of racialising 
practices of preferring those considered culturally or biologically suitable and excluding others for 
reasons of ‘difficulty of integration’ because of racialised notions of culture. The pre-Schengen and the 
contemporary EU visa regime were clearly influenced by the notion of a socio-evolutionary human 
pedigree through which technologies of limiting entry and the access to rights as a foreigner favoured 
‘whiteness’ and disciplined darker phenotype and poverty. I compared this to the classical eugenic 
immigration policy in the United States where, between 1921 and 1965, immigration was regulated by a 
quota structure based on ‘race’ or ‘race-nation’. As I insisted, the nationalist discourse in itself does not 
have more to say about the foreigner, beyond that (s)he is foreigner, and that, therefore, the rationality 
of governing for socio-evolutionary fitness is a social Darwinist one, because it measures fitness of race-
nations through their developmental status calculated as social position. As discussed these rationalities 
were not simply nationalist, but they were based on eugenic science that painstakingly evidenced the 
degeneracy of the barred race-nations based on socio-evolutionary conceptualisations. If the Eugenic 
Record Office became the unofficial immigration research centre of the Congress in the US, which 
started the statistical traditions of investigating the impact of ‘race’ or ‘nationality’ to crime, intelligence, 
employment, poverty, school success etc., in order to bar those who were ‘racially’ unfit from entering, 
and as Zuberi insists, this statistical tradition is very much alive in the West (e.g. in Zuberi and Bonilla-
Silva 2008).  
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I also compared the ways in which market veridiction was used to discipline rights, thus upholding the 
social Darwinist view of the worth of individuals. In important ways, in the immigration control apparatus 
human worth was a calculation of human capital down to the visa regime, the UNHRC refugee and 
family reunification policy, to the preferential treatment of ‘professional’ labour and the exclusion of 
cheap labour, thus evidencing the (neo)liberal extension of the market model through the homo 
oeconomicus to disciplining the rights of people (Foucault 1978-79/2008, especially ch. 11; also e.g. 
Venn 2009; and 2011). These class-based rationalities, which were re-interpreted inside the socio-
evolutionary framework during the zenith of eugenics and social Darwinism, were explicitly connected to 
the biopolitical conceptualisations of increasing the fitness, or the wealth and health, of the population. 
In this sense, immigration policy continues the same logic of selection that eugenic immigration policy 
did in the United States, and the same is the case in many other countries that utilise income 
requirements as a standard entry criterion. There is no equality in front of immigration law, but some are 
simply worthier than others. 
But the social Darwinist model of fitness was not merely about ‘race’ and class. Degeneracy and 
unfitness functioned as key technologies of discipline in domestic policies seen in institutionalisation and 
at worst in sterilization. These rationalities were inserted into immigration policy through a medicalized 
apparatus of immigration inspections in the United States after the 1880s. Degeneracy as a form of 
inadequate moral and cultural control, in the Finnish case, is a fundamental logic of exclusion that can 
be seen in the continuation of the eugenic policies against admitting criminals, prostitutes and 
polygamists into the country. It was shown that, with time, the definitions of who constituted a 
degenerate in the above senses was extended rather than diminished and that liberal discourses about 
‘fit’ citizenship were utilised to legitimise this race hygienic exclusion. Contemporarily, these rationalities 
function on the basis of the principle of ‘well-grounded’ suspicion according to the same expanding 
pattern of exclusion applied to unfits, i.e. to those who were at the time thought to be ‘genetically’ of 
lower quality in the United States. These exclusionary technologies were executed through outright 
bans as well as through the category of ‘likely to become a public charge’ in the early American 
immigration policy. Whilst the rationalities of excluding those deemed quasi-biologically unfit cannot be 
said to function as an active policy of exclusion in the Finnish case, the same cannot be said about 
some other countries, such as the United States and the UK, which apply medical controls as standard 
technologies of exclusion.  
That is, there are shifts and changes in the way liberal and moral discourses have impacted the 
governmentality of state racism, and certain disciplinary technologies have been re-politicized. But as is 
central to Foucaultian analysis, we are not looking for one-to-one sameness, but for a dynamic 
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governmentality that functions as a strategic game of power/knowledge. Race hygienic strategies are 
contextual and there are differences between early eugenic and the contemporary Finnish immigration 
policies. And certainly it cannot be claimed that state racist rationalities and socio-genesis would lie 
beneath all aspects of contemporary alien’s law, as we have seen important dissimilarities between 
Finnish and old eugenic immigration law, the absence of medical examinations and health criteria and 
lacking ‘racial’ preferences or restrictions in naturalisation law, for example. Yet, there are more 
similarities than there are dissimilarities in the fundamental rationalities—although the methods of 
implementation or extent of exclusions may vary. 
As we have insisted, rendering government technical is one of the key ways in which this type of 
eugenic immigration control is made apolitical. Today the focus on the defence of the race-nation is 
stronger because of the system of pre- and post-immigration checks and the application of market 
veridiction to limit the rights of foreigners than it was in the US previously. Whilst the eugenic focus and 
medical inspection regimes were clearly more intense then, today the visa regime continues to address 
the legitimacy of entry of those whose likelihood of over-staying or whose immigration desires are not 
deemed a priori as worthy. At the same time as governments and politicians profess a desire to protect 
the ‘true’ refugee, the entry of nationals from countries where asylum seekers are likely come from is 
strictly controlled through carrier sanctions and the airport visa regime (Morris 1998, 952-953). If the 
technologies of prevention of the immigration of the ‘defective classes’, as the eugenicists called them, 
are very much similar, also the technologies of criminalisation, removal and deportation, which were 
created to enforce the implementation of eugenic immigration policies, endure. If the American ‘whites 
only’ citizenship policy can be connected to the desire of maintaining the Chinese and Mexicans as a 
cheap workforce that was/is prevented from settling permanently, similar technologies are used today. 
Market veridiction is used to discourage the settlement of lower-skilled workers from outside the EU or 
EEA and the same is done through the seasonal work and outsourcing arrangements, which maintain a 
‘guest worker’ scheme typical of early immigration policies in Europe. These exclusions that are 
rendered technical are excellent examples of the ways in which segregationist rationalities can be 
hidden away in administrative rules. 
Therefore, what we need to appreciate is that the way of problematizing immigration is essentially the 
same since its eugenic grounding in the 1880s US. At the level of governmentality, this policy did not 
truly accept the social Darwinist conceptualisation of the survival of the fittest as laissez-faire 
competition, because it aimed at proactive improvement of fitness: Immigration could have been 
conceptualised as increasing the fitness of the race-nation through increased competition. Instead, 
immigration was deemed as race suicide of the Nordics whose fitness was deemed factual and not in 
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need of improvement through competition. Thus, being true to its social Darwinist definition of fitness but 
not to its means of governing for improved fitness, the race suicide theory was aimed at the 
conservation of the social position of the ‘fit’, and as such it propagated an ‘end of history’ theory of its 
own aided by a naturalised, but fundamentally artificial, conceptualisation of natural selection. 
Immigration control presented thinkers influenced by social Darwinism with a singular opportunity “to 
exercise artificial selection on an enormous scale” and by careful selection of immigrants to improve the 
race-nation not only by those who would survive but those who could contribute towards the progress of 
the race-nation (Prescott F. Hall, a co-founder of the Immigration Restriction League, in 1906, quoted in 
Schrag 2010, 68). Whilst the language has changed, the rationality of the way in which immigration was 
problematized remains largely intact. That is, the effects of immigration control and the rationalities of 
disciplining rights are in practice, if not in explicit language, similar to the eugenic ways of controlling 
migration and disciplining rights. 
My claim is that this perpetuation of the rationality of problematization, which at times results in not-
always-so-politically-correct reformulation of the race suicide theory, is because under liberalism the 
task of governing is a matter of governing for progress and avoiding regression and degeneration and, 
further, that liberal governmentality in many ways continues to problematize immigration on the basis of 
social Darwinist conceptualisations of fitness. Therefore, the immigration apparatus cannot be 
understood simply as a matter of asserting sovereign control, because its biopolitical governmentality 
cannot be explained by sovereignty. Neither can it be deemed as a matter of nationalism, because 
nationalism merely makes a distinction between the national and the foreigner. Civilizational discourses 
in the West are not nationalist discourses, they are socio-evolutionary discourses. If we look at 
securitisation as part of a wider apparatus, because of the ways in which threat is defined, i.e. as social 
Darwinist fitness and race suicide, and not simply as terrorism or equally applied definitions of 
(il)legality, we can place it inside a state racist governmentality of governing through socio-evolutionary 
discourses. Inside the governmentality of immigration, the social Darwinist socio-evolutionary framework 
functions as an integral condition of possibility of securitisation, because it brings with it survivalist 
discourses that enable the hystericization of risk. It is because of the underlying naturalism that socio-
evolutionary discourses cannot be divorced from liberal governmentality. We should remember that 
despite its exceptionalisation, social Darwinism is merely an application of a type of evolutionary 
thinking to society and that many of its rationalities became commonsensical. This is why, at this nexus 
of progress/regress and fitness/degeneracy, the problematization of immigrant quality makes sense.  
The race suicide theory can be situated inside the liberal culture of fear. State racism gives birth to an 
analysis of the wealth and health of the population as an effect of “competition and conflict, especially 
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the competition of group with group and the equilibrium and adjustment that ensue upon such struggles” 
(Floyd N. House quoted in Bannister 1979, 4). As MacMaster has argued, “[i]t appears that Social 
Darwinism, the general idea that contemporary society could be analysed as a process of struggle for 
survival between competing groups and individuals, was omnipresent throughout European higher 
culture in the later nineteenth century” (MacMaster 2001, 48). Discourses of survivalist necessity were 
made elemental to the naturalised laws. Politics functioned and in many ways functions inside a socially 
constructed framework of survivalist fear essential to the way we conceptualise (international) politics 
(Foucault 1976/1998, 137). Liberal governmentality cannot escape the logic of fear but instead 
individuals “are conditioned to experience their situation, their life, their present, and their future as 
containing danger” (Foucault 1978-79/2008, 66-67): the dangers of war, poverty, crime, degeneration 
and immigration. As Foucault noted, “[t]here is no liberalism without a culture of danger”. Whilst 
contemporarily this culture of danger can be seen in the securitization of migration and asylum seeking 
(e.g. Waever 1993; Huysmans 2000; Bigo 2002; Duffield 2007; Hyndman and Mountz 2008), state 
racism intimately connected these discourses with survivalist ‘evolutionary competition’. Because of the 
struggle for survival racism in many ways becomes necessary and ends up repeating new racist themes 
of culturalization (Ibrahim 2005) in very much the same way that social Darwinism and eugenics did 
earlier.   
Social Darwinism explained human society and human behaviour in terms of biology and genes in ways 
that today are often considered excessive, but the important point is that its actual diagnosis of a socio-
evolutionary human pedigree did not alter; it was merely the cure to degeneracy and unfitness that 
changed. This was already acknowledged by eugenic thinkers, which was why the models of biological-
determination of social behaviour saw their marginalisation. But as I claimed this marginalisation was 
never complete, because the problematization of unfitness and moral degeneracy as such remained. As 
Ramsden claims, the critique of social Darwinism or scientific racism was about the possibility of speedy 
evolution, because the ‘let die’ policy of laissez-faire social Darwinism reduced and hampered “the 
potentials for eugenic engineering” (Ramsden 2002, 883). What the critique of social Darwinism did was 
“cast a wider eugenic net of control” as the “incorporation of environment and culture into the eugenic 
equation ends up meaning that the reproduction of those who are either genetically or environmentally 
‘deficient’ becomes a eugenic concern” (Franks 2005, 101). That is, the critique of social Darwinism 
merely intensified the culturalising and individualising rationalities of state racism. The critics in the day 
claimed that eugenics failed “’to perform that specific task which it, and it alone, can perform’” (Ramsden 
2002, 883). That is, “it is important to recognize that biological approaches to population dynamics were 
not challenged by social demographers because of their eugenic elements, but on the contrary, they 
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were attacked because they seemed to disallow man the possibility of taking his own evolution into his 
own hands” (Ramsden 2002, 890), of pursuing socio-genesis. Therefore, in assessing the impact of 
state racist thinking, with its eugenic discourses, we cannot operate at the level of surface discourses, 
but rather we need to investigate the effect and aims of policies. The analysis of racism, social 
Darwinism and eugenics cannot be limited by its explicit inclusion or exclusion by the state (Doty 2007). 
Thus, I have insisted that social Darwinism should rather be seen as a banal feature of liberal 
governmentality and that the exceptionalising reading of social Darwinism and eugenics by identifying 
them through their negative technologies, which parallels the exceptionalising definition of racism, as a 
strategy of power/knowledge merely introduces silence around the contemporary conceptualisations of 
fitness and its function as a limit to politics; and as such they limit the employment of discourses of 
rights and morality in politics. 
As has been discussed, the exceptionalisation of social Darwinism and eugenics is implicated in the 
exceptionalisation of racism, because social Darwinism has largely been associated with scientific 
racism. Although my aim in this thesis has not been to analyse social Darwinism, eugenics or racism as 
academic discourses, but to investigate how they are made to function in conjunction with politics and 
the ways in which we govern ourselves, nevertheless the political and academic battle against scientific 
racism or social Darwinism was enlightening in that it showed how modern anti-racism never 
abandoned the socio-evolutionary framework or the need to explain cultural degeneracy in terms of 
evolution, and not history. In the UNESCO anti-racism tradition, it is evolutionary theory that has the 
power of veridiction on whether the inferiority of some races is true or not. That is, the worth of the 
human being is not advocated as solely a moral issue, but as an issue of biological science, an issue of 
determining whether environmental and socio-evolutionary forces have in actual fact given rise to 
genotypical, not just phenotypical, biological differences that would be culturally determining. That is, the 
UNESCO tradition contains the link between biology and culture: What is taken as a starting point is that 
social evolution has placed human beings in unequal developmental stages, thus rendering cultural 
development determining. As such this strategy may have been deemed the best at the time, but 
fundamentally the ethnicity paradigm renders itself usable for discriminatory purposes and therefore this 
anti-racist strategy is not able to deal with racialised thinking, but rather perpetuates it (e.g. Anthias and 
Lloyd 2002; Lentin 2004).  
The discourses of cultural suitability and inherent characteristics of a group of people, which we 
evidenced in the Finnish discursive formation, rely on the quasi-biological notions of culture, mistaking 
cultural value for individual ‘essence’ and deducing from history and its structural phenomena the 
‘inherent’ nature of populations. Through such logic the marginalised position of these racialised groups 
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appears ‘natural’, as if caused by inherent unfitness, thus silencing and disciplining the entry of 
discourses on structural discrimination into the political arena (e.g. Shapiro 1997). As Bonilla-Silva 
insists, the ‘new racist’ edifice is maintained by four technologies: the insistence on abstract equality, 
cultural racism, naturalisation and minimization or exceptionalisation of racism (Bonilla-Silva 2010). 
Naturalisation of societal structures lies at the heart of liberal governmentality and its silencing 
discourses of ‘too much state’. Consequently, we need to attach the contemporary ethnicity paradigm to 
the practices of racialisation, as the theorists of new racism have done. But as Leach has pointed out, 
there is nothing new in ‘new racism’ and that racism and social Darwinism always contained a cultural 
dimension, i.e. the socio-evolutionary dimension (Leach 2005; also Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; 
Goldberg 1993; Balibar 1994; also Rahikainen 1995; Lentin 2004, 90).  
What this anti-racist strategy does, is “enable people to talk about race without mentioning the word” 
(Gilroy 1992, 53). What we have today, with this socio-evolutionary anti-racism, are the disciplinary 
technologies of intellectual hygiene, of political correctness. That is, what we have is “an orthodoxy that 
seeks to end racial discrimination not by political reasoning but by identifying pernicious race language 
wherever it appears and excising it forcefully” (Hannaford 1996, 15). But as Butler highlights focusing on 
forms of hate-speech through legal means is not sufficient (Butler 1997); omitting the ‘bad words’ does 
not constitute omitting the rationality. Therefore, despite the complaints from the far-right, the policy of 
political correctness does not primarily serve to silence the far-right and anti-immigrant actors, as is 
claimed, but to silence and hide the fundamentally similar basis of mainstream thinking. Political 
correctness has become “an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses”, 
integral to the normalising technologies of power/knowledge that silences the origin of the dynamic 
governmentality for fitness (Foucault 1976/1998, 27). Whilst studying the disciplining or proliferation of 
the social Darwinist discourses of the survival of the fittest would be another study, we have seen how 
the immigration policy contains social Darwinist rationalities without naming them so. 
Therefore, exceptionalisation is an inadequate way to approach social Darwinism and eugenics. In fact, 
when reading some of the writing of eugenic thinkers, it becomes evident that eugenics never was a 
theory of only ‘raving-mad’ racists. The patterns of scientific argumentation, the ability for self-criticism, 
the attempt to increase the scientificity of the theories, the propensity to change viewpoints in front of 
contradictory evidence, the focus on methods and their distortion were all there. And we should not 
forget that socio-biological theory, as eugenics is presently named, is thriving today in many 
disciplines—and some of these theories are not any different to earlier eugenic writings and they 
continue to circulate as commonsensical ways of making sense of society. In this sense, the 
exceptionalisation of social Darwinism and eugenics as forms of scientific racism is inadequate. Eugenic 
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theories were/are not uniformly racist, but some entertained quite opposite viewpoints, such as Myrdal’s 
The American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy shows (Myrdal et al. 1944). 
Myrdal was a Swedish, social democratic eugenicist, but his analysis of the ‘race problem’ in America 
came to be heralded as a vindication of anti-racism (Southern 1987). To be a racist was not the same 
as to be eugenicist, to be eugenicist meant to be race-hygienic in the general sense. What was common 
in eugenic thinking was the socio-biological synopsis in which governmental policy was deemed as a 
tool of race improvement and racial progress. Degeneracy was and is a socially and culturally defined 
impairment, whether applied on the individual or group level. Whilst the early religio-cultural hierarchy 
with its quota systems was more brutal in comparison to the current, more subtle and more 
encompassing hierarchy, which does allow visa-free entry for some ‘non-whites’ and allows entry based 
on individual merit from all countries, the subrace/superrace divide and the degeneracy/fitness binary 
remained a central dynamic of governing immigration as a technology of state racist purification.  
Race suicide theory identified the failure to exercise a selective and highly restrictive immigration policy 
as a failure to govern for the improvement of the race-nation. This race suicide theory lies at the centre 
of state racism. Yet, despite the overtly racialising logic, it has become evident that state racism cannot 
be defined by a ‘white’ vs. ‘non-white’ binary, but that state racism is about a dynamic, mostly socio-
cultural racialising logic that functions as a key rationality of governing; ‘race’ or ‘race-nation’ is merely 
one aspect of this state racist apparatus. What ‘race’ fundamentally referred to was the organic 
definition of a population, and with state racism government became a matter of the constant purification 
of society from the abnormal defined as degenerate and sub-racialised.  
In this context, I have to insist that conceptualising racism in this wider framework is not meant to take 
away the significance of racism against the ‘non-white’, even less to deny the undesirability of racism, or 
to refute previous racism studies, but to address the issue of why combating racism (or other 
discriminatory intersectionalities) can be like running around in circles. What is essential for governing 
immigration here, is the fact that state racism is not ‘racist’ in the limited definition of racism, as a belief 
in the inferiority of ‘non-white races’ (e.g. Leonard 2003, 691), but that state racism is constituted 
through the racialising and individualising binary of superrace/subrace in which ‘whiteness’ functions as 
a sign of likely fitness and in the end, this human pedigree reflects socio-evolutionary and/or social 
Darwinist notions of selection modelled according to a struggle for survival of the ‘fittest’ (Foucault 1975-
76/1997, 60-61). That is, it is possible for a ‘non-white’ or a ‘less-white’ to be fit, but this fitness is 
calculated as social position and moral fitness, not as fundamental equality. Whilst the sub-racialisation 
is clearly more evident in the technologies of governing foreigners than in domestic policies, the real 
question is how much these rationalities are employed as part of (neo)liberal governmentality in various 
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other policy areas and how much these sub-racialising rationalities have translated into social Darwinist 
policies of ‘letting die’. 
We cannot equate racism or sub-racialisation with evolutionism of course, but we cannot intellectually 
separate them either, because they share the same conditions of possibility as discourses. It should not 
be treated as a coincidence that the heyday of nationalism and social Darwinist thinking coincided. 
‘Race’ and nation were opposite sides of the same coin, it would require a radical epistemic break to 
fundamentally separate them. As many insist, it is arguable if nationalism on the whole has shed its 
‘racist’ history—or whether indeed it is even logically possible (e.g. Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; 
Silverman 1992; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992/1993). The same question must be posed to liberalism. 
The question we need to ask ourselves is: ‘What is liberal government through freedom designed to 
execute?’ What does the constitution of ‘artificial’ government through the discourses of not governing 
too much enable? 
What this investigation has done is blur the line of what constitutes liberalism and nationalism vis-à-vis 
social Darwinism. Although contemporarily many of the social Darwinist and racialising discourses 
appear in watered down forms, it nevertheless is problematic to distinguish them from (neo)liberal 
governmentality. As Lentin insists: “The psychologisation of racism, as much on the level of common-
sense as on the intellectual plane, has hindered explications that root it, rather, in the history of 
European political thought (Lentin 2004, 35; Dean 2010; McWhorter 2010). If racism requires the 
modern state (Bauman 1989), Lentin argues that the current anti-racist discourse is not able to 
distinguish itself from the Western public political culture. Liberalism, as it is used today, partly finds it 
difficult to resist and partly is coterminous with the impetus of protecting society from racialised others. 
The fact that anti-racism bases its strategy on the limited definition of racism enables racialised thinking 
to continue as a mainstream conceptualisation through its interlinks with the rationalities and 
technologies of state (Lentin 2008b; Lentin 2008a; Lentin and Lentin 2006/2008; Lentin 2004; Lentin 
and Titley 2011). Instead, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the typical anti-racist discourse 
formulates itself as a requirement to respect the Western liberal heritage of democracy, equality and 
tolerance—a superficial method of normalizing the ‘fit citizen’ through political correctness that, as we 
saw, were utilised to defend sub-racialising exclusionary principles. Anti-racism, as it is formulated as a 
form of identity politics, a battle over the ‘true’ identity of the Westerners (cf. Boswell 2000; Boswell 
2005) has led to the fundamental failure to address the relation between ‘racial fitness’ and democracy.  
Therefore, we cannot identify power in the immigration apparatus through its “murderous splendour” 
(Foucault 1976/1998, 144), because such an approach leaves the mundane state racism and banal 
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social Darwinist power/knowledge constellation in the shadows. In the face of the continuing social 
Darwinist ways of problematizing immigration, we need to decentre the evolutionary conceptualisations 
that keep functioning as discourses of power at the heart of biopolitics and state racism. We need to 
distinguish social evolution as a fact from the stories we tell about it. We need to distinguish between 
academic research into the history of human evolution and how evolutionary thought is used in politics. 
What I am talking about here is basically the freedom (not) to be governed like this (Cadman 2010). 
Conceptualisations of social evolution could be quite different giving rise to very different politics. For 
example, if our conceptualisation of social evolution was calculated in increased survival and not in 
increased wealth then, for example, the politics around global warming, patent rights of medication, food 
and agricultural production, labour exploitation, industrial accidents or war and peace for that matter 
would be quite different. That is, alternative stories about evolution could be told and they could equally 
function as valid political discourses. What we need to focus on is that even if evolution is a fact, its 
meaning is not and neither is its application to government a self-evident necessity meriting uncritical 
application. Instead what we need to do is pay attention to the stories we tell ourselves about the natural 
and how our modes of governing are informed by such naturalising discourses: It is that evolved 
being—who, from within the socio-evolutionary life, to which he entirely belongs and by which he is 
traversed in his whole being, constitutes evolutionary representations, by means of which he lives and 
governs himself, and on the basis of which he possesses that strange capacity of being able to 
represent to himself precisely the truthfulness of that socio-evolutionary life—that we need to question 
and decentre. We need to decentre the naturalising ontologies that sometimes take the form of pure 
animal fables that we use to discipline and silence moral discourses and cease deducing that ‘what 
should be’ from ‘what is’, like social Darwinist discourses of morality do (Sanderson 1990; and 2007; 
Rosenberg 2000; Weikart 2004). If the liberal promise is formulated as an increase of freedom and 
equality, we need to re-address the beginning and the end of liberal discourses as they are employed in 
politics and to critically evaluate our need to address the limits and the critique of government as quasi-
naturalising discourses. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Background to Finnish History of Migration and Aliens’ Policy 
This appendix will contextualise Finnish aliens’ policy and its trends by discussing its political 
background. It will firstly outline the historical background to immigration policy before World War II. This 
section is largely based on two recent historical studies by Arto Leitzinger on Finnish immigration policy 
and foreigners in Finland between 1812 and 1972 (Leitzinger 2008b; Leitzinger 2008a). Then the 
appendix will discuss the politicization of the aliens’ policy during the Cold War, which in general 
politicised Finnish foreign and domestic policy in many ways. Subsequently this appendix moves on to 
discussing post-Cold War immigration policy trends in Finland. That is, Finnish immigration policy is best 
understood in terms of 1) the policies employed during the Russian rule 1809-1917, 2) the post-
independence period of 1917-1945 (Russian revolution, World Wars I and II and the interwar period), 3) 
immigration policies during the Cold War and 4) the post-1990s aliens’ policies that are impacted by the 
development of the European Union. But first the appendix discusses general migration patterns in 
Finland.  
  
Migration Patterns 
As the introduction in the thesis indicated, before the 1980s, Finland was—proportionally speaking—a 
country of emigration. It has been estimated that over one million Finns had emigrated before the 
Second World War due to economic hardship, the main destinations being Sweden, the United States, 
Canada and Australia. The post-independence period saw major population movements. During the 
Russian revolution Lenin granted Finland, which was an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Tsar 
at the time, independence in 1917. The Russian Revolution led to many people from the near abroad to 
seek refuge in Finland, and the same trend continued until the end of the Second World War, during 
which Finland fought two wars with the Soviet Union. During World War II Finland also evacuated and 
resettled some 430.000 Finnish citizens from the war zone along the border of the Soviet Union, which 
was largely lost to the Soviet Union in the peace treaty after the war. During the war there were also 
people going out from Finland. Besides a lot of foreign refugees who sought safety especially in the 
neighbouring Sweden, there were about 70.000-75.000 unaccompanied Finnish children who were sent 
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to safety as refugees to Sweden and other Nordic countries. About 15.500 of them ended up staying 
after the war.135 We will discuss these general trends more in detail below. 
As Chart 1 shows, after the Second World War, emigration continued to be more prevalent than 
immigration. Another 600.000 people emigrated from Finland after the war, often to other Scandinavian 
countries, especially to Sweden again. The emigration of Finns to other Nordic countries was helped by 
the Scandinavian passport-free zone that took shape in 1954. Despite the nationalist rhetoric of ‘hard-
working Finnish emigrants’, Finnish immigration to Sweden and to the United States was in fact 
problematized in both countries. As is the case of immigrants in general, also Finnish immigrants, 
especially in Sweden, were/are involved in criminal activities in higher than average numbers. In 
Sweden this gave rise to a saying ‘en Finne igen’ – ‘a Finn again’. Indeed, often in Swedish crime 
novels criminals have Finnish names. In the United States some saloons prevented the entry of Finnish 
immigrants—along with Indians and dogs.  
 
Chart 1. Annual Net Migration in Finland 1945-2010.136 
Net migration peaked in the 1970s, with Finnish return migration, but did not turn permanently on the 
positive side until the 1980s. That is, it is only since the 1980s that more people have immigrated to 
Finland than have left. In total, the number of emigrants from Finland is relatively high for a country that 
today has around 5 million people: The government estimates that today there are well over one million 
ex-patriots abroad, if the second generation is counted in. These ex-patriots have been one of the 
explicitly coveted immigrants (or ‘returnees’) in current immigration policy. (Appendix 2 outlines analyses 
                                                     
135 Figures from the Finnish child refugee association ‘Sotalapsi ry ’ (http://www.sotalapset.fi). 
136 Source: Statistics Finland – “Väestönmuutokset ja väkiluku 1749-2012, koko maa” (Eng. Population changes and size 
1974-2012, whole country). Available at: http://pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/vrm/muutl/muutl_fi.asp, accessed 
11.2.2011. 
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some of the statistics related to migration patterns in Finland.) In general, Finland experienced similar 
patterns of emigration to Southern Europe making the earlier migration patterns very different from 
many other larger European countries that experienced an influx of labour migration in the mid twentieth 
century  (e.g. Nylund-Oja et al. 1995; Similä 2003; in English see Lahav 2004, 30). Because of this 
background of emigration, immigration was not politicized until the 1990s—outside the politicization of 
the refugee issue during the Cold War, which we shall discuss shortly. 
 
Migration during the Autonomy 1812-1917 
Yet, despite the prevalence of emigration before the 1980s, Finland has also always been a country of 
immigration, in fact if not in identity. As Leitzinger’s studies show, there have been considerable non-
Finnish populations in Finland before the 1990s. At this time, the size of the Finnish population was 
almost half the size of today, and although the numbers of foreigners were not large, the concentration 
of immigrants in larger cities increased the visibility of foreigners, very much like today. The history of 
having been part of both Swedish (until 1808) and Russian empires (until 1917) has had its impact: Both 
Swedes and Russians have settled in what today is Finland. Swedes settled especially along the 
coastal areas as well as in provinces being employed in various administrative, religious and 
commercial roles. Consequently Finland has two official languages, Finnish and Swedish, and two 
official state religions, Lutheran and Orthodox. Throughout history, the borders between 
Novgorod/Russia and the Swedish Kingdom/Finland have been redrawn many times. The population 
consequently has also moved over the border or been moved by the border, which for many centuries 
was not considered to be culturally defined in the same way it may be considered today. 
The fluctuating history of the borders has had an impact both on immigration to Finland and on Finnish 
aliens’ policy. The Western border with Sweden and Norway is partly based on natural borders, such as 
the the sea in the south and the Tornio and Muonio rivers in the north, and has traditionally seen a free 
movement of peoples, especially by the Sami, who are the original inhabitants of the Lapland region in 
Norway, Sweden and Finland. Since 1954 this movement has been official because of the Scandinavian 
passport free zone, which allows Scandinavian citizens to settle in any other Scandinavian country by 
mere registration of their residency without income requirements. This can be seen in the fact that 
Finnish dialects are spoken in both Sweden and Norway. The ‘meän kieli’ (‘our language’), based 
largely on Finnish but with a lot of loaned words from Swedish, that is spoken in the Tornio river basin 
on both sides of the northern border, is an official language in Sweden. Also the twin cities of Tornio (in 
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Finland) and Haparanda (in Sweden) up in the north have a long history of cooperation. Tornio was 
initially a Swedish-speaking town, but the Swedish Crown lost it to Russia with the rest of Finland in the 
War of Finland in 1809. After Finnish independence, the border being open, the lives of the people in 
these two cities have been interconnected. For decades people have been able to buy with either the 
Finnish or Swedish currency in both towns and today these two towns are united as Tornio-Haparanda 
or Haparanda-Tornio ‘EuroCity’ that shares certain municipal services, such as postal services, fire and 
rescue services and water treatment facilities etc. 
Whilst the border between Finland and Sweden is non-politicized, as the ‘EuroCity’ shows, this has not 
been the case with the Finnish-Russian border. This border has seen multiple wars over history. Yet, it 
has not been securitized to the degree that it would have consistently prevented migrations, except 
during the Cold War, because the populations living along the shifting border are culturally and 
linguistically closely related. This can be seen in the ‘migrations’ of Karelians and Ingrians or Ingrian 
Finns, who have been considered ‘Finnish peoples’ and live along the south-eastern border with 
Russia/the Soviet Union. Karelians and Ingrians both speak a language or a dialect that is closely 
related to the Finnish language according to current linguistic theories (Finno-Ugric languages)—like the 
‘ethnic’ Estonians do too. The southern border  
 
Chart 2. The Finnish-Russian border area. 
regions between Finland and Russia, i.e. Karelia, have had quite a mixed population. Historically, the 
territory of Karelia has been divided between the Swedish Kingdom and Novgorod/Russia. Culturally 
and geographically Karelians have been divided into Eastern/Russian Karelians and Western/Finnish 
Karelians. Western Karelia, containing roughly the areas of ‘Old Finland’ prior to the border changes 
after World War II, has been considered to have special, symbolic meaning in Finnish culture and 
Karelia 
Ingria 
Leningrad / St. Petersburg 
 
The Karelian and Ingrian areas and the 
areas Finland lost to the Soviet Union 
after the Second World War (in red). 
(Source: Wikipedia GNU Free Documentation 
License). 
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identity: Namely, Karelia has been constructed as the birth place of a ‘uniquely’ Finnish culture partly 
through the collection of Karelian and Finnish folk poetry into a book called ‘Kalevala’, which became 
the national epic of Finland.  
Ingrians live south of Karelians. Cultural studies commonly define Ingrian Finns as a population that 
traditionally lived in the area between the Gulf of Finland, the basin of the River Neva and Lake Ladoga 
(covering areas of both today’s Russia and Estonia; an estimation of the area is shown by the smaller 
circle on the bottom of the above map in Chart 2). Ingrians, who emigrated south during the seventeenth 
century because the Swedish Crown tried to convert Ingrians to Lutheranism, nevertheless converted 
largely to Lutheranism later as Lutheran Finns moved into their new areas of living (Nylund-Oja et al. 
1995, 177-178). Therefore, confusingly today they are sometimes thought to be the descendants of 
‘Lutheran Finns’ and have supposedly remained culturally somewhat different from the ‘Orthodox 
Russians’ or ‘Finnish Karelians’ who were/are of both Orthodox and Lutheran religion. Officially no 
distinction is made between being Lutheran or Orthodox in the case of defining Ingrians. In fact, 
because of this history, the Orthodox Church is the second state church in Finland, and the Karelians, 
most of who were evacuated to Finland during the Second World War, are Orthodox Christians. The 
same is the case with recent Russian immigrants and historically many Finns living in the border regions 
adopted the Orthodox religion despite the Swedish Crown’s attempts at conversion. (E.g. Nylund-Oja et 
al. 1995; Hyry 1995.)  Consequently, because of history Finland has had a lot of Swedish and Russian 
influence seen in the two official languages and two official state churches solution.  
It was not, however, only ‘Finns’ who lived in and/or moved in these areas, but also ‘Russians’ were on 
the move. In general, the Russian-Finnish border saw a lot of population movement throughout these 
years of autonomy under the Russian empire between 1809 and 1917. Russians had a lot of summer 
houses in the Eastern districts of Finland and this tradition of vacationing in Finland still lives on in many 
ways, which can be seen in the huge number of visas granted in Russian embassies solely, as the 
thesis discusses. Also many Russians as well as other minorities from the Russian empire, like Tatars 
and Jews, visited and lived in Finland. During this time a group of Tatars, who are of Turkish origin and 
traditionally Islamic, settled in Finland. Tatars, like Finns, had their own political ambitions and difficulties 
under the Russian empire, and consequently at the time there was sympathy for their plight under the 
same Tsar. In addition, an unknown number of Russians settled in Finland. Today there is a minority of 
5.000 people who consider themselves descendants of Russian merchants and soldiers who settled in 
Finland before Finnish independence in 1917. They, like many Swedish-speakers, have also changed 
and translated their names into Finnish. This is partly to avoid discrimination and partly due to the 
fashion at the height of Finnish nationalism around the turn of the last century. On top of this, the Baltic 
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Sea has created a natural avenue of movement for people leading to many Russian, Swedish, Balkan 
(especially Estonian), German and Polish immigrants settling in Finland. Regardless, such a 
multicultural element seems alien to many people in Finland today. In many ways, Finland was more 
‘cosmopolitan’ during the early years of Finnish statehood. This multicultural background is evident in 
Finnish population genetics too: According to some estimates, the genetic make-up of the population in 
Finland is 8% ‘Baltic’. From contemporary discussions these earlier immigrants have been omitted. 
However, as many have tried to point out, many of the Finnish industrial household brands, from food to 
large machinery, are actually companies founded by and named after foreigners who settled and started 
businesses in Finland. During the autonomy, Finland was a developing country that required foreign 
capital. Also societally, before World War II, Finland was mostly agrarian and experienced the major 
societal changes associated with modernisations, such as large scale industrialisation and urbanisation, 
only in the 1950s and the 1960s. In fact, today’s Finland would not be the same without the 
industriousness of these foreigners. The reason why foreigners tended to become entrepreneurs relates 
to the way that immigration policy separated work permits from residence permits and often allowed 
merely residence without right to work, except as entrepreneurs. 
In terms of integration of immigrants, because during the nineteenth century Swedish was still the 
majority language in Helsinki and Turku, for example, linguistically it was easier for foreigners to 
integrate through learning Swedish. Some even worried that the Swedish minority was increasing 
‘disproportionately’ because of immigration (Leitzinger 2008b). Today this same concern has been re-
politicized especially by the (True) Finns, and there are both political and media discussions about the 
‘appropriate language of integration’. The contemporary citizenship law, which has required language 
skills as a criterion of obtaining citizenship since 2003, allows a choice between Finnish or Swedish, but 
in practice it is difficult to function or gain employment in Finland without the knowledge of the Finnish 
language. The Swedish-speaking minority is after all only around 5% of the population or some 290.000 
people (including the Swedish-speaking autonomous Åland islands).  
With globalisation and increasing immigration Finland has seen a tendency towards politicizing the two-
languages arrangement in Finland, which can be seen, for example, in the abolishment of the long-term 
policy requiring the second domestic language (Swedish for Finnish speakers and vice versa) as a 
compulsory subject in matriculation examinations (A-levels). University graduates and state officials still 
need to have good knowledge of the second domestic language (Swedish-speakers have a right to be 
served in Swedish in state and municipal institutions), which according to some imposes 
disproportionate requirements on immigrant employees. Some Finnish-speakers argue that having to 
know both Finnish and Swedish on top of English, which is often also a requirement for gaining 
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employment, immigrants who have different mother tongues and possibly still know other languages, 
face too many linguistic requirements that create structural discrimination in the job market. The 
Swedish People’s Party, on the other hand, advocates Swedish as a language of integration, as they 
see that it is easier for people to learn which then allows immigrants to have a quicker route to 
integration. In contrast to this sense of the Swedish language being an integral part of Finland, in the 
chauvinist sections of the society one can hear racist ‘Swedes go home’ calls in reference to Swedish-
speaking Finns and their rights and status in Finland. Historically, though, Swedish-speaking Finns have 
been at the centre of Finnish nationalism. Many of the key writers, poets and artists at the centre of 
Finnish nationalism were Swedish-speaking Finns. If industrial development would not have been the 
same without foreigners, Finnish culture certainly would be completely different without the Swedish 
Crown, its institutions and societal programmes and without the impact of the Swedish-speaking upper 
class.  
Adding to this linguistic issue is the Finnish constitution that protects the cultural and linguistic rights of 
minorities. Sami and Roma languages have official support. The Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE) 
has its own Swedish section and it also provides news and programmes in Sami and news in Russian 
and English. Schools can teach immigrant languages to immigrant children who learn Finnish or 
Swedish as their second language. Thus, constitutionally and practically speaking, the direction is 
towards multi-lingual solutions. Russian-speakers are a considerable minority in Finland (some 60.000). 
Especially in the eastern border regions Russian skills are argued to be more valuable than Swedish 
skills, and political and media discussions have focused on making Russian an option for a second 
compulsory language at school instead of either Finnish or Swedish (the first compulsory language 
chosen by 9-year-olds is typically English). Lately, even the notion of making English a third official 
language (which would require that state officials provide services in English) in order to enable 
immigrants to better function in society has been entertained in the media. Consequently, we can see 
how both historical and contemporary migrations have impacted Finnish society. Despite this, the 
tendency to conceptualise Finland as mono-cultural has persevered.  
 
Immigration Policy before Independence: Come and Go 
Akin to this discourse of ‘the age of immigration’ also the typical narrative about Finnish immigration 
policy forgets history and starts from the 1973 decision to accept refugees from Chile. But as Leitzinger 
asserts there has always been a system of regulating—even if not necessarily controlling—immigration. 
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According to Leitzinger, even if Finland as a state gained its independence only in 1917, Finnish 
immigration regulation can be seen to have started around the time when, after the War of Finland in 
1808-1809, the Finnish territories were moved under Russian rule. The borders of the Finnish state 
reached their shape in 1812 when the Vyborg area in the south east, which Russia had conquered 
previously, was reunited with the rest of Finland under the Finnish Grand Duchy in the Russian empire. 
The Vyborg area had been considered ‘Old Finland’ and its inhabitants were ‘Finns’ and not ‘Russians’. 
From 1812 the Karelian inhabitants of the Vyborg region were considered Finnish citizens and during 
the Second World War the inhabitants of this region would be evacuated and permanently resettled in 
other parts of Finland. Finland was an autonomous district under the Russian Tsar. Finland retained, for 
example, the political institutions inherited from Sweden (although the Russian Tsar had veto right over 
all political decisions). During the period under Russian rule Finland reformed the earlier representative 
institutions and formed the Finnish parliament in 1906 and was the first country in Europe to grant 
universal suffrage also in the same year. During the autonomy there was also border control between 
the Russian empire and the Finnish Grand Duchy. Also during this time passport control remained in 
place at the Russian-Finnish border, although its efficiency can be debated.  
The historical events over the Finnish-Russian border have had a major impact on Finnish aliens’ policy 
throughout the years. As has been said, the Finnish borders have changed since 1812, but after that 
these movements did not fundamentally change the legal conceptualisation of who is foreign and who is 
Finnish—although the Russification policies attempted to grant equal rights to Russians in Finland 
during Russian rule—according to Leitzinger (2008b, 77-79). Therefore, prior to independence there 
was basic aliens’ policy in place, although this was legally at the decree level. The first decree 
specifically regarding the entry of foreigners to Finland was given in 1811. Yet, as Leitzinger insists, this 
early aliens’ policy formulation was not coherent, because there was no strategic governmental policy 
accepted by the parliament. In fact, until the 1980s the regulation of foreigners was done through 
decrees and not through complete acts of law. Especially during the nineteenth century, aliens’ policy 
consisted of local level application of administrative passport regulations, but Leitzinger has insisted that 
this does not mean that there was no ‘policy’ (Leitzinger 2008b). This assertion is also understandable 
from a Foucaultian governmentality point of view, because the absence of high level policy formulation 
does not mean that there would not have been a rationality to the decision-making. After the 
independence and the brief civil war in 1919, aliens’ policy started gaining more coherence. 
Before independence the residence permit policy was lenient and in the hands of provincial mayors and 
local magistrates. The number of registered foreigners has been estimated to have been somewhere in 
24.000s, if not over 30.000 by the end of the 1920 (Leitzinger 2008b, 100). These numbers do not 
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include those who had been given Finnish nationality, which over the years were numerous. Foreigners 
of Christian faith were simply registered in state church population registers and de facto gained 
residency in a very uncomplicated manner. Even if a residence permit was cancelled, the cancellation 
only applied in that particular province and the foreigner could move to another province. There were 
some agreements in place regarding the deportation of criminals and vagrants and such people could 
find that they would not be granted residence in another province either. Equally, the process of granting 
citizenship lacked all pomp and ceremony in those earlier days. Rather it was a question of local level 
administrative action; of being recorded in church records. There were no general guidelines in this 
regard and provincial authorities followed their own thinking in these matters. It has been estimated that 
before 1856 there had already been 4.000 Finnish citizens who spoke Russian as their mother tongue, 
and during the period of autonomy, there were 3644 registered naturalisations. Overall according to 
Leitzinger, it was not a common practice to give Finnish citizenship to Russians during the era of 
Russian rule, as Russians should have had equal status in Finland in terms of rights and duties, 
especially during the latter Russification periods (1899–1905 and 1908–1917). Altogether, most of those 
(some 57-64%) who did receive citizenship were Russian citizens. According to the statistics, which 
Leitzinger has obtained, between 1832 and 1945 some 14.000 applications for Finnish citizenship were 
accepted (these numbers are not comparable to current volumes as these are numbers of applications 
that could include a whole family in one application (Leitzinger 2008b, 112)). Consequently, what we 
can see is that the settlement of foreigners was not equally problematized during the nineteenth century. 
However, for non-Christians gaining residence was sometimes more difficult: Jews, who were 
persecuted in Russia, suffered also discrimination in Finland, although, according to Leitzinger, not all 
the orders of harassment by the Russian Tsar were carried out in Finland. During the nineteenth century 
especially Jews and the Roma were expelled and were not allowed to settle permanently. The Tatars, 
despite being Islamic often had it easier (Leitzinger 2008b, 225). Before independence there were 
restrictions on other than those of Lutheran religion from acquiring citizenship, but during the early years 
of independence Finland removed all clearly racist restrictions from naturalization policy: in 1917 
restrictions regarding Jews were removed, in 1919 restrictions regarding the Roma and in 1920 the 
restrictions regarding those practicing Muslim and other non-Christian religions (Leitzinger 2008b, 173). 
It has to be noted that there were other grounds of rejecting citizenship and other restrictions on the 
ability of (especially the Roma) to practice citizenship that related to vagrancy, institutionalisation and 
poverty (Mattila 2003) than these merely explicitly racist exclusion policies. That is, gaining citizenship 
did not necessarily mean having civic rights, such as voting rights, which, for example, were often 
denied to the Roma on the basis of vagrancy. 
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A further difference between the earlier and contemporary problematization of immigration is that during 
these early migrations, the distinction between a ‘migrant’ and a ‘refugee’ was not as clear cut as it is 
today. There was no refugee status or definition of it in the law until the early 1920s and it made little 
impact on giving residence status or citizenship whether a person had political, economic or other 
personal motivations for moving (Leitzinger 2008b, 64, 154-155, 173). Especially during the political 
upheaval in Russia during the early years of the twentieth century, the Finnish Grand Duchy had 
functioned as a haven for many political activists—earlier those from the left and later those from the old 
establishment. The fact that Lenin and Stalin had also spent some time in Finland, whilst escaping 
persecution prior to the Russian Revolution, has been attributed as a factor in Finland gaining 
independence in 1917 (Leitzinger 2008b, 155-158). It is because of this that it is difficult to estimate the 
actual numbers of foreigners or refugees in Finland: many stayed in the country with their original 
passports, many were not necessarily logged into church population registries, instead of being 
recorded as refugees many foreigners were simply given alien’s passports when they were not allowed 
to renew their original passports in their embassies (Leitzinger 2008b, 64, 153, 161). Based on his 
study, Leitzinger suspects that in fact 40.000 to 60.000 foreigners might have resided in Finland during 
the autonomy (Leitzinger 2008b, 108). Proportionally this is a significant number, as in 1900 the size of 
the Finnish population was half of what it is today, some 2.6 million. The omission of these numbers 
from immigration history in a way allows the currently common discourse that sees foreigners and 
refugees as something alien and recent in Finnish history.  
 
Immigration after Independence 1917-1945: Refugees and Evacuees 
Even after independence the borders with both Russia and Sweden saw a lot of migration and refugee 
movement. Attitudes regarding border movements did get stricter after independence, especially with 
the Russian political upheaval and with the Finnish civil war, which took place from January to May in 
1918. The Finnish Civil War was sparked by the rebellion of the ‘Reds’, i.e. the Social Democratic and 
Communist parties, who set up their own governing body, the People’s Deputation, against the ‘Whites’ 
of the ruling conservative elite. The Reds were supported by the Russia/Soviet Union and the Whites 
received support from Germany and Sweden. After the civil war, which the ruling Whites did win, the 
relationship with the Communist Russia deteriorated. During the Civil War there were mass expulsions 
of Russians from Finland. In total roughly half of Russians in Finland were expelled and the rest were 
given residence status. Regardless, after the Civil War, the border districts were advised to accept 
refugees from Russian (Leitzinger 2008b, 227-234). It has been estimated that there were some 30.000-
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44.000 mostly Russian, Karelian, Ingrian and Estonian refugees in Finland related to the political 
upheaval in Russia between 1917 and 1939.  
Despite the Civil War, the relations of the various Finnish communist and social democratic parties with 
the Soviet Union were not simple. A lot of the communist Finns, who had moved to the Soviet Union 
after Finnish independence to participate in the building of socialism, had fallen victim to Stalin’s purges. 
This had turned the Finnish socialists against the Soviet Union. This rift was elemental during the 
Second World War when, against the expectations of both the Soviet Union and the Finnish right-wing 
politicians, the Finnish socialists did not fight on the Soviet side. Despite the bloody civil war the country 
united against the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1944. In this sense, the Soviet Union lacked a ‘natural’ ally 
in Finland. Also many of the Ingrians and Karelians, who had taken refuge in Finland during the political 
upheaval in Russia/Soviet Union in the 1920s, fought on the Finnish side in the wars during the Second 
World War (e.g. Hyry 1995, 87-89). This political distrust between Finns and Soviets had an elemental 
role in dictating both the events of the Second World War and the consequent attitudes towards 
migration impacting the aliens’ policy in considerable degree.  
Yet, the attitudes towards Russian migrants during the Russian/Soviet political upheaval in the early 
decades of the twentieth century were more lenient in many ways than attitudes would be later. As 
Leitzinger analyses, this had to do with the two different aspects: first, the fact that most of the refugees 
and migrants coming from Russia/Soviet Union were Karelian, Ingrian or Estonian, i.e. ‘Finnish tribes’. 
Secondly, after Finnish independence, the state authorities expressed more ‘cosmopolitan’ attitudes. 
This attitude environment was also reflected in the already mentioned abolishment of racist restrictions 
to gaining citizenship that had been imposed on Jews, the Roma, Muslims and other non-Christians 
before independence. Yet already during the inter-war period, attitudes started turning more negative 
towards other refugees than Finnish ‘tribal peoples.’ These negative attitudes were especially focused 
on Jewish refugees, despite the fact that their numbers were small in total (Leitzinger 2008b, 171-172). 
As part of the Russian empire, Finland had already had anti-Jewish policies, although as said these 
were not always carried out to the full letter of the law. Although Jews enjoyed full civic rights at this 
stage in Finland, the overall attitude towards Jewish refugees shows, this ‘cosmopolitan’ phase had its 
limits. This can be seen especially in the comments and the ‘successful’ attempt at preventing the 
Jewish refugees from arriving in Finland before the Second World War (Leitzinger 2008b, 185-191), 
which are described in sections 3.3.1. and 4.2.3. of the thesis. 
In many ways, the increased legalisation of asylum and entry processes started with the Jewish 
refugees before World War II: the general Western impetus of not admitting Jews and not recognising 
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them as refugees was pivotal (Leitzinger 2008b, 185-191). At the time, Jews were not considered to be 
expelled ‘state’ or pure ‘political’ refugees that would have deserved protection. This was a regular 
policy in Europe and America: before (and after) the atrocities of the Holocaust were revealed, 
discrimination against the Jews was the order of the day. Regardless of the negative attitudes towards 
Jewish refugees, Finland, despite cooperating with Nazi Germany during World War II, refused to 
participate in the Nazi persecution of Jews (beyond returning eight Jewish refugees into the hands of 
Gestapo) and insisted that there was no ‘Jewish question’ in Finland. Outside the restrictions imposed 
on Jewish refugees, some have even estimated that, if the Second World War is taken into account, 
approximately 100.000 people sought refuge in Finland between 1917 and 1944. Nevertheless, with 
Finland being at war with the Soviet Union, the refugee movement towards Finland diminished after 
1939 and Finland rather became a transition route to the rest of Europe.  
After Finland fought three wars, the Winter War, the Continuation Wars and the War of Lapland, two of 
them with the Soviet Union during the Second World War, the Finnish-Russian borders were redrawn. 
The first war, The Winter War in 1939, was connected to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which was a 
non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany that allowed the Soviet Union to 
invade Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland without German interference. The Finnish pre-war territory 
extended to only 32 kilometres (20 miles) north of the former capital of Leningrad/St. Petersburg (capital 
until 1918), which was considered to pose a geopolitical concern for Russia/the Soviet Union. Before the 
war the Soviet Union made attempts at getting Finland to agree to move the border northward—
covering roughly the areas that had been attached to the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1812 by the 
Russian Tsar and including the economically very active city of Vyborg—in exchange for territories in 
the northern parts of Karelia. Finland did not agree to this, as in contrast some groups in Finland 
harboured desires to extend the border further into the Soviet Karelia without losing any territory (Hentilä 
1999, 96). Failing this route, the Soviet Union attacked Finland in November 1939 (e.g. Doerr 2001). 
The attack was condemned by the League of Nations and plans for joining the war against the Soviet 
Union were formulated by France and Great Britain. Despite the superiority of its military resources the 
Soviet Union did not manage to occupy Finland; a fact that in military literature has been often 
contributed to the lack of skill in the Soviet Army, which had suffered from Stalinist purges, and to the 
non-conventional tactics of the Finnish army—as well as the harsh winter conditions (hence the name 
Winter War) that Soviet troops were unaccustomed to. The Soviet troops were recruited mostly from 
southern states due to the risk of treason, as many Ingrians and Karelians had joined Finnish forces 
and, thus, as soldiers they could have presented a risk. With the escalation of Nazi aggression, plans to 
send military aid to Finland with the UK, France and Sweden were abandoned. After a few months of 
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truce, Finland signed a cooperation treaty with Nazi Germany for military assistance and, after the 
Soviet Union attacked Finland again in 1941, the UK and the Commonwealth countries declared war on 
Finland.  
If on top of the ‘tribal warriors’ from the Soviet Union and Estonia also a few hundred foreign volunteer 
soldiers had joined the Winter War in 1939, Western support was not forthcoming after Nazi Germany 
sent troops to Finland during the Continuation War. Finland did not allow Nazi troops to fight against the 
Soviet Union in the south, but Nazi troops fought along the northern border. Finland was effectively an 
ally of Nazi Germany during the Continuation War, although attempts were made at distinguishing 
Finnish cooperation from allied status. When Finland lost the war to the Soviet Union, Finnish troops 
had to fight the Nazi troops off Finnish soil in the War of Lapland in 1944-1945. Yet, therein, i.e. in the 
initial response by Western countries to the Winter War, on the fact that the US never declared war on 
Finland and that Finland fought off both Russian and German troops from its soil, lies also the reason 
for the Finnish emotional denial of its role as an ally of Nazi Germany and the conceptualisation of the 
Second World War as a delayed war of independence. The defeat has been conceptualised as a 
‘defensive victory’. These wars had important consequences in terms of migrations resulting in the mass 
evacuation and permanent settlement of some 430.000 Karelians in Finland, in some 70.000 Finnish 
children sent as refugees to Sweden mostly and the securitisation of the Finnish-Soviet border. Further, 
in terms of racialising discourses, Russians had become the ‘common enemy number one’. Although 
Finland fought against Nazis in the end, Germans were hardly an object of similar derogatory 
discourses as Russians would be after the Second World War. For many Finns every Russian still 
embodies the policies of Stalin today. In these discourses Lenin, who granted Finland independence, is 
always somehow ‘less Russian’ than Stalin.  
For many of the Karelian and Ingrian ‘tribal warriors’, the end of the war meant deportation to the Soviet 
Union with the likely result being persecution if not death. Due to the forced return, a notion of a ‘debt of 
honour’ toward these Ingrian soldiers was created that functioned as one of the arguments supporting 
the policy of ‘Ingrian return’ migration, that would be one of the key pieces of immigration legislation 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, it has to be noted that the areas of the Karelian Isthmus 
known as Ingria have always remained south of the Finnish border, except when these Ingrian areas 
were under the Swedish Empire in 1617-1721 when Finland was part of Sweden. Hence ‘return’ 
technically is a questionable phrase, except maybe in the case of those Ingrian soldiers or resettled 
individuals who did live long enough under Stalin’s purges to take advantage of the possibility of Ingrian 
immigration. These soldiers and migrants are the only ones who continue to have a right to return under 
the Ingrian return policy even after 2016. 
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The Cold War and the Politicization of Immigration:  Refusal at the Border Due to Foreign 
Relations 
If the Second World War had caused huge migration movements over the Finnish-Russian border 
especially, the emerging geopolitical divide between Communist and Capitalist blocs added another 
layer of politicizing migration. The Cold War put Finland in a peculiarly delicate situation and politicised 
aliens’ policies, especially refugee policy in Finland. Altogether, the experience of having the Finnish 
‘Reds’ turn on the Soviet Union and the inability to occupy Finland during the Second World War clearly 
had implications for the Soviet policy toward Finland during the Cold War. Although Finland had been 
able to maintain its independence and had not been occupied, it was forced to sign a Friendship and 
Cooperation Agreement with the Soviet Union, which, granted, was different from the agreements 
between the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states. Nevertheless, the agreement dictated 
that Finland should remain outside the Cold War super-power rivalry and it provided for consultation 
with the Soviet Union should Soviet military interests be threatened by a Finnish inability or 
unwillingness to defend its own territory against Germany or its allies. The pragmatist/Realist 
compromise, also known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, that Finnish political leaders envisioned in this 
situation, was to allow Finnish foreign policy to be ‘held hostage’ by the Soviet Union in return for 
internal political independence. The Soviet Union even gave up its military base near Helsinki in 1955, 
earlier than the 1994 release date that the Paris Peace Treaty would have required. Consequently, 
Finland escaped the faith of other Eastern European countries and was able to retain its Scandinavian 
societal order. The influence of the Soviet Union on Finnish domestic policy remained very limited, 
although the same cannot be said about Finland’s international relations, which capitulated and 
succumbed to a precarious balancing act between the East and the West for the whole duration of the 
Cold War. If the Second World War had a strong influence on Finnish attitudes towards Russians, the 
Cold War did not necessarily ameliorate them 
The official Finnish foreign policy aimed at maintaining neutrality regarding the political tensions of the 
Cold War in order not to create any geopolitical threats to the Soviet Union and thereby preventing the 
Soviet Union from getting involved in Finnish politics in Finland. The Soviet Union had tried to influence 
internal Finnish politics through supporting socialist parties and organisations since Finnish 
independence from Russia/the Soviet Union in 1917, but had not succeeded as was evidenced by the 
participation of the socialists in the war against the Soviet Union. It tried gaining new ground by 
protesting, for example, against the fact that the Socialist party, which was the largest party, had been 
left out of the government. This crisis, known as the ‘Night Frost’ in 1958-1959, was dissolved when 
President Kekkonen guaranteed that a centre-right government did not jeopardise the neutrality of 
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Finnish foreign policy (which, during the Cold War, was tightly held in the hands of President Kekkonen 
himself). Thereafter, the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union became epitomised in the 
persons of the Presidents Paasikivi (1946-1956, a right-wing conservative politician of the National 
Coalition Party) and Kekkonen (1956-1982, an agrarian Centre Party politician) and relied on their 
personal assurances of the neutrality of Finnish foreign policy. (E.g. Apunen 1977; Lehtonen 1999; Kirby 
2006; Penttilä 2006.) This ‘neutrality’ could also be seen in aliens’ policy. In terms of immigration policy 
this meant that the border with Russia became heavily politicized and heavily guarded and movement 
over the border was practically stopped in comparison to earlier decades.  
When Finnish foreign policy was sacrificed for the independence and democracy of internal politics and 
the issue of immigration and asylum policy was painted in the colours of the Cold War, the possibility 
that political dissidents would attempt to seek asylum in Finland (the only Western European country 
besides NATO-belonging Norway that bordered on the Soviet Union) was made into a foreign policy 
issue. This in itself was nothing new as also during the autonomy, the Russian Governor-General of 
Finland had equally made a political scene over the dissidents residing in Finland (Leitzinger 2008b, 
155-156). But during the Cold War possible refugee ‘flows’ from the Eastern bloc were seen as 
potentially jeopardising the delicate balance of Finnish-Soviet relations. It was deemed that accepting 
political refugees from the Soviet bloc would have entailed making political statements regarding Soviet 
domestic policy. Tellingly, Finnish Presidents received memos of any political asylum seekers crossing 
the Finnish-Soviet border. Thus, the question of refugees from the Communist bloc—who would now be 
called ‘defectors’ rather than persecuted political activists—would fall under the same auspices of 
policies held hostage by the Cold War. 
During the Cold War Finland’s asylum policy did not have a good reputation. Western countries 
suspected that Finland had an official agreement with the Soviet Union to return all asylum applicants, 
although according to Leitzinger (who has been employed by the Immigration Services for years and 
has had access to their old records when doing his research) there was no such agreement. Yet, his 
study sheds light on the unofficial ways in which the policy of returning ‘defectors’ was motivated by 
foreign policy, but often the motivation was, on one hand, a suspicion of Russian spies posing as 
asylum seekers/’defectors’ or, on the other hand, a suspicion of anti-communist asylum seekers being in 
fact agents provocateur set to infiltrate Russian emigrant or anti-communist circles in Finland. Between 
these suspicions little room was left for genuine ‘defectors’, as Leitzinger notes. Between 1945 and 
1949 Finland returned all the 70 ‘defectors’ from the Soviet Union, for example, and in 1952-1956 the 
authorities suspected that almost all ‘defectors’ had been spies. (Leitzinger 2008b, 271-273.)  
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Whatever the reasons, Leitzinger mentions that in 1947-1981 about 149 refugees ‘defected’ from the 
Soviet Union, and 114 of them were returned back (Leitzinger 2008b, 213). As with the many ‘Soviet 
citizens’ that were returned after the war, there were no guarantees regarding the faith of the people 
returned. Consequently, due to the risk of deportation many of the foreigners entering Finland and 
seeking asylum did consider it wiser to continue to other countries before seeking asylum. In fact this 
policy was silently supported by Finnish authorities (Leitzinger 2008b, 216-217). The authorities 
described their asylum policy in internal communications more in passive terms: ‘defectors’ were not 
mentioned to the Soviet authorities unless they specifically asked about individuals, but rather 
‘defectors’ were advised to continue to Sweden and apply for asylum there. Also there was an unofficial 
policy to give alien’s passports to those that could not return or renew their (Soviet or other) passports, 
but these figures were not included in refugee statistics. Often ‘defectors’ with Finnish alien’s passports, 
would continue to other West European countries where their ‘defection’ was looked upon as positive 
political currency. Consequently, it is not surprising that the government’s secret records of asylum 
seekers were higher than the public ones still in the 1980s (Leitzinger 2008b, 220). It can be estimated 
that besides the year 1962 when over 2000 alien’s passports were granted to those Ingrians and 
Eastern Karelians, who had remained in Finland after the war, around 1500 aliens’ passports were 
given between 1963-1973 (Leitzinger 2008b, 217-218).137 
The administrative arrangements around immigration tell their own story about how migration was 
conceptualised. The administration of immigration-related issues had been handled under the Passport 
office in the Security Intelligence Services before 1949. A special Aliens’ Office was founded in 1949 
and moved under the Ministry of the Interior, which today functions under the name of Finnish 
Immigration Services (Leitzinger 2008b). At the same time, the monitoring of foreigners was assigned to 
the police and the Finnish Security Intelligence Services—Helsinki was, after all, one of the hot spots of 
spying during the Cold War. In the Aliens Act the politicisation of aliens’ policy could be seen in the legal 
possibility of preventing entry or deporting aliens due to foreign policy interests. The right to prevent 
entry from and return people who are deemed to jeopardise Finland’s foreign relations is still in force, 
although the right to deport immigrants based on foreign policy interests was removed in 2007. It was 
only after the end of the Soviet Union, in 1991, that some aspects of refugee policy and integration 
issues were moved from under the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for domestic security, 
and placed under the Ministry of Labour (Lepola 2000, 40-45; Aliens Act § 37 and 40, Finnish State 
22.2.1991) speaking of an envisioned change in the nature of immigration policy towards labour market 
                                                     
137 These figures are based on available statistics from 1946-1950 and 1961-1973. The figures for 1951-1960 are lost 
according to Leitzinger.  
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needs. In case of employment–based immigration, it is the agencies of the Ministry of Labour that have 
the right to decide whether there is a labour market need for foreign employees. Whilst immigration 
policy largely remained under the Ministry of Interior with a consolidation of residence permit decisions 
being taken away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, integration policy remained under the Ministry of 
Labour since its conception in 1999 until 2009, when also the responsibility for the integration policy was 
transferred to the Ministry of Interior.  
This fact that refugee policy was allowed to be politicized in this manner did not parallel Finland’s desire 
to be a credibly neutral ‘Western’ and ‘Nordic’ country. The refugee policy attracted international 
criticism. To combat the notion of ‘Finlandisation’, something had to be done. Also aliens’ policy 
functioned as a convenient way of increasing internationalisation and the credibility of the claim to 
neutrality. Finland set to negotiate many bilateral agreements of visa free travel in order to increase 
tourism and to provide foreigners with an ability to witness the ‘Western-ness’ of Finland. As Leitzinger 
notes, during the Cold War Finland had the freest visa policy in Europe and the Finnish passport still 
offers one of the best visa-free entry rights in the world. More importantly, failing the neutrality test 
towards ‘defectors’ from the Soviet bloc, Finland sought another direction in the 1970s. Besides active 
foreign policy initiatives to improve multilateral solutions in a bilateral world, the United Nations 
functioned as one of the key organisations of legitimising an active Finnish foreign policy. The ‘Third 
World’ development policy was equally politicized by the Cold War divide, but re-legitimised through 
cooperation with the UN. The opportunity for further developing the foreign policy identity as a small, 
neutral Scandinavian country created a chance for resisting the pressures of the neutrality discourse 
influencing the policy towards Eastern European refugees, which lead to a focus on Third World aid and 
the refugee crisis in Finland (Koponen 1999). In the late 1960s Finnish refugee policy started gearing 
towards the ‘neutral’, UN-sanctioned quota refugee policy organised under the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
Finland signed up to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention only in 1968—which also explains 
the lack of a legal requirement to consider the safety of returning ‘defectors’ from the Soviet Union. After 
that Finland accepted some 180 refugees from Chile in the 1970s and in 1979 and 1983 from Vietnam. 
It was not until 1983 that an Aliens Act was formulated that started conceptualising asylum seeking not 
as a foreign political problem but as a humanitarian issue, Salmio asserts. Finland started regularly 
accepting quota refugees under UNHCR in 1985. (Salmio 2000.) The quota refugee system relies on 
refugee status recognised by the UNHCR and upon arrival quota refugees are granted the ‘actual’ 
Geneva refugee status. Under the system participating countries select refugees for resettlement 
directly from UNHCR-run refugee camps without additional asylum investigations. In 1986 a quota for 
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UNHCR-refugees was formed, which was initially set at 100 and rose to 750 per annum in the following 
years. Quota refugees are thus a separate category from asylum seekers. On top of the quota refugees, 
the numbers of official asylum applications in Finland were small during the Cold War, only about 300 
between 1964 and 1989 (Leitzinger 2008b, 219).  
Summa summarum, during the Cold War both the level of foreigners in Finland and the numbers of 
those given Finnish citizenship decreased considerably in comparison to 1918-1945 (Leitzinger 2008b, 
103-104 and 109-116) as Chart 3 below shows. During the Cold War immigration was mostly limited to 
foreign spouses of Finnish nationals and it was common to refuse entry to foreigners at the border 
before they had a possibility even to submit an asylum application (e.g. Lepola 2000, ch. 3). In 1946-
1979 only a little short of 12.400 foreigners were given Finnish citizenship. Thus, in comparison to many 
other European countries, which experienced an increase in work-related migration from the 1950s 
onwards, in Finland the numbers of immigrants decreased in comparison to previous levels. As can be 
remembered from Chart 1 and be seen in Chart 3, it was only in the 1970s that immigration started 
 
Chart 3. Foreigners in Finland 1920-2010. (Source: Statistics Finland). 
increasing slightly, but the levels of pre-war immigration were not reached before the 1990s. Certainly 
the psychological and factual ‘tightness’ of the border to the Soviet Union has had a generational impact 
on why immigration seems like a ‘new’ phenomena in Finland. What this psychological impact created in 
terms of policy and the problematization of immigration shall be discussed next. 
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Post-Cold War Immigration Policy: General Trends 
The difference between how immigration was politicized during the Cold War and how it became 
politicized with the increasing population movements after the Cold war, from the 1990s onwards, is 
considerable. After the Cold War immigration policy was quickly transformed into one of the key societal 
policies. In general, during the 1990s, immigration policy changed from being an ‘administrative tool’ 
functioning as a guide for officials to handle the entry of foreigners to being an actual governmental 
policy. In 1999 immigration policy was officially defined as a ‘proactive’ policy with policy aims. In 1997 
the government had already given its first policy paper on immigration, which at this stage focused on 
refugee policy—as independently arriving asylum seekers had become a new phenomenon during the 
1990s. Outside Ingrian return policy, it is only during the 2000s that immigration policy can be 
characterised as becoming part of employment policy (e.g. Finnish Ministry of the Interior 30.4.2008). In 
2006 the next government drafted a new policy paper that focused more on employment-based 
immigration, because of increasing concerns over the diminishing workforce with the large retiring post-
War generation. The government had for long worried over the lack of work-related immigration, which 
typically formed about 5-10% of all immigration to Finland in recent years. The rest of immigration is 
mainly return immigration, refugees or family reunification. It is estimated that in the next 15 years the 
active workforce will diminish by some 10% (or by some 265.000 people). At the same time the number 
of pensioners and other dependent people will increase by 35% creating a considerable tax burden for 
the diminished workforce (Tilastokeskus - Statistics Finland; e.g. Jaakkola 2009, 11). The financial crisis 
after 2008, however, has prolonged the implementation of the intention to obliterate labour market 
consideration from granting employment based residence permits and the 2011 election victory by the 
(True) Finns may have buried the intention altogether. Since 2008 immigration policy has been one of 
the key focuses of political debate. In the 2000s different parties, the (True) Finns leading the way, 
would formulate their own immigration policy agendas. The political concern over immigration has 
resulted in governmental reports and legislative changes that have touched upon different aspects of 
the existence of foreigners in Finland.  
Since 1990 there have been many legislative changes to the Aliens’ Act. The 1983 Aliens’ Act had been 
rewritten in 1991. At this stage, the act was still rather simple and short until EU membership introduced 
different categories of foreigners in 1993, on top of Nordic citizens who already had separate 
regulations. Since then Finnish immigration law has been changed due to the developing EU 
immigration policy cooperation many times. During the Finnish Presidency of the European Union in 
1999 the work on common migration policy was started in the European Union. Although the 
coordination of immigration policies has gone ahead rather slowly due to the diverse interests of the 
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Member States, EU cooperation has offered chances of domestic policy formulation and re-politicization 
of immigration law in Finland. EU membership naturally impacted the immigration law fundamentally, 
but I shall not discuss these changes, as the provisions for free movement for EU citizens are a well-
known prerequisite to membership. In this Appendix I shall merely discuss the influence of EU policy on 
Finnish immigration legislation as far it relates to third country nationals or to changing rights for EU 
citizens in terms of implementation of the acquis communautaire after the 1995 joining of the EU. There 
have been also many domestically-initiated changes. After 1991 the Act was changed over 20 times 
before it was rewritten again in 2004. These changes and the increasing complexity of the Aliens’ Act 
resulted partially from the incorporation of decree level regulations into law as well as from the impetus 
of restricting immigration, especially asylum seeking. Further, the Aliens’ Act is not the only law relevant 
to aliens’ policy, but also the Citizenship Act and the Integration Act are relevant. The changes to these 
two laws are few and have been discussed exhaustively in the thesis already. Therefore, I shall not 
repeat these issues here. Also other laws relating to the status of foreigners in Finland have been 
changed since the early 1990s, and I shall discuss these briefly where significant. But mainly the 
amendments to these laws have been discussed in the thesis in such depth that reiterating them here is 
limited. I will now proceed to outline the changes to the Finnish immigration policies towards foreigners 
in a more chronological manner by presenting the more substantial amendments made to these acts by 
examining the changes made to certain policies such as the Ingrian return policy, refugee policy or 
policy towards third-country nationals.  
 
Ingrian Return Policy 1990-2016 
After the end of the Cold War, the Ingrian return policy was one of the first legislative changes impacting 
Finnish immigration patterns. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, political room for the development 
of a discourse on the ‘return of the Ingrians’ from the ex-Soviet Union was created and the historical 
migrations over the Finnish-Russian border restarted (Leitzinger 2008). The initiative for the formulation 
of an Ingrian return policy came from the Finnish president Mauno Koivisto in April 1990. In the 
parliamentary discussion of the issue references to ‘a debt of honour’ and the ‘right of return to the 
promised fatherland’ were made. In the discourses Ingrians were re-conceptualised from ‘Soviets’ to 
‘Finns’ and their ‘return’—although as has been pointed Ingrians had not lived in Finland beyond the 
population movements during the World Wars—was initially discursively constructed as a historical 
continuation of the ‘repatriation’ or ‘return of ‘Finns’ from the wrong side of the border’. As has been 
seen, the discursively ordered status of Ingrian Finns has fluctuated throughout history in Finland: On 
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the one hand, before World War II, i.e. before Finland lost parts of the Karelian territory to the Soviet 
Union as war reparation, the Ingrians and Eastern Karelians residing outside Finnish territorial borders 
had been registered as ‘foreigners’ in the Finnish population register, although Ingrians or East 
Karelians did not require a residence permit to stay in Finland. (E.g. Lepola 2000, 96-108.)  
Ingrian immigration started in the early 1990s through decree level instructions given to the officials in 
charge. In 1993 the immigration of Ingrian Finns was enabled by adding a clause about ‘Finnish origins’ 
being a sufficient reason for granting a residence permit. In 1990 President Koivisto had specified that 
‘Finnishness’ in this sense applied only to Ingrians and not to other ‘Finnish tribes’. Officially the policy 
was incorporated into the Aliens’ Act in 1996. The law stipulates a right of return for those who had 
served in the Finnish army or who were deported to the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Also, 
those whose parents or grandparents had been designated as ‘Finnish’ in Soviet passports could 
immigrate to Finland without the normal requirement of being able to support oneself financially. It is 
relevant to note the policy’s similarity to the German policy of ‘returning’ those who can demonstrate 
biological ‘Germanness’. The return policy is also said to be connected to the labour shortages in 1989-
1990 before the harsh depression that hit Finland after the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
Since 1990, the Ingrian return policy has seen some major changes, the most important being its 
termination by 2016. In 1991 it had been agreed that Ingrians would be granted continuous permits 
regardless of the immigrant’s possible temporary intentions of residing in Finland, thus excluding them 
from the regular examination of ‘intention to stay’ before granting a right to municipality and to services 
and benefits. With continuous permit they were eligible for social benefits. It was also decided that 
having one grandparent who was registered as Finnish in the Soviet Union was a sufficient condition for 
granting entry, which is why the Ingrian return policy was initially treated as a matter of general ex-
patriot return policy. This was changed in 1996, when the policy was formulated as a law and made 
stricter. At this stage it was decided that two grandparents needed to have been registered as Finnish in 
order for Russian or Estonian citizens to qualify as ‘Ingrians’. As said, Ingrians have been exempted 
from income requirements. However, this right extended also to spouses and not only to children as in 
the case of other ex-patriots and in this sense the Ingrian return policy was more beneficial than that 
reserved for other ex-patriots.  
The Ingrian policy was tightened again in 2003. This time the grounds for establishing ‘another 
connection to Finland’ were specified strictly and the requirement of Finnish or Swedish skills was 
established—something which is not required from other ex-patriots. If Ingrians had been required to 
attend orientation training in Finnish embassies already before, now the system of registering as a 
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returnee was formalised and the passing of language tests was made compulsory making spontaneous 
immigration impossible. In addition, unlike for any other immigrant category, having arranged for 
permanent accommodation was imposed as a prerequisite of granting residence permits. Also the 
definition of family was limited so, that children of Ingrian immigrants needed to be under 18 at the time 
of granting the residence permit—something that would later be applied to TCN children in general. In 
2011, the Ingrian return policy was all but terminated in practice. By establishing a five-year interval 
during which those, who had already registered as returnees could fulfil the entry requirements, any 
further Ingrian return was limited to those who had actually served in the Finnish army during the 
Second World War or had resided in Finland during 1943-1944 and had thereafter been returned to the 
Soviet Union. Also, in comparison, if in the beginning Ingrians were treated the same as those with 
‘Finnish ancestry’, i.e. those who had one grandparent that was a native Finn, today Ingrians do not 
qualify as having Finnish ancestry, because the requirement is that the grandparent must have been 
born in Finland—which Ingrians as  a group have not been. (Finnish Government 10.05.1996: HE 
56/1996; 27.09.2002: HE 160/2002; 12.11.2010: HE 252/2010.)  
With the Ingrian return policy the numbers of these Ingrian ‘Russians’ and ‘Estonians’ in Finland started 
to increase. During the 1990s much of the non-Finnish ‘white’ immigration was due to Ingrian return. 
(Once in Finland, the Ingrians are statistically identified as either Russian or Estonian because of their 
passports and before they are eligible to apply for Finnish citizenship.) At the moment Russians are the 
single largest group of foreigners in Finland (approx. 26.000 people) (e.g. Nylund-Oja et al. 1995b, 175-
176). The number of Russian speakers in Finland, estimated by The Family Federation of Finland 
(Väestöliitto), numbers around 60.000 containing both those with a foreigner’s status and those with a 
Finnish passport. The integration of these new minorities is varied. In the case of Russians integration 
has proved itself to be a discursively contested field (e.g. Pentikäinen and Hiltunen 1995, 7): On the one 
hand, there are calls for the provision of Russian language schooling by the state. This call is linked to 
the aforementioned Finnish language policy, which defines Finnish and Swedish as the two official 
languages, and gives protection to other minority languages. On the other hand, the discursive field is 
characterised by lamentations about ‘the Ingrians actually being Russian and not Finnish’, i.e. in this 
discourse it is assumed that the Russification policies of the Soviet Union have turned the Ingrians into 
‘Russians’, which is thought to be marked by the loss of Finnish language skills and by having ‘non-
Finnish’ concepts of societal functioning etc. Whilst such historical factors were acknowledged in the 
initial formulations of the policy, in the later amendments this ‘Russian character’ is what became 
problematized in official documents. 
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Refugee Policy 1991-2010 
Racism or ‘prejudices’ against the Russians are not the only attitudes informing immigration policy. As 
the Introduction discusses, if the increase of immigration to Finland was initiated by the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, the arrival of the Somali asylum-seekers to Finland started making skin colour an issue in 
Finland. Before the arrival of Somalis in the early 1990s, the uptake of refugees had been managed in 
terms of long-term planning and selection under the procedures of the UNHCR annual quota system: 
from the date of approving refugees into the quota, it could be years before their actual arrival. When 
the Somalis started arriving ‘independently’ via the Soviet Union,138 the notion of ‘uncontrollable floods 
of asylum seekers’ started surfacing in the media and political discussions. The initial governmental 
intention of returning Somali asylum seekers and refusing entry at the border without giving a possibility 
for asylum application (Aallas 1991; Lepola 2000, 78-83) was, of course, made legally impossible by 
Finnish participation in the Geneva Refugee Convention, and the fact that the Soviet Union/Russia was 
not a signatory to the treaty. Since then especially the Council of Europe and the European Court of 
Human Rights, with its attempt to extend the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms to all those residing in the participating countries, and the common EU immigration policy 
framework have had an impact, beyond the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees in Finland. 
Legally, the refugee policy has been influenced both by the domestic impetus of limiting the number of 
asylum seekers and the requirements of international and European law. 
Since the early 1990s, the number of independently arriving asylum seekers has increased to a few 
thousand a year. The Aliens’ Act has since then seen many changes contributing towards the tightening 
of refugee policy. To the government bill resulting in the new 1991 Aliens’ Act the parliament had 
already added stipulations on the speedier treatment of ‘obviously groundless’ asylum applications, thus 
tightening the refugee provisions due to the arrival of a few thousand Somali asylum seekers. In 1992 
these provisions were quickly tightened further by adding the policy of safe countries through which 
those asylum seekers, who had passed through ‘safe countries’ could be returned without taking their 
applications under material investigation. The amendment was explicitly voiced as an intention to send a 
message to would-be asylum seekers, reaffirming the principle that asylum seekers cannot freely 
choose the country from which protection is sought, thus aiming to reduce applications and to save 
money. At the same time the provisions for deportation were reinforced, as it was seen that the non-
                                                     
138 The initial reasons for the Somalis to arrive to Finland were related to the fall of the socialist regime in Somalia (although 
this regime was not supported by the Soviet Union). Nevertheless, there were educational ties as well as a flight from 
Mogadishu to Moscow, from where it was easy to fly or take a train or a ferry to Finland. Some of the first Somalis arriving 
in Finland were students or elites asking for political asylum after the fall of the socialist regime in Somalia. In addition, 
Finland had given developmental aid to Somalia and hence, the name of the country was known to many Somalis fleeing 
the deteriorating conditions in their native country (Aallas 1991). 
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refoulement provisions made expulsion too cumbersome and costly. The law was changed so that 
asylum seekers arriving from safe countries could be returned immediately without a chance of 
challenging the decision. Also the possibility of adding an entry-ban to a return and deportation decision 
was provided for. Further, it was agreed that a deportation order could be implemented even if the 
applicant had challenged the decision in the courts. These measures followed the urge felt in the early 
1990s to return Somali asylum applicants from the border without investigating their applications. 
Additionally, with the aim of preventing the arrival of undocumented foreigners, as well as the 
exploitation and trafficking of foreigners under duress, the early 1990s also saw the institutionalisation of 
the procedure of fingerprinting asylum applicants. With the same aim, arranging the arrival of foreigners 
without required permits was criminalized and the carrier’s responsibilities for returning foreigners at 
their own cost were reinforced. All in all, the immediate political and legislative reaction to the arrival of 
Somali asylum seekers was negative and high-handed.  
The asylum application numbers had come down in 1995 to under a thousand and in the mid-1990s 
immigration policy changes focused mostly on EU-related policy issues, some of which also impacted 
on asylum seekers. For example, the restrictions on travel for people from certain countries from which 
asylum seekers were mostly coming (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ghana, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Somalia, 
Sri Lanka and Zaire) were further increased under EC law through airport transfer visas in 1997. The 
Dublin regulations, establishing the principle of assigning the first country through which an asylum 
seeker enters the EU as the country responsible for processing the asylum application, were 
incorporated into the Finnish law also in 1997. At the same time, however, the overzealous restrictions 
were toned down somewhat. The provisions for appealing for negative asylum decisions and 
deportation decisions were increased, because of international law and EU recommendations. Whilst 
deportation at this stage could be executed without the appeal having been decided on (except in the 
case of an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court), the provisions for appeal were changed 
significantly by enlarging the scope of decisions that could be challenged. The letter of the law did not 
necessarily change the actual practice or administrative culture around appeal, but rather the 
significance that the Immigration Services gave to the decisions of the Administrative Courts would be 
negotiated in the years to come.  
This negotiation around appeal and subsequently granting residence permits or citizenship has not been 
easy and the notion of the rule of law has sometimes been missing. The Ombudsman of the Parliament 
has had to assert the supremacy of the (Supreme) Administrative Court’s decision over Immigration 
Service’s opinion many times.  In 1998 the Ombudsman cautioned the Immigration Services for ignoring 
the Administrative Court’s decision to overrule their denial of citizenship based on the number of traffic 
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violations that a professional bus driver had committed (EOAK 1417/1998). In 2004 the Ombudsman 
responded to a complaint around a case in which the Administrative Court had reversed the Immigration 
Service’s negative asylum decision, but the Immigration Services were nevertheless dragging their feet 
and attempting to re-investigate the application instead of implementing the Court’s decision (EOAH 
1434/2004). In 2004 the Immigration Services were reproached for deporting a new-born child entitled 
to Finnish citizenship at birth (EOAH 1977/2004). In 2005 the Immigration Services were reprimanded 
for procrastinating the implementation of the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision and attempting to 
re-investigate issues it had itself already made a positive decision on before the appeal (EOAK 
301/2005). In 2007 the Ombudsman needed to reprimand the Immigration Services for ignoring the 
decision of the Supreme Administrative Court to grant citizenship to a refugee’s child and asserted that 
the re-investigation jeopardised the safety of the refugee’s family and was, in principle, against the rule 
of law and asserted again that the role of the Immigration Services after the court’s decision was to 
implement the court’s decision and not to re-investigate (EOAK 3565/2007). In 2010 again the 
Immigration Services re-investigated the fulfilment of income security related to a residence permit 
application and ordered the deportation of the applicants despite the fact that the Administrative Court 
had already decided that the Immigration Services had not had any bases, in this case, for denying a 
residence permit based on income security to start with (EOAH 2140/2010). That is, the Ombudsman 
has had to insist on the rule of law and the subsequent insignificance of the opinion of the Immigration 
Services after the courts have ruled on the appeal and overruled their decisions. However, it has to be 
said that the Immigration Services are not alone in expressing such disregard, but the validity of 
international conventions and the rule of law are questioned also in some statements in the Finnish 
Parliament, as is shown in the thesis. 
These illiberal attitudes can be seen in the tightening restrictions against refugees. Especially the turn of 
the century saw a lot of activity around immigration policy and some of it focused around restricting 
family reunification. Refugee status, which had earlier applied to the family members of the ‘actual’ 
Geneva refugee, was removed from family members, unless they themselves were in need of 
protection, thus impacting the rights and protection granted to them. This regulation had, for example, 
implications for the above mentioned Ombudsman’s reprimand in 2007 to investigate a refugee’s 
spouse who had not been given refugee status for his/her relationship status and the possibility to grant 
citizenship to a child in the country of origin. Because the wife had not been given a refugee status 
although her husband had refugee status, the Immigration Services did not deem it necessary to protect 
her and her child vis-à-vis the authorities of the country of origin. In addition, in 1999 a requirement of 
considering if the family was able to relocate to another country to spend family life was added to the 
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family reunification clause indicating the direction that considering family reunification applications 
should take. In the 2000s biopolitical measures were incorporated into the Aliens’ Act. These measures 
are applied in situations in which reliable documentation is missing; hence they mainly apply to 
refugees. In 2000 a retroactive clause instituting DNA-testing into family reunification decisions was 
added to combat fraudulent applications. The tests are paid for by the state in cases in which there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that there is an actual biological family relation but official documentation 
is missing. In such cases the DNA-testing is voluntary, but refusal nevertheless constitutes grounds for 
denying family reunification. In cases in which the state decides that there is not enough evidence of 
existing family relations, the applicants can challenge a negative decision by paying for DNA-testing 
themselves. Consequently, DNA-testing can function as a positive means of proving family relation, 
although biological family relations are not always sufficient as a reason to grant family reunification. 
(Helén and Tapaninen 2013) These measures would be supplemented by biopolitical age definition 
measures, but only a decade later.  In 2010 refugees’ asylum rights and family reunification rights of 
refugees were tightened further. The practice of forensic age verification—especially aimed at 
unaccompanied underage children—was instituted despite its scientific unsoundness. Also the right of 
family reunification that was granted to foster children required that these foster children be under 18 on 
the date of the permit decision—and not on the date of the application. Further, the refugee’s or 
protected person’s family reunification rights were limited so that the freedom from income 
considerations would apply only to families formed before international protection had been granted. 
The early 2000s had seen also other restrictive changes. In 2000 the provisions for treating ‘evidently 
groundless’ asylum applications, which tended to last 5-16 months at this stage, were augmented by the 
so called ‘speedy removal’ measures that stipulate that, when the asylum application ‘evidently’ does 
not provide evidence that under the Geneva Convention would count as reasons for seeking asylum or 
when a person is coming from/through a safe country or when the person ‘evidently’ attempts to misuse 
the asylum process, the asylum seeker can be returned to the country of origin or departure without 
having to materially investigate the asylum application any further. In this regard the Finnish immigration 
policy chose a strict line. In comparison, in a few other EU countries at this stage even a less than a 
three-month stay in a safe country did not necessarily constitute ‘coming from a safe country’ although 
some countries applied similarly strict definitions of a safe country. The aim of this change was to avoid 
the lengthy appeal process during which the asylum seeker could not be removed. Speedy removal was 
organised through accelerated processing of applications: after the asylum hearing was completed the 
Immigration Services would need to decide on the application inside seven days. However, the negative 
decision containing a removal order was at this stage automatically subjected to the Administrative 
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Court that was designated the responsibility of assessing the validity of the negative asylum decision 
inside seven days. ‘Speedy return’ was demarcated to signify return no sooner than after eight days of 
receiving the negative decision from the Administrative Court. The law was also changed so that an 
appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court would not prevent deportation and a renewed application 
would not be materially investigated unless it contained new evidence. This policy has been subject to 
intense criticism in the Finnish Parliament, but no government has changed it since then. In itself 
speedy return is accepted by the UNHCR as a measure aimed at securing the protection of ‘actual’ 
refugees in need of protection. This reason and the notion of saving money as well as general EU 
immigration policy goals were used to justify accelerated processing of applications in Finland. Much 
quicker accelerated procedures are also in place in most other EU countries and in most the courts are 
not involved in affirming validity or handling appeals.   
Yet, there were also changes towards a more lenient direction during the 1990s. In 1999, the wording of 
the refugee clauses was changed so that the notion that granting asylum was an option—that is ‘could 
be granted’ if the criteria were fulfilled—was replaced by an obligation to grant asylum (‘will be granted’) 
in such situations. This was due to a specific problematization of the wording of the law by certain 
parties. Relating to the accelerated procedure the handling of asylum hearings was removed from the 
police or border control officials and given to the Immigration Services. If earlier it had been deemed that 
the police held the correct interrogation skills, now it was deemed more efficient that the person making 
the decision would also conduct the hearing. In addition, it was retrospectively required that possibilities 
of gaining another type of residence permit would be investigated and that asylum seekers would be 
questioned about their feelings about being removed and banned from re-entering the country. Yet, it 
was deemed that for conducting the initial interview, in which the identity and travel route of the asylum 
seeker were investigated, police pre-trial techniques of investigation were still essential for preventing 
the abuse of the asylum system. Asylum seekers were also given a right to work after the first three 
months as a measure to combat the notion that asylum seekers abused the benefit system. This would 
be changed in 2010 when it was stipulated that those who could not prove their identity would obtain the 
right to work only after six months. Because of international critique and domestic concerns the notion 
that a child’s interest needed to be taken into account was added to immigration law in 1999 indicating 
also that, where possible, a child over 12 years of age would need to be heard about issues relating to 
him/her. However, the implementation of this clause can be questioned. Combined with the rule of 
considering whether the family can reunite in a third country, as the Immigration Services’ instructions 
note, this can mean that the child’s interest—for unaccompanied children especially—would be that the 
child would be returned to the country where his/her parents reside instead of granting family 
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reunification in Finland. Further on the liberal side, in 2000, the application of the aforementioned safe 
country principle, which allows the return of asylum seekers if they come through/from a safe country, 
was limited by adding a requirement that this safe country needs to actually apply international 
conventions in practice, i.e. not merely be a signatory to them. Additionally, a requirement that 
Immigration Services decisions would need to include information on the appeal process in its decisions 
was added to the law in 2000.  
Before the 2004 revamp of the Aliens’ Act, regulations relating to temporary protection were added. 
Temporary protection is designed for situations of mass exodus when it can be estimated that the need 
of international protection is short. Temporary protection is based on an EU directive (2001/55/EC) and 
does not constitute protection given under the Geneva Convention for Refugees. Temporary protection 
does not require individual need of protection, but is based on general need of protection that prevent 
return and it grants immediate family reunification (not paid for) and the right to work, but includes only 
restricted right to benefits. Temporary protection is granted without material asylum investigation, that is, 
the investigation of the asylum application is suspended. Maximum period of temporary protection is 
three years after which the asylum application will need to be individually inspected. However, the 
application of this law requires that the government indicate the countries to whose nationals this clause 
can be applied, and the Finnish government has not done this in the case of Syria, for example, but has 
insisted on taking a few hundred Syrian refugees under the UNHCR quota structure (who, however, are 
then given the ‘actual’ Geneva refugee status). 
The rewriting of the Aliens’ Law in 2004 focused mainly on codifying decrees and administrative rules 
into law, which was required by the new constitution that went into force in 2000 and stipulated that all 
limitations to basic rights, which also apply to foreigners according to the constitution, had to be 
legislated at the level of law. The amendment was also done to improve the rule of law by clarifying the 
law, specifying the responsibilities of various authorities, affirming the appeals process and the limits of 
interpretation as well to narrow the possibilities of misusing the entry and asylum regulations. The 
changes focusing on refugee policy were limited. Most importantly the Ombudsman of Minorities’ right to 
be heard automatically about individual asylum applications, removal, deportation and detention was 
limited to situations of explicit request to be heard on issues relating to an asylum seeker or deportation. 
Also regulations on granting temporary residence permits to those who could not be removed or 
deported from the country were added to the law, which affects the foreigner’s rights to services. In 
general, the asylum policy itself was largely left intact until 2009, except in 2006 the rights of 
unaccompanied children were compromised by requiring refugee reception centres run by the Red 
Cross to provide confidentially obtained information about the identity and family members of asylum-
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seeking unaccompanied children to the police, border control agency and the Immigration Services to 
assist them in their decision-making and tracking down the child’s family. Even when the statements 
made by various ministries and the Red Cross were highly negative citing serious concern over the 
violation of confidentiality and children’s right and over the employment of unqualified social workers in 
asylum investigations, the parliament passed the law without discussion. Similar requirements of 
passing confidential information to the Immigration Services had been placed on social and health 
authorities in the case of sponsor’s family reunification applications already in 2004.  
In 2009 the EU directive on minimum standards of asylum (2004/83/EC) was implemented in Finland. 
The significant impact of the directive related, not to the change of vocabulary that it introduced to the 
four different categories of protection provided, but to the inclusion of the definitions of persecution and 
harm (with examples), specified reasons for persecution and widened definition of persecutors (not just 
state but in-country organisations and parties also) in the letter of the law. As is indicated in the thesis 
and in Appendix 2, this common EU asylum policy has impacted the way Finland grants asylum by 
increasing the number of ‘actual refugee’ or ‘Geneva refugee statuses’ and 4-year secondary protection 
permits granted. The procedural aspects of the asylum application process had been reinforced already 
in 2004, but again in 2009 some new specifications were added. In addition to inquiring about the 
applicant’s feelings about being returned given an entry ban in different situations, the authorities were 
required to inform asylum seekers of the application process, of their right to submit another application 
(upon the lapsing of the application) and the authorities were required to ensure that the information 
used to decide the application is up-to-date. 
 
Border Control, Carrier Sanctions and Detention of Foreigners 1991-2011 
The largest changes relating to asylum seeking have to do with carrier sanctions. The 2004 
amendments included the incorporation of the EU directive on carrier sanctions (2001/51/EC). This 
policy in itself was nothing new. The 1991 immigration act had already included limited carrier sanctions. 
For decades carriers were held responsible for transporting foreigners who were refused entry at the 
border, if need be, at their own expense. Carriers were also required to compensate for the expenses 
accrued by the state, if the foreigner had managed to exit the means of transport without appropriate 
documents. In this sense, the additional carrier sanctions relating to the Schengen area introduced in 
2004 were not new in terms of the logic of governing immigration. Finland had criminalised the 
organisation of entry for people without required right of entry in 1993, but in case of carriers’ monetary 
sanctions, these had not been applied in practice, according to the government. The Schengen 
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agreement had been incorporated into Finnish law already in 2001, which incorporated rules relating to 
carrier responsibilities regarding passenger documentation, affirming right of entry and transporting 
passengers whose entry had been refused at the carrier’s own expense. The directive on carrier 
sanctions harmonised the level of sanctions imposed on carriers by adding an additional 3.000 € penalty 
for failing to ascertain that the foreigner has the valid documentation for entering a Schengen country. 
The directive insisted on the application of the directive also in practice. Regulations were also tightened 
by adding the return of failed asylum seekers (and not just those returned during the first three months) 
to the carrier’s responsibilities. Although sanctions would be withdrawn, if the person obtained 
international protection, the regulations nevertheless reinforced the transition of asylum seeker 
transportation to the black market in practice. Related to carrier sanctions, the regulations criminalizing 
the arrangement of illegal entry were further tightened in line with EU policy cooperation and directive on 
(2002/90/EC) by adding a category of serious offence in 2004. After this the regulations have mainly 
remained the same.    
Also the regulations on detaining foreigners, which apply to asylum seekers and other foreigners in case 
their identity is undetermined, sometimes to individuals who have received negative asylum or other 
permit decisions or to illegal immigrants, have been changed. In 2002 the regulations relating to the 
detention of foreigners were liberalized due to international criticism relating to the fulfilment of the 
Council of Europe’s European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and European Convention on Human Rights, also the Body of Principles for 
the Protection of all Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment of the UN from 1988 
(43/173). These provisions stopped in principle the earlier practice of treating detained foreigners 
according to pre-trial custody regulations, except in specific short-term situations, such as when 
immediate access to refugee centres with detention facilities was impossible due to geographical 
distance etc. Especially these changes limited the earlier practice of holding foreign children in jail, 
which was now limited to the previously mentioned conditions and possible only when the child’s 
parent(s) were placed in the same cell. However, in conjunction with the amendments to the Border 
Security Act in 2005, these regulations were tightened again in the sense that the border control agents 
of lower rank were given the right to decide on detention and in 2010 the rank requirements were again 
lowered. The government referred to operative reasons when justifying these changes. For the same 
reason, in 2005, detention was also enabled in the border control facilities under the same exceptional 
circumstances as in police cells. However, after 2006 detention in such circumstances was not defined 
through pre-trial custody regulations anymore, but designated to follow the same regulations as the 
lockup of, for example, overly intoxicated individuals who had not been arrested. When the detention 
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regulations were reformed in 2002 no maximum detention time had been specified. This was done in 
2011, in connection to the EU directive on returning illegally staying TCNs (2008/115/EC), when the 
time limit was set at 6 months, or in cases of non-cooperation or inability to deport to no more than 12 
months.  Thus, we can see how the common asylum and immigration policy is having an effect on 
Finnish immigration law in both more lenient (detention) and stricter (carrier sanctions) ways. Next we 
shall take a look at the general immigration policy toward third-country nationals, which is also 
increasingly impacted by EU legislation. We shall first look at entry regulations, move on to discussing 
how immigration regulations have been impacted by economic and labour market considerations. After 
this we shall investigate the residence permit and family reunification regulations for TCNs.  
 
Immigration policy towards third-country nationals 1991-2010 
Finland joined the European Economic Area in 1994 and the EU in 1995. The relevant legislation on 
free movement of peoples was mainly incorporated into law in 1993. After this, we can talk about the 
regulation toward third-country nationals, i.e. citizens from countries not belonging to the EU or the EEA. 
During the 1990s the amendments to the Aliens’ Act mostly focused on asylum seekers and EU policy 
cooperation. But in 1999 a more profound domestically initiated change of the Aliens’ Act also touched 
upon the rights of TCNs in general, yet these changes in themselves did not provoke much public 
discussion in the Parliament at this stage.  
Starting with entry regulations, in 1999 the regulations relating to entry conditions were tightened and 
specified. A mere permission to enter was made inadequate, but a reassessment of the fulfilment of visa 
granting conditions was added. It was required that foreigners could present documents testifying to the 
purpose of sojourn and the required funds for upkeep and return at the border, if requested. Regulations 
for removal at the border were reinforced. Those suspected of acquiring funds through illegal means, 
such as theft, peddling or prostitution, were specified at the level of law—the regulations themselves 
had been in force at a level of decree since 1933. But codification of old decrees is not the only source 
of change, but substantial changes to entry regulations have been introduced through EU policy 
cooperation. When the Aliens’ Act was rewritten in 2004 some of the developing Schengen regulations, 
such as the common visa regulations, were added to the act. Finland opted-out of using the national 
Schengen visa that would have allowed entry for longer than three months, and stipulated that all 
permits granted for longer than three months would be residence permits. Yet, at the same time the 
rights of border control officials to deny, extend and amend visas was broadened. However, if the 
Finnish border guard had had more freedom to grant visas to those arriving without a visa before 2004, 
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the Schengen regulations (415/2003/EC) incorporated into the Aliens’ Act in 2004 narrowed those rights 
by tightening the definition of exceptional circumstances and limiting the time of such visas to 15 days. 
The Immigration Act of 2004 did not grant a right to appeal negative visa decisions, but the authorities 
were required to inform the applicant of the grounds of rejection unless it related to security concerns. 
However, this right was granted later due to EU visa regulations, in 2006, but only to EU citizens’ TCN 
family members when practicing the right of free movement. In 2011, with the incorporation of the 
common EU visa code, other TCNs gained a right to appeal a negative visa decision, but this appeal 
could only be logged against the embassy and not in the administrative courts like in the case of EU 
citizens’ TCN family members. In case of EU citizens’ TCN family members, whose right of free 
movement is not limited to situations in which the EU citizen and TCN have lived together permanently 
in another EU country before moving since 2010, the Finnish government established a right to hear the 
visa applicant and his/her EU family member in order to establish the veracity of the visa application in 
order to guard against marriages of convenience or intentions to circumvent immigration law. In 
connection to this the Finnish citizens’ right to utilise the more lenient EU family reunification rights was 
narrowed, as the application of these regulations to each EU country’s own nationals is left to their 
discretion.  
Looking at the way labour market and economic considerations have impacted immigration policy, the 
main amendment relates to the application of labour market consideration to TCNs. After the 1991 
Immigration Act reform work permits were no longer completely separate from residence permits, as 
they had been before, but residence permits obtained based on employment are still tied to specific and 
loosely limited employment rights and granting employment based residence permits is based on labour 
market considerations—outside the certain types of professional occupations outlined in the thesis. 
Before 1999 those who had been granted permanent residence, which at this stage was granted after 
two years of continuous abode, had been freed from labour market consideration. In the 2004 rewritten 
Aliens’ Act one of the most significant changes was renouncing the practice of granting separate work 
permits. From 2004 onwards all continuous residence permits included a right to work. That is, only 
employment-based residence permits were first subject to labour market needs assessment. Yet, at this 
stage, those who had other than employment-based temporary residence permits, such as temporary 
permits based on family reunification (e.g. students’ or temporary workers’ families), did not have a right 
to work, until the EU family reunification directive (2003/86/EC) changed this in 2006.  
If protecting national labour markets was an important consideration, as has been said, the government 
was also concerned about the decreasing population. In order to gain economically active immigrants 
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‘with integration potential’, better rights were granted to TCN students in 2006 to encourage them to find 
employment and to remain in Finland. Because education for foreigners is free in Finland, the 
government regarded it pertinent to grant students a right to remain temporarily for 6 months after the 
completion of their degree to look for a job and enable the Finnish economy to reap the benefits of 
education given to them. TCN students’ rights to employment during studies were also increased to 
facilitate the finding of a permanent job after studies and to enable more flexible employment 
opportunities. Before this the meagre rights of students had been especially limited in practice by the 
inability of students’ family members to work on temporary permits, but as said, this was also changed 
in 2006 due to EU law. However, the EU directive on TCN students (2004/114/EC) added a requirement 
to possess health insurance as a condition of granting student permits. This had not been the case 
under Finnish law, because all students, regardless of nationality, are covered under student health 
services included in the university fee (for example currently at 92€ per year in Helsinki University), and 
students gain access to health services at the latest after one year of residence. Further, with the EU-
wide aim of increasing the competitiveness of the EU research and design sector, the EU researcher 
directive (2005/71/EC) was implemented in 2008. This amendment gave TCNs who are scientific 
researchers better rights than regular unfunded Ph.D. students by allowing better entry rights to other 
EU countries, longer residence permits and, thus in Finland, also better access to services and benefits. 
In line with this concern for competitiveness, but relating more to regulations on economic migration 
itself, the EU Blue Card scheme reserved for high-earning experts and researchers was implemented in 
2011.  
One of the changes relevant to economic and labour market considerations is the addition of the right to 
seasonal work in certain sectors within visa-free/visa-authorised stay in the 2004 revamp of the Aliens’ 
Act. Seasonal work had previously been arranged by giving working permits to short-term labour from 
the neighbouring countries, especially from Estonia. Earlier only certain professions, such as top and 
middle managers, those working in international organisations or inter-state cooperation endeavours, 
professional musicians, artists or scientists, or professionals working in sports, religious officials had had 
a right to work without a permit. These rights were expanded to include lecturers, researchers, teachers, 
trainers and consultants for one year. In 2004 also the employer gained a right to appeal a negative 
employment-based residence permit of an (potential) employee it had recruited. Related, the 
Immigration Services gained a right to appeal the decision of the Administrative Court overturning its 
initial decision. At the same time, however, the changes implemented in 2004 intensified the 
criminalisation of employing immigrants without work permits. Negligence would be deemed a reason 
enough for conviction. The occupational health and safety officials would be required to report to the 
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police any suspicion of illegal terms of employment related to the right to work. Consequently, if 
considerations of competitiveness have led to increasing changes of obtaining the right to work in 
Finland, this rather constitutes a policy of foreign worker policy, not necessarily a policy of enabling the 
entry of foreign families, as we shall see next.  
Out of the domestically motivated changes the 2004 changes to the residence permit duration were the 
most significant, although this was not explicitly stated in the government bill relating to the rewriting of 
the Aliens’ Act (HE 28/2003). One of the main amendments was to legislate, at the level of law instead 
of decree, the granting of types of residence permits and their length. From 2004 onwards the residence 
permit system operated based on two types of fixed-term permits: continuous and temporary, or so 
called A- and B-permits (previously there had been only one type of fixed-term permits). In addition, 
most importantly the time of residence required before granting a permanent residence was doubled 
from two to four years. Thus, the differentiation between the continuous and temporary permits became 
more important, because continuous permits could be counted as indicating an intention to stay when 
deciding whether a right to municipality, i.e. a right to services and benefits as stipulated by the 
constitution securing basic rights to foreigners, would be granted. Yet, regardless of the type of permit, a 
TCN would gain a right to municipality after having legally resided for a year, which would allow them 
the right to services and to certain basic benefits.  
EU law has also impacted the regulation on TCN’s residence permits. The EU directive on long-term 
TCN residence permits (2003/109/EC) that TCNs, who are not students, protected persons or refugees 
or otherwise temporarily in a country, can obtain after five years were implemented in 2007. But Finland 
did not use the possibilities of requiring insurance covering health costs, as in cases in which a TCN 
was eligible for this permit, the TCN would have already obtained a right to benefits including health 
services. Also, no specific integration requirements were placed on obtaining the permit, such as 
language skills or integration training that are in place in some other EU countries. However, the room 
for manoeuvre that the directive enabled was utilised to maintain labour market need assessment as a 
condition of granting permits to those TCNs who have a long-term TCN’s EU permit from another EU 
country. This was done explicitly in reference to the non-Estonian residents of Estonia who were not 
given Estonian citizenship at the time of Estonian independence. Estonians have for years engaged in 
seasonal work in Finland and many of them have ended up immigrating to Finland. The same future 
was not envisioned in the case of ‘Estonian Russians’ without Estonian citizenship. 
Proceeding to discuss family reunification rights, as said, in comparison to TCN’s family reunification 
rights, the changes introduced to Finnish and EU citizens’ family reunification rights were more on the 
 
278 
positive side. In the new Immigration Act of 2004 better rights of applying for family reunification were 
granted to the family members of Finnish citizens than to TCNs. If EU citizens had had the right to bring 
their families into the country to apply for residence permits when migrating from another EU country, 
the official right to apply for a residence permit in the country was given to the family members of 
Finnish citizens in 2004 after which only other family members of the Finnish citizen needed to wait for 
decision abroad. In principle established family ties had been a basis for granting residence permits in 
Finland, but for most of the non-Western TCNs entry overall was possible only with a visa, which were 
not granted for spending family life in Finland. In 2004 the Finnish citizen’s family members’ right to 
apply for residence permit in Finland was changed to a requirement to register with the police, who 
would submit a residence permit decision to the Immigration Services in cases in which they suspected 
a marriage of convenience or an attempt to circumvent immigration law. In 2006 also the family 
members of the Finnish citizen’s spouse (e.g. his/her children from a previous marriage) were granted 
this right to register their residence. This change was tied to the aforementioned EU directive on family 
reunification that made a general amendment to the definition of the nuclear family. 
However, the family reunification possibilities for third-country nationals have been tightened, whilst at 
the same time as EU law has improved the family reunification rights of EU citizens and family 
reunification of Finns has been made easier. That is, if the government’s concern over decreasing 
population and economic input focus focused on immigrants, the focus on immigrant families did not aim 
to encourage the immigration of TCN families, as has been indicated in the thesis. Rather the family 
reunification rights of TCNs were narrowed in 1999, first by abolishing the basis of granting permits if a 
close relative lived in Finland and, second, by taking away the right to bring other family members than 
the spouse and children in 2004. Further, also in 1999, family reunification decisions were required to 
account for the possibility that the resident applicant be able to move to a third country to continue 
family life. There was an element of securitisation of family immigration and since 1999 also those 
applying for residence permits through family reunification (and not just for asylum) could be 
fingerprinted by the police or border guard. Today all those applying or registering their residence are 
fingerprinted for biometric residence cards. However, in 2010 this was made a prerequisite for leaving a 
family reunification application instead of allowing for the possibility of adding the biometric data to the 
application at a convenient stage. In 2010 TCN’s family reunification rights were tightened further. A 
stipulation was made that, in order to apply for family reunification, the sponsor had to have a residence 
permit already, thus instituting a separation in family life. Further, it was required that the children be 
under 18 on the day of the decision on the residence permit—and not on the day of the application, thus 
enabling the exclusion of 17-year-olds by merely procrastinating the decision-making.  
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Yet, also more lenient changes were made when negative family reunification decisions were granted a 
right to appeal. In 2006, in conjunction with the EU directive on family reunification (2003/89/EC), family 
reunification rights were reinforced in the sense that the principle of denying residence permits based on 
the applicants putting Finnish foreign relations in jeopardy was prioritised as secondary in relation to 
family reunification rights. Importantly, from 2006 this would automatically include the children in the 
custody of either spouse, thus allowing uncomplicated family reunification for blended families (taking 
into account, of course that for some blended families income security is required, for some not). Also, 
Finland did not use many of the possibilities that the EU directive allowed in limiting family reunification, 
such as requiring a residency period before family reunification would be allowed, requiring certain types 
of accommodation or limiting the right to family reunification of under 21-year-olds. Also Finland did not 
entertain the idea of allowing the entry of other relatives or adult children for TCNs, which the directive 
permits. Although at this stage, in 2006, Finland did not use the possibility, which the directive offered, 
to limit the refugee’s family reunification rights to pre-existing families, this was done in 2010 as has 
been said. Further, the directive required that immigration officials needed to consider the applicants’ 
ties to their home country—not just to Finland, and this clause was added to the law to reinforce the 
previous notion of having to consider if family reunification could happen in a third country.  
Further, more generally on the more liberal side, the obligation to abide by international agreements on 
human rights etc. was added to the letter of the law. Most importantly, the right of appeal was expanded 
to include residence permits denied to foreigners residing abroad. This expansion also relates to the 
1995 constitutional extension of basic rights also to foreigners residing in Finland (excluding the right of 
entry and voting rights). One of these basic rights is to right have one’s official and legal issues decided 
inside reasonable time, which in the case of residence permits and citizens has attracted the 
Ombudsman’s attention a few times. A reference to the Administrative Procedure Act had been included 
in the Aliens’ Act in 1999 in the attempt to bring the administration of foreigners’ applications in line with 
the law especially in regard to the need to process all types of applications inside a reasonable time 
frame. However, at this stage the government did not implement any specific time limits to processing 
asylum applications, except of course in the case of the speedy asylum process, although it referred to 
the likelihood of having to do so due to the EU directive on minimum criteria for asylum processes that 
was under preparation at the time.  No such specific limits have been applied to asylum applications yet, 
although in 2006 the government limited the processing of family reunification applications to nine 
months, which then applies also to asylum seekers and not just TCNs.  
Consequently, we have now seen how the Aliens’ Act has been changed in relation to TCNs and their 
various rights. We have also seen how EU law has had an impact on the direction of Finnish 
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immigration law. Appendix 2 will evaluate some of the Finnish immigration policy practices in relation to 
other EU states, showing that Finnish practices relatively are not very restrictive. We will now take a 
look at EU migrants and the changes to their rights vis-à-vis Finland.  
 
EU Migrants 
Finland joined the EEA in 1994 and the EU in 1995 and the immigration act was amended accordingly. 
With the development of EU law, several amendments were made that had to do with the room for 
manoeuvre that the directives allowed. In 2007, specifications as to when EU law would be applied to 
EU citizens and their family were added to the law. According to the Finnish interpretation, rights would 
not be determined based on citizenship, but based on ‘practising the right of free movement’, that is, 
only when an EU citizen was moving from another EU country where (s)he had lived with a family 
member in a non-temporary manner. This room for manoeuvre was ended in 2010, when EU courts 
asserted that EU citizens family reunification rights could not depend on wherefrom either the EU citizen 
or the family member were coming. In 2007 also a clause regarding EU citizen’s marriage of 
convenience investigation was added to the law. Clear stipulations for this had not been included in the 
Aliens’ Act, and the EU had had a Council resolution on combatting marriages of convenience since 
1997 (97/C 382/01). For Finnish citizens and TCNs the possibility of conducting a marriage of 
convenience investigation was included in a clause regarding the suspicion of intention to circumvent 
entry regulations. EU citizen’s family definition was widened to include other relatives who were under 
the care of the EU citizen (but not of the spouse). In 2007 the regulations on immigration offences were 
amended to include EU citizens who had failed to register their long-term stay, which had not been 
criminalized before. After 2007 the application of specific income requirements on EU citizen was struck 
down by the Commission, although income security was still required in unspecified amounts. At the 
same time, the EU citizens’ deportation regulations were specified so that the deportation of EU citizens 
was allowed if they were not employed and relied on income support. In addition, the time required 
before EU citizens were given permanent residency (which increases protection from deportation) was 
extended from four to five years in the name of ‘harmonisation’. Thus, although there is no explicit 
problematization of EU immigration, rather it is constantly referred to in positive light (excluding Roma 
migrants as was seen in the thesis), the government has a tendency to regulate the rights of EU citizens 
as well.   
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Summa summarum, clearly two directions can be seen in the amendments made to the Aliens’ Act: one 
is restrictive. These changes partly come from domestic pressures, partly from the EU—especially when 
it comes to limiting illegal(ised) immigration. The second direction is liberal. These amendments arise 
both from domestic and international sources. The fact that foreigners are secured equal rights in the 
constitution (a point that went undiscussed during the basic rights amendment in the parliament) places 
certain restrictions on limiting foreigners’ rights to benefits, for example. However, in many other senses, 
the fulfilment of these rights could be better, such as in case of the right to have issues decided inside 
reasonable time frames and have the Immigration Services respect the judicial results of one’s appeal. 
An important influence towards liberalism comes from the EU. The rationalities of EU policy are in many 
ways the same, which can be seen in the next Appendix, in which some basic comparative analysis is 
made of the implementation practices in other EU countries. Yet, legislative culture is more liberal in 
Finland and this can be seen in the more robust rights of appeal and referencing of international law 
present in the directives forwarded, which then imposes regulations on Finland that are not seen as 
pivotal domestically.  
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Appendix 2:  Statistics – Migrants, Foreigners and Asylum Seekers in Finland 
In this appendix I explore the statistical background to immigration and immigration policy. I will first lay 
out the statistics related to migration patterns that were discussed in the introduction of the thesis. After 
this I shall examine statistics about asylum seeking and illegal immigration in a comparative context. 
Then the discussion will move onto the issue of refused entry at the border, illegal immigration and 
deportations, again in a comparative framework. Further, visa and residence permit decisions will then 
be discussed and their denial rates shall be examined. Permit decisions will also be examined in terms 
of the duration of granted first permits by comparing them to EEA tendencies. Lastly, a look at additional 
statistics related to visa requirements and the racialising results of the visa policy will be in order.  
 
Statistics and Migration Patterns:  Immigration Figures and Ex-patriots and EU Migrants 
As it was outlined in the thesis, migration figures often include returning ex-patriots. That is, a lot of the 
emigration and immigration is due to the movement of citizens themselves. Therefore, it is always 
essential to examine what these figures contain in reality. For example, in Chart 4 we see a pattern of 
Finnish immigration, based on Statistics Finland immigration figures, that is very different to Chart 3 (in 
Appendix 1), which looked at the number of foreign citizens in Finland and saw a more exponentially  
 
Chart 4. Immigration to Finland 1945-2010 (including returning Finnish emigrants). (Source: Statistics Finland A) 
growing figure. Because the Scandinavian passport free zone allowed mass emigration from Finland, 
and many more Finns took advantage of this opportunity than other Scandinavians did to immigrate to 
Finland, a lot of the immigration in the 1970s and 1980s is Finnish return migration. This highlights two 
things: first there have been migration peaks before and that the economy has incorporated large 
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numbers of immigrating people. Secondly, whilst these earlier migrations were largely Finnish 
migrations, the qualitative difference is also clear: since the 1990s the entry of foreigners has increased 
a lot. Yet, Finnish migrations form a large part of the contemporary immigration figures still today. This 
inclusion of own nationals in immigration figures is a confusing practice, as a non-expert would not 
consider an immigrant to mean a country’s own nationals. Based on current Eurostat figures, if the 
nationals of the country itself are deducted from the immigration figures regularly quoted as 
‘immigration’, the numbers are reduced roughly by 17% (see Chart 5). In case of Finland, there is a 
reduction of 39% in immigration figures. Further, because the term ‘immigrant’ is such an inflammable 
concept, it is worthwhile looking at another aspect that is hidden behind the ‘immigration’ figures. 
Immigration figures of foreigners can be broken down to include EU migrants. Chart 6 shows how the 
actual numbers of immigrants from outside the EU represent about 39% of all immigrants between 1998 
and 2009. As was indicated in the Introduction to the thesis, when the net migration is broken down by 
‘whiteness’ and ‘non-whiteness’, ‘white’ migration to Finland has grown more than ‘non-white’ migration 
and represented over 65% of foreigners in Finland. Consequently, presenting figures, which do not 
distinguish between these different types of immigrants, offers important ways of politicizing immigration 
through high numbers. None of the anti-immigration agendas advocate a cessation from the EEA, which 
would be the only measure stopping the entry of EU and EEA nationals. 
 
Chart 5. Proportions of immigrants based on citizenship categories 1998-2009. (Source: Eurostats A. Values 
from those countries that had the required data.)139  
                                                     
139 Values from those countries that had comparable data. Percentages calculated based on the sum of all immigrants in the 
years that data was available. Data missing from the following years: Belgium 2008, 2009; Czech Republic 1998, 2009; 
Cyprus 1998, 1999, 2009; France 1998-2002, 2009; Hungary 2009; Poland 2009; Slovakia 1998,1999, 2000; and United 
Kingdom 1998. Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Malta, Portugal and Romania did not have enough or any of the required data.  
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Finally, it is worthwhile to evaluate the proportion of foreigners in Finland in relation to EEA countries. In 
Chart 6 we can see that the proportion of foreigners in Finland is one of the smallest in the EU.  
 
Chart 6. Average proportion of foreigners of total population in 1999-2010 (when reported).140 
 
Asylum Applications in a Comparative Frame 
This section outlines the number of asylum seekers in Finland in comparison to the same data from 
other countries. The numbers are compared against long-term averages, the comparative size of the 
economy and the size of the population to gain a proportionate notion of the amount of asylum seekers 
in Finland. As the thesis has indicated, the discussions in the Finnish parliament are geared toward  
Average Number of Asylum Applications per Year 1999-2012 (when reported) 
Country Average Country Average Country Average Country Average 
Germany 57610 Belgium 17038 Czech Republic 4262 Malta 1346 
France 43087 Switzerland 12884 Ireland 4010 Luxembourg 976 
United Kingdom 41921 Greece 11852 Cyprus 3839 Bulgaria 965 
Sweden 27114 Norway 11123 Denmark 3419 Romania 895 
Netherlands 26528 AVERAGE ALL 10235 Slovakia 3202 Slovenia 640 
Italy 19026 Poland 5664 Finland 2890 Lithuania 293 
Austria 18863 Spain 5155 Hungary 2468 Portugal 141 
Chart 7. The average number of asylum applications in EEA countries (1999-2012) (where data available, 
Source: Eurostats B and C). 
                                                     
140 Source: Eurostat database on “Population by sex, age and broad group of citizenship [migr_pop2ctz]”. Available at:  
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_pop2ctz&lang=en, accessed 20.1.2014. 
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preventing an influx of asylum seekers: The explicit goal of asylum legislation is to ‘send a message to 
‘asylum shoppers’ that gaining asylum is not easy in Finland’. Yet, the number of asylum applications is 
small in comparison to the applications handled in many other European countries, as Chart 7 shows. 
This chart shows that when annual fluctuations are removed by calculating the long-term average of 
asylum applications in each country, the average number of asylum applications in Finland between 
1999 and 2012 is well below the EEA average. It has to be noted that the figures of some countries, 
such as Greece, Italy, Germany and Spain, may not be accurate, as the statistics they have provided 
are not complete (i.e. they may have provided data only after 2001 or 2002). 
Further, a quantitative look into the actual practices of granting of asylum is in place. As was indicated in 
the thesis, Finnish asylum policy has been restrictive in practice. Clearly, the number of applications 
does not say anything about the validity of applications, i.e. there can be a huge number of asylum 
applications that do not give grounds for granting any type of protection without the decision-making 
practices in themselves being restrictive. Also, countries tend to receive asylum applications from 
different parts of the world. Yet, in terms of long-term averages, there are also clear tendencies of how 
asylum applications are treated. Yet, if we look at Chart 8, it shows the various tendencies of 
interpreting asylum legislation in different EEA countries. There are a number of factors that influence 
these figures. First of all, again, as above, all countries have not provided data for all the years between 
1999 and 2012. Secondly, the legislation in each country is different; some countries had only the 
category ‘protection under the Geneva Convention’ in their legislation until the Common European 
Asylum System, especially the directive on minimum standards of protection to asylum seekers 
(2004/83/EC) changed this for participating EU countries. We shall discuss this shortly. Whilst these 
differences in national legislation have often been interpreted as not reflecting lenience or strictness of 
asylum decision-making, but merely differences in options, this does not have explanatory value in 
terms of governmentality. That is, firstly, what these legislative differences demonstrate is indeed the 
national impetus for governing asylum seeking: as offering options outside the Geneva Convention 
enables the granting of different rights to refugees than the Geneva Convention stipulates. For example, 
the use of other types of protection than Geneva refugee status enables the restriction of refugees’ 
travelling provisions by granting different types of travel documentation or the disciplining of rights given 
to refugees’ family members as is done in Finland. Secondly, what these differences demonstrate is the 
possibility of reading the Geneva Convention quite differently. That is, other countries clearly interpret 
the Convention more leniently than Finland does. Consequently, what we have are vastly different 
tendencies of reading the Geneva Convention, as Chart 9 shows. In the case of Finland, we can see 
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that while the tendency to give positive decisions is above the EEA average, when it comes to granting 
a Geneva refugee status, Finland is clearly one of the strict interpreters of the Geneva Convention. 
 
Chart 8. Average number of asylum decisions per year based on decision types in 1999-2012 (when data 
available; source of data: Eurostat C and D). 
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Chart 9. The share of various types of asylum decisions in 1999-2012 (percentages calculated based on annual 
average for the years were data provided; source Eurostat C and D).141 
 
Further, as was mentioned above, the Common European Asylum System has influenced national 
legislation and decision-making. If we look at the shift in national decision-making tendencies prior to 
and after 2008, giving a leeway of two years because of the large number of countries that missed the 
transposition deadline, we can see in Chart 10 how there have been shifts in the tendency to interpret 
asylum legislation. That is, in countries that granted Geneva refugee statuses in nearly all cases prior to 
2008, i.e. did not have other types of refugee statuses available in their national legislations, continue to 
read the Geneva Convention in a more lenient way. In comparison, in some countries, such as Finland, 
that did have a strict way of interpreting the Geneva Convention, the EU-wide minimum standards have 
pushed the interpretation towards leniency. 
                                                     
141 Percentages are shown for the Geneva statuses and rejected applications. 
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Chart 10. The percentage of Geneva refugee statuses granted out of positive decisions prior to and after 2008 
between 1999 and 2012 (when data available, source Eurostat C and D). 
Further, to make these numbers of asylum applications comparable, it is important to take into account 
the size of the various national economies. I have compared the average number of asylum applications 
per annum (based on the data in Chart 9) to the size of the economy in 2009. There is obviously a 
difference in terms of the years in question, but as it is actual resources different countries use towards 
asylum seekers vary depending on national legislation, this comparison cannot be but indicative in any 
case. Chart 11 shows how Norway, Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Spain have richer economies in 
comparison to the number of asylum seekers they receive. Hence, comparatively the per capita financial 
burden in Finland is not in any way negatively out of proportion to the size of the economy. France, 
Germany and the UK have quite the opposite situation: the number of asylum seekers received is 
disproportionate in comparison to per capita GNI.  
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Chart 11. The average number of asylum applications (1999-2007) versus per capita Gross National Income 
(PPP) in 2008 (Source: UNData and Eurostat A). 142 
 
 
Chart 12. Average annual number of asylum applications (1999-2007) as a percentage of population size. 
(Source: Eurostat A and E.) 
                                                     
142 The wealth of the economy is measured in the internationally used per capita Gross National Income (GNI) for year 2008 
and it takes into account the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The value is shown in US dollars as UNData receives the 
information from the World Bank. 
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Moreover, if we compare the average number of asylum applications (1999-2007) to the size of the 
population, to indicate the proportional ‘visibility’ or what some call ‘the capacity to integrate foreigners’, 
we can see that also in this regard Finland is below the average. If the amount of asylum applications is 
measured against the population size of the country, Chart 12 above shows that the proportion of 
asylum applicants in Finland is well below the average of 0,078% in the EU and EEA. Altogether, the 
Immigration Services reports, Finland had accepted some 18.000 refugees between 1973 and 2000. By 
2010 the total number of accepted refugees, including their families, was some 37.500 individuals. 
 
Deportations, Refusals of Entry and Illegal Immigration 
In this section we shall highlight some of the statistics related to refusals of entry at the border, illegal 
immigration and deportation along the lines that these issues were discussed in the thesis. First, a quick 
look at the statistics discussed in section 3.3.3. relating to the refusals of entry at the border is in order. 
As was discussed and as Chart 13 shows, Finland, together with the UK, are the highest users of 
‘insufficient funds’ as a reason for denial of entry at the border. 
 
 
 
Chart 13. Refusals of entry in each EU and EEA Country based on insufficient means of subsistence as a 
percentage of all refusals of entry at the border in each country in 2008-2012. (Source: Eurostat F) 
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37 percent of all refusals of entry at the border in Finland are based on the assessment that the 
foreigner cannot show sufficient means of subsistence for the duration of the stay as judged by the 
official requirements of the level of finances required. The figures are in proportion to each country’s 
own number of refusals of entry, and hence do not reveal the actual comparative number of refusals 
(Chart 15 shows this) but merely the national practices. With an average of 1358 refusals per annum 
between 2008 and 2012 Finland has the fourth highest amount of refusals of entry at the border in this 
category among the EU and EEA countries. The average for the UK was 19.910.  
Further, if we look at the data available for 2008 and 2012 on EEA country tendencies, we can clearly 
see that different countries have quite different tendencies to refuse entry at the border based on ‘no 
valid reason’. These figures are naturally impacted by the geography of external borders to Schengen 
and the required border control measures, but airport security is a common feature in all these 
countries.   
 
Chart 14. Refusals at the border because the purpose or conditions of stay are unjustified in 2008-2009. (Source: 
Eurostat F) 
There are also clear tendencies in terms of numbers and proportions of reasons for refusal shown in 
Chart 15. The values in the case of Spain, Germany and Switzerland are not complete. The total 
number of refusals at the border for Spain during these years is 1.614.555. However, for most of these 
Spain has not reported a reason that would fall into the available Eurostat categories. On average Spain 
refuses entry for some 330.000 individuals per year when the average for the rest of the countries, 
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Poland, UK and France included,143 is 115.994. For having a long external Schengen border, Finnish 
numbers are rather low. 
 
Chart 15. Total refusals at border in 2008-2012. (Source: Eurostat F.) 
                                                     
143 The average number of refusals per year for Poland is 23,337, for the UK 17,697 and 12,645 for France.  
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Moving onto discussing illegal immigration, as was explained, ‘immigrant’ is one of the key terms that 
carry different connotations from what statistics actually reveal them to be, as different categories of 
immigrants included also ex-patriots. The same is the case with ‘illegal immigration’, as was explained in 
section 3.3.2. of the thesis. As Chart 16 shows, between 2005 and 2009 the majority of ‘illegal 
immigrants’, i.e. of those who resided in Finland without appropriate permission, were ‘white’. This does 
not necessarily correspond to the common sense notion of illegal immigrants.  
 
Chart 16. Immigration Offences according to ‘race’ in 2005-2009 (Source: Statistics Finland B). 
In comparison to EU figures in absolute numbers the numbers of illegal immigrants are on the lower 
side in Finland between 2008 and 2012 (some 4.500).  
Chart 17 shows that proportionally speaking, when comparing the numbers of illegal immigrants to legal 
immigrants, the problems are largest in Malta, Romania, Poland, Cyprus and Greece, where the number 
of TCNs who are found to be in the country illegally represent an over 10% addition to the number of 
legally residing TCNs, whereas in Denmark and Germany the share is 0.3% and 1.2% respectively 
(although in absolute numbers in Germany this corresponds to some 55.000 illegal immigrants found 
annually). In Finland the figure is 4.6%, that is, in addition to legally present TCNs, the 4.500 annually 
detected illegal immigrants would add an extra 4.6% to the annual immigration figures in Finland. 
Typically, illegal immigrants would be subject to forced deportation unless they apply for asylum. On 
average, there are some 880 illegally present foreigners per year in Finland who are fined for 
immigration offences. Next we shall take a look deportation figures. 
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Chart 17. Average number of illegally and legally present TCNs in 2008-2012 (Source: Eurostat G). 
 
As was discussed in the thesis, in 3.3.2. in footnote 56, there has been an increase in the number of 
deportation recommendations given by the police. This is a category different from deportation orders 
attached to negative permit decisions, but rather relates to situations in which, the police takes the 
initiative and recommends the deportation of a foreigner who has stayed legally in the country, but has 
committed some kind of a crime. Chart 18 shows how the tendency to recommend deportation has risen 
more than the actual decisions to deport and that decisions against the recommendation have increased 
more than decisions agreeing with the recommendation. Indeed, Chart 18 shows that the number of 
decisions to deport remained steady (60-90 deportations a year) until 2010, when they doubled. The 
situation altered radically in 2010 when the number of recommendations of deportation went up to 446 
and deportations totalled 216. If we look at the percentage of deportation decisions in the Chart 19 
below, it tells us that annually the percentage fluctuates quite considerably. Despite the peak after 
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2009,144 the trend at this stage was for deportation decisions going down in relation to deportation 
recommendations. Nevertheless, the increasing recommendations of deportation have resulted in an 
increased number of deportations, as the trend lines show, and they were still on the rise in 2013.  
 
Chart 18. Decisions on Recommendations of Deportation 2001-2012 with actual numbers and trend lines. 
(Source Finnish Immigration Services A.) 
 
Chart 19. Deportation Decisions 2001-2012 with actual numbers and trend lines. (Source Finnish Immigration 
Services A.) 
                                                     
144 The media connects this trend to a 2009 Sello mass murder case in which a refugee, who had been in the country for 
nearly 20 years and had been convicted and investigated of many crimes and had been issued multiple restraining orders 
against his long-term partner, murdered this then ex-partner, himself and four other people at the partner’s workplace 
including a man he suspected of being his partner’s new boyfriend. The refugee had been denied Finnish citizenship 
because of his criminal activity, but had not been deported. After the murders the issue of his non-deportation was debated 
in the public, and 2010 saw a sharp increase in the deportation recommendations. The deportation numbers and 
deportation legislation have since remained in the public eye.  
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So far we have discussed recommendations for deportation, next we shall look at orders to leave. The 
statistics below need to be distinguished from what has been discussed above. This is because in 
Finland an ‘order to leave’ is discussed as ‘deportation’, whereas in the EEA context an ‘order to leave’ 
is differentiated on the basis of whether the departure is voluntary and forced. This distinction has been 
added to the Finnish legislation later, which now requires that ‘voluntary return must be allowed’. 
Looking at the Finnish tendency to deport or to assure voluntary return, by comparing it to EEA 
tendencies, it can be  
 
Chart 20. Share of actually returned TCNs after orders to leave in 2008-2012 (not including Dublin transfers; 
Source Eurostat H). 
seen in Chart 20 that Finland actually does not verify whether foreigners have left or not very strictly. 
That is, the notion that ‘deportation is self-evident’ discussed in section 3.3.2. does not materially result 
in exceptionally efficient deportation measures. These numbers, especially in comparison to those of the 
UK, certainly are impacted by the difficulty of controlling movement inside the borderless Schengen 
area. Therefore, it cannot be said that the average numbers of actual deportations in Finland would 
reflect a governmentality of not wanting to control actual return, as practical difficulties of implementation 
may compromise the impetus to control immigration that was evident in the governmental texts and 
parliamentary discussions. 
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Visa and Residence Permit Decisions: Denial Rates and Durations of First Permits 
In this subsection we shall be looking at the statistics relating to visa and permit decisions, their type 
and their relation to the nationality of the applicant, which were discussed in section 4.2.1. of the thesis. 
First, we shall take a look at the figures of denials of visas between 2000 and 2010. Chart 21 shows the 
denial rates for visa applications logged in Finnish embassies abroad. The applicants’ phenotype or 
religion cannot be known based on these statistics, because visa applications can be submitted in any 
country and not only in the country of origin. Yet, it has to be noted that visa applications are not 
required from any of the EU or ‘Western white’ citizens. Hence, all these applications, including those 
logged in the EU or ‘non-EU white’ countries are all for visa requiring TCNs who have not obtained a 
TCNs’ long-term residence permits or who are not married to EU citizens, i.e. who do not have permits 
for free movement inside the EU. The majority of cases in the ‘non-EU white countries’ were logged in 
Russia (largely Russian tourism in Finland) and are, thus, typically ‘Eastern white’. In other regions, it is 
safe to assume that the majority of the applicants are either from the  
 Visa applications in Finnish Embassies in 2000-2010 
The location of the 
embassy: 
All 
applications 
Refused 
applications 
Percentage 
of refusal 
In the EU 160449 11568 7 % 
In non-EU 'white' countries 5 714 718 76 623 1 % 
Outside the 'white' world 571623 43105 8 % 
In 'non-white' Christian 
countries 163586 7727 5 % 
In Asian countries 304608 16483 5 % 
In African countries 51 158 7 881 15 % 
In Muslim countries 103429 18895 18 % 
Total without Russia 831465 58855 7 % 
Total 6434306 129705 2 % 
Chart 21. Visa applications in Finnish Embassies in 2000-2010.145 
region or from the country where the application has been logged or at least phenotypically ‘non-white’. 
What stands out is the larger refusal rate in countries that are mainly Muslim or ‘Black African’: Against 
the average excluding Russia (7%), the refusal rate is 18% and 15% respectively.  
If looking at the denial shares in various countries paints a certain king of picture, also the residence 
permit denial rates tell a similar story, as was indicated in the thesis. Here merely some more detailed 
statistics are added to what was presented in the thesis and some additional comments are made about 
the data that these statistics are based on. It is important to consider that the data the Immigration 
Services release covers only the annual ‘Top-10’ nationalities applying for residence permits, which  
                                                     
145 Information based on visa statistics (’viisumitilastot’) obtained from the Foreign Ministry of Finland.  
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Chart 22. Top-10 Countries for Residence Permit Applicants and the Denial Percentage (Source: Finnish Immigration Services B). 
2006-2012
Granted Denied Total Granted Denied Total Granted Denied Total Granted Denied Total Granted Denied Total Granted Denied Total Granted Denied Total Denial %
Croatia 567 3 570 1 %
United States 590 18 608 656 4 660 658 10 668 671 21 692 637 20 657 822 24 846 760 37 797 3 %
Bulgaria 285 12 297 4 %
India 955 37 992 1239 32 1271 1546 41 1587 1256 61 1317 1594 66 1660 1 482 57 1 539 1 158 29 1 187 5 %
Ukraine 461 47 508 981 56 1037 953 106 1059 601 82 683 675 66 741 822 63 885 858 100 958 9 %
China 946 57 1003 1223 52 1275 1557 93 1650 1248 155 1403 1208 179 1387 1 347 91 1 438 1 381 132 1 513 11 %
Thailand 383 59 442 525 56 581 415 60 475 446 78 524 13 %
Russian Federation 3716 323 4039 4927 360 5287 5173 480 5653 3662 527 4189 3703 582 4285 4 027 552 4 579 4 175 676 4 851 15 %
Vietnam 376 96 472 345 96 441 496 136 632 571 94 665 574 86 660 18 %
Nepal 423 97 520 19 %
Serbia and Montenegro 294 64 358 381 92 473 19 %
Nigeria 368 121 489 25 %
Irak 251 45 296 289 41 330 328 147 475 307 178 485 26 %
Turkey 463 150 613 737 205 942 707 202 909 581 258 839 518 214 732 544 245 789 505 206 711 27 %
Somalia 257 172 429 523 218 741 563 191 754 534 417 951 522 686 1208 595 1 433 2 028 473 2 054 2 527 41 %
Afganistan 98 66 164 222 339 561 56 %
TOP-10 total 8065 946 9011 11296 1127 12423 12431 1392 13823 9602 1718 11320 10127 2174 12301 10 999 2 901 13 900 10 614 3 595 14 209 12 %
ALL TOTAL 12786 1626 14412 17271 2031 19302 19606 2599 22205 15208 3052 18260 16322 3998 20320 17 683 5 064 22 747 17 157 5 463 22 620 14 %
2011 2012Residence permit 
applications (TNC) 
20082006 2007 2009 2010
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results in the fact that not all nationalities are given information for every year (see Chart 22). Nevertheless, 
there is a trend, as Charts 22 and 23 show, that the Top-10 countries with ‘white’ populations clearly have a 
 
Chart 23. Percentage of Residence Permits Denied According to Top-10 Nationalities (2006-2010). (Source: Finnish 
Immigration Services B) 
lower tendency for denial than the average. Yet, as was said in the thesis, these conclusions need to be 
evaluated against the data, which is not statistically reliable, because these numbers ‘compare apples and 
oranges’: That is, the residence permits here contain all types of residence permits that TCNs require, 
including employment-based, Finnish ancestry, family reunification, student permits etc. In this sense, a 
high-salaried American manager who applies for employment-based residence permits and family 
reunification is here compared with a Somali national who makes a residence permit application for a foster 
child, for example. Further, the applications do not signify the number of new entrants either, but reflect 
merely an occasion that an entry permit needs to be renewed—which is more often for those who are not 
either Finnish or EU citizens’ family members, do not have Finnish ancestry, or are not protected based on 
individual merit (refugees and protected persons). Therefore, the chart cannot be said to reflect a 
biologically racist practice by the immigration officials as such, but what it does show is that the criteria for 
entering are designed so that they produce racialising consequences. The nationals of the Top-10 
countries for which applications have been denied at an above average rate tend to be ‘darker’ and ‘more 
Muslim than not’. That is, the chart indicates some clear tendencies of racialisation. 
Mostly this data suggests a need for the Immigration Services to provide better statistics that can be used 
for analysing the implementation practices as well as the result of policy design. Yet, the fact that the 
Immigration Office does not provide more detailed statistics does not necessarily say anything about the 
0%
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15%
20%
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Percentage of Residence Permits Denied According to Top-
10 Nationalities (2006-2010) 
Average Denial 14% of the Total 
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Immigration Services, but it says something about the design of law. As was discussed, in 2011 the law 
was changed so that applications for family reunification can only be made by the family members 
themselves (finger prints are required at the time of leaving the application) and this law was applied to all 
open family reunification cases, thus enabling a mass denial of especially refugees’ family reunification 
applications. It is interesting to note that Minister Thors (Migration and European Affairs) had suggested 
prior to 2011, when discussing the ‘huge’ number of Somali family reunification applications with the media, 
that bio-passports could be requested of Somali nationals.146 Whilst such a suggestion opens up questions 
about discrimination based on nationality, this basic principle was introduced through the fingerprint 
requirement for biometric permit cards, which in practice requires that also family members, including 
children, need to travel to Finnish embassies to apply for residence permits or visas when making the 
application. This creates, especially in the case of refugees and displaced persons, considerable costs, and 
thus limits poor foreigners’ capability to practice their rights.   
However, in order to understand where Finnish immigration practices stand in regard to the strictness of 
residence permit decisions, we can also look at the residence permit decisions in a comparative EEA 
framework by focusing on the duration of first permits granted to TCNs. Eurostats has provided data on this 
since 2008. The first chart below, Chart 24, shows the average numbers of first residence permits granted 
per year and demonstrates well the disproportionate numbers of annually entering foreigners in different 
countries as well as the different types of immigration that different countries attract. Particularly, the 
educational sector has a huge impact on the annual immigrant numbers in the UK. However, it has to be 
remembered that the legislative differences between various countries impact the proportions presented 
here in the sense that if a country has strict family reunification regulations, they are likely to show up as a 
small proportion or short duration of family reunification permits granted. 
In terms of governmentality, it is interesting to look at the duration of different types of permits granted at 
the initial stage. As was discussed in the thesis, in section 3.3.5., there were clear differences in the length 
of the permit renewal periods that different categories of foreigners were subject to. It is interesting to 
contrast the Finnish legislation and the renewal periods required by comparing them to the patterns in other 
countries. Whilst it is obvious that different countries have different possibilities of granting different types of 
residence permits for different durations, this is exactly the point: the regulations reflect a desire to govern, 
as renewal periods have consequences in terms of the cost-benefit analysis. That is, a country must 
evaluate its need to control the stay of foreigners with the cost to the tax payer of having to reprocess 
residence permit applications more frequently. Firstly, however, Charts 24 to 27 demonstrate the different 
                                                     
146 Helsingin Sanomat (30.8.2010). Astrid Thors: Voimme vaatia somalialaisilta biopassia. (Eng. We can request a biopassport 
from Somalis). By Marja Hannula.  Available at: http://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/artikkeli/Astrid+Thors+Voimme+vaatia+somalialaisilta+ 
biopassia/1135259730330, accessed 30.8.2010.  
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proportions and durations that different countries grant permits for to TCNs. In Chart 24 we can see, for 
example, that Belgium and Austria seem to have rather strict economic immigration policies in regards to 
TCNs, whereas in Italy and Poland the proportion is relatively high. When it comes to family reunification  
  
  
Chart 24. Average annual number of first residence permits by type in 2008-2012 (Source: Eurostat I). 
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policies Cyprus, Poland and Ireland seem to have rather strict tendencies, whereas Luxembourg and 
Greece have the highest proportion of family reunification permits. Finally, the number of student permits 
granted is the highest in the UK and Ireland. The proportion of different types of permits granted in Finland 
is relatively average. 
Charts 25 to 27 demonstrate the tendency to grant longer or shorter residence to TCNs upon first 
application. Thus, what we see, for example, is that the Netherlands is clearly strictest in granting first 
residence permits limiting them to permits under a year. Greece, on the other hand, is the opposite; 
granting permits longer than a year of duration, except for economy-based immigrants. More importantly, 
what these comparative charts show is that Finnish legislation and implementation is not strictest in any 
way. Rather, Finland has a tendency to grant longer permits in the majority of cases. Therefore, in terms of 
governmentality, the impetus of governing immigration in ‘a strict and highly selective’ way is not limited to 
Finland.  
 
Chart 25. Average share of remuneration- or economy-based first permits granted by duration in 2008-2012 (Shares 
out of each country’s own granted permits of the type; Source Eurostat I). 
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Chart 26. Average share of family reunification first permits granted by duration in 2008-2012 (Source Eurostat I).  
 
 
 
Chart 27. Average share of education-based first permits by permit duration in 2008-2012. (Source Eurostat I) 
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‘Race’, Class and Visa Regulations in Schengen and Pre-Schengen Finland 
This section outlines some additional results of the statistical analysis of how ‘race’ and religio-cultural 
groupings impact the visa requirements that were discussed in section 3.3.1. in the thesis. The category 
sizes and the break-down of these groupings are explained in Appendix 3. The sample consists of all 197 
current states and the results are expressed solely in percentages. As the thesis indicated, the three-fold 
‘racial’ category based on phenotype (‘white’, ‘mixed brown’, ‘black African’) correlated clearly with the visa 
requirements. Chart 28 below shows both the Schengen and Finnish pre-Schengen visa requirements and 
their relation to ‘race’.  
  
Chart 28. Schengen and Finnish Pre-Schengen visa requirement for countries according to ’race’. (Source: Finlex)  
Chart 28 shows that, both before and after the common Schengen visa policy, visas were required much 
more commonly when the country’s majority population has a darker phenotype. Chart 28 would indicate 
that the Finnish pre-Schengen visa policy was more lenient, but this is not necessarily a valid conclusion. 
This is because there are a lot of problems related to the pre-Schengen percentages. To start with, the way 
various countries were required to have visas or not varied drastically in Finland–-some countries had visa-
free access only for a year or two, whereas others were constantly on the list. I have included in these pre-
Schengen figures countries that had a visa-free access to Finland at some point to take into account the 
mere willingness of allowing certain countries visa-free treatment. That is, especially the figures on 
countries with darker phenotype are not similarly representative, but in practice would have been stricter for 
most of the time, as the figures on ‘white Western’ countries, which normally had visa free access 
consistently since the 1950s. Also, it has to be taken into account that the numbers of countries have 
changed over the years, so this also impacts the percentages. Nevertheless, the validity of the percentages 
in terms of their rationality of governing is viable: The tendency that countries with Muslim and/or ‘black’ 
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populations are more often required visas than other countries is consistent both in Schengen and pre-
Schengen visa regimes in Finland.  
This rationality can be examined more scrupulously by taking a look at how religio-cultural groupings 
impact on the visa requirement, as is done in Chart 29. This chart demonstrates how the visa requirements  
  
Chart 29. Schengen and Finnish Pre-Schengen visa requirement for religio-cultural categories. (Source Finlex) 
for non-Christian countries are more common than for Christian countries, which indicates a certain religio-
cultural preference when deciding on allowing easy access to the Schengen area and to Finland prior to 
Schengen regulations. This indicates that there is also a racialising rationality that relates to cultural 
stereotypes and not just to phenotype. But if we examine the impact of Christian or Jewish religion on visa- 
     
Chart 30. Schengen and Finnish Pre-Schengen Visa Requirements for Christian and Jewish Countries. (Source 
Finlex) 
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free entry, ‘race’ nevertheless plays a part, as Chart 30 shows.  Thus, whilst religion impacts on visa-free 
entry and suggests that nationals from Christian countries have better access than those of other religions, 
also among Christians phenotype has an impact on the likelihood of Christians enjoying visa-free access to 
Schengen and pre-Schengen Finland. In this nexus, the notion, introduced by the Finnish Minister of the 
Interior, Päivi Räsänen, that ‘Finland should accept primarily Christian refugees rather than those of other 
religions’, is rather in line with the practice of limiting chances of entry.147 
This culturalising rationality extends to phenotypical categories, as among these countries religio-cultural 
affiliation has equally an impact on visa-free access, as Chart 31 shows.  
  
Chart 31.  Schengen Visa requirement for ‘mixed brown’ and ‘dark African’ countries according to religio-cultural 
categories. (Source Finlex) 
That is, if for Christian countries with a majority population of ‘mixed brown’ phenotype (mostly Latin 
American, Middle Eastern and Asian countries) a visa is required for 66% of these countries, the same 
number for those Christian countries with the darkest phenotype is 85%. Further, Chart 30 shows that for 
‘dark African’ countries (mostly sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean Islands) visas are required less often 
if the country is Christian, but, overall, for countries with ‘black’ populations the frequency of visa 
requirements is extremely high. For ‘dark African’ Muslim countries the visa requirement is 100%. 
These rationalities can be considered against the variables of geographic proximity and wealth also, and 
these considerations reinforce the fact that racialising categories are more important than such rationalities: 
                                                     
147 Helsingin Sanomat (2010), “Päivi Räsänen ottaisi Suomeen ensisijaisesti kristittyjä pakolaisia”. (Eng. Päivi Räsänen would 
accept Christian refugees in the first instance.). By Jukka-Pekka Raeste. Available at:  http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/artikkeli/ 
P%C3%A4ivi+R%C3%A4s%C3%A4nen+ottaisi+Suomeen+ensisijaisesti+kristittyj%C3%A4+pakolaisia/1135261263069, 
accessed 20.1.2014. 
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Whereas proximity could explain the visa free access of European countries, it does not explain the visa-
free access of ‘white’ New World countries and the visa requirements placed on Eastern Europeans that 
continue after the Cold War and change only with the accession of these countries to the EU. Rather, as 
Roediger (2005) could say, as these countries ‘work toward whiteness' during their path to EU 
membership. This process of ‘whitening Eastern Europe’ is currently expanding and discussions are on the 
way to allow visa-free entry also for Russians. These intra-‘white’ regulations could be explained by wealth, 
but wealth is not a logic that is consistent either, as the thesis and the following section demonstrates.  
To distinguish between racialising practices and socio-economic conditions, I analysed the impact of the 
effect of the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (Purchasing Power Parity, PPP)148 for the country’s 
visa regulation status in Schengen. Chart 32 shows the percentage of countries in the GNI category 
requiring and not requiring visas. 
 
Chart 32. Impact of GNI on visa requirement (categories in equal increments of dollars). (Source UNData.) 
When we look at how GNI impacts visa regulation, when the GNI categories are formed on the basis of 
equal increments of 9.999$,149 we can see that the impact is not linear. That is, gross national income in 
dollars does not categorically translate into visa-free access. Yet, it cannot be denied that also wealth has 
an impact on visa-free access to Schengen: If we categorize the GNI groupings differently, not based on 
equal increments of income, but rather divide countries into equal groups based on income, the picture is 
clearer, as Chart 32 shows. This categorisation was used in Chart G in section 3.3.3. of the thesis. As 
Chart G in the thesis indicated, the effect of wealth on allowing visa free entry is not as strong as the impact 
of racial or religio-cultural categories (coefficients of 0.8 were somewhat lower than the typical coefficients 
                                                     
148 Sources of data: The GNI per capita data is sourced from UNData “GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)” online 
databases (www.data.un.org) for year 2008 or the latest available. Where data did not exist at UN (North Korea, Kosovo and 
Taiwan), the information is based on CIA World Fact Book information (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/). Date accessed 14.12.2010.  
149 The increments are equal in other than the highest category (25.000-212.000$) as in this category a couple of extremely rich 
countries extend the upper limit.  
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of 0.9 in the previous charts). More importantly, the correlations can be manipulated through 
categorisations of GNI, as the examples of different categorisations showed in Charts 32 and 33. 
 
Chart 33. Impact of GNI on visa requirement (similar number of countries per category). (Source UNData.) 
However, even if we go with the first categorisation (equal increments of dollars) that indicates non-linear 
effect, we can see in Chart 34 that the correlation coefficient indicates a moderate impact of poverty on 
denying entry to Schengen (R2=0.49). That is, overall, the influence of higher GNI is weaker than the higher 
impact of poverty when it comes to allowing entry. To be rich is not enough. 
 
Chart 34. Visa requirement according to GNI – correlation (equal increments of GNI per category). (Source UNData.) 
 
Consequently, we need to investigate the rationalities of allowing and disallowing visa-free entry more 
thoroughly by correlating the GNI categories with the ‘race’ and religio-cultural categories. Charts 34 and 
35 tell the same story about visa requirements that we have been telling so far: whiteness matters more 
than wealth. More specifically, degrees of whiteness matter. As Chart 35 shows, out of the poorest 
countries (n=148, i.e. 75% of all countries) granted visa-free entry the vast majority of countries are 
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Christian. In contrast, Chart 36 shows that out of the richest countries the majority of the countries that are 
required to have visas are Muslim (n=7 out of 11 countries required visas). 
 
Chart 35. Schengen visa requirements for countries with GNI per capita (PPP) income of 0-19.999$ in 2008 
according to racialising categories. (Source UNData.) 
 
Chart 36. Schengen visa requirements for countries with GNI per capita (PPP) income of 20-212.000$ in 2008 
according to racialising categories. (Source UNData.)150  
Thus, as a recap, in this Appendix we have seen some additional information on immigration statistics that 
may be of interest to readers from other countries. We have also seen the basis for claiming that Finnish 
asylum numbers are small in actual and relative numbers. Also the asylum granting practices are restrictive 
in the sense that the reading of the Geneva Convention is stringent, although the overall tendency to grant 
asylum is relatively lenient, especially because of the recent increases in Geneva refugee statuses granted. 
We have also seen that the Finnish deportation practices are not exceptionally restrictive despite the notion 
of deportation being self-evident. We have seen that illegal immigration in Finland is at an average level 
and that refusals at the border are at a moderate level. We have seen the statistics on the visa and 
residence permit denial rates and re-evidenced their racialising results. And finally we have taken a more 
                                                     
150 Half of the countries (n=24) in this category are ’Christian Western White’. Where there is no column, there are no countries 
in that category. 
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in-depth look at the racialising and culturalising structures of the Schengen and pre-Schengen visa 
regulations in Finland and investigated the comparative impact of racialising and culturalising categories 
vis-à-vis categories of wealth in the current Schengen regulations. Altogether then we have witnessed how 
race hygienic rationalities permeate the visa and residence permit rules and how a ‘restrictive and highly 
selective’ immigration policy is not solely a Finnish phenomenon.   
Statistical Sources 
Eurostat A: Database on “Asylum applications by citizenship till 2007 (Annual data (rounded)’).” Available at: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyctz&lang=en, accessed 6.2.2011. 
Eurostat B: Database on “Asylum and new asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data 
(rounded) [migr_asyappctza]”. Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset= 
migr_asyappctza&lang=en, accessed 3.6.2012. 
Eurostat C: Database on “Decisions on asylum applications by citizenship till 2007 Annual data (rounded) 
[migr_asydctzy]”. Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asydctzy 
&lang=en, accessed on 30.1.2014. 
Eurostat D: Database on “First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated 
data (rounded) [migr_asydcfsta]”. Available at:  http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset= 
migr_asydcfsta&lang=en, accessed 30.1.2014. 
Eurostat E: Database “Population on 1 January by age and sex [demo_pjan]”. Available at: http://appsso.eurostat. 
ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_pjan&lang=en, accessed 11.7.2011.  
Eurostat F: Database on “Third country nationals refused entry at the external borders - annual data (rounded) 
[migr_eirfs].” Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eirfs&lang=en, 
accessed 6.2.2014. 
Eurostats G: Database on “Third country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded) [migr_eipre]”. 
Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eipre&lang=en, accessed 
29.1.2014. 
Eurostat H: Database on “Third country nationals returned following an order to leave - annual data (rounded) 
[migr_eirtn].” Available at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eirtn&lang=en, 
accessed 6.2.2014. 
Eurostat Database I: Database on ”Residence permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship (migr_resval).“ 
Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database, accessed 
12.9.2013. 
Finlex: The data is based on the treaties available at the Finnish state’s Finlex.fi website’s under the International 
Treaties section, category 4.1. ’viisumivapaus’ (visa freedom). Available at: http://www.finlex.fi/fi/ 
sopimukset/sopsviite/ luokitus.php, data accessed 10.1.2011. 
Finnish Immigration Services A: Statistics on “Karkotusesitykset ja -päätökset 2001-2012” (Eng. Deportation 
Recommendations and Decisions 2001-2012). Available at: http://www.migri.fi/tietoa_virastosta/tilastot/ 
karkotukset, accessed 13.8.2013. 
Finnish Immigration Services B: Various statistics on residence permit applications at: available 
http://www.migri.fi/tietoa_virastosta/tilastot/oleskelulupatilastot, accessed 30.7.2013. 
Statistics Finland A: Database on “Väestönmuutokset ja väkiluku 1749-2012, koko maa.” (Eng. Population changes 
and size 1974-2012, whole country). Available at: http://pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/vrm/muutl/ 
muutl_fi.asp, accessed 15.7.2011. 
Statistics Finland B: Database on “Rangaistukset kansalaisuuden, asuinpaikan ja rikoksen mukaan, 2005-2009.” 
(Eng. Sanctions and Sentencing according to citizenship and crime, 2005-2009). Available at: 
http://pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/oik/syyttr/syyttr_fi.asp, accessed in 28.4.2010. 
UNData: Database on “GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)”, available online through 
http://www.data.un.org. Date accessed 14.12.2010.  
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Appendix 3: Racialised Categorisation Used for Analysing Policy Outcomes 
Historically, the use of the term ‘race’ was multifarious ranging from talking about a single human race to 
conceptualising nations and their subpopulations as separate ‘races’. Contemporary genetic research-
based race theories differentiate between a few lineages, which do not clearly correspond to phenotypical 
differences. Modern, gene-based race research in general acknowledges that pure races cannot be found 
in real life due to mixed heritage as, among others, the scientists in the Genome Project asserted. It was 
also established a long time ago, that phenotype is not an indication of genotype, i.e. that a person’s 
genetic make-up cannot be deduced from outwardly apparent qualities. All populations vary more inside 
themselves than between themselves.  
As was indicated in the thesis, historically race theories often purported three races: Caucasian, Mongol 
and Negroid. This tripod edifice of race theories persist: we typically talk about ‘white’, ‘Asian’ and ‘black’ as 
racial categories, even if these are rather phenotypical categories. Nevertheless, these categories are 
constantly being used as actual ‘racial’ categories in, for example, intelligence testing or medical research. 
Whilst I do not agree with this simplistic, phenotype-based notion of ‘race’, I concede that to describe and 
analyse commonsensical prejudices it has its place. However, whilst the categorisation that I have chosen 
to use reflects the common sense ‘Finnish race theory’, i.e. because discourses are contextual and historic, 
the Finnish viewpoints regarding race are not necessarily reflective of the racial assumptions in other 
countries. For example, because a lack of common history, in Finnish stereotypes the differences between 
Indians and Pakistanis, or Saudi Arabians and Turks are not as pronounced, if not non-existent, as in the 
UK. Whilst each country has its context in which race theories have been formulated, the tripartite race 
theoretical structure in itself is not Finnish. This choice is also supported by what Omi and Winant call the 
’they all look alike’ model in which ethnicity theory is often unable to attribute ’nation’ to ’blacks’ and 
’Asians’ and their ethnicity ends up being that of their phenotype. Consequently, I have assigned each 
country a ‘racial’ category based on the phenotype of the majority population. While many countries have 
racially mixed populations or identities different from their majority populations, such as the United States 
or South Africa, as said in the thesis, the level at which Western states can approach the issue of ‘race’ is 
limited to nationality because of the liberal legal framework. Also, the implementation of entry restrictions 
can in practice reflect (or not) the actual phenotype or cultural background of visa or residence permit 
applicants. This is a level of analysis that cannot be captured by this model of operationalising racialising 
stereotypes. But because the function of these categories is to reflect Western prejudices, not actual ‘racial’ 
or cultural realities of the various countries, I have deemed this to be an adequate level of analysis.  
In addition to phenotype, I have made the distinction between different religio-cultural groupings. This is 
because race theories never lacked the cultural dimension and today most of racialising discourses operate 
as culturalising discourses. Instead of trying to find phenotypical categories, such as ‘white but not White’, 
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that would be relevant to actual stereotypes, I have differentiated between different types of ‘white’ and 
‘brown’ and ‘black’ populations through religio-cultural categories. For ‘whites’ I have utilised a culturalised 
notion of ’degrees of whiteness’, or rather the non-whiteness of Southern and Eastern Europeans, which 
was a common feature of early race theories. The distinction reflects the early theories about ’Eastern’ vs. 
’Western’ ‘whites’ and reflects the religio-cultural distinction of ’East’ / ’Orthodox’ / ’Slavic’ / ’Baltic’ Europe 
vs. ‘Nordic whites’. This categorisation also reflects the discourses about ‘Finland in-between Western and 
Eastern Europe’, which functions as a discourse of problematizing national identity. Such a distinction, with 
its racialising overtones, was common in earlier race theories in Finland as either ‘Mongol’ or ‘Germanic’, 
as Kemiläinen et al. put it (1985). These racialised notions are still prevalent in Finland, especially with the 
economic difficulties in the euro zone. There is, however, no point in differentiating between Southern and 
Northern Europeans in terms of immigration policy because all Southern European countries belong to the 
EU. This move, however, should not be read as a notion that racialisation would not be relevant to 
‘whiteness’. Rather, this move reflects the contemporary stereotype, i.e. the silence that constitutes 
‘Western whiteness’ as a ‘non-race’, as a standard to be achieved that functions as a category and criteria 
of fitness. 
As said, besides the overall problems of making these racialising categorisations that are clearly 
biologically inadequate, the problem with using merely phenotype-based categorisation is that it does not 
reflect the stereotyping aimed at, for the want of a better adjective, the ‘brown’ or ‘racially mixed 
populations’, such as in Latin America, the Middle East or South East Asia. Starting to create categories 
between the various ‘reddish brown’, ‘yellow brown’, ‘yellow’ or ‘whiter than white but still yellow’ seemed 
equally completely ludicrous, and hence I turned towards the patterns of racialising culture, and simply 
named the category between the ‘white’ and ‘black’, ‘mixed brown’. Consequently, I have used three 
variables in creating the categories for ‘civilizational’ or ‘religious’ groups. These religious or ‘civilizational’ 
categories are ‘Christian’, ‘Asian religions’ and ‘Muslim’. For the sake of simplicity, I have included Israel in 
the ‘Christian’ category. Jesus was a Jew in the end. However, as said I have divided the Christian 
category into two. Equally, to simplify the categorisation, I have treated religions prevalent in Asian 
countries as one block, although this clearly risks a certain orientalising generalisation. This is not out of 
disrespect for the differences between Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Hinduism or other smaller 
religions, but reflects the non-politicization of these religions in comparison to Islam and consequently the 
non-specificity of the stereotypes. In the end, these categorisations speak of Western prejudices, not about 
the qualities of any ‘racialised’ category itself. Thus, to recap, the combined categorisation of ‘race’ and 
religio-cultural background runs as ‘Western white’, ‘Eastern white’, ‘Christian mixed brown’, ‘Asian 
religions & mixed brown’, ‘Muslim mixed brown’, ‘Christian black’ and ‘Muslim black’. The individual 
countries listed in each category shall be outlines shortly. 
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Statistically speaking, when countries had ‘racially’ mixed or religio-culturally mixed populations, i.e. where 
there is no clear majority, these countries were divided between the relevant categories. That is, the ‘one 
country’ was mathematically speaking divided between different categories by adding either a ‘0.5’ or ‘0.33’ 
to the relevant categories. In the couple of countries where the majority professes no organised religion, 
the religion was conceived of in terms of ‘religio-cultural’ influence and the largest religious group was 
designated as the religion. Below the reader can find countries listed under the various categories reflecting 
broad racialising stereotypes. 
 
Religious or ‘Civilizational’ categories (according to majority religion) 
 Christian and Jewish countries (n=118): EU countries and Andorra, Iceland, Croatia, Liechtenstein, 
Macedonia, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, The Vatican, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, all Latin American and 
Caribbean countries (except for Trinidad and Tobago, which is mixed), Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Eritrea, 
South Africa, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Cap Verde, Kenya, Republic of Central Africa, Congo, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Zambia, Sao Tome and Principle, 
Seychelles, Swaziland, Uganda, Zimbabwe, The Pacific Islands, Philippines, East Timor, the Marshall Islands 
and Israel.  
 Buddhist (and other ‘Asian’ religions) and Hindu countries (n=19): Bhutan, South Korea, Japan, Cambodia, 
China, China-Hong Kong, China-Taiwan, China-Macao, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, 
Solomon Islands, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam and India.  
 Muslim Countries (n=50): Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, United Arab 
Emirates, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Comoros, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Maldives, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Chad, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  
 
‘Racial’ Categories (according to majority phenotype): 
 ‘Western white’ countries (n=26): , Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Hungary, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Andorra, Australia, Iceland, Canada, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Switzerland, New Zealand, the Vatican and the United States.  
 ‘Eastern white’ countries (n=26): Albania, Armenia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kosovo, Greece, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia, Estonia and Israel (to denote the continuing 
prejudices against Jews).  
 ‘Mixed brown’ countries (n=87): Afghanistan, Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Brunei, Egypt, , Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Maldives, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Fiji, Philippines, India, East Timor, Cambodia, Kiribati, Laos, Maldives, Malaysia, 
the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Myanmar, the Pacific Islands, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, 
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Samoa, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, China, China-Hong Kong, China-Taiwan, China-
Macao, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brasilia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Columbia, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
 ‘Black’ countries (n=58): Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Djibouti, Chad, Dominica, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Comoros, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Cameroon, Cap Verde, Kenia, Central African Republic, the Comoros, Congo, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and  Grenadines, 
Zambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe.  
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Appendix 4:  An Overview of the Discourse Theoretical Research Method 
In this appendix I will illustrate how the first- and second-level discourse theoretical methods function in 
practice. I will first show how the analysis of discourses at the first level was operationalised. As explained 
in the thesis, the method operationalised the concept of statement through Foucault's account of General 
Grammar and its structure and the way that Foucault paralleled this structure with the theory of 
anthropological sleep. These epistemological aspects have been treated in the thesis itself (Chapter 2) and 
here I shall concentrate merely on the practical analytical process and the actual methods used.  
First–level Analysis 
In the first-level method, as was explained in the thesis, a statement was understood as a logical entity that 
required a proposition (‘something is’), an articulation (‘something is X’), a designation towards sources of 
positivity (‘something is X because Y’) and a derivation (‘something is X, because Y, which means Z) to 
affirming discursive order, or an order of things. In Chapter 3 the method was indicated merely by 
demonstrating the proposition and articulation, designation and derivation in the examples given. Below I 
will give a more detailed example of the underlying logic of analysis at this first stage. This example is from 
the government’s immigration policy document from 2006151 discussing the possibility of the government’s 
involvement in recruiting foreign workers and cooperating with foreign countries to recruit their nationals 
(Finnish Government 19.10.2006). Before demonstrating how the method was employed, it has to be said 
that one statement often designates towards various discourses as sources of its positivity, as the example 
below shows. This is because a statement is basically defined by the discursive order it proposes, as there 
can be multiple ‘reasons’ for one single discursive order. Next I will explain how the analytical process 
functions. 
Since engagement in public authority activities in the territory of a foreign state requires contractual 
arrangements, it is appropriate to choose states that are suitable for the purpose with regards to both 
administrative costs and operating efficiency for contractual partners. [...] When considering suitability, 
attention should be given to such factors as population figure, age structure, standard of education, 
population mobility principles, the distance of country from Finland and the conditions for integrating 
residents of the country in Finland. The labour administrations of Finland and Estonia have traditionally had 
good cooperative relations. Prospects for cooperation with other new EU countries, such as Poland, are also 
good. Poland has a central location in Europe, a large population and traditions of labour mobility. The 
Polish population is relatively young and well-educated. 
1 Proposition and 2 Articulation: [When considering suitability, attention should be given to such factors as...] 
The basic assertion is that ‘suitability’ should be a consideration in immigration policy cooperation 
arrangements and when considering what kind of immigrants are wanted. 
3 Designation: The discourses that are designated toward as defining ‘suitability’ are: 
                                                     
151 Finnish Government (19.10.2006). "Government Migration Policy Programme: Government Resolution". 
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 Integration to national society/assimilation [“the conditions for integrating residents of the country 
in Finland”] 
The explicit preference in many government documents and discussions is for immigrants from 
cultures that are ‘compatible’, which in the Finnish context often translates into ‘Western’, ‘hard-
working’, ‘honest’, ‘modest’, ‘quiet’ and ‘well-educated’. 
 Racism as racialisation [“When considering suitability, attention should be given to such factors 
as...population mobility principles, the distance of country from Finland”]:  
The criterion of ‘population mobility principles’ (of which the government is of course in control of) is 
a way of limiting immigration to EU nationals. The condition of the (close) distance from Finland is a 
pseudonym for Europeanness. The explicit aim of the government is long-term and permanent 
immigration and not cheap and flexible labour. Taking this into consideration then the close distance 
has to be questioned. One could argue that at a close distance could present more of a threat of 
immigrants leaving, as has been seen in the case of Eastern European migration patterns—when 
the goal is to keep immigrants as tax payers for the long term.  
 Economic interest [“When considering suitability, attention should be given to such factors as...age 
structure, standard of education”]:  
The explicit economic interest dictates that employees need to be young in order to contribute to the 
Finnish economy the longest and they need to be well-educated in order to add to the 
competitiveness and know-how of the country. Low educational levels are not considered as 
enhancing the competitiveness of the country. 
 Nationalism 
The general attitude of the statement conceptualises immigration policy in terms of national interest 
and suitability for national culture. 
 Rationalism [“administrative costs and operating efficiency for contractual partners”] 
The self-evident frame of reference is the neoliberal cost-benefit analysis (time and effort spent by 
bureaucrats on establishing contractual arrangements and the likely outcomes in relation to profit to 
be gained from the immigrants, as the text implies on the whole). This condition is underlined by a 
certain assumption about “operating efficiency”, which not only designated toward governmentality 
but also towards preconceptions about cultures that are inherently efficient and thus ‘rational’ (or not) 
in their functioning.  
4 Derivation: [“it is appropriate to choose states that are suitable for the purpose”] 
The discursive order created here rests on the articulations: “it is appropriate to choose states that 
are suitable for the purpose”. The initial interpretation of the discursive order derived asserts that the 
purpose is to recruit employees from countries whose populations have access to the Finnish labour 
market, i.e. from the EU, and from populations that are easily assimilable in terms of culture and that 
have a surplus of ‘ideal workers’, i.e. young and well-educated.   
On the whole, derivation outlines the conclusion derived from the line of reasoning that follows logically 
from the accepted proposition and articulation and from the designated sources of positivity. In practice, the 
analytical process was not as elaborate as this but it was adjusted to fit the mass scale of analysis. As it 
was said, some 3000 statements were analysed, but this analysis was more a matter of ticking boxes 
following the analytical logic presented here, as shall be shown shortly. 
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Thus, in the primary phase, it is the content of the texts that was analysed by analysing individual 
statements. A statement was understood as an assertion of a discursive order of things. Hence, a 
statement is not equal to a sentence, but can be both shorter and longer than a sentence or one sentence 
can include multiple statements, as was seen.  
 
Chart 37. The first and second levels of analysis 
To reiterate, Chart 37 above tries to explain the overall process of the two-tier analytical method. The figure 
above, which, in terms of presentation, deliberately avoids the ‘scientific’ seriousness of simplistic 
procedural models, pictures the overall process of the two-fold methodical analysis as a creative process. 
The phase of primary analysis of discourse is presented by the upward arrow on the background 
symbolising the bulk of statements that offer themselves to the secondary analysis. Most importantly, the 
primary method records the statements, the designated discourses and the types of inclusive and exclusive 
discursive orders arrived at. Based on these an overall picture of the modes of knowing, i.e. of discourses, 
relevant to immigration in Finland is built. A single statement can refer to multiple discourses and various 
actors can and do refer to multiple discourses, as the arrows going out from the text boxes demonstrate. 
Thus, from this pool of articulations and propositions designations are made into a ‘nebulous’ resource of 
discourses as modes of knowing. It contains the corpuses of knowledge, i.e. discourses, used to 
discursively order immigration in Finland in their specificity. These discourses then give life to specific 
discursive orders. The derivative process is highlighted by the arrows between designation and derivation.  
Second-level of Analysis 
The secondary method of analysis focused on relations of power/knowledge and it is represented by a star 
to indicate the creativeness of the process. The final focus was on sources of positivity and their decentring 
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through the various tools of decentring as indicated in the thesis. Yet, initially in practice the secondary 
analytical phase was rather an accumulation of observations whilst doing the first-level analysis, this was 
not because the method did not allow for a structured analysis. Rather, the secondary analytical process 
was more heuristic, searching for the omitted. Yet, the structure underlying this analytical process helped to 
tease out the power/knowledge games. Namely, the secondary analysis of power/knowledge is based on 
the analysis of derivations of discursive orders and the object definitions and subject positions forwarded in 
these. On top of recording the discourses designated towards, the analysis recorded such factors as the 
topic of discussion. For example in the example above, the assertions would relate to ‘entry/stay’, 
‘belonging’, ‘employment’, ‘coping with immigration’, ‘identity of the immigrant’ and ‘identity of the nation’, 
and to rationalities of ‘exclusion’ or ‘inclusion’. These tools allow for the comparison of statements made 
about the same topics and a more detailed identification of discourses and their underlying relations to 
other discourses. These relations were charted through recording the discourses that the discursive order 
objected to—not just the discourses that it referred to as sources of positivity. That is, both the rationalities 
of inclusion and exclusion on the level of discourses were analysed.  
The analysis functioned in MS Excel, which facilitates the categorisation and management of large chunks 
of qualitative data that do not need to be analysed statistically but merely categorically. To illustrate the 
second-level of analysis extracts from the Excel sheet are presented in the following pages. For more 
concise presentation I will first show the four statements analysed in this example in their full context, and 
then use the synopsis of the discursive order being analysed in the later tables. Because Charts 37 and 43 
may create questions, words of warning are in place. Firstly, the names of the discourses are not fully 
descriptive of their content. Whilst this is obviously due to the available space in the chart, the discourses 
are not specific either, but rather they are defined by the statements themselves. That is, the discourses 
rather refer to their conditions of possibility, not to a specific content in the sense of well-defined quasi-
academic sources of knowledge. For example, talking about ‘rationalism’ merely indicates the value placed 
on rational management of issues. By keeping this category loose it is possible to see what kinds of things 
are deemed ‘rational’ without making too detailed presumptions.  
Secondly, because the data was not used for quantitative analysis, the analytical process did not strive for 
statistical reliability, but rather it searched for the self-evident and taken-for-granted and the silent spaces 
in–between statements. That is, the analysis functioned more as a heuristic process; as a process that 
searched for questions rather than answers. This type of analytical process, however, enabled the ‘pulling-
out’ of topics of discussion and evaluating what kind of discourses were used for and against them and 
whether the rationalities were exclusionary or inclusionary etc. For instance, one could pull out statements 
relating to ‘religion’ and see whether religion was mostly talked about in reference to discourses of human 
rights or multiculturalism, in reference to nationalist or segregationist discourses and whether religion 
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functioned more as a rationality of exclusion or inclusion. This process then helped to define how various 
aspects of immigration were problematized. For example, whether asylum was problematized through 
discourses of economic costs or through culturalising discourses and, for example more specifically, 
whether economic costs of asylum were nevertheless discussed in the context of inclusionary rationalities 
and human rights. Whilst a more quantitative analysis of these aspects certainly would have been 
interesting, my aim was not to study merely immigration discourses, but the governmentality, hence the 
quantitative aspects of determining the types of problematizations forwarded were left undeveloped.  
After this phase the analysis moved on to the third phase, which charted the way immigration was 
regulated. A synopsis of this analytical process was seen in Appendix 1. The fourth level amalgamated the 
results of the second and third levels and approached the field of rationalities and technologies of 
governing and answered the formulated research questions that had arisen from this amalgamation at the 
level of governmentality and its silences and commonsensical assumptions. 
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Statement 
Number 
1 2 3 4 5 
P
ro
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 A
rt
ic
u
la
ti
o
n
 
There are problems with these immigration 
regulations exactly because the Finnish regulations 
are different from EU-regulations and the common 
immigration and aliens' policy. They are in many 
ways lenient so that it creates a possibility of seeking 
to get to Finland, when in other European countries, 
in Sweden among others, the implementation is 
stricter. ... These family reunification applications, I 
remember, I think there are some 8000 family 
reunification cases in process, and the common rules 
of the game that others in Europe or we have here in 
Finland do impact on these. As the MP [name] before 
noted, it is quite clear that if we do not have clear 
rules of the game, it enables even racist views and 
anti-foreign attitudes and even xenophobia.  
.  
Minister Katainen found 
additional 209 million 
euros to invest in this 
bad [immigration] 
administration at the 
same time when in our 
country in [citizen's] 
basic security and 
university and other 
such issues, or in 
rheumatism hospitals, 
there have been really 
painful and difficult 
situations. 
Unaccompanied children 
have to wait 176 days on 
average. The waiting period 
for unaccompanied youth is 
over a year. One of the 
reasons why municipalities 
have been accepting these 
unaccompanied youth so 
reluctantly is that the state 
does not compensate for the 
expenses created by the after 
care of those older than 18. 
The state compensates the 
expenses of income support 
for three years after arrival.  
Section 3 would regulate on a foreigner's 
possibility, in case of fixed-term, permanent 
or EU-long-term residence permits, to apply 
for the non-termination of their permit before 
the termit expires. The application can be 
accepted in cases in which residence outside 
Finland or the EU has been caused by 
special or exceptional circumstances. Such 
special circumstances that defend long-term 
absence could relate to, for example, 
education or work in a long-term project and 
other such circumstances that require long-
term dedication or situations that require stay 
in or outside the EU, such as taking care of a 
sick family member or establishing a new 
family. 
D
is
cu
rs
iv
e 
o
rd
er
 in
 a
 
n
u
ts
h
el
l 
Lenient regulation 
causes more family 
reunification 
applications and this 
creates the possibility 
for racism, xenophobia 
and even hatred of 
foreigners.  
Finnish immigration policy 
is more lenient than in 
other EU countries 
more money is put into 
immigration 
administration when 
sick citizens and 
universities are 
suffering cuts 
unaccompanied child 
refugees cost more than 
adults 
taking care of sick family member or having a 
family outside one EU country is a reason 
enough not to cancel EU permit 
 
Chart 38. Examples of statements analysed.  
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Chart 39. First- and second-level analytical tool – Information on the source of statement. 
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Discursive order in a 
nutshell 
Lenient 
regulation 
causes more 
family 
reunification 
applications 
and this 
creates the 
possibility for 
racism, 
xenophobia 
and even 
hatred of 
foreigners.  
Finnish 
immigration 
policy is more 
lenient than in 
other EU 
countries 
more money is 
put into 
immigration 
administration 
when sick 
citizens and 
universities 
are suffering 
cuts 
unaccompanie
d child 
refugees cost 
more than 
adults 
taking care of 
sick family 
member or 
having a 
family outside 
one EU 
country is a 
reason 
enough not to 
cancel EU 
permit 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 o
n
 t
h
e 
so
u
rc
e 
o
f 
st
at
em
en
t 
Statement Number 1 2 3 4 5 
Government & ministries       x x 
Ministry of Interior           
Ministry of Labour           
Ministry of Justice           
Ministry of Education           
Ministry of Social Affairs & 
Health 
          
Parliament x x x     
Immigration Services       x   
Political party & politician x x x     
National Coalition Party           
Social Democratic Party     x   x 
The Centre Party x x     x 
The Green Party           
Swedish People's Party           
True Finns           
Left Alliance           
Christian Democrats           
Other description 
HE 208/2010 -  
MP comments 
HE 208/2010 -  
MP comments 
HE 208/2010 -  
MP comments 
Immigration 
Administration 
Reform - 
Norrback 
report 
Government 
Bill 94/2006 
Legislation         x 
Policy document         x 
Official proceeding x x x     
Speech           
Report       x   
Year 2011 2011 2011 2008 2006 
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Chart 40. First- and second-level analytical tool – Topics of discussion. 
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Discursive order in a 
nutshell 
Lenient 
regulation 
causes more 
family 
reunification 
applications 
and this 
creates the 
possibility for 
racism, 
xenophobia 
and even 
hatred of 
foreigners.  
Finnish 
immigration 
policy is more 
lenient than in 
other EU 
countries 
more money is 
put into 
immigration 
administration 
when sick 
citizens and 
universities 
are suffering 
cuts 
unaccompanie
d child 
refugees cost 
more than 
adults 
taking care of 
sick family 
member or 
having a 
family outside 
one EU 
country is a 
reason 
enough not to 
cancel EU 
permit 
T
o
p
ic
 o
f 
d
is
cu
ss
io
n
 
Asylum seeking   x x     
Belonging x x   x x 
Benefits & Services       x   
Citizenship           
Coping with immigration x x  x x   
Crime x x       
Culture           
Custody / imprisonment           
Deportation        
Education           
Effects of immigration       x   
Employment        x x  
Entry/Stay (residence) x x x   x 
Family (women and children) x x x x x 
Identity  x     x x 
Immigration & integration 
policy 
 x x  x  x x  
Language           
Law / Legality           
Media           
Nationality / identification           
Political participation           
Refugee       x   
Religion           
Security      x     
Societal 
participation/integration 
      x    
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Chart 41. First- and second-level analytical tool – Designation (discursive sources of positivity). 
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Discursive order in a 
nutshell 
Lenient 
regulation 
causes more 
family 
reunification 
applications 
and this 
creates the 
possibility for 
racism, 
xenophobia 
and even 
hatred of 
foreigners.  
Finnish 
immigration 
policy is more 
lenient than in 
other EU 
countries 
more money is 
put into 
immigration 
administration 
when sick 
citizens and 
universities 
are suffering 
cuts 
unaccompanie
d child 
refugees cost 
more than 
adults 
taking care of 
sick family 
member or 
having a 
family outside 
one EU 
country is a 
reason 
enough not to 
cancel EU 
permit 
  
Subject category Politician Politician Politician State State 
  
Object category State State State Immigrant Immigrant 
D
es
ig
n
at
io
n
 -
 D
is
cu
rs
iv
e 
so
u
rc
es
 o
f 
p
o
si
ti
vi
ty
 
Anti-discrimination discourse     
x 
Anti-racism      
Action needed      
Economic interest in immigr.     
x 
Diversity bonus      
Civic nationalism      
Cosmopolitanism     
x 
Culturalism      
Civic society    
x 
 
National society   
x x 
 
Assimilation      
Economic need   
x x 
 
Benefits are not for all  
x x 
 
x 
Social democratic     
x 
Liberal     
x 
Women's equality      
Human Rights     
x 
Political rights      
Social rights     
x 
Children's human rights      
Education as a right      
Multiculturalism      
National standards      
Nationalism x x x x x 
National security   
x 
  
Tolerance      
Prejudice or racialisation x     
Racism x     
Segregation x x x  
x 
Socio-biology x     
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Rationalism vs. emotionalism x x   
x 
Management x x x x  
Rule of Law      
Rational & legal standards      
Chart 42. First- and second-level analytical tool – Power/knowledge (discourses objected to). 
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Discursive order in a 
nutshell 
Lenient 
regulation 
causes more 
family 
reunification 
applications 
and this 
creates the 
possibility for 
racism, 
xenophobia 
and even 
hatred of 
foreigners.  
Finnish 
immigration 
policy is more 
lenient than in 
other EU 
countries 
more money is 
put into 
immigration 
administration 
when sick 
citizens and 
universities 
are suffering 
cuts 
unaccompanie
d child 
refugees cost 
more than 
adults 
taking care of 
sick family 
member or 
having a 
family outside 
one EU 
country is a 
reason 
enough not to 
cancel EU 
permit 
P
o
w
er
/k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
- 
d
is
co
u
rs
es
 o
b
je
ct
ed
 t
o
 
AGAINST Assimilation      
... Beneficial immigration x x x x  
… Benefits are not for all      
… Neoliberalism - self-interest      
… Cosmopolitanism x  
x 
  
… Culturalism      
… Difficulty of integration      
… Discrimination & 
intolerance     
x 
… Easy integration x x  
x 
 
… Equality x x x x  
… Human Rights x  
x 
  
… Individualism      
… Inequality & injustice    
x x 
… Multiculturalism x x    
… Nationalism and      
parochialism      
… Open borders x x x   
… Racism / Prejudice      
… Rationalism      
… Segregation      
… Universalism   
x 
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Chart 43. First- and second-level analytical tool – Rationalities of exclusion and inclusion. 
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Discursive order in a 
nutshell 
Lenient 
regulation 
causes more 
family 
reunification 
applications 
and this 
creates the 
possibility for...  
Finnish 
immigration 
policy is more 
lenient than in 
other EU 
countries 
more money is 
put into 
immigration 
administration 
when sick 
citizens and 
universities 
are suffering 
cuts 
unaccompanie
d child 
refugees cost 
more than 
adults 
taking care of 
sick family 
member or 
having a 
family outside 
one EU 
country is a 
reason 
enough ... 
R
at
io
n
al
it
ie
s 
o
f 
E
xc
lu
si
o
n
 
 
Particularism x x x x x 
Universalism  
x 
   
Cosmopolitanism      
Cultural issues      
Cultural Rights      
Economic factors   
x x 
 
Employability    
x 
 
Habits     
x 
Human rights      
Integration (lack of)    
x x 
Language skills      
Loyalty     
x 
Nationalism x x x x x 
Prejudice x x x x  
Racism x     
Rationalism x  
x 
  
Religion      
Security   
x 
  
Skills & education    
x 
 
Values  
x 
  
x 
R
at
io
n
al
it
ie
s 
o
f 
In
cl
u
si
o
n
 
Particularism         x 
Universalism         x 
Assimilation           
Cosmopolitanism         x 
Cultural Rights          x 
Economic factors          x 
Employability          x 
Habits          x 
Human rights         x 
Integration         x 
Language skills           
Loyalty           
Multiculturalism           
Nationalism           
Secularity           
Values           
 
